Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLVII8,
Vi bonorum raptorum et de turba
Liber quadragesimus septimus
VIII.

Vi bonorum raptorum et de turba

(Concerning the Robbery of Property by Violence, and Disorderly Assemblages.)

1Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Qui rem ra­puit, et fur­ti nec ma­ni­fes­ti te­ne­tur in du­plum et vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum in qua­dru­plum. sed si an­te ac­tum sit vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum, de­ne­gan­da est fur­ti: si an­te fur­ti ac­tum est, non est il­la de­ne­gan­da, ut ta­men id quod am­plius in ea est con­se­qua­tur.

1Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXII. Anyone who takes property by force is liable to the action of non-manifest theft for double damages, and to the action of robbery with violence for quadruple damages. If the action for robbery with violence is first brought, that of theft will be refused. If that for theft is first brought, the other will not be refused, but only what exceeds the amount included in the first suit can be recovered.

2Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Prae­tor ait: ‘Si cui do­lo ma­lo ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis dam­ni quid fac­tum es­se di­ce­tur si­ve cu­ius bo­na rap­ta es­se di­cen­tur, in eum, qui id fe­cis­se di­ce­tur, iu­di­cium da­bo. item si ser­vus fe­cis­se di­ce­tur, in do­mi­num iu­di­cium noxa­le da­bo’. 1Hoc edic­to con­tra ea, quae vi com­mit­tun­tur, con­su­luit prae­tor. nam si quis se vim pas­sum do­ce­re pos­sit, pu­bli­co iu­di­cio de vi pot­est ex­per­i­ri, ne­que de­bet pu­bli­co iu­di­cio pri­va­ta ac­tio­ne prae­iu­di­ca­ri qui­dam pu­tant: sed uti­lius vi­sum est, quam­vis prae­iu­di­cium le­gi Iu­liae de vi pri­va­ta fiat, ni­hi­lo mi­nus ta­men non es­se de­ne­gan­dam ac­tio­nem eli­gen­ti­bus pri­va­tam per­se­cu­tio­nem. 2‘Do­lo’ au­tem ‘ma­lo fa­ce­re’ pot­est (quod edic­tum ait) non tan­tum is qui ra­pit, sed et qui prae­ce­den­te con­si­lio ad hoc ip­sum ho­mi­nes col­li­git ar­ma­tos, ut dam­num det bo­na­ve ra­piat. 3Si­ve igi­tur ip­se quis co­gat ho­mi­nes si­ve ab alio co­ac­tis uti­tur ad ra­pien­dum, do­lo ma­lo fa­ce­re vi­de­tur. 4Ho­mi­nes co­ac­tos ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus ad hoc co­ac­tos, ut dam­num da­re­tur. 5Ne­que ad­di­tur, qua­les ho­mi­nes: qua­les­cum­que si­ve li­be­ros si­ve ser­vos. 6Sed et si unus ho­mo co­ac­tus sit, ad­huc di­ce­mus ho­mi­nes co­ac­tos. 7Item si pro­po­nas so­lum dam­num de­dis­se, non pu­to de­fi­ce­re ver­ba: hoc enim, quod ait ‘ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis’, ut si­ve so­lus vim fe­ce­rit si­ve et­iam ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis, sic ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus et­iam ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis vel ar­ma­tis vel in­er­mi­bus hoc edic­to te­n­ea­tur. 8Do­li ma­li men­tio hic et vim in se ha­bet. nam qui vim fa­cit, do­lo ma­lo fe­cit, non ta­men qui do­lo ma­lo fa­cit, uti­que et vi fa­cit. ita do­lus ha­bet in se et vim: et si­ne vi si quid cal­li­de ad­mis­sum est, ae­que con­ti­ne­bi­tur. 9‘Dam­ni’ prae­tor in­quit: om­nia er­go dam­na con­ti­net et clan­des­ti­na. sed non pu­to clan­des­ti­na, sed ea, quae vio­len­tia per­mix­ta sunt. et­iam quis rec­te de­fi­niet, si quid so­lus ad­mi­se­rit quis non vi, non con­ti­ne­ri hoc edic­to, et si quid ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis, et­iam­si si­ne vi, dum­mo­do do­lo sit ad­mis­sum, ad hoc edic­tum spec­ta­re. 10Ce­te­rum ne­que fur­ti ac­tio ne­que le­gis Aqui­liae con­tri­bu­tae sunt in hoc edic­to, li­cet in­ter­dum com­mu­nes sint cum hoc edic­to: nam Iu­lia­nus scri­bit eum qui vi ra­pit fu­rem es­se im­pro­bio­rem, et si quid dam­ni co­ac­tis ho­mi­ni­bus de­de­rit, uti­que et­iam Aqui­lia pot­erit te­ne­ri. 11‘Vel cu­ius bo­na rap­ta es­se di­cun­tur’. quod ait prae­tor ‘bo­na rap­ta’, sic ac­ci­pie­mus: et­iam si una res ex bo­nis rap­ta sit. 12Si quis non ho­mi­nes ip­se co­ege­rit, sed in­ter co­ac­tos ip­se fue­rit et quid aut ra­pue­rit aut dam­ni de­de­rit, hac ac­tio­ne te­ne­tur. sed utrum hoc so­lum con­ti­neat edic­tum, quod do­lo ma­lo ho­mi­ni­bus a reo co­ac­tis dam­num da­tum sit vel rap­tum, an ve­ro quod do­lo ma­lo rei rap­tum vel dam­num da­tum sit, li­cet ab alio ho­mi­nes sint co­ac­ti, quae­ri­tur. et me­lius es­se di­ci­tur et­iam hoc con­ti­ne­ri, ut om­nia haec con­ti­nean­tur et quod ex co­ac­tis ab alio dam­num da­tum sit, ut et is qui co­egit et is qui co­ac­tus est con­ti­ne­ri vi­dea­tur. 13In hac ac­tio­ne in­tra an­num uti­lem ve­rum pre­tium rei qua­dru­pla­tur, non et­iam quod in­ter­est. 14Haec ac­tio et­iam fa­mi­liae no­mi­ne com­pe­tit, non im­po­si­ta ne­ces­si­ta­te os­ten­den­di, qui sunt ex fa­mi­lia ho­mi­nes qui ra­pue­runt vel et­iam dam­num de­de­runt. fa­mi­liae au­tem ap­pel­la­tio ser­vos con­ti­net, hoc est eos, qui in mi­nis­te­rio sunt, et­iam­si li­be­ri es­se pro­po­nan­tur vel alie­ni bo­na fi­de no­bis ser­vien­tes. 15Hac ac­tio­ne non pu­to pos­se ac­to­rem sin­gu­lo­rum ser­vo­rum no­mi­ne age­re ad­ver­sus do­mi­num eo­rum, quia suf­fi­cit do­mi­num se­mel qua­dru­plum of­fer­re. 16Ex hac ac­tio­ne no­xae de­di­tio non to­tius fa­mi­liae, sed eo­rum tan­tum vel eius, qui do­lo fe­cis­se com­pe­rie­tur, fie­ri de­bet. 17Haec ac­tio vol­go vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum di­ci­tur. 18Hac ac­tio­ne is de­mum te­ne­tur, qui do­lum ma­lum ad­hi­buit. si quis igi­tur suam rem ra­puit, vi qui­dem bo­no­rum rap­to­rum non te­ne­bi­tur, sed ali­ter mul­ta­bi­tur. sed et si quis fu­gi­ti­vum suum, quem bo­na fi­de ali­quis pos­si­de­bat, ra­puit, ae­que hac ac­tio­ne non te­ne­bi­tur, quia rem suam au­fert. quid er­go, si si­bi ob­li­ga­tam? de­be­bit te­ne­ri. 19Vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio in im­pu­be­rem, qui do­li ma­li ca­pax non est, non da­bi­tur: ni­si ser­vus ip­sius vel fa­mi­lia eius ad­mi­sis­se pro­po­nan­tur, et ser­vi et fa­mi­liae no­mi­ne noxa­li vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio­ne te­ne­tur. 20Si pu­bli­ca­nus pe­cus meum ab­du­xe­rit, dum pu­tat con­tra le­gem vec­ti­ga­lis ali­quid a me fac­tum: quam­vis er­ra­ve­rit, agi ta­men cum eo vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum non pos­se La­beo ait: sa­ne do­lo ca­ret: si ta­men id­eo in­clu­sit, ne pas­ca­tur et ut fa­me per­iret, et­iam uti­li le­ge Aqui­lia. 21Si per vim ab­duc­tum pe­cus in­clu­se­rit quis, uti­que vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum con­ve­ni­ri pot­erit. 22In hac ac­tio­ne non uti­que spec­ta­mus rem in bo­nis ac­to­ris es­se: si­ve in bo­nis sit si­ve non sit, si ta­men ex bo­nis sit, lo­cum haec ac­tio ha­be­bit. qua­re si­ve com­mo­da­ta res sit si­ve lo­ca­ta si­ve et­iam pig­ne­ra­ta pro­po­na­tur si­ve de­po­si­ta apud me sic, ut in­ter­sit mea eam non au­fer­ri, si­ve bo­na fi­de a me pos­si­dea­tur, si­ve usum fruc­tum in ea ha­beam vel quod aliud ius, ut in­ter­sit mea non ra­pi: di­cen­dum est com­pe­te­re mi­hi hanc ac­tio­nem, ut non do­mi­nium ac­ci­pia­mus, sed il­lud so­lum, quod ex bo­nis meis, hoc est ex sub­stan­tia mea res ab­la­ta es­se pro­po­na­tur. 23Et ge­ne­ra­li­ter di­cen­dum est, ex qui­bus cau­sis fur­ti mi­hi ac­tio com­pe­tit in re clam fac­ta, ex his­dem cau­sis ha­be­re me hanc ac­tio­nem. di­cet ali­quis: ad­quin ob rem de­po­si­tam fur­ti ac­tio­nem non ha­be­mus. sed id­eo ad­di­di ‘si in­ter­sit nos­tra non es­se rap­tam’: nam et fur­ti ac­tio­nem ha­beo, si in re de­po­si­ta cul­pam quo­que re­pro­mis­si vel pre­tium de­po­si­tio­nis non qua­si mer­ce­dem ac­ce­pi. 24Uti­lius di­cen­dum est et si ces­set ac­tio fur­ti ob rem de­po­si­tam, es­se ta­men vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio­nem, quia non mi­ni­ma dif­fe­ren­tia est in­ter eum qui clam fa­cit et eum qui ra­pit, cum il­le ce­let suum de­lic­tum, hic pu­bli­cet et cri­men et­iam pu­bli­cum ad­mit­tat. si quis igi­tur in­ter­es­se sua vel mo­di­ce do­ce­bit, de­bet ha­be­re vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio­nem. 25Si fu­gi­ti­vus meus quas­dam res in­struen­di sui cau­sa eme­rit eae­que rap­tae sint, quia in bo­nis meis hae sunt res, pos­sum de his vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio­ne age­re. 26Re­rum rap­ta­rum no­mi­ne et­iam fur­ti vel dam­ni in­iu­riae vel con­dic­tio­ne agi pot­est vel cer­te sin­gu­lae res vin­di­ca­ri pos­sunt. 27Haec ac­tio he­redi ce­te­ris­que suc­ces­so­ri­bus da­bi­tur. ad­ver­sus he­redes au­tem vel ce­te­ros suc­ces­so­res non da­bi­tur, quia poe­na­lis ac­tio in eos non da­tur. an ta­men in id, quod lo­cu­ple­tio­res fac­ti sunt, da­ri de­beat, vi­dea­mus. et ego pu­to id­eo prae­to­rem non es­se pol­li­ci­tum in he­redes in id quod ad eos per­ve­nit, quia pu­ta­vit suf­fi­ce­re con­dic­tio­nem.

2Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVI. The Prætor says: “If any damage is said to have been committed maliciously against anyone by persons unlawfully assembled, or his property is said to have been taken by violence, I will grant an action against whoever is alleged to have done these things. Likewise, if a slave is said to have committed these acts, I will grant a noxal action against his master.” 1By this Edict, the Prætor has provided against illegal acts committed by force. For if anyone can prove that he has suffered violence, he can proceed by means of a public action against violence, and certain authorities hold that the private action should not prejudice the public one. It, however, seems to be more available, and although it may interfere with the operations of the Lex Julia having reference to private violence, still, an action ought not to be refused those who select the private remedy. 2He who commits robbery by violence not only perpetrates the crime maliciously, as stated in the Edict, but also when he seizes property by force, after having formed his plan, and collected armed men for the purpose of causing damage. 3Therefore, whether he himself assembles men, or makes use of those who already have been assembled by another in order to commit robbery, he is considered to have acted with malice. 4We should understand men who have been assembled to be such as are brought together for the purpose of causing damage. 5It is not added what kind of men, hence it makes no difference whether they are free or slaves. 6If only one man is called upon, we still say that men have been assembled. 7Ad Dig. 47,8,2,7Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 454, Note 4.Again, if you suppose that only one has caused the damage, I do not think that the words of the Edict will fail to be applicable, for when it says, “Persons unlawfully assembled,” we must understand this to mean that, whether one alone is guilty of violence, or whether he acts in company with others who are assembled and they are either armed or unarmed, he will be liable under this Edict. 8The mention of malice includes violence, for he who employs violence acts maliciously. It does not, however, necessarily follow that he who is malicious employs violence; hence malice suggests violence, and he who commits an act without violence But deceitfully is equally included. 9The Prætor says “damage.” This word refers to every kind of injury, even that which is clandestine. I do not think, however, that all clandestine damage is included, but only such as is combined with violence. For anyone will give a suitable definition if he were to say that he who committed damage alone, and without violence, is not included in this Edict, and that if it was committed by persons who are assembled, even without violence, provided malice was present, it will come within the terms of this Edict. 10But neither the action of theft, nor that provided for by the Aquilian Law should be included in this Edict, although sometimes they coincide with it; for Julianus says that he who commits robbery by violence is a more unprincipled thief; and that he who commits any damage with the aid of assembled persons can also be held liable under the Aquilian Law. 11“Or his property is said to have been taken by violence.” When the Prætor says, “Property taken by violence,” we must understand this to apply even where only one article has been obtained by force. 12If anyone does not himself assemble men, but is found among them, and either takes anything by violence, or causes some damage, he will be liable under this action. But does this Edict only refer to damage fraudulently or violently committed by men assembled by the defendant, or does it also refer to robbery by violence, or damage committed by the men aforesaid, although they may have been called together by another, is a question which has been asked. It is better to hold that this also is the case, so that all these things are comprehended, as well as any injury committed by persons assembled by another, so that he who assembled them, as well as he who joined them, may be considered to be included. 13Ad Dig. 47,8,2,13Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 454, Note 5.In this action the true price of the property is quadrupled within the available year, but not the amount of the interest of the plaintiff. 14This action will also lie with reference to a household, without it being necessary to show who among the members of the same committed the robbery by violence, or even the damage. The term “household” also includes the slaves, that is to say those that are in service, although it may be alleged that they are free, or are the slaves of others serving us in good faith. 15I do not think that by means of this action the plaintiff can proceed against the master on account of his slaves, because it will be sufficient for the master to once tender fourfold the amount involved. 16Under this suit for reparation, a surrender should not be made of the entire number of slaves, but only of those, or of him, who is proved to have caused the damage. 17This action is commonly styled one for property taken by violence. 18Ad Dig. 47,8,2,18Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 454, Note 2.He alone is liable in this action who has been guilty of fraud. Therefore, if anyone forcibly seizes what is his own, he will not be liable for taking property in violence, but he will be fined in a different way. If, however, anyone should forcibly seize his own slave, of whom another has possession in good faith, he will, in like manner, not be liable under this action, because he removes his own property. But what if he takes away some article that had been encumbered to him? He will be liable. 19The action for property taken by violence will not be granted against a child under the age of puberty who is not capable of criminality, unless his slave, or his body of slaves, are alleged to have committed the offence, and, when this is the case, he will be liable in a noxal action for property taken by violence by his slave, or by a number of his slaves. 20If a farmer of the revenue should drive away my cattle, thinking that I have committed some offence against the tax law, although he may be mistaken, still, I cannot bring an action against him for property taken by violence, Labeo says, for he is not guilty of fraud. Where, however, he shuts up the cattle in order that they may not feed, and causes them to perish with hunger, a prætorian action can be brought under the Aquilian Law. 21When anyone shuts up cattle which he has taken by violence, suit can be brought against him on this account. 22In this action we do not merely consider whether that which has been forcibly seized constitutes part of the property of the plaintiff, for, whether it does or does not, if it has any connection with it, there will be ground for this proceeding. Therefore, whether the property is loaned for use, or leased, or even pledged, or deposited with me, and hence it is to my interest that it should not be removed, or if any of it is possessed by me in good faith; or I have an usufruct or any other right in it, so that it is to my interest that it shall not forcibly be taken away, it must be said that I will be entitled to this action, not that the ownership, but merely that what has been removed from my property, that is to say, from my substance, may be recovered. 23Ad Dig. 47,8,2,23Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 454, Note 6.And, generally speaking, it must be held that an action for theft will lie in my favor for whatever has been done clandestinely in all these cases, and that I will be entitled to a right of action on this ground. Someone, however, may say that we are not entitled to an action for theft on account of property which has been deposited, but with reference to this, I have added: “If it is to our interest that the property should not be taken by violence,” for then I am entitled to an action for theft. 24If, where property is deposited, I have become responsible for negligence, or if I have received the value of the deposit, but not as compensation, it is more proper to hold that even though the action for theft based on the deposit will not lie, one for property taken by force can be brought; because only a very small difference exists between one who acts clandestinely, and one who takes property by violence, as the former conceals his crime, and the other publishes his, and even commits it publicly. Therefore, when anyone proves that he has only a moderate interest in the matter, he should have an action for property taken by violence. 25If my fugitive slave buys articles to be used by himself, and they are taken away by force, for the reason that the said articles are included in my property, I can bring an action for robbery with violence. 26When property is taken by violence, an action can be brought for theft or wrongful damage, or a personal action will be available, or proceedings can be instituted for the recovery of each article. 27This action will lie in favor of the heir and other successors. It shall not, however, be granted against heirs and other successors, because a penal action cannot be brought against them. Let us see whether it should be granted for something by which they have become pecuniarily benefited. I think that the Prætor did not promise the action against the heirs for what comes into their hands, because he thought that the personal action was sufficient.

3Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. Si ser­vus ra­pue­rit et cum li­be­ro aga­tur, et­iam, si cum do­mi­no ex­per­i­un­di po­tes­tas fuit, non rec­te cum ma­nu­mis­so post an­num age­tur, quia cum quo­cum­que ex­per­i­un­di po­tes­tas fue­rit, ex­clu­di­tur ac­tor. si cum do­mi­no in­tra an­num ac­tum sit, de­in­de cum ma­nu­mis­so aga­tur, rei iu­di­ca­tae ex­cep­tio­nem no­ce­re La­beo ait.

3Paulus, On the Edict, Book LIV. If a slave takes property by violence, and an action is brought against him when he becomes free, although he has the power to proceed against his master, suit cannot legally be brought against the manumitted slave after a year has elapsed; because, no matter against whom proceedings could have been instituted, the plaintiff will be excluded. If an action should be brought against the master within a year, and afterwards one is brought against the manumitted slave, Labeo says that an exception on the ground of res judicata, will operate as a bar.

4Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Prae­tor ait: ‘Cu­ius do­lo ma­lo in tur­ba dam­num quid fac­tum es­se di­ce­tur, in eum in an­no, quo pri­mum de ea re ex­per­i­un­di po­tes­tas fue­rit, in du­plum, post an­num in sim­plum iu­di­cium da­bo’. 1Hoc edic­tum de eo dam­no pro­po­ni­tur, quod quis in tur­ba de­dit. 2Tur­bam au­tem ap­pel­la­tam La­beo ait ex ge­ne­re tu­mul­tus id­que ver­bum ex Grae­co trac­tum ἀπὸ τοῦ θορυβεῖν. 3Tur­bam au­tem ex quo nu­me­ro ad­mit­ti­mus? si duo ri­xam com­mi­se­rint, uti­que non ac­ci­pie­mus in tur­ba id fac­tum, quia duo tur­ba non pro­prie di­cen­tur: enim­ve­ro si plu­res fue­runt, de­cem aut quin­de­cim ho­mi­nes, tur­ba di­ce­tur. quid er­go, si tres aut quat­tuor? tur­ba uti­que non erit. et rec­tis­si­me La­beo in­ter tur­bam et ri­xam mul­tum in­ter­es­se ait: nam­que tur­bam mul­ti­tu­di­nis ho­mi­num es­se tur­ba­tio­nem et coe­tum, ri­xam et­iam duo­rum. 4Hoc au­tem edic­to te­ne­tur non so­lus, qui dam­num in tur­ba de­dit, sed et is, qui do­lo ma­lo fe­ce­rit, ut in tur­ba dam­ni quid da­re­tur, si­ve il­lo ve­ne­rit si­ve non fue­rit prae­sens: do­lus enim ma­lus et­iam ab­sen­tis es­se pot­est. 5Hoc edic­to di­cen­dum est et­iam eum te­ne­ri, qui venit et in tur­ba fuit auc­tor dam­ni dan­di, si ta­men et ip­se in­ter tur­bam fuit, cum dam­num da­re­tur, et do­lo ma­lo fuit: nam et hu­ius do­lo ma­lo in tur­ba dam­ni quid fac­tum es­se ne­ga­ri non pot­est. 6Si quis ad­ven­tu suo tur­bam con­ci­ta­vit vel con­tra­xit, vel cla­mo­re vel fac­to ali­quo vel dum cri­mi­na­tur ali­quem vel dum mi­se­ri­cor­diam pro­vo­cat: si do­lo ma­lo eius dam­num da­tum sit, et­iam­si non ha­buit con­si­lium tur­bae co­gen­dae, te­ne­tur. ve­rum est enim do­lo ma­lo eius in tur­ba dam­ni quid da­tum: ne­que enim ex­igit prae­tor, ut ab ip­so sit tur­ba con­vo­ca­ta, sed hoc, ut do­lo ali­cu­ius in tur­ba dam­num da­tum sit. erit­que haec dif­fe­ren­tia in­ter hoc edic­tum et su­pe­rius, quod ibi de eo dam­no prae­tor lo­qui­tur, quod do­lo ma­lo ho­mi­ni­bus co­ac­tis da­tum est vel rap­tum et­iam non co­ac­tis ho­mi­ni­bus: at hic de eo dam­no, quod do­lo ma­lo in tur­ba da­tum est, et­iam­si non ip­se tur­bam co­egit, sed ad cla­mo­rem eius vel dic­ta vel mi­se­ri­cor­diam tur­ba con­trac­ta est, vel si alius con­tra­xit vel ip­se ex tur­ba fuit. 7Id­cir­co il­lud qui­dem edic­tum prop­ter atro­ci­ta­tem fac­ti qua­dru­pli poe­nam com­mi­na­tur, at hoc du­pli. 8Sed et hoc et il­lud in­tra an­num tri­buit ex­per­i­un­di fa­cul­ta­tem: post an­num in sim­plum com­pe­tit. 9Lo­qui­tur au­tem hoc edic­tum de dam­no da­to et de amis­so, de rap­to non: sed su­pe­rio­ri edic­to vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum agi pot­erit. 10Amis­sa au­tem di­cun­tur ea, quae cor­rup­ta ali­cui re­lin­quun­tur, scis­sa for­te vel frac­ta. 11Haec au­tem ac­tio in fac­tum est et da­tur in du­plum, quan­ti ea res erit: quod ad pre­tium ve­rum rei re­fer­tur. et prae­sen­tis tem­po­ris fit aes­ti­ma­tio: et sem­per in du­plum in­tra an­num est. 12Do­ce­re­que ac­tor in tur­ba dam­num es­se da­tum de­bet: ce­te­rum si ali­bi da­tum sit quam in tur­ba, ces­sa­bit haec ac­tio. 13Si, cum ser­vum meum Ti­tius pul­sa­ret, tur­ba fue­rit col­lec­ta is­que ser­vus in ea tur­ba ali­quid per­di­de­rit, cum eo qui pul­sa­bat age­re pos­sum, quip­pe cum in tur­ba do­lo ma­lo dam­num da­tum sit: sic ta­men, si, ut dam­num da­ret, id­eo coe­pe­rat cae­de­re. ce­te­rum si alia cau­sa ver­be­ran­di fuit, ces­sat ac­tio. 14Sed et si quis ip­se tur­bam con­vo­cas­set, ut tur­ba co­ram ser­vum ver­be­ra­ret in­iu­riae fa­cien­dae cau­sa, non dam­ni dan­di con­si­lio, lo­cum ha­bet edic­tum. ve­rum est enim eum, qui per in­iu­riam ver­be­rat, do­lo fa­ce­re et eum, qui cau­sam prae­buit dam­ni dan­di, dam­num de­dis­se. 15In ser­vum au­tem et in fa­mi­liam prae­tor dat ac­tio­nem. 16Quae de he­redi­bus ce­te­ris­que suc­ces­so­ri­bus in vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum ac­tio­ne di­xi­mus, et hic erunt re­pe­ti­ta.

4Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVI. The Prætor says: “When any damage is said to have been committed maliciously by one of a mob, I will grant an action for double damages against him within the year from the time when proceedings could have been instituted, and, after a year has elapsed, I will grant an action for simple damages.” 1This Edict is introduced with reference to damage committed by any member of a disorderly crowd. 2Labeo says that the term “crowd” indicates a kind of riotous assemblage, and that it is derived from a Greek term signifying to “make a tumult.” 3How large a number shall we consider to constitute a crowd? If two persons engage in a quarrel, we should not understand this to be done by a crowd, because two persons cannot properly be said to compose one. If, however, there should be a larger number, for instance, ten or fifteen persons, they may be called a crowd. But what if there are only three or four? This will not be a crowd. Labeo very properly says that there is a great difference between a tumult and a quarrel; because a tumult is the uproar and disturbance made by a multitude of men, and a quarrel is made by only two. 4Not only he who causes damage while in a tumultuous assemblage is liable under this Edict but also he who maliciously exerted himself in order that damage might result from the acts of the assemblage whether he was present or not, for malice can be manifested even if the person is absent. 5It must be said that he also is liable under this Edict who joined the crowd, and advised the damage to be committed; provided, however, he himself was present when it was done, and was there with evil intent, for it cannot be denied that the damage was committed by the crowd through his malicious interference. 6Where a man on his arrival excites or unites a crowd either by his cries, or by any act, either accusing someone, or arousing pity, and through his malicious conduct damage is committed, he will be liable; even if he did not have the intention of convoking the assemblage. For it is true that through his malice damage was committed by the crowd, and the Prætor does not require that it should be brought together by the person himself, but that the damage should be committed through the malicious instigation of one forming a part of it. The following difference exists between this Edict and the former one, namely: in the first the Prætor speaks of damage maliciously committed by persons tumultuously assembled, or robbery with violence perpetrated by them where they were not assembled; but in the second, he refers to damage committed maliciously by a crowd, although the accused person did not convoke it, but where it was incited by his cries, or his languages, or because he aroused pity, even if another assembled the mob, for he himself constituted part of it. 7Therefore, on account of the atrocity of the deed, the first Edict presents a penalty of quadruple damages, and the latter one of double damages. 8Both of them, however, grant the power of bringing an action within a year, but, after the year has elapsed, an action for only simple damages will lie. 9Moreover, this Edict mentions damage which has been caused and property which has been lost, but it does not refer to robbery with violence; still, suit can be brought for robbery with violence under the former Edict. 10Property is said to be lost which has been allowed by anyone to be destroyed, as for instance cut, or broken to pieces. 11Again, this action is in factum, and is granted for double the value of the property, which has reference to its true price and the estimate made at the present time, is always doubled within a year. 12The plaintiff must prove that the damage was caused by a mob. If, however, it was caused in any other way than by a mob, this action will not lie. 13If, when Titius struck my slave, a crowd assembled, and the slave lost something thereby, I can bring suit against the person who struck him, even though the crowd was responsible for the loss, and he began to strike him in order that injury might be committed. The action, however, will not lie if any other cause for striking him existed. 14When, however, anyone himself assembles a crowd, and beats the slave in its presence for the purpose of doing him injury, and not with the intention of causing damage, the Edict will apply; for it is true that he who strikes anyone unjustifiably displays malice, and that he who is responsible for the commission of damage commits it. 15The Prætor grants an action against a slave, and against an entire body of slaves. 16What we have stated with reference to heirs and other successors being entitled to bring the action for property taken by violence may be repeated here.

5Gaius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Non prod­est ei qui vi ra­puit ad evi­tan­dam poe­nam, si an­te iu­di­cium re­sti­tuat rem quam ra­puit.

5Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXI. It will not benefit the person guilty of robbery with violence to restore the property before judgment is rendered, with a view to avoiding the penalty.

6Ve­nu­leius li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo sti­pu­la­tio­num. Quod vi pos­ses­sum rap­tum­ve sit, an­te­quam in po­tes­ta­tem do­mi­ni he­redis­ve eius per­ve­niat, usu­ca­pi lex ve­tat.

6Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XVII. The law forbids property which has been possessed or taken by violence to be acquired by usucaption, before it again comes under the control of the owner, or his heir.