De iniuriis et famosis libellis
(Concerning Injuries and Infamous Libels.)
1 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo sexto ad edictum. Iniuria ex eo dicta est, quod non iure fiat: omne enim, quod non iure fit, iniuria fieri dicitur. hoc generaliter. specialiter autem iniuria dicitur contumelia. interdum iniuriae appellatione damnum culpa datum significatur, ut in lege Aquilia dicere solemus: interdum iniquitatem iniuriam dicimus, nam cum quis inique vel iniuste sententiam dixit, iniuriam ex eo dictam, quod iure et iustitia caret, quasi non iuriam, contumeliam autem a contemnendo. 1Iniuriam autem fieri Labeo ait aut re aut verbis: re, quotiens manus inferuntur: verbis autem, quotiens non manus inferuntur, convicium fit. 2Omnemque iniuriam aut in corpus inferri aut ad dignitatem aut ad infamiam pertinere: in corpus fit, cum quis pulsatur: ad dignitatem, cum comes matronae abducitur: ad infamiam, cum pudicitia adtemptatur. 3Item aut per semet ipsum alicui fit iniuria aut per alias personas. per semet, cum directo ipsi cui patri familias vel matri familias fit iniuria: per alias, cum per consequentias fit, cum fit liberis meis vel servis meis vel uxori nuruive: spectat enim ad nos iniuria, quae in his fit, qui vel potestati nostrae vel affectui subiecti sint. 4Et si forte cadaveri defuncti fit iniuria, cui heredes bonorumve possessores exstitimus, iniuriarum nostro nomine habemus actionem: spectat enim ad existimationem nostram, si qua ei fiat iniuria. idemque et si fama eius, cui heredes exstitimus, lacessatur. 5Usque adeo autem iniuria, quae fit liberis nostris, nostrum pudorem pertingit, ut etiamsi volentem filium quis vendiderit, patri suo quidem nomine competit iniuriarum actio, filii vero nomine non competit, quia nulla iniuria est, quae in volentem fiat. 6Quotiens autem funeri testatoris vel cadaveri fit iniuria, si quidem post aditam hereditatem fiat, dicendum est heredi quodammodo factam (semper enim heredis interest defuncti existimationem purgare): quotiens autem ante aditam hereditatem, magis hereditati, et sic heredi per hereditatem adquiri. denique Iulianus scribit, si corpus testatoris ante aditam hereditatem detentum est, adquiri hereditati actiones dubium non esse. idemque putat et si ante aditam hereditatem servo hereditario iniuria facta fuerit: nam per hereditatem actio heredi adquiretur. 7Labeo scribit, si quis servum hereditarium testamento manumissum ante aditam hereditatem verberaverit, iniuriarum heredem agere posse: at si post aditam hereditatem verberatus sit, sive scit se liberum sive ignorat, ipsum agere posse. 8Sive autem sciat quis filium meum esse vel uxorem meam, sive ignoraverit, habere me meo nomine actionem Neratius scripsit. 9Idem ait Neratius ex una iniuria interdum tribus oriri iniuriarum actionem neque ullius actionem per alium consumi. ut puta uxori meae filiae familias iniuria facta est: et mihi et patri eius et ipsi iniuriarum actio incipiet competere.
1 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVI. Something done contrary to law is designated an injury, for everything which is illegal is held to be injurious. This, generally speaking, is the case, but, specifically, an injury is defined to be an insult. Sometimes, by the term “injury” damage caused by negligence is meant, as we are accustomed to state in the Aquilian Law. At other times, we call injustice an injury, as where anyone has rendered a wrongful or inequitable decision, and this is styled an injury because it is in violation of law and justice as not being legal. The term “insult” is derived from the verb “to despise.” 1Labeo says that an injury can be caused by a thing, or by words. By a thing, when the hands are employed; by words, when the hands are not used, and the outrage is committed by speech. 2Every injury involves either the person or the honor of him who is the object of it, and has a tendency to render him infamous. It is directed against the person, when he is beaten; against his honor, when a matron is deprived of her attendant; and it tends to render anyone infamous when his or her modesty is attacked. 3Again, an injury is committed against anyone by a person himself, or by others: by the person himself, where it is committed directly against the head, or the mother of a family; by others, where it is committed indirectly, as for instance, against my children, my slaves, my wife, or my daughter-in-law. For injury concerns us when it is directed against those who are subject to our authority, or are entitled to our affection. 4If an injury is perpetrated against the body of a deceased person, of whose estate we are the heirs, or the prætorian possessors, we can bring an action for injury in our own name; for an injury committed in this manner involves our reputation. The same rule applies if the reputation of him whose heirs we are is attacked. 5Moreover, any injury committed against our children is an attack upon our honor; so that, if anyone sells a son with his own consent, his father will be entitled to an action for injury in his own name, but the son will not, because no injury is committed against one who consents. 6Whenever an injury is committed against the funeral of a testator, or his corpse, and this is done after the estate has been entered upon, it must be said that it is, to a certain extent, committed against the heir, for it is always to the interest of the latter to protect the reputation of the deceased. If it was committed before the estate was entered upon, the action will rather be acquired by the estate, and transmitted by it to the heir. Finally, Julianus says, there is no doubt that if the body of the testator is detained before the estate has been entered upon, the right of action will be acquired by the estate. He also thinks that the same rule will apply if any injury is committed against a slave belonging to the estate before it has been entered upon, because the right of action is acquired by the heir through the estate. 7Labeo says that if anyone, before the estate has been entered upon, strikes a slave forming part of it, who has been manumitted by will, the heir can bring an action for injury. But if he should be struck after the estate has been entered upon, whether he knows that he is free or not, he can bring the suit. 8But whether he knows that it is my son or my wife, or whether he does not, Neratius says that I will be entitled to this action in my name. 9Neratius also says that from one injury sometimes a right to proceed against three persons will arise, and that the right of action of one is not extinguished by that of another; as, for instance, when an injury has been committed against my wife who is a daughter under paternal control, the action for injury will lie in favor of me, of her father, and of the woman herself.
2 Paulus libro quinquagensimo ad edictum. Quod si viro iniuria facta sit, uxor non agit, quia defendi uxores a viris, non viros ab uxoribus aequum est.
2 Paulus, On the Edict, Book L. When an injury is committed against a husband, his wife cannot bring the action, because it is proper for wives to be defended by their husbands, and not husbands by their wives.
3 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo sexto ad edictum. Illud relatum peraeque est eos, qui iniuriam pati possunt, et facere posse. 1Sane sunt quidam, qui facere non possunt, ut puta furiosus et inpubes, qui doli capax non est: namque hi pati iniuriam solent, non facere. cum enim iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat, consequens erit dicere hos, sive pulsent sive convicium dicant, iniuriam fecisse non videri. 2Itaque pati quis iniuriam, etiamsi non sentiat, potest, facere nemo, nisi qui scit se iniuriam facere, etiamsi nesciat cui faciat. 3Quare si quis per iocum percutiat aut dum certat, iniuriarum non tenetur. 4Si quis hominem liberum ceciderit, dum putat servum suum, in ea causa est, ne iniuriarum teneatur.
3 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVI. It is said, by way of reciprocity, that those who can suffer an injury can also commit it. 1There are, however, some persons who cannot do this, for example, a lunatic, and a minor who is not capable of criminality, since they can suffer injuries but cannot commit them; for as an injury can only take place with the intention of him who commits it, and the result will be that such persons, whether they resort to blows, or use insulting language, are not considered to have committed injury. 2Hence, anyone can suffer an injury without perceiving it, but he cannot commit one unless he is aware of it, even if he does not know against whom it is committed. 3Therefore, if anyone strikes another in jest, or while he is contending with him, he will not be liable for committing an injury. 4When anyone strikes a freeman, thinking that he was his slave, he is in such a position that he will not be liable to an action for injury committed.
4 Paulus libro quinquagensimo ad edictum. Si, cum servo meo pugnum ducere vellem, in proximo te stantem invitus percusserim, iniuriarum non teneor.
4 Paulus, On the Edict, Book L. If, when intending to strike my slave with my fist, I should unintentionally strike you, while you were standing near him, I will not be liable for injury.
5 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo sexto ad edictum. Lex Cornelia de iniuriis competit ei, qui iniuriarum agere volet ob eam rem, quod se pulsatum verberatumve domumve suam vi introitam esse dicat. qua lege cavetur, ut non iudicet, qui ei qui agit gener socer, vitricus privignus, sobrinusve est propiusve eorum quemquem ea cognatione adfinitateve attinget, quive eorum eius parentisve cuius eorum patronus erit. lex itaque Cornelia ex tribus causis dedit actionem: quod quis pulsatus verberatusve domusve eius vi introita sit. apparet igitur omnem iniuriam, quae manu fiat, lege Cornelia contineri. 1Inter pulsationem et verberationem hoc interest, ut Ofilius scribit: verberare est cum dolore caedere, pulsare sine dolore. 2Domum accipere debemus non proprietatem domus, sed domicilium. quare sive in propria domu quis habitaverit sive in conducto vel gratis sive hospitio receptus, haec lex locum habebit. 3Quid si quis in villa habitet vel in hortis? idem erit probandum. 4Et si dominus fundum locaverit inque eum impetus factus sit, colonus aget, non dominus. 5Si tamen in fundum alienum, qui domino colebatur, introitum sit, Labeo negat esse actionem domino fundi ex lege Cornelia, quia non possit ubique domicilium habere, hoc est per omnes villas suas. ego puto ad omnem habitationem, in qua pater familias habitat, pertinere hanc legem, licet ibi quis domicilium non habeat. ponamus enim studiorum causa Romae agere: Romae utique domicilium non habet et tamen dicendum est, si vi domus eius introita fuerit, Corneliam locum habere. tantum igitur ad meritoria vel stabula non pertinebit: ceterum ad hos pertinebit, qui inhabitant non momenti causa, licet ibi domicilium non habeant. 6Illud quaeritur, an pater filio familias iniuriam passo ex lege Cornelia iniuriarum agere possit: et placuit non posse deque ea re inter omnes constat. sed patri quidem praetoria iniuriarum actio competit, filio vero legis Corneliae. 7In lege Cornelia filius familias agere potest ex omni causa nec cavere debet ratam rem patrem habiturum: nam nec alias agentem filium iniuriarum ad cautionem de rato compellendum Iulianus scribit. 8Hac lege permittitur actori ius iurandum deferre, ut reus iuret iniuriam se non fecisse. sed Sabinus in adsessorio etiam praetores exemplum legis secuturos ait: et ita res se habet. 9Si quis librum ad infamiam alicuius pertinentem scripserit composuerit ediderit dolove malo fecerit, quo quid eorum fieret, etiamsi alterius nomine ediderit vel sine nomine, uti de ea re agere liceret et, si condemnatus sit qui id fecit, intestabilis ex lege esse iubetur. 10Eadem poena ex senatus consulto tenetur etiam is, qui ἐπιγράμματα aliudve quid sine scriptura in notam aliquorum produxerit: item qui emendum vendendumve curaverit. 11Et ei, qui indicasset, sive liber sive servus sit, pro modo substantiae accusatae personae aestimatione iudicis praemium constituitur, servo forsitan et libertate praestanda. quid enim si publica utilitas ex hoc emergit?
5 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVI. The Cornelian Law relating to injuries has reference to a person who wishes to bring suit for injury, because he says that he has been struck and beaten, or that his house has been entered by force. It is provided by this law that he cannot, in such a case, preside as judge, who is either the son-in-law, father-in-law, stepfather, stepson, cousin, or is any more nearly connected with the plaintiff by either relationship or affinity, or who is the patron, or the father of any of the abovementioned persons. Therefore, the Cornelian Law grants an action for two causes, namely, where anyone has been struck or beaten, or where his house has been forcibly entered. Hence it is apparent that every injury which can be committed by the hands is included in the Cornelian Law. 1The following difference exists between striking and beating, so Ofilius says: to beat is to cause pain, to strike is to inflict blows without pain. 2We should understand the word “house” to be not merely one which is owned by the plaintiff, but the one in which he resides. Therefore this law will be applicable, whether the aggrieved person lives in his own house, or in one which he has leased, or occupied gratis, or is one where he happens to be a guest. 3When he lives in a house in the country, or one surrounded by gardens, what should be done? The same rule should be adopted. 4If the owner should lease a tract of land, and it is entered by force, the tenant, and not the landlord, can bring the action. 5Where, however, anyone enters the land of another which is cultivated by the owner, Labeo denies that this action can be brought by the owner of the land, under the Cornelian Law, because he cannot have his residence everywhere, that is to say, in all his farmhouses. I think that this law applies to every habitation in which the head of a household resides, although he may not have his domicile there. For suppose someone goes to Rome for the purpose of pursuing his studies, he certainly does not reside at Rome, and still it should be said that if his house is entered by force, there will be ground for the application of the Cornelian Law. Therefore it does not apply to temporary lodgings, or to stables. It is, however, applicable to those who remain in a place for a very short time, although they may not have their domicile there. 6The question is asked, whether the head of a household can bring the action for injury under the Cornelian Law, if a son under his control has sustained an injury. It has been decided that he cannot do so. This rule applies in all cases. The Prætorian Action for injury will, however, lie in favor of the father, and that of the Cornelian Law in favor of the son. 7A son under paternal control can bring the action under the Cornelian Law for any of these reasons, and he need not provide that his father will ratify his act; for Julianus has stated that a son who brings an action for injury under any other law cannot be compelled to give security for ratification. 8By this law, the plaintiff is permitted to tender the oath, in order that the defendant may swear that he has not committed any injury. Sabinus, however, in his work on Assessors, says that even Prætors must follow the example of the law. And this is the fact. 9When a person writes anything for the purpose of defaming another, or composes, or publishes it, or maliciously procures this to be done, even though it may be published in the name of someone else, or without any name, he can be prosecuted under this law, and if he should be convicted, he will be declared incapable of testifying in court. 10He who publishes any inscriptions, or anything else, even if it is written, for the purpose of libelling another, will incur the same penalty, under the Decree of the Senate, as a person will who has caused any of these things to be purchased, or sold. 11Anyone, whether he be free or a slave, who gives information of the guilty party shall be rewarded by the judge in proportion to the wealth of the accused person; and where the informer is a slave, he may, perhaps, be granted his freedom. For why not, if the public welfare is promoted by his information?
6 Paulus libro quinquagensimo quinto ad edictum. Quod senatus consultum necessarium est, cum nomen adiectum non est eius, in quem factum est: tunc ei, quia difficilis probatio est, voluit senatus publica quaestione rem vindicari. ceterum si nomen adiectum sit, et iure communi iniuriarum agi poterit: nec enim prohibendus est privato agere iudicio, quod publico iudicio praeiudicatur, quia ad privatam causam pertinet. plane si actum sit publico iudicio, denegandum est privatum: similiter ex diverso.
6 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LV. This Decree of the Senate is necessary, when the name of him against whom the act was committed is not mentioned. Then, for the reason that proof is difficult, the Senate wished that the crime should be punished by a public prosecution. If, however, the name of the person is mentioned, he can bring suit for injury under the Common Law, for he should not be prevented from bringing a private action because it prejudices a public prosecution, as private interests are concerned. It is evident that if a public prosecution is instituted, a private action must be denied, and vice versa.
7 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo septimo ad edictum. Praetor edixit: ‘qui agit iniuriarum, certum dicat, quid iniuriae factum sit’: quia qui famosam actionem intendit, non debet vagari cum discrimine alienae existimationis, sed designare et certum specialiter dicere, quam se iniuriam passum contendit. 1Si dicatur homo iniuria occisus, numquid non debeat permittere praetor privato iudicio legi Corneliae praeiudicari? idemque et si ita quis agere velit ‘quod tu venenum dedisti hominis occidendi causa?’ rectius igitur fecerit, si huiusmodi actionem non dederit. adquin solemus dicere, ex quibus causis publica sunt iudicia, ex his causis non esse nos prohibendos, quo minus et privato agamus. est hoc verum, sed ubi non principaliter de ea re agitur, quae habet publicam exsecutionem. quid ergo de lege Aquilia dicimus? nam et ea actio principaliter hoc continet, hominem occisum non principaliter: nam ibi principaliter de damno agitur, quod domino datum est, at in actione iniuriarum de ipsa caede vel veneno ut vindicetur, non ut damnum sarciatur. quid ergo, si quis idcirco velit iniuriarum agere, quod gladio caput eius percussum est? Labeo ait non esse prohibendum: neque enim utique hoc, inquit, intenditur, quod publicam habet animadversionem. quod verum non est: cui enim dubium est etiam hunc dici posse Cornelia conveniri? 2Praeterea illo spectat dici certum de iniuria, quam passus quis sit, ut ex qualitate iniuriae sciamus, an in patronum liberto reddendum sit iniuriarum iudicium. etenim meminisse oportebit liberto adversus patronum non quidem semper, verum interdum iniuriarum dari iudicium, si atrox sit iniuria quam passus sit, puta servilis. ceterum levem cohercitionem utique patrono adversus libertum dabimus nec patietur eum praetor querentem, quasi iniuriam passus sit, nisi atrocitas eum moverit: nec enim ferre praetor debet heri servum, hodie liberum conquerentem, quod dominus ei convicium dixerit vel quod leviter pulsaverit vel emendaverit. sed si flagris, si verberibus, si vulneravit non mediocriter: aequissimum erit praetorem ei subvenire. 3Sed et si quis ex liberis, qui non sunt in potestate, cum parente velit experiri, non temere iniuriarum actio danda est, nisi atrocitas suaserit. certe his, qui sunt in potestate, prorsus nec competit, etiamsi atrox fuerit. 4Quod autem praetor ait ‘quid iniuriae factum sit, certum dicat’, quemadmodum accipiendum sit? certum eum dicere Labeo ait, qui dicat nomen iniuriae, neque sub alternatione, puta illud aut illud, sed illam iniuriam se passum. 5Si mihi plures iniurias feceris, puta turba et coetu facto domum alicuius introeas et hoc facto efficiatur, et simul et convicium patiar et verberer: an possim separatim tecum experiri de singulis iniuriis, quaeritur. et Marcellus secundum Neratii sententiam hoc probat cogendum iniurias, quas simul passus est, coniungere. 6Posse hodie de omni iniuria, sed et de atroci civiliter agi imperator noster rescripsit. 7Atrocem iniuriam quasi contumeliosiorem et maiorem accipimus. 8Atrocem autem iniuriam aut persona aut tempore aut re ipsa fieri Labeo ait. persona atrocior iniuria fit, ut cum magistratui, cum parenti patrono fiat. tempore, si ludis et in conspectu: nam praetoris in conspectu an in solitudine iniuria facta sit, multum interesse ait, quia atrocior est, quae in conspectu fiat. re atrocem iniuriam haberi Labeo ait, ut puta si vulnus illatum vel os alicui percussum.
7 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. The Prætor provides in his Edict as follows: “Anyone who brings an action for injury must state positively what injury was sustained,” because he who brings an action which may render another infamous should not make a vague accusation admitting of a distinction which may affect the good name of another, but he must designate and specify clearly the injury which he alleges he has suffered. 1When it is said that a slave has been killed for the purpose of causing injury, should not the Prætor permit the public action to be prejudiced by the private one of the Cornelian Law, just as if anyone should desire to bring suit, because you gave poison for the purpose of killing a man? He will, therefore, act more properly, if he does not grant an action of this kind. We are, however, accustomed to hold that, in cases which can be publicly prosecuted, we ought not to be prevented from bringing private actions. This is true only where the action which should be publicly prosecuted is not vitally concerned. What, then, must we say with reference to the Aquilian Law, for this action has principally reference to this? The slave who was killed was not the principal object of the action which was brought mainly on account of the loss sustained by his owner; but, in the action for injury, proceedings are instituted with reference to murder and poisoning, for the purpose of inflicting punishment, and not for reparation of damage. But what if anyone should desire to bring the action for injury, because he has been struck on the head with a sword? Labeo says that he should not be prevented from bringing it, as the case is not one which demands public punishment. This is not true, for who doubts that the aggressor can be prosecuted under the Cornelian Law? 2Besides, the nature of the injury which the person suffered must be specifically stated, in order that we may ascertain whether judgment should be rendered against a patron in favor of his freedman. For it must be remembered that an action for injury is, not always but only occasionally, granted to a freedman against his patron, where the injury he has sustained is atrocious; for instance, if it is one which may be inflicted upon a slave. Moreover, we allow a patron to inflict a light punishment upon his freedman; and the Prætor will not receive his complaint as having sustained an injury, unless he is impressed by the atrocity of the act. For the Prætor should not permit the slave of yesterday who is the freedman of today to complain that his master has insulted him, or struck him lightly, or corrected him. It will, however, be perfectly just for the Prætor to come to his relief, if his master has scourged him, or severely beaten him, or seriously wounded him. 3If one of several children, who are not subject to paternal authority, desires to bring suit against his father, an action for injury cannot be rashly instituted, unless the atrocity of the deed should induce this to be done, but certainly those who are under paternal control are not entitled to this action, even if the injury was atrocious. 4When the Prætor says, “Must state positively what injury was sustained,” how should this be understood? Labeo holds that he states anything positively who mentions the name of the injury, without any ambiguity (for instance, “either this or that”), but alleges that he has suffered such-and-such an injury. 5If you inflict several injuries upon me, for example, where a disorderly crowd having assembled, you enter my house, and in consequence I am insulted and beaten at the same time; the question arises, can I bring separate actions against you for each injury? Marcellus, in accordance with the opinion of Neratius, approves of the union in a single action of all the injuries that anyone has suffered at the same time. 6Our Emperor stated in a Rescript that, at present, civil actions can be brought for all kinds of injuries, even such as are of an atrocious character. 7We understand an atrocious injury to be one which is more than usually insulting and serious. 8Labeo says that an atrocious injury is committed with reference to the person, or the time, or the thing. An injury to the person becomes more atrocious when it is committed against a magistrate, a parent, or a patron. With reference to time, when it is committed at the games, and in public, or in the presence of the Prætor, or in private, for he asserts that there is a great difference, as an injury is more atrocious when it is committed in public. Labeo says that an injury is atrocious with reference to the thing, as for instance, where a wound is inflicted, or anyone is struck in the face.
8 Paulus libro quinquagensimo quinto ad edictum. Vulneris magnitudo atrocitatem facit et nonnumquam locus vulneris, veluti oculo percusso.
8 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LV. The size of the wound constitutes the atrocity, and sometimes the place where it is inflicted, for example, when the eye is struck.
9 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo septimo ad edictum. Sed est quaestionis, quod dicimus re iniuriam atrocem fieri, utrum, si corpori inferatur, atrox sit, an et si non corpori, ut puta vestimentis scissis, comite abducto vel convicio dicto. et ait Pomponius etiam sine pulsatione posse dici atrocem iniuriam, persona atrocitatem faciente. 1Sed et si in theatro vel in foro caedit et vulnerat, quamquam non atrociter, atrocem iniuriam facit. 2Parvi autem refert, utrum patri familias an filio familias iniuria facta sit: nam et haec atrox aestimabitur. 3Si atrocem iniuriam servus fecerit, si quidem dominus praesens sit, potest agi de eo: quod si afuerit, praesidi offerendus est, qui eum flagris rumpat. 4Si quis tam feminam quam masculum, sive ingenuos sive libertinos, inpudicos facere adtemptavit, iniuriarum tenebitur. sed et si servi pudicitia adtemptata sit, iniuriarum locum habet.
9 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. While we are discussing the point that the injury becomes atrocious on account of the thing itself, the question arises whether, in order for it to be atrocious, it must be inflicted upon the body, or whether it can be such if it is not corporeal, for instance, where clothing is torn, or an attendant is taken away, or insulting language is used. Pomponius says that an injury can be called atrocious without inflicting a blow, the atrocity being dependent upon the person. 1When, however, one person strikes and wounds another in the theatre or in some other public place, he perpetrates an atrocious injury even though it is not serious. 2It makes little difference whether the injury is inflicted upon the head of a household, or on a son under paternal control, for it will be considered atrocious. 3If a slave inflicts an atrocious injury and his master is present, proceedings can be instituted against the latter. If his master is absent, the slave should be delivered to the Governor, who shall cause him to be scourged. 4When anyone makes immodest advances to either a woman or a man, or to a freeborn person, or to a freedman, he will be liable to an action for injury. If the modesty of a slave is attacked, the action for injury can be brought.
10 Paulus libro quinquagensimo quinto ad edictum. Adtemptari pudicitia dicitur, cum id agitur, ut ex pudico inpudicus fiat.
10 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LV. The modesty of a person is said to be attacked when an attempt is made to render a virtuous person depraved.
11 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo septimo ad edictum. Non solum is iniuriarum tenetur, qui fecit iniuriam, hoc est qui percussit, verum ille quoque continetur, qui dolo fecit vel qui curavit, ut cui mala pugno percuteretur. 1Iniuriarum actio ex bono et aequo est et dissimulatione aboletur. si quis enim iniuriam dereliquerit, hoc est statim passus ad animum suum non revocaverit, postea ex paenitentia remissam iniuriam non poterit recolere. secundum haec ergo aequitas actionis omnem metum eius abolere videtur, ubicumque contra aequum quis venit. proinde et si pactum de iniuria intercessit et si transactum et si iusiurandum exactum erit, actio iniuriarum non tenebit. 2Agere quis iniuriarum et per se et per alium potest, ut puta procuratorem tutorem ceterosque, qui pro aliis solent intervenire. 3Si mandatu meo facta sit alicui iniuria, plerique aiunt tam me qui mandavi quam eum qui suscepit iniuriarum teneri. 4Proculus recte ait, si in hoc te conduxerim, ut iniuriam facias, cum utroque nostrum iniuriarum agi posse, quia mea opera facta sit iniuria: 5Idemque ait et si filio meo mandavero, ut tibi iniuriam faciat. 6Atilicinus autem ait et si persuaserim alicui alias nolenti, ut mihi ad iniuriam faciendam oboediret, posse iniuriarum mecum agi. 7Quamquam adversus patronum liberto iniuriarum actio non detur, verum marito libertae nomine cum patrono actio competit: maritus enim uxore sua iniuriam passa suo nomine iniuriarum agere videtur. quod et Marcellus admittit. ego autem apud eum notavi non de omni iniuria hoc esse dicendum me putare: levis enim coercitio etiam in nuptam vel convici non inpudici dictio cur patrono denegetur? si autem conliberto nupta esset, diceremus omnino iniuriarum marito adversus patronum cessare actionem, et ita multi sentiunt. ex quibus apparet libertos nostros non tantum eas iniurias adversus nos iniuriarum actione exequi non posse, quaecumque fiunt ipsis, sed ne eas quidem, quae eis fiunt, quos eorum interest iniuriam non pati. 8Plane si forte filius liberti vel uxor velint iniuriarum experiri: quia patri maritove non datur, denegandum non erit, quia suo nomine experiuntur. 9Ei, qui servus dicitur seque adserit in libertatem, iniuriarum actionem adversus dicentem se dominum competere nulla dubitatio est. et hoc verum est, sive ex libertate in servitutem petatur sive ex servitute in libertatem proclamet: nam hoc iure indistincte utimur.
11 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. Not only is he liable to an action for injury who commits the injury, that is to say, he who delivered the blow, but he also is included who, either by malice or through his efforts, causes anyone to be struck with the fist, for instance, upon the cheek. 1The action for injury is founded on right and justice. It is extinguished by dissimulation; for if anyone should abandon an injury, that is to say, if, after having suffered it, he does not recall it to mind, and should afterwards repent of having neglected to do so, he cannot revive it. According to this, equity is considered to abolish all apprehension of an action, whenever anyone opposes what is just. Hence, if an agreement with reference to an injury is entered into, or a compromise is made, or an oath is exacted in court, the action for injury will not survive. 2Anyone can bring the action for injury either by himself or by another; as, for example, by an agent, a guardian, or any other persons who are accustomed to act in behalf of others. 3If an injury is committed against anyone by my direction, most authorities hold that both I, who gave the order, and the person who received it, are liable to the action for injury. 4Proculus very properly says that if I hire you to commit an injury, suit can be brought against each of us, because the injury was committed by my agency. 5He says that the same rule will apply, if I direct my son to commit an injury against you. 6Atilicinus, however, says that if I persuade anyone to commit an injury who otherwise would be unwilling to obey me, an action for injury can be brought against me. 7Although the action for injury is not granted to a freedman against his patron, it can be brought by the husband of a freedwoman, in her name, against her patron; for the husband, when his wife has suffered any injury, is considered to bring the action in her name; which opinion Marcellus accepts. I, however, have made a note on him to the effect that I do not think that this applies to every injury. For why should light chastisement of a freedwoman even if she is married, or strong language, which is not obscene, be denied to a person? But if the woman was married to a freedman, we should say that an action for injury ought, by all means, to be granted to the husband against the patron. This is the opinion of many authorities. Hence it is apparent that our freedmen not only cannot bring an action for injury against us for injuries inflicted upon themselves, but not even for such as are inflicted upon those whom it is to their interest should not suffer injury. 8It is clear that if the son of a freedman, or his wife, should wish to bring an action for injury sustained, this ought not to be refused them because the action is not granted to the father or the husband, since they bring suit in their own names. 9There is no doubt that anyone who is said to be a slave and asserts that he is free can bring the action for injury against one who alleges that he is his master. This is true, whether from being free he desires to introduce him into slavery, or whether the slave wishes to obtain his freedom, for we use this law without making any distinction.
12 Gaius libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. Si quis de libertate aliquem in servitutem petat, quem sciat liberum esse, neque id propter evictionem, ut eam sibi conservet, faciat: iniuriarum actione tenetur.
12 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXII. When an action is brought to reduce anyone from freedom to servitude whom the plaintiff knows to be free, and he does not do this on account of eviction, in order to preserve it for himself; he will be liable to the action for injury.
13 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo septimo ad edictum. Iniuriarum actio neque heredi neque in heredem datur. idem est et si in servum meum iniuria facta sit: nam nec hic heredi meo iniuriarum actio datur. semel autem lite contestata hanc actionem etiam ad successores pertinere. 1Is, qui iure publico utitur, non videtur iniuriae faciendae causa hoc facere: iuris enim executio non habet iniuriam. 2Si quis, quod decreto praetoris non obtemperavit, ductus sit, non est in ea causa, ut agat iniuriarum, propter praetoris praeceptum. 3Si quis per iniuriam ad tribunal alicuius me interpellaverit vexandi mei causa, potero iniuriarum experiri. 4Si quis de honoribus decernendis alicuius passus non sit decerni ut puta imaginem alicui vel quid aliud tale: an iniuriarum teneatur? et ait Labeo non teneri, quamvis hoc contumeliae causa faciet: etenim multum interest, inquit, contumeliae causa quid fiat an vero fieri quid in honorem alicuius quis non patiatur. 5Idem Labeo scribit, si, cum alium contingeret legatio, alii hoc onus duumvir indixerit, non posse agi iniuriarum ob laborem iniunctum: aliud enim esse laborem iniungere, aliud iniuriam facere. idem ergo erit probandum et in ceteris muneribus atque honoribus, quae per iniuriam iniunguntur. ergo si quis per iniuriam sententiam dixerit, idem erit probandum. 6Quae iure potestatis a magistratu fiunt, ad iniuriarum actionem non pertinent. 7Si quis me prohibeat in mari piscari vel everriculum (quod Graece σαγήνη dicitur) ducere, an iniuriarum iudicio possim eum convenire? sunt qui putent iniuriarum me posse agere: et ita Pomponius et plerique esse huic similem eum, qui in publicum lavare vel in cavea publica sedere vel in quo alio loco agere sedere conversari non patiatur, aut si quis re mea uti me non permittat: nam et hic iniuriarum conveniri potest. conductori autem veteres interdictum dederunt, si forte publice hoc conduxit: nam vis ei prohibenda est, quo minus conductione sua fruatur. si quem tamen ante aedes meas vel ante praetorium meum piscari prohibeam, quid dicendum est? me iniuriarum iudicio teneri an non? et quidem mare commune omnium est et litora, sicuti aer, et est saepissime rescriptum non posse quem piscari prohiberi: sed nec aucupari, nisi quod ingredi quis agrum alienum prohiberi potest. usurpatum tamen et hoc est, tametsi nullo iure, ut quis prohiberi possit ante aedes meas vel praetorium meum piscari: quare si quis prohibeatur, adhuc iniuriarum agi potest. in lacu tamen, qui mei dominii est, utique piscari aliquem prohibere possum.
13 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. The action for injury sustained is not granted in favor of, or against an heir. The same rule applies where an injury has been inflicted upon my slave, for, in this instance, the action for injury will not be granted to my heir. But after issue has once been joined, this right of action passes even to successors. 1He who has recourse to a public law is not understood to do so for the purpose of causing injury, for the execution of the law does not inflict injury. 2Where anyone is arrested for not having obeyed the decree of the Prætor, he is not in a position to bring suit for injury founded on the order of the Prætor. 3If anyone should unjustly summon me before a tribunal of the magistrate, in order to annoy me, I can bring the action for injury against him. 4If, when honors are to be conferred, anyone should not suffer this to be done, as, for instance, where a statue, or something else of this kind has been decided upon, will he be liable to the action for injury? Labeo says that he will not be liable, even though he may do this for the sake of insult; for he says it makes a great deal of difference where something is done by way of insult, or where a person does not permit an act to be performed in honor of another. 5Labeo also says that where one person was entitled to an embassy, and the duumvir imposed this duty upon another, the action for injury cannot be brought on the ground of labor enjoined; for it is one thing to impose a duty upon a person, and another to inflict an injury upon him. This rule should be adopted with reference to other offices and duties which are unjustly bestowed. Hence, if anyone should render a decision for the purpose of causing injury, the same opinion should prevail. 6No act of a magistrate performed by virtue of his judicial authority renders the action for injury applicable. 7Where anyone prevents me from fishing, or casting a net in the sea, can I bring the action for injury against him? Some authorities hold that I can do so, and among them is Pomponius. The majority, however, hold that the case is similar to that of a person who is not suffered to bathe publicly, or seat himself in a theatre, or go into, sit down, or associate with others in any public place, or where anyone does not permit me to make use of my own property, for he can be sued in an action for injury. The ancients granted an interdict to anyone who leased these public places, for it was necessary to prevent force from being used against him by which he would be unable to enjoy his lease. But if I prevent anyone from fishing in front of my residence, or farm-house, what must be said? Am I liable to an action for injury, or not? For the sea, as well as the shore and the air, is common to all persons, and it has very frequently been stated in rescripts that no one can be prevented from fishing, or hunting birds, but he can be prevented from entering upon land belonging to another. It has, nevertheless, improperly, and without the authority of law, been assumed that anyone can be prohibited from fishing in front of my residence or my farm-house; therefore, when anyone is prevented from doing so, he can still bring the action for injury. I, however, can prevent anyone from fishing in a lake which is my property.
14 Paulus libro tertio decimo ad Plautium. Sane si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, uti possidetis interdictum ei competit, si prohibeatur ius suum exercere, quoniam ad privatam iam causam pertinet, non ad publicam haec res, utpote cum de iure fruendo agatur, quod ex privata causa contingat, non ex publica. ad privatas enim causas accommodata interdicta sunt, non ad publicas.
14 Paulus, On Plautius, Book XIII. It is evident that, where anyone has a private right to any part of the sea, he will be entitled to the interdict Uti possidetis, if he should be hindered from exercising it, as this relates to a private matter and not to a public one, since the enjoyment of a right based on a private title, and not on a public one, is involved; for interdicts have been introduced for private and not for public reasons.
15 Ulpianus libro septuagensimo septimo ad edictum. Item apud Labeonem quaeritur, si quis mentem alicuius medicamento aliove quo alienaverit, an iniuriarum actio locum haberet. et ait iniuriarum adversus eum agi posse. 1Si quis pulsatus quidem non est, verum manus adversus eum levatae et saepe territus quasi vapulaturus, non tamen percussit: utili iniuriarum actione tenetur. 2Ait praetor: ‘qui adversus bonos mores convicium cui fecisse cuiusve opera factum esse dicetur, quo adversus bonos mores convicium fieret: in eum iudicium dabo’. 3Convicium iniuriam esse Labeo ait. 4Convicium autem dicitur vel a concitatione vel a conventu, hoc est a collatione vocum. cum enim in unum complures voces conferuntur, convicium appellatur quasi convocium. 5Sed quod adicitur a praetore ‘adversus bonos mores’ ostendit non omnem in unum collatam vociferationem praetorem notare, sed eam, quae bonis moribus improbatur quaeque ad infamiam vel invidiam alicuius spectaret. 6Idem ait ‘adversus bonos mores’ sic accipiendum non eius qui fecit, sed generaliter accipiendum adversus bonos mores huius civitatis. 7Convicium non tantum praesenti, verum absenti quoque fieri posse Labeo scribit. proinde si quis ad domum tuam venerit te absente, convicium factum esse dicitur. idem et si ad stationem vel tabernam ventum sit, probari oportere. 8Fecisse convicium non tantum is videtur, qui vociferatus est, verum is quoque, qui concitavit ad vociferationem alios vel qui summissit ut vociferentur. 9‘Cui’ non sine causa adiectum est: nam si incertae personae convicium fiat, nulla executio est. 10Si curaverit quis convicium alicui fieri, non tamen factum sit, non tenebitur. 11Ex his apparet non omne maledictum convicium esse: sed id solum, quod cum vociferatione dictum est, 12sive unus sive plures dixerint, quod in coetu dictum est, convicium est: quod autem non in coetu nec vociferatione dicitur, convicium non proprie dicitur, sed infamandi causa dictum. 13Si quis astrologus vel qui aliquam illicitam divinationem pollicetur consultus aliquem furem dixisset, qui non erat, iniuriarum cum eo agi non potest, sed constitutiones eos tenent. 14Iniuriarum, quae ex convicio nascitur, in heredes non est reddenda: sed nec heredi. 15Si quis virgines appellasset, si tamen ancillari veste vestitas, minus peccare videtur: multo minus, si meretricia veste feminae, non matrum familiarum vestitae fuissent. si igitur non matronali habitu femina fuerit et quis eam appellavit vel ei comitem abduxit, iniuriarum tenetur. 16Comitem accipere debemus eum, qui comitetur et sequatur et (ut ait Labeo) sive liberum sive servum sive masculum sive feminam: et ita comitem Labeo definit ‘qui frequentandi cuiusque causa ut sequeretur destinatus in publico privatove abductus fuerit’. inter comites utique et paedagogi erunt. 17Abduxisse videtur, ut Labeo ait, non qui abducere comitem coepit, sed qui perfecit, ut comes cum eo non esset. 18Abduxisse autem non tantum is videtur, qui per vim abduxit, verum is quoque, qui persuasit comiti, ut eam desereret. 19Tenetur hoc edicto non tantum qui comitem abduxit, verum etiam si quis eorum quem appellavisset adsectatusve est. 20Appellare est blanda oratione alterius pudicitiam adtemptare: hoc enim non est convicium, sed adversus bonos mores adtemptare. 21Qui turpibus verbis utitur, non temptat pudicitiam, sed iniuriarum tenetur. 22Aliud est appellare, aliud adsectari: appellat enim, qui sermone pudicitiam adtemptat, adsectatur, qui tacitus frequenter sequitur: adsiduo enim frequentia quasi praebet nonnullam infamiam. 23Meminisse autem oportebit non omnem, qui adsectatus est, nec omnem, qui appellavit, hoc edicto conveniri posse (neque enim si quis colludendi, si quis officii honeste faciendi gratia id facit, statim in edictum incidit), sed qui contra bonos mores hoc facit. 24Sponsum quoque ad iniuriarum actionem admittendum puto: etenim spectat ad contumeliam eius iniuria, quaecumque sponsae eius fiat. 25Ait praetor: ‘ne quid infamandi causa fiat. si quis adversus ea fecerit, prout quaeque res erit, animadvertam’. 26Hoc edictum supervacuum esse Labeo ait, quippe cum ex generali iniuriarum agere possumus. sed videtur et ipsi Labeoni (et ita se habet) praetorem eandem causam secutum voluisse etiam specialiter de ea re loqui: ea enim, quae notabiliter fiunt, nisi specialiter notentur, videntur quasi neclecta. 27Generaliter vetuit praetor quid ad infamiam alicuius fieri. proinde quodcumque quis fecerit vel dixerit, ut alium infamet, erit actio iniuriarum. haec autem fere sunt, quae ad infamiam alicuius fiunt: ut puta ad invidiam alicuius veste lugubri utitur aut squalida, aut si barbam demittat vel capillos submittat, aut si carmen conscribat vel proponat vel cantet aliquod, quod pudorem alicuius laedat. 28Quod ait praetor: ‘si quis adversus ea fecerit, prout quaqua re erit, animadvertam’, sic intellegendum est, ut plenior esset praetoris animadversio, id est ut quodcumque eum moverit vel in persona eius qui agit iniuriarum actionem vel eius adversus quem agitur vel etiam in re ipsa, in qualitate iniuriae, non audiat eum qui agit. 29Si quis libello dato vel principi vel ali cui famam alienam insectatus fuerit, iniuriarum erit agendum: Papinianus ait. 30Idem ait eum, qui eventum sententiae velut daturus pecuniam vendidit, fustibus a praeside ob hoc castigatum iniuriarum damnatum videri: utique autem apparet hunc iniuriam ei fecisse, cuius sententiam venditavit. 31Si quis bona alicuius vel rem unam per iniuriam occupaverit, iniuriarum actione tenetur. 32Item si quis pignus proscripserit venditurus, tamquam a me acceperit, infamandi mei causa, Servius ait iniuriarum agi posse. 33Si quis non debitorem quasi debitorem appellaverit iniuriae faciendi causa, iniuriarum tenetur. 34Praetor ait: ‘Qui servum alienum adversus bonos mores verberavisse deve eo iniussu domini quaestionem habuisse dicetur, in eum iudicium dabo. item si quid aliud factum esse dicetur, causa cognita iudicium dabo’. 35Si quis sic fecit iniuriam servo, ut domino faceret, video dominum iniuriarum agere posse suo nomine: si vero non ad suggillationem domini id fecit, ipsi servo facta iniuria inulta a praetore relinqui non debuit, maxime si verberibus vel quaestione fieret: hanc enim et servum sentire palam est. 36Si communem quis servum verberaverit, utique hac actione non tenebitur, cum iure domini id fecerit. 37Nec si fructuarius id fecerit, dominus cum eo agit, vel si proprietarius fecerit, fructuarius eum conveniet. 38Adicitur ‘adversus bonos mores’, ut non omnis omnino qui verberavit, sed qui adversus bonos mores verberavit, teneatur: ceterum si quis corrigendi animo aut si quis emendandi, non tenetur. 39Unde quaerit Labeo, si magistratus municipalis servum meum loris ruperit, an possim cum eo experiri, quasi adversus bonos mores verberaverit. et ait iudicem debere inquirere, quid facientem servum meum verberaverit: nam si honorem ornamentaque petulanter adtemptantem ceciderit, absolvendum eum. 40‘Verberasse’ dicitur abusive et qui pugnis ceciderit. 41‘Quaestionem’ intellegere debemus tormenta et corporis dolorem ad eruendam veritatem. nuda ergo interrogatio vel levis territio non pertinet ad hoc edictum. quaestionis verbo etiam ea, quam malam mansionem dicunt, continebitur. cum igitur per vim et tormenta habita quaestio est, tunc quaestio intellegitur. 42Sed et si iussu domini quis quaestionem habeat, modum tamen excesserit, teneri eum debere Labeo ait. 43Praetor ait: ‘Si quid aliud factum esse dicetur, causa cognita iudicium dabo’. proinde si quidem verberatus sit servus vel tormentis de eo quaestio habita est, sine causae cognitione iudicium in eum competit, si vero aliam iniuriam passus sit, non aliter competit quam causa cognita. 44Itaque praetor non ex omni causa iniuriarum iudicium servi nomine promittit: nam si leviter percussus sit vel maledictum ei leviter, non dabit actionem: at si infamatus sit vel facto aliquo vel carmine scripto puto causae cognitionem praetoris porrigendam et ad servi qualitatem: etenim multum interest, qualis servus sit, bonae frugi, ordinarius, dispensator, an vero vulgaris vel mediastinus an qualisqualis. et quid si compeditus vel male notus vel notae extremae? habebit igitur praetor rationem tam iniuriae, quae admissa dicitur, quam personae servi, in quem admissa dicitur, et sic aut permittet aut denegabit actionem. 45Interdum iniuria servo facta ad dominum redundat, interdum non: nam si pro libero se gerentem aut cum eum alterius potius quam meum existimat quis, non caesurus eum, si meum scisset, non posse eum, quasi mihi iniuriam fecerit, sic conveniri Mela scribit. 46Si quis servo verberato iniuriarum egerit, deinde postea damni iniuriae agat, Labeo scribit eandem rem non esse, quia altera actio ad damnum pertineret culpa datum, altera ad contumeliam. 47Si usum fructum in servo habeam, tu proprietatem isque verberatus sit vel quaestio de eo habita, iniuriarum actio magis proprietario quam mihi competit. idemque probatur et si servum meum, quem bona fide possidebam, cecideris: domino enim magis competit iniuriarum actio. 48Item, si liberum hominem, qui mihi bona fide serviebat, quis ceciderit, distinguendum est, ut, si in contumeliam pulsatus sit, competat mihi iniuriarum actio. idem ergo et si in servo alieno bona fide mihi serviente, ut totiens admittamus iniuriarum actionem, quotiens in meam contumeliam iniuria ei facta sit. nam ipsius quidem servi nomine domino dabimus iniuriarum actionem. si autem me tangat et pulset, iniuriarum mihi quoque est. ergo et in fructuario idem distingui potest. 49Si servum complurium cecidero, competere iniuriarum actionem omnibus plus quam manifestum est:
15 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVII. The question is also asked by Labeo, if anyone should alienate the mind of a person by drugs, or by any other means, whether there will be ground for the action for injury. He says that the action for injury can be brought against him. 1Where a man has not been beaten, but hands have been threateningly raised against him, and he has been repeatedly alarmed at the prospect of receiving blows, without having actually been struck, the offender will be liable to an equitable action for injury sustained. 2The Prætor says: “I will grant an action against anyone who is said to have abused another, or to have caused this to be done, in a way contrary to good morals.” 3Labeo says that vociferous abuse by several individuals constitutes an injury. 4The expression, “Vociferous abuse by several individuals,” is said to be derived from the terms “tumult,” or “assembly,” that is to say the union of several voices, for where those are united it receives this appellation, just as if someone had said an “assembly of voices.” 5But what is added by the Prætor, that is to say, “Contrary to good morals,” shows that he noted not all the united clamor, but merely that which violates good morals, and which has a tendency to render someone infamous, or detested. 6He also says that the expression, “Contrary to good morals,” should not be understood to refer to those of the person who commits the offence, but, in general, to mean in opposition to the morals of this community. 7Labeo says that the abusive clamor of many voices can not only be raised against a person who is present, but also against one who is absent. Hence, if anyone, under such circumstances, should come to your house when you are not there, a clamor of many voices may be said to have occurred. The same rule applies to your lodging, or to your shop. 8Not only is he considered to have caused a disturbance who has himself uttered cries, but also he who has instigated others to cry out, or who has sent them for that purpose. 9The words, “Abused another,” were not added without a cause, for if the clamor was raised against a person who was not designated, there could be no prosecution. 10If anyone should attempt to incite a clamor against another, but does not succeed, he will not be liable. 11From this it is apparent that every kind of abuse is not the clamor of several voices, but that alone which is uttered with vociferation. 12Whether one or several persons have uttered these expressions in a disorderly crowd, it is an united clamor. But anything which has not been spoken in a tumultuous assemblage, or in loud tones, cannot properly be designated an united clamor, but speech with a view to defamation. 13If an astrologer, or anyone who promises unlawful divination, after having been consulted should say that another was a thief, when in fact he was not, an action for injury sustained cannot be brought against him, but he can be prosecuted under the Imperial Constitutions. 14The action for injury, which is based on general clamor, is not granted either against or in favor of heirs. 15If anyone should speak to young girls who are attired in the garments of slaves, he will be considered to be guilty of a minor offence; and still less, if they are dressed as prostitutes, and not as respectable women. Therefore, if a woman is not dressed as a respectable matron, anyone who speaks to her or takes away her female attendant will not be liable to the action for injury. 16We understand an attendant to mean one who accompanies and follows anyone (as Labeo says), whether it be a freedman or a slave, a man or woman. Labeo defines an attendant to be one who is appointed to follow a person for the purpose of keeping him or her company, and is abducted either in a public or a private place. Teachers are included among attendants. 17He is considered to have a“bducted an attendant (as Labeo says), not where he has commenced to do so, but where he has absolutely taken the attendant away from his or her master or mistress. 18Moreover, he is not only understood to have abducted an attendant who does so by the employment of force, but also he who persuades the attendant to leave her mistress. 19Not only he who actually abducts an attendant is liable under this Edict, but also anyone who addresses or follows one of them. 20To “address” is to attack the virtue of another by flattering words. This is not raising a tumultuous clamor, but is a violation of good morals. 21He who makes use of foul language does not attack the virtue of anyone, but is liable to the action for injury. 22It is one thing to address, and another to follow a person, for he addresses a woman who attacks her virtue by speech; and he follows her who silently and constantly pursues her, for assiduous pursuit is sometimes productive of a certain degree of dishonor. 23It must, however, be remembered that everyone who follows or addresses another cannot be sued under this Edict; for he who does this in jest, or for the purpose of rendering some honorable service, will not come under the terms of this Edict, but only he who acts contrary to good morals. 24I think that a man who is betrothed should also be permitted to bring this action for injury; for any insult offered to his intended wife is considered an injury to himself. 25The Prætor says: “Nothing shall be done for the purpose of rendering a person infamous, and if anyone violates this provision, I will punish him according to the circumstances of the case.” 26Labeo says that this Edict is superfluous, because we can bring a general action for injury committed, but it appears to Labeo himself (and this is correct) that the Prætor, having examined this point, wished to call attention to it specifically; for where acts publicly performed are not expressly mentioned, they seem to have been neglected. 27Generally speaking, the Prætor forbade anything to be done which would render anyone infamous; hence, whatever a person does or says, which has a tendency to bring another into disrepute, will afford ground for an action for injury sustained. Such are almost all those things which cause disgrace; as, for instance, the use of mourning garments or clothing that is filthy, or allowing the hair or the beard to grow, or the composition of poetry, or the publication or singing of anything which may injure anyone’s modesty. 28When the Prætor says, “If anyone violates this provision, I will punish him according to the circumstances of the case,” this should be understood to mean that the punishment by the Prætor will be more severe; that is, that he will be influenced either by the personal character of him who brings the action for injury, or by that of him against whom it is brought, or by the matter itself, and the nature of the injury as alleged by the plaintiff. 29If anyone attacks the reputation of another by means of a memorial presented to the Emperor, or to anyone else, Papinianus says that the action for injury can be brought. 30He also says that he who sells the result of a decision, before any money has been paid, can be condemned for injury, after having been whipped by order of the Governor, as it is apparent that he committed an injury against the person whose judgment he offered for sale. 31Where anyone seizes the property of another, or even a single article, for the purpose of causing him damage, he will be liable to an action for injury. 32Likewise, if anyone has given notice of the sale of a pledge, and states that he is about to sell it, as having received it from me, and does this for the purpose of insulting me, Servius says that an action for injury can be brought. 33If anyone, in order to injure another should refer to him as his debtor, when he is not, he will be liable, to the action for injury. 34The Prætor says: “If anyone is said to have beaten the slave of another contrary to good morals, or to have put him to torture without the order of his master, I will grant an action against him. Likewise, where any other illegal act is said to have taken place, I will grant an action after proper cause is shown.” 35If anyone causes an injury to a slave in such a way as to inflict one upon his master, I hold that the master can bring the action for injury in his own name; but if he did not do this for the purpose of insulting the master, the Prætor should not leave the injury done to the slave himself unpunished, and, by all means, if it was effected by blows, or by torture; for it is clear that the servant suffered by it. 36If one joint-owner beats a slave held in common, it is clear that he will not be liable to this action, as he did this by the right of a master. 37If an usufructuary should do this, the owner can bring an action against him; or if the owner did it, the usufructuary can sue him. 38He adds, “Against good morals,” meaning that everyone who strikes a slave is not liable, but everyone who strikes him against good morals is liable. Where, however, anyone does so with a view to his correction or reformation, he will not be liable. 39Therefore, if a municipal magistrate should wound my slave with a whip, Labeo asks if I can bring suit against him because he beat him contrary to good morals. And he says the judge should inquire what my slave did to cause him to be whipped; as, if he impudently sneered at his office, or the insignia of his rank, he should be discharged from liability. 40“To beat” is improperly applied to one who strikes with his fist. 41By “torture,” we should understand the torment and corporeal suffering and pain employed to extract the truth. Therefore, a mere interrogation or a moderate degree of fear does not justify the application of this Edict. In the term “torment” are included all those things which relate to the application of torture. Hence when force and torment are resorted to, this is understood to be torture. 42If, however, torture should be applied by order of the master himself, and it exceeds the proper limits, Labeo says he will be liable. 43The Prætor says, “Where any other illegal act is said to have taken place, I will grant an action, after proper cause is shown.” Hence, if a slave has been severely beaten, or put to the question, judgment can be rendered against the guilty party without any further investigation. If, however, he suffered any other injury, the action will not lie, unless proper cause is shown. 44Therefore the Prætor does not promise the action for injury in the name of the slave, for every kind of cause. For if he was lightly struck, or not grossly abused, he will not grant it. If his reputation has been assailed by any act, or by any written verses, I think that the investigation of the Prætor should be extended so as to include the character of the slave. For there is a great difference between the characters of slaves, as some are frugal, orderly, and careful; others are common, or employed in menial occupations, or of indifferent reputation. And what if the slave was shackled, or of bad character, or branded with ignominy? Therefore, the Prætor must take into consideration not only the injury which was committed, but also the reputation of the slave against whom it is said to have been perpetrated, and thus he will either permit or refuse the action. 45Sometimes the injury done to the slave falls back upon his master, and sometimes it does not; for if anyone, thinking that he belonged to someone else and not to me, should beat a man who alleged that he was free, and he would not have beaten him if he had known that he was mine, Mela says that he cannot be sued for having committed an injury against me. 46If anyone should bring an action for injury on account of a slave who had been beaten, and afterwards an action for wrongful damage, Labeo says that this is not the same thing, because one of the actions has reference to damage caused by negligence, and the other to insult. 47If I have the usufruct in a slave, and you have the ownership in him, and he has been beaten or subjected to torture, I, rather than the owner, will be entitled to bring the action for injury sustained. The same rule applies, if you have beaten my slave whom I possessed in good faith, for the master has the better right to bring an action for injury. 48Again, when anyone beats a freeman who was serving me in good faith as a slave, it should be ascertained whether he struck him for the purpose of insulting me, and if he did, an action for injury will lie in my favor. Therefore, we grant an action for injury with reference to the slave of another who is serving me in good faith, whenever the injury was committed with the intention of insulting me; for we grant it to the master of the name of the slave himself. If, however, he touches and beats me, I can also bring an action for injury. The same distinction must be made with reference to the usufructuary. 49If I beat a slave belonging to several masters, it is perfectly clear that they all will be entitled to bring the action for injury sustained.
16 Paulus libro quadragensimo quinto ad edictum. sed non esse aequum pro maiore parte, quam pro qua dominus est, damnationem fieri Pedius ait: et ideo officio iudicis portiones aestimandae erunt.
16 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLV. It is not just, however, as Pedius says, that judgment should be rendered for a larger sum than the value of the share of the owner, and therefore it is the duty of the judge to make an estimate of the different shares.
17 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo septimo ad edictum. Sed si unius permissu id fecero, si quidem solius eius esse putavi, nulli competit iniuriarum actio. plane si scii plurium, ei quidem, qui permisit, non competit iniuriarum actio, ceteris competit. 1Si iussu tutoris aut procuratoris vel curatoris quaestio habita sit, consequens erit dicere cessare iniuriarum actionem. 2Servus meus opera vel querella tua flagellis caesus est a magistratu nostro. Mela putat dandam mihi iniuriarum adversus te, in quantum ob eam rem aequum iudici videbitur, et si servus decesserit, dominum eius agere posse Labeo ait, quia de damno, quod per iniuriam factum est, agatur. et ita Trebatio placuit. 3Quaedam iniuriae a liberis hominibus factae leves (non nullius momenti) videntur, enimvero a servis graves sunt: crescit enim contumelia ex persona eius qui contumeliam fecit. 4Cum servus iniuriam facit, maleficium eum admittere palam est: merito igitur sicuti ex ceteris delictis, ita et ex hoc iniuriarum noxalis actio datur. sed in arbitrio domini est, an velit eum verberandum exhibere, ut ita satisfiat ei qui iniuriam passus est: neque erit necesse domino utique eum verberandum praestare, sed dabitur ei facultas praestare ei servum verberandum aut, si de eo verberibus satis non fiat, noxae dedendum vel litis aestimationem sufferendam. 5Ait praetor ‘arbitratu iudicis’: utique quasi viri boni, ut ille modum verberum imponat. 6Si ante iudicem dominus verberandum servum exhibuerit, ut satis verberibus ei fieret, et erit factum arbitratu alicuius, postea actor agere iniuriarum perseverat, non est audiendus: qui enim accepit satisfactionem, iniuriam suam remisit. nam et si nuda voluntate iniuriam remisit, indubitate dicendum est extingui iniuriarum actionem non minus, quam si tempore abolita fuerit iniuria. 7Si iussu domini servus iniuriam fecerit, utique dominus conveniri poterit etiam suo nomine. sed si proponatur servus manumissus, placet Labeoni dandam in eum actionem, quia et noxa caput sequitur nec in omnia servus domino parere debet: ceterum et si occiderit iussu domini, Cornelia eum eximemus. 8Plane si defendendi domini gratia aliquid fecerit, rationem ei constare apparet, inque eam rem adversus agentem exceptio obicienda erit. 9Si servus, in quo usus fructus meus est, iniuriam mihi fecerit, adversus dominum noxali iudicio experiri potero: neque debeo deterioris condicionis ob hoc esse, quod usum fructum in eo habeo, quam si non haberem. aliter atque si servus communis esset: tunc enim non daremus socio actionem, eapropter, quia et ipse iniuriarum actione tenetur. 10Ait praetor: ‘Si ei, qui in alterius potestate erit, iniuria facta esse dicetur et neque is, cuius in potestate est, praesens erit neque procurator quisquam existat, qui eo nomine agat: causa cognita ipsi, qui iniuriam accepisse dicetur, iudicium dabo’. 11Filio familias iniuriam passo, si praesens sit pater, agere tamen non possit propter furorem vel quem alium casum dementiae, puto competere iniuriarum actionem: nam et hic pater eius absentis loco est. 12Plane si praesens agere nolit, vel quia differt vel quia remittit atque donat iniuriam, magis est, ut filio actio non detur: nam et cum abest, idcirco datur filio actio, quia verisimile est patrem, si praesens fuisset, acturum fuisse. 13Interdum tamen putamus et si pater remittat, iniuriarum actionem filio dandam, ut puta si patris persona vilis abiectaque sit, filii honesta: neque enim debet pater vilissimus filii sui contumeliam ad suam vilitatem metiri. ponamus esse eum patrem, cui iure meritoque curator a praetore constitueretur. 14Sed si pater lite contestata coeperit abesse vel etiam neclegere executionem pater vilis, dicendum est causa cognita translationem filio competere. idem et si emancipatus filius esse proponatur. 15Procuratorem patris praetulit praetor ipsis personis, quae iniuriam passae sunt. si tamen procurator aut neglegat aut colludat aut non sufficiat adversus personas, quae iniuriam fecerunt, ipsi potius, qui passus est iniuriam, actio iniuriarum competit. 16Procuratorem autem accipere debemus non utique eum, cui specialiter mandata est procuratio actionis iniuriarum, verum sufficit eum esse, cui omnium rerum administratio mandata est. 17Quod autem ait praetor causa cognita ipsi, qui iniuriam accepisse dicetur, iudicium permitti, ita accipiendum est, ut in cognitione causae hoc versetur, quam longe pater absit et quando superventurus, et numquid is, qui iniuriarum vult actionem movere, segnitior vel inutilis admodum, qui non sufficiat ad rei cuius administrationem ac per hoc nec ad actionem. 18Quod deinde ait ‘qui iniuriam accepit’, interdum ita accipiendum est, ut patri eius competat actio. ut puta nepoti facta iniuria est, pater praesens est, avus abest: scribit Iulianus patri potius dandam iniuriarum actionem quam ipsi nepoti: ad cuius, inquit, officium pertinet etiam vivente avo filium suum in omnibus tueri. 19Idem Iulianus scribit filium non tantum ipsum agere debere, verum procuratorem dare posse: alioquin, inquit, nisi ei permiserimus procuratorem dare, futurum est, ut, si valetudine impediatur neque sit qui iniuriarum actionem exequatur, impediatur actio. 20Idem ait, et si nepoti facta sit iniuria et nemo sit, qui avi nomine agat, permittendum esse patri experiri, et is procuratorem dabit. omnibus enim, qui suo nomine actionem habent, procuratoris dandi esse potestatem: intellegi autem filium, inquit, familias suo nomine agere, cum patre cessante praetor ei agere permittat. 21Si filius familias iniuriarum egerit, patri actio non competit. 22Idem ait filio familias iniuriarum nomine actionem dari, quotiens nemo est, qui patris nomine experiatur, et hoc casu quasi patrem familiae constitui. quare sive emancipatus sit sive ex parte heres scriptus fuerit vel etiam exheredatus sive paterna hereditate abstinuerit, executionem litis ei dandam: esse enim perabsurdum, quem praetor manente patria potestate ad actionem admittendum probaverit, ei patri familias ultionem iniuriarum suarum eripi et transferri ad patrem, qui eum, quantum in ipso est, omiserit, aut, quod est indignius, ad heredes patris, ad quos non pertinere iniuriam filio familias factam procul dubio est.
17 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVII. If, however, I have done this with the permission of one alone, and thinking that he was the sole owner of the slave, the action for injury will not lie in favor of anyone. If I knew that the slave belonged to several persons, the action will not lie in favor of the owner who permitted me to strike the slave, but it will lie in favor of the others. 1Where torture has been inflicted by order of a guardian, an agent, or a curator, it must be said that the action for injury will not lie. 2My slave was scourged by our magistrate at your solicitation, or upon your complaint. Mela thinks that an action for injury should be granted me against you for an amount which may seem to the court to be equitable. And Labeo says that if the slave should die, his master can bring suit, because damage committed by means of injury is involved. This opinion was adopted by Trebatius. 3Some injuries inflicted by freemen seem to be slight and of no importance, but when inflicted by slaves they are serious; for the insult increases on account of the person who offered it. 4When a slave inflicts an injury, it is clear that he commits an offence. Therefore, it is reasonable, as in the case of other crimes, that a noxal action for damages sustained should be granted under such circumstances. The master, however, if he prefers to do so, can bring the slave into court in order to have him whipped, and in this way satisfy the person who sustained the injury. It will not be necessary for the master to give him up to be whipped, but the power will be granted him to surrender his slave for that purpose; or if the injured party is not satisfied with having him whipped, the slave should be surrendered by way of reparation, or the amount of damages appraised in court should be paid. 5The Prætor says, “In the discretion of the judge,” which means that of a good citizen, in order that he may impose the measure of the punishment. 6If, before the master produces the slave in court to be whipped, in order to satisfy the complainant, this having been done by the authority of a magistrate, the plaintiff afterwards should insist upon bringing an action for injury, he should not be heard, for he who has received satisfaction has abandoned the injury he sustained; for if he acted voluntarily, it may undoubtedly be said that the right of action for injury will be extinguished no less than if it had been annulled by lapse of time. 7If a slave should inflict an injury by the order of his master, the latter can certainly be sued, even in his own name. Where, however, it is stated that the slave has been manumitted, it is held by Labeo that an action can be granted against him, because the injury follows the person, and a slave should not obey his master in all things. But if he should kill anyone by order of his master, we exempt him from the operation of the Cornelian Law. 8It is clear when he commits some act for the purpose of defending his master, that he has reason in his favor, and that he can plead an exception if he is prosecuted for what he has done. 9If the slave, in whom I have the usufruct, commits an injury against me, I can bring a noxal action against his owner, nor should my condition be rendered any worse because I have only an usufruct in him, than if I did not have it. The rule is otherwise where the slave is owned in common, for then we will not grant an action to the other joint-owner, for the reason that he himself is liable to one for injury. 10The Prætor says: “If someone is alleged to have committed an injury against a person who is under the control of another, and he to whose authority he is subject, or anyone who can act in his name as agent is not present, I will, upon proper cause being shown, grant an action to him who is said to have sustained the injury.” 11When a son under paternal control has suffered an injury, and his father was present, but cannot bring suit on account of being insane, or because of some other affection of the mind, I think that an action for injury will lie; for in this instance the father is considered as being absent. 12If the father is present, but is unwilling to bring suit, either because he wishes to postpone it, or abandon, or pardon the injury, the better opinion is that the right of action should not be granted to the son; for, when the father is absent, the action is granted to the son for the reason that it is probable that his father would have brought it if he had been present. 13Sometimes, however, we think that even if the father excuses the injury, the action should be granted to the son, for instance, if the character of the father is vile and abject, and that of the son is honorable; for a father who is extremely contemptible should not estimate the insult offered to his son by his own degradation. Suppose, for example, the father to be a person for whom, by law and reason, a curator should be appointed by the Prætor. 14If, however, the father, after issue has been joined, should depart or neglect to prosecute the case, or is of inferior rank, it must be said that the right of action can be transferred to the son, if proper cause is shown. The same rule will apply where the son is emancipated. 15The Prætor gave the preference to the agent of the father over the persons themselves who suffered the injury. When, however, the agent neglects the case, is in collusion with the other parties, or is not able to prosecute those who have committed the injury, the action will rather lie in favor of him who suffered it. 16We understand an agent to be not a person who has been specially appointed an attorney to conduct an action for injury, but it will be sufficient if the administration of all the property has been entrusted to him. 17Where, however, the Prætor says that if proper cause is shown an action will be granted to him who is said to have sustained the injury, this must be understood to mean that when the investigation is made, it must be ascertained how long the father has been absent, and when he is expected to return, and whether the person who desires to bring suit for injury is indolent, or altogether worthless, and not capable of transacting any business, and on this account is not fitted to bring this action. 18When he afterwards says, “Who has sustained the injury,” this must sometimes be understood to mean that his father will be entitled to bring the action; for instance, where the injury has been inflicted upon a grandson, and his father was present, but his grandfather was not. Julianus says that the action for injury should be granted to the father rather than to the grandson himself, for he holds it is the duty of the father, even while the grandfather is living, to protect his son against everything. 19Julianus also says that the son can not only bring the action himself, but can also appoint an attorney to do so. Otherwise, he says, if we do not permit him to appoint an attorney, and he should happen to be prevented from appearing by illness, and there is no one to conduct the action for injury, it must be dismissed. 20He also says that when an injury is inflicted upon a grandson, and there is no one to bring suit in the name of the grandfather, the father should be permitted to do so, and can appoint an attorney; for the power of appointing an attorney is conceded to all those who have the right to bring suit in their own names. Moreover, he asserts that a son should be considered as bringing the action in his own name, for, when his father fails to do so, the Prætor will give him permission to bring it. 21If a son under the control of his father brings the action for injury, it will not lie in favor of his father. 22He also says that an action on account of injury is granted to a son under paternal control when there is no one who can act in the name of the father, and that, in this instance, he is considered the head of the household. Wherefore, if he has been emancipated, or should be appointed a testamentary heir, or even if he is disinherited or has rejected his father’s estate, authority to conduct the case shall be granted him; for it would be perfectly absurd that anyone, whom the Prætor would permit to bring the action, while he was under the control of his father, should be rendered incapable of avenging his injuries, after he had once become the head of a household, and that this privilege should be transferred to his father, who had abandoned him as far as it was in his power to do so; or (which is still more improper) if it should be transferred to the heirs of the father, who, there is no doubt, are not in any way interested in an injury inflicted upon a son under paternal control.
18 Paulus libro quinquagensimo quinto ad edictum. Eum, qui nocentem infamavit, non esse bonum aequum ob eam rem condemnari: peccata enim nocentium nota esse et oportere et expedire. 1Si servus servo fecerit iniuriam, perinde agendum, quasi si domino fecisset. 2Si nupta filia familiae iniuriam acceperit et vir et pater iniuriarum agant, Pomponius recte putat tanti patri condemnandum esse reum, quanti condemnetur, si ea vidua esset, viro tanti, quanti condemnaretur, si ea in nullius potestate esset, quod sua cuiusque iniuria propriam aestimationem haberet. et ideo si nupta in nullius potestate sit, non ideo minus eam iniuriarum agere posse, quod et vir suo nomine agat. 3Si iniuria mihi fiat ab eo, cui sim ignotus, aut si quis putet me Lucium Titium esse, cum sim Gaius Seius: praevalet, quod principale est, iniuriam eum mihi facere velle: nam certus ego sum, licet ille putet me alium esse quam sum, et ideo iniuriarum habeo. 4At cum aliquis filium familias patrem familias putat, non potest videri iniuriam patri facere, non magis quam viro, si mulierem viduam esse credat, quia neque in personam eorum confertur iniuria nec transferri personae putationem ex persona filiorum ad eos potest, cum affectus iniuriam facientis in hunc tamquam in patrem familias consistat. 5Quod si scisset filium familias esse, tamen, si nescisset, cuius filius esset, dicerem, inquit, patrem suo nomine iniuriarum agere posse: nec minus virum, si ille nuptam esse sciret: nam qui haec non ignorat, cuicumque patri, cuicumque marito per filium, per uxorem vult facere iniuriam.
18 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LV. It is neither proper nor just for anyone to be condemned for speaking ill of a person who is guilty; for it is both necessary and expedient for the offences of guilty persons to be known. 1When one slave inflicts an injury upon another, an action should be brought just as if he had injured his master. 2If a daughter under paternal control, who is married, should sustain an injury, both her husband and her father can bring the action for injury. Pomponius very properly holds that judgment against the defendant should be rendered in favor of the father for an amount equal to what it would have been if she were a widow; and in favor of the husband, for the same amount, just as if she was independent; because the injury sustained by each party has its own distinct valuation. Therefore, if the married woman is under no one’s control, she cannot bring the action, because her husband can bring it in her name. 3If an injury should be inflicted upon me by someone to whom I am unknown, or if anyone thinks that I am Lucius Titius, when I am Gaius Seius, the principal matter here will have the preference, that is, the fact that he desired to injure me. For I am a certain individual, although he may think that I am some other person than myself, and therefore I will be entitled to an action for injury. 4But when anyone thinks that a son under paternal control is the head of a household, he cannot be considered to have committed an injury against the father of the latter any more than against the husband, if he believes his wife to be a widow, because the injury is not personally aimed at the parties concerned, and cannot be transferred from their children to them by a mere effort of the mind; since the intention of him who inflicts the injury does not extend beyond the aggrieved person, who is regarded as the head of the household. 5If, however, he was aware that he was a son under paternal control, but still did not know whose son he was, I would hold (so he says) that the father could bring an action for injury in his own name, just as a husband could do, if he knew that the woman was married; for he who is aware of these things intends to inflict an injury through the son, or the wife, upon any father or husband whomsoever.
19 Gaius libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum provinciale. Si creditor meus, cui paratus sum solvere, in iniuriam meam fideiussores meos interpellaverit, iniuriarum tenetur.
19 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXII. If my creditor, whom I am ready to pay, should attack my sureties for the purpose of injuring me, he will be liable to an action for injury.
20 Modestinus libro duodecimo responsorum. Si iniuriae faciendae gratia Seia domum absentis debitoris signasset sine auctoritate eius, qui concedendi ius potestatemve habuit, iniuriarum actionem intendi posse respondit.
20 Modestinus, Opinions, Book XII. If Seia, for the purpose of inflicting injury, seals up the house of her absent debtor, without the authority of the magistrate who has the right and the power to allow this, he gave it as his opinion that the action for injury could be brought.
21 Iavolenus libro nono epistularum. Iniuriarum aestimatio non ad id tempus, quo iudicatur, sed ad id, quo facta est, referri debet.
21 Javolenus, Epistles, Book IX. The estimate of the injury sustained should not date from the time when judgment was rendered, but from the time when the injury was committed.
22 Ulpianus libro primo ad edictum praetoris. Si liber pro fugitivo adprehensus erit, iniuriarum cum eo agit.
22 Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Prætor, Book I. If a freeman is arrested as a fugitive slave, he can bring an action for injury against the person who seizes him.
23 Paulus libro quarto ad edictum. Qui in domum alienam invito domino introiret, quamvis in ius vocat, actionem iniuriarum in eum competere Ofilius ait.
23 Paulus, On the Edict, Book IV. Ofilius says that anyone who enters the house of another against the will of the owner, even though the latter may be summoned to court, he will be entitled to an action for injury against him.
24 Ulpianus libro quinto decimo ad edictum praetoris. Si quis proprium servum distrahere prohibetur a quolibet, iniuriarum experiri potest.
24 Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Prætor, Book XV. Where anyone is prevented by another from selling his own slave, he can bring an action for injury sustained.
25 Idem libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Si stuprum serva passa sit, iniuriarum actio dabitur: aut, si celavit mancipium vel quid aliud furandi animo fecit, etiam furti: vel, si virginem inmaturam stupraverit, etiam legis Aquiliae actionem competere quidam putant.
25 The Same, On the Edict, Book XVIII. If anyone should have intercourse with a female slave, an action for injury will be granted to her master, but if he conceals the slave, or does something else with the intention of stealing, he will also be liable to an action for theft; or, if anyone should have intercourse with a young girl who was not mature, some authorities think that the action under the Aquilian Law will also lie.
26 Paulus libro nono decimo ad edictum. Si quis servum meum vel filium ludibrio habeat licet consentientem, tamen ego iniuriam videor accipere: veluti si in popinam duxerit illum, si alea luserit. sed hoc utcumque tunc locum habere potest, quotiens ille qui suadet animum iniuriae faciendae habet. atquin potest malum consilium dare et qui dominum ignoret: et ideo incipit servi corrupti actio necessaria esse.
26 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. If anyone makes a laughing-stock of my slave or my son, even with his consent, I will still be considered to have sustained an injury; as, for instance, if he takes him to a tavern, or induces him to throw dice. This will always be the case when the person who persuades him does so with the intention of injuring me. However, evil advice may be given by one who does not know who the master is, and hence the action for corrupting a slave becomes necessary.
27 Idem libro vicensimo septimo ad edictum. Si statua patris tui in monumento posita saxis caesa est, sepulchri violati agi non posse, iniuriarum posse Labeo scribit.
27 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXVII. If the statue of your father, erected on his monument, is broken by having stones thrown at it, Labeo says that an action for violating a tomb cannot be brought, but that one for injury can.
28 Ulpianus libro trigensimo quarto ad Sabinum. Iniuriarum actio in bonis nostris non computatur, antequam litem contestemur.
28 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXXIV. The action for injury does not affect our property until issue has been joined.
29 Paulus libro decimo ad Sabinum. Si servum, cuius nomine iniuriarum actio tibi competit, manumiseris aut alienaveris, superest tibi iniuriarum actio.
29 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book X. If you manumit or alienate a slave, on whose account you are entitled to an action for injury, you will retain the right to bring the action.
30 Ulpianus libro quadragensimo secundo ad Sabinum. Servo autem manumisso non competere actionem ob iniuriam, quam in servitute passus est, quis dubitet? 1Si filio iniuria facta sit, cum utrique tam filio quam patri adquisita actio sit, non eadem utique facienda aestimatio est,
30 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLII. Who doubts that, after a slave has been manumitted, an action will not lie for an injury which he sustained while in servitude? 1If an injury has been inflicted upon a son, while the right of action will be acquired by the son as well as the father, the same estimate should not be made for both:
31 Paulus libro decimo ad Sabinum. cum possit propter filii dignitatem maior ipsi quam patri iniuria facta esse.
31 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book II. As the injury done to the son may be greater than that done to the father, on account of the superior rank of the former.
32 Ulpianus libro quadragensimo secundo ad Sabinum. Nec magistratibus licet aliquid iniuriose facere. si quid igitur per iniuriam fecerit magistratus vel quasi privatus vel fiducia magistratus, iniuriarum potest conveniri. sed utrum posito magistratu an vero et quamdiu est in magistratu? sed verius est, si is magistratus est, qui sine fraude in ius vocari non potest, exspectandum esse, quoad magistratu abeat. quod et si ex minoribus magistratibus erit, id est qui sine imperio aut potestate sunt magistratus, et in ipso magistratu posse eos conveniri.
32 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLII. Magistrates are not allowed to do anything by which an injury may be caused. Therefore, if a magistrate, either as a private individual, or in his magisterial capacity, is instrumental in committing injury, he can be sued for injury. But will it be necessary to wait until he has relinquished his office, or can the suit be brought while he still holds it? The better opinion is, that if he is a magistrate who cannot legally be summoned to court, it will be necessary to wait until he relinquishes his office. If, however, he is one of the inferior magistrates, that is to say, one of those not invested with supreme jurisdiction or authority, he can be sued, even while he is still discharging his judicial duties.
33 Paulus libro decimo ad Sabinum. Quod rei publicae venerandae causa secundum bonos mores fit, etiamsi ad contumeliam alicuius pertinet, quia tamen non ea mente magistratus facit, ut iniuriam faciat, sed ad vindictam maiestatis publicae respiciat, actione iniuriarum non tenetur.
33 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book X. When anything is done in compliance with the dictates of morality for the purpose of protecting the interests of the State, and this causes anyone to be insulted, nevertheless, for the reason that the magistrate did not act with the intention of causing injury, but had in view the vindication of the majesty of the Republic, he will not be liable to an action for injury.
34 Gaius libro tertio decimo ad edictum provinciale. Si plures servi simul aliquem ceciderint aut convicium alicui fecerint, singulorum proprium est maleficium et tanto maior iniuria, quanto a pluribus admissa est. immo etiam tot iniuriae sunt, quot et personae iniuriam facientium.
34 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XIII. Where several slaves together have beaten someone, or have raised a tumultuous clamor against him, each of them, individually, is guilty of the offence, and the injury is all the greater, since it was committed by slaves; and, indeed, there are the same number of injuries as there are persons responsible for them.
35 Ulpianus libro tertio de omnibus tribunalibus. Si quis iniuriam atrocem fecerit, qui contemnere iniuriarum iudicium possit ob infamiam suam et egestatem, praetor acriter exequi hanc rem debet et eos, qui iniuriam fecerunt, coercere.
35 Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book III. Where anyone commits an atrocious act who can, on account of his infamous character and poverty, disregard a judgment rendered against him in an action for injury, the Prætor should exercise all his severity in the prosecution of the case, and the punishment of those who committed the injury.
36 Iulianus libro quadragensimo quinto digestorum. Si filii nomine cum patre iniuriarum agere velim et is procuratorem det, non intellegitur filius defendi, nisi iudicatum solvi satisdetur: et ideo actio adversus filium, tamquam a patre non defendatur, danda erit.
36 Julianus, Digest, Book XLV. If I desire to bring an action in the name of a son against his father, and the latter appoints an attorney, the son is not considered to be defended unless he gives security for the payment of the judgment; and therefore an action should be granted against him just as if he was not defended by his father.
37 Marcianus libro quarto decimo institutionum. Constitutionibus principalibus cavetur ea, quae infamandi alterius causa in monumenta publica posita sunt, tolli de medio. 1Etiam ex lege Cornelia iniuriarum actio civiliter moveri potest condemnatione aestimatione iudicis facienda.
37 Marcianus, Institutes, Book XIV. It is provided by the Imperial Constitutions that anything placed upon public monuments for the purpose of defaming another shall be removed. 1The action for injury can even be brought civilly under the Cornelian Law, and the amount of the judgment be estimated by the judge.
38 Scaevola libro quarto regularum. Senatus consulto cavetur, ne quis imaginem imperatoris in invidiam alterius portaret: et qui contra fecerit, in vincula publica mittetur.
38 Scævola, Rules, Book IV. It is provided by a decree of the Senate that no one shall carry the statue of the Emperor for the purpose of exciting odium against anyone, and that he who violates it shall publicly be placed in chains.
39 Venuleius libro secundo publicorum iudiciorum. Vestem sordidam rei nomine in publico habere capillumve summittere nulli licet, nisi ita coniunctus est adfinitati, ut invitus in reum testimonium dicere cogi non possit.
39 Venuleius, Public Prosecutions, Book II. No one is permitted to wear filthy clothing or long hair in public under the name of an accused person, unless he is so closely connected with him by affinity that he cannot be compelled to testify against him in opposition to his will.
40 Macer libro secundo publicorum iudiciorum. Divus Severus Dionysio Diogeni ita scripsit: ‘Atrocis iniuriae damnatus in ordine decurionum esse non potest. nec prodesse tibi debet error praesidum aut eius, qui de te aliquid pronuntiavit, aut eorum, qui contra formam iuris mansisse te in ordine decurionum putaverunt’.
40 Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. The Divine Severus wrote to Dionysius Diogenes, as follows: “Anyone who has been condemned for an atrocious injury cannot belong to the Order of Decurions; and the error of a Governor or of anyone else who has rendered a different decision on the point in controversy will not benefit you, nor will that of those who, in opposition to the established law, held that you still retained your membership in the Order of Decurions.”
41 Neratius libro quinto membranarum. Pater, cuius filio facta est iniuria, non est impediendus, quo minus duobus iudiciis et suam iniuriam persequatur et filii.
41 Neratius, Parchments, Book III. A father, against whose son an injury has been committed, should not be prevented from bringing suit for his own injury and that of his son, by two different proceedings.
42 Paulus libro quinto sententiarum. Iudici ab appellatoribus convicium fieri non oportet: alioquin infamia notantur.
42 Paulus, Sentences, Book V. Parties who are conducting a case should not raise their voices against the judge, otherwise they will be branded with infamy.
43 Gaius libro tertio regularum. Qui iniuriarum actionem per calumniam instituit, extra ordinem damnatur: id est exilium aut relegationem aut ordinis amotionem patiatur.
43 Gaius, Rules, Book III. Anyone who brings an action for injury against another for the purpose of annoyance shall be condemned by extraordinary proceedings, that is to say he shall either suffer exile, deportation, or expulsion from his order.
44 Iavolenus libro nono ex posterioribus Labeonis. Si inferiorum dominus aedium superioris vicini fumigandi causa fumum faceret, aut si superior vicinus in inferiores aedes quid aut proiecerit aut infuderit, negat Labeo iniuriarum agi posse: quod falsum puto, si tamen iniuriae faciendae causa inmittitur.
44 Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book IX. If the owner of a lower house causes smoke to affect the building of his neighbor above him, or if a neighbor occupying a higher house throws or pours anything upon that of another, which is situated below, Labeo says that an action for injury cannot be brought. I think that this is not true provided it was thrown down upon the neighbor’s premises for the purpose of injuring him.
45 Hermogenianus libro quinto epitomarum. De iniuria nunc extra ordinem ex causa et persona statui solet. et servi quidem flagellis caesi dominis restituuntur, liberi vero humilioris quidem loci fustibus subiciuntur, ceteri autem vel exilio temporali vel interdictione certae rei coercentur.
45 Hermogenianus, Epitomes, Book V. So far as injuries are concerned, it is customary at present to pass sentence arbitrarily, according to the circumstances and the person. Slaves who have been scourged are restored to their masters; freemen of inferior ranks are whipped with rods; and others are punished either with temporary exile, or by the interdiction of certain property.