Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLVI4,
De acceptilatione
Liber quadragesimus sextus
IV.

De acceptilatione

(Concerning Release.)

1Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro se­cun­do re­gu­la­rum. Ac­cep­ti­la­tio est li­be­ra­tio per mu­tuam in­ter­ro­ga­tio­nem, qua utrius­que con­tin­git ab eo­dem ne­xu ab­so­lu­tio.

1Modestinus, Rules, Book II. A release is a discharge from liability through mutual interrogation, by means of which both parties are freed from compliance with the same contract.

2Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. Pu­pil­lum per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem et­iam si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te li­be­ra­ri pos­se pla­cet.

2Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXIV. It is established that a ward can be discharged from liability by means of a release, without the authority of his guardian.

3Pau­lus li­bro quar­to ad Sa­binum. Per pro­cu­ra­to­rem nec li­be­ra­ri nec li­be­ra­re quis­quam ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne si­ne man­da­to pot­est.

3Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV. No one can be freed from liability through an agent, nor can anyone be discharged by a release without a mandate.

4Pom­po­nius li­bro no­no ad Sa­binum. Ac­cep­ti­la­tio sub con­di­cio­ne fie­ri non pot­est.

4Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book IX. A release cannot be granted under a condition.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. In diem ac­cep­ti­la­tio fac­ta nul­lius est mo­men­ti: nam so­lu­tio­nis ex­em­plo ac­cep­ti­la­tio so­let li­be­ra­re.

5Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXXIV. A release to date from a certain time is of no force or effect, for a release discharges a person from liability in the same way as a payment.

6Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Plu­ri­bus sti­pu­la­tio­ni­bus fac­tis si pro­mis­sor ita ac­cep­to ro­gas­set: ‘quod ego ti­bi pro­mi­si, ha­bes­ne ac­cep­tum?’, si qui­dem ap­pa­ret, quid ac­tum est, id so­lum per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem sub­la­tum est: si non ap­pa­ret, om­nes sti­pu­la­tio­nes so­lu­tae sunt: dum­mo­do il­lud scia­mus, si ego aliud ac­cep­to tu­li, aliud tu ro­gas­ti, ni­hil va­le­re ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem.

6The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVII. Where several stipulations have been entered into, and the promisor demands a release, as follows, “Do you acknowledge the receipt of what I have promised you?” and it is clear to what reference is made, it alone will be disposed of by the release. If this is not clear, all of the stipulations will be extinguished, provided we bear in mind that if I had intended to grant the release of one debt, and you had asked for the release of another, the transaction will be void.

7Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Sa­ne et sic ac­cep­ti­la­tio fie­ri pot­est: ‘ac­cep­ta fa­cis de­cem?’ il­le re­spon­dit ‘fa­cio’.

7The Same, On Sabinus, Book L. It is certain that a release can be made as follows, “Do you acknowledge the receipt of ten aurei?” and the other party answers “I do.”

8Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad Sa­binum. An in­uti­lis ac­cep­ti­la­tio uti­le ha­beat pac­tum, quae­ri­tur: et ni­si in hoc quo­que con­tra sen­sum est, ha­bet pac­tum. di­cet ali­quis: pot­est er­go non es­se con­sen­sus? cur non pos­sit? fin­ga­mus eum, qui ac­cep­to fe­re­bat, scien­tem pru­den­tem­que nul­lius es­se mo­men­ti ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem sic ac­cep­to tu­lis­se: quis du­bi­tat non es­se pac­tum, cum con­sen­sum pa­cis­cen­di non ha­bue­rit? 1Ser­vus com­mu­nis sic­ut uni ex do­mi­nis sti­pu­la­ri pot­est, ita et­iam ac­cep­tum ro­ga­re uni ex do­mi­nis pot­est eum­que in so­li­dum li­be­rat: et ita Oc­ta­ve­nus pu­tat. 2Ac­cep­to li­be­ra­re ser­vus com­mu­nis al­te­rum ex do­mi­nis et­iam ab al­te­ro do­mi­no pot­est: id enim et La­beo­ni pla­cuit. de­ni­que li­bro pi­tha­non scrip­sit, si a pri­mo do­mi­no se­cun­do so­cio do­mi­no suo sti­pu­la­tus fue­rit, pos­se se­cun­dum ac­cep­to ro­ga­re et per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem pri­mum li­be­ra­re, quem ip­se ob­li­ga­ve­rat: sic fie­ri, ut per unum at­que eun­dem ser­vum et con­sti­tua­tur et tol­la­tur ob­li­ga­tio. 3Ac­cep­tum fie­ri non pot­est, ni­si quod ver­bis col­li­ga­tum est: ac­cep­ti­la­tio enim ver­bo­rum ob­li­ga­tio­nem tol­lit, quia et ip­sa ver­bis fit: ne­que enim pot­est ver­bis tol­li, quod non ver­bis con­trac­tum est. 4Fi­lius fa­mi­lias pro­mit­ten­do pa­trem ci­vi­li­ter non ob­li­gat, sed se ob­li­gat: prop­ter quod ac­cep­to ro­ga­re fi­lius fa­mi­lias pot­est, ut se li­be­ret, quia ip­se ob­li­ga­tus est, pa­ter au­tem ac­cep­tum ro­gan­do ni­hil agit, cum non sit ip­se ob­li­ga­tus, sed fi­lius. idem erit et in ser­vo di­cen­dum: nam et ser­vus ac­cep­to li­be­ra­ri pot­est, et tol­lun­tur et­iam ho­no­ra­riae ob­li­ga­tio­nes, si quae sunt ad­ver­sus do­mi­num. quia hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut iu­ris gen­tium sit ac­cep­ti­la­tio: et id­eo pu­to et Grae­ce pos­se ac­cep­tum fie­ri, dum­mo­do sic fiat, ut La­ti­nis ver­bis so­let: ἔχεις λαβὼν δηνάρια τόσα; ἔχω λαβών.

8The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. The question arises whether a release which is of no effect can include a valid agreement. It includes an agreement, unless the intention is otherwise. Someone may say, “Can it not then be a consent?” Why can it not be? Suppose that he who makes the release, being well aware that it will be of no effect, grants it; who would entertain any doubt that there was no agreement, since he did not have the consent required to render one valid? 1As a slave owned in common can stipulate for one of his masters, he can also receive a release for him, and by so doing, he entirely discharged him from liability. Octavenus is of the same opinion. 2A slave owned in common can receive a release from one of his masters for the discharge of the other; and this opinion is held by Labeo. Finally, in the Book of Probabilities, he says that if the slave has stipulated with his first master for the benefit of his second, who is his partner, he can demand a release from the second, and by means of it, release his first master, whom he himself had bound by an obligation. Hence it happens that an obligation is contracted and annulled by one and the same slave. 3Only a verbal contract can be dissolved by a release, for it destroys the oral obligation, as it, itself, is verbally made; for what has not been contracted by words cannot be annulled by them. 4A son under paternal control does not bind his father civilly by promising, but he binds himself. Hence a son under paternal control can ask for a release in order to be discharged from liability, because he himself is bound; but the father, by making the interrogatories with reference to the release, does not produce any legal effect, for the reason that not he himself, but his son, is bound. The same rule applies to the case of slaves; for a slave can be discharged by a release, and even prætorian obligations are extinguished if they are against the master, because this is our practice, and a release is part of the Law of Nations. Therefore, I think that the release can be expressed in the Greek language, provided the same formula is used as in Latin, that is, “Do you acknowledge the receipt of so many denarii?” “I do.”

9Pau­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Pars sti­pu­la­tio­nis ac­cep­to fie­ri pot­est non tan­tum, si sic di­cat: ‘ex num­mis de­cem, quos ti­bi pro­mi­si, quin­que ha­bes­ne ac­cep­tos?’, sed et si sic: ‘quod ego ti­bi pro­mi­si, id pro par­te di­mi­dia ha­bes­ne ac­cep­tum?’

9Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XII. A part of a stipulation can be annulled by a release, as where anyone says, “Do you acknowledge the receipt of five of the ten sesterces which I have promised to pay you?” And also if anyone should ask, “Do you acknowledge the receipt of half of what I have promised you?”

10Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sex­to ad Sa­binum. Sed et si non nu­me­ra­ta pe­cu­nia, sed cer­tum cor­pus, vel­uti ho­mo in sti­pu­la­tio­nem de­duc­tus est, pot­est ex par­te ac­cep­ti­la­tio fie­ri: quo mo­do et uni ex he­redi­bus ac­cep­tum fie­ri pot­est.

10Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXVI. If, however, it is not money, but some other property, as, for instance, a slave, which is the object of the stipulation, a release can be granted for a portion of the same, as it can be granted for the benefit of one of several heirs.

11Pau­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Spe­cies ad­quiren­di est li­be­ra­re do­mi­num ob­li­ga­tio­ne: et id­eo fruc­tua­rius quo­que ser­vus li­be­ra­re ac­cep­tum ro­gan­do fruc­tua­rium pot­est, quia ex re eius vi­de­tur ei ad­quire­re. sed et si usum tan­tum ha­be­mus, idem fiet. idem­que di­ce­mus et in eo, qui bo­na fi­de no­bis ser­vit, et in ce­te­ris, qui nos­tro iu­ri sub­iec­ti sunt. 1Sed et si ser­vo quod ip­se mi­hi pro­mi­sit ac­cep­tum fe­ce­ro, in­uti­les mi­hi erunt ad­ver­sus do­mi­num ho­no­ra­riae ac­tio­nes, quae de pe­cu­lio vel in rem ver­so dan­tur. 2Si ser­vus he­redi­ta­rius an­te ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem ac­cep­tum ro­get, quod de­func­tus pro­mi­sit, ve­rius pu­to con­tin­ge­re li­be­ra­tio­nem, ut per hoc he­redi­tas ip­sa li­be­re­tur. 3Sed et si do­mi­nus apud hos­tes sit, di­cen­dum est iu­re post­li­mi­nii con­fir­ma­ri ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem: nam et sti­pu­la­ri ei, qui apud hos­tes est, ser­vus pot­est.

11Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XII. One method of acquisition is the liberation of an owner from an obligation; and therefore a slave in whom someone has the usufruct can, by obtaining a release, discharge the usufructuary, because he will be considered to acquire the property of the latter. Even when we have only the use of property, the same rule applies. We say the same thing with reference to a person who is serving us in good faith as a slave, as well as to others subject to our authority. 1If, however, I release the slave who has himself promised to pay me, I cannot avail myself of any prætorian action against his master, which is granted with reference to peculium, or on account of the benefit accruing to property. 2Where a slave belonging to an estate, before it is entered upon, asks for a release which the deceased promised to give, I think that the better opinion is that he will be freed from liability, so that, in this manner, the estate itself will be released. 3But even if the master is in the hands of the enemy, it must be said that a release is confirmed by the right of postliminium; for a slave can stipulate for his master who is in the hands of the enemy.

12Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sex­to ad Sa­binum. Quod in diem vel sub con­di­cio­ne de­be­tur, ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne tol­li pot­est: sed ita id fac­tum ap­pa­re­bit, si con­di­cio sti­pu­la­tio­nis ex­ti­te­rit vel dies ve­ne­rit.

12Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXVI. Anything which is due from a certain date, or under a condition, can be disposed of by means of a release. This, however, will appear to be done only where the condition is complied with, or the time has arrived.

13Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Et per ius­iu­ran­dum li­ber­ti in­ter­po­si­tam ope­ra­rum ob­li­ga­tio­nem per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem tol­li ve­rius est. 1Si id, quod in sti­pu­la­tio­nem de­duc­tum est, di­vi­sio­nem non re­ci­piat, ac­cep­ti­la­tio in par­tem nul­lius erit mo­men­ti, ut pu­ta si ser­vi­tus fuit prae­dii rus­ti­ci vel ur­ba­ni. pla­ne si usus fruc­tus sit in sti­pu­la­tum de­duc­tus, pu­ta fun­di Ti­ti­a­ni, pot­erit pro par­te ac­cep­ti­la­tio fie­ri et erit re­si­duae par­tis fun­di usus fruc­tus. si ta­men viam quis sti­pu­la­tus ac­cep­to iter vel ac­tum fe­ce­rit, ac­cep­ti­la­tio nul­lius erit mo­men­ti: hoc idem est pro­ban­dum, si ac­tus ac­cep­to fue­rit la­tus. si au­tem iter et ac­tus ac­cep­to fue­rit la­tus, con­se­quens erit di­ce­re li­be­ra­tum eum, qui viam pro­mi­sit. 2Il­lud cer­tum est eum, qui fun­dum sti­pu­la­tus usum fruc­tum vel viam ac­cep­to fa­cit, in ea es­se cau­sa, ut ac­cep­ti­la­tio non va­leat: qui enim ac­cep­to fa­cit, vel to­tum vel par­tem eius, quod sti­pu­la­tus est, de­bet ac­cep­to fa­ce­re, hae au­tem par­tes non sunt, non ma­gis quam si quis do­mum sti­pu­la­tus ac­cep­to fe­rat ce­men­ta vel fe­nes­tras vel pa­rie­tem vel diae­tam. 3Si quis usum fruc­tum sti­pu­la­tus usum ac­cep­to tu­le­rit, si qui­dem sic tu­le­rit ac­cep­tum qua­si usu de­bi­to, li­be­ra­tio non con­tin­get: si ve­ro qua­si ex usu fruc­tu, cum pos­sit usus si­ne fruc­tu con­sti­tui, di­cen­dum est ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem va­le­re. 4Si is, qui ho­mi­nem sti­pu­la­tus est, Sti­chum ac­cep­to tu­le­rit, Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo quar­to di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem ali­quid egis­se tol­lis­se­que to­tam ob­li­ga­tio­nem: quod enim in­vi­to sti­pu­la­to­ri pro­mis­sor sol­ve­re pot­est, id et ac­cep­tum la­tum li­be­ra­tio­nem pa­riet. 5Eum, qui fun­dum sti­pu­la­tus est, non pos­se de do­lo ma­lo clau­su­lam ac­cep­tum fer­re con­stat: non enim in par­tem de­bi­ti id con­sti­tit, et aliud est quod de­be­tur, aliud quod ac­cep­to fer­tur. 6Si Sti­chum aut de­cem sub con­di­cio­ne sti­pu­la­tus Sti­chum ac­cep­tum fe­ce­rit et pen­den­te con­di­cio­ne Sti­chus de­ces­se­rit, de­cem in ob­li­ga­tio­ne ma­ne­bunt, per­in­de ac si ac­cep­ti­la­tio in­ter­po­si­ta non fuis­set. 7Si fi­de­ius­so­ri ac­cep­to fue­rit la­tum, cum reus re, non ver­bis fuis­set ob­li­ga­tus, an reus quo­que li­be­re­tur? et hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut, li­cet reus non sit ver­bis ob­li­ga­tus, ta­men ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne per fi­de­ius­so­rem li­be­re­tur. 8Si le­ga­to­rum sub con­di­cio­ne re­lic­to­rum fi­de­ius­so­ri da­to ac­cep­to la­tum sit, le­ga­ta de­be­bun­tur post­ea con­di­cio­ne eo­rum ex­is­ten­te. 9Qui ita sti­pu­la­tur a fi­de­ius­so­re: ‘quod Ti­tio cre­di­de­ro, fi­de tua es­se iu­bes?’, de­in­de, an­te­quam cre­de­ret, ac­cep­tum fe­cit fi­de­ius­so­ri, reus non li­be­ra­bi­tur, sed quan­do­que ei cre­di­tum fue­rit, te­ne­tur: nam et si fi­de­ius­so­rem non an­te li­be­ra­tum es­se cre­di­mus, quam cum fue­rit cre­di­tum reo, non ta­men reus an­ti­quio­re ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne, quam ob­li­ga­tio eius est, li­be­ra­ri po­tuit. 10Tu­tor, cu­ra­tor fu­rio­si ac­cep­tum fer­re non po­tuit, nec pro­cu­ra­tor qui­dem pot­est fa­ce­re ac­cep­tum: sed hi om­nes de­bent no­va­re (pos­sunt enim) et sic ac­cep­to fa­ce­re. ne his qui­dem ac­cep­to fie­ri pot­est, sed no­va­tio­ne fac­ta po­tue­runt li­be­ra­ri per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem. nam et in ab­sen­tium per­so­na hoc re­me­dio uti so­le­mus: sti­pu­la­mur ab ali­quo id no­van­di cau­sa, quod no­bis ab­sens de­bet, et ita ac­cep­to li­be­ra­mus, a quo sti­pu­la­ti su­mus: ita fiet, ut ab­sens no­va­tio­ne, prae­sens ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne li­be­re­tur. 11He­res quo­que et li­be­ra­re et li­be­ra­ri ac­cep­to pot­est et ho­no­ra­rii suc­ces­so­res. 12Ex plu­ri­bus reis sti­pu­lan­di si unus ac­cep­tum fe­ce­rit, li­be­ra­tio con­tin­git in so­li­dum.

13Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book L. It is better to say that the obligation for services promised by the oath of a freedman can be extinguished by a release. 1If what is the object of a stipulation is not susceptible of division, the release of a portion of it will be of no force or effect; as, for instance, where it is a servitude attaching to a rustic or an urban estate. It is clear that if an usufruct, for instance, of the Titian Estate, is the object of the stipulation, a release can be made for a part of it, and the usufruct of the remaining portion of the land will continue to exist. If, however, anyone should stipulate for a right of way, and a stipulation is granted for a right of passage, or a driveway, it will be of no effect. This opinion should also be adopted if a release is made for a driveway. But where a release is granted for both a passage and a driveway, the result will be that he who promised the right of way will be released. 2It is certain that anyone who stipulates for a tract of land, and consents to the release of the usufruct, or of a right of way through said land, commits an act which renders the release void; for he who grants a release must do so for the entire right, or that part of it which is included in the stipulation. These things, however, are not parts of the land, any more than if someone, having stipulated for a house, should give a release for the stones or windows, or for a wall, or a room. 3Ad Dig. 46,4,13,3Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 202, Note 1.Where anyone having stipulated for an usufruct gives a release for the use, and does so believing that only the use was due, there will be no release. If, however, he did this in order to deduct it from the usufruct, when the use can be established without the usufruct, it must be held that the release is valid. 4Where anyone who stipulated for a slave gives a receipt for Stichus, Julianus, in the Fifty-fourth Book of the Digest, says that the release has an effect, and that is to extinguish the entire obligation; for what the promisor can pay to the stipulator, even against his consent, being the object of the release, discharges the former from liability. 5Where anyone stipulates for a tract of land, it is decided that the clause having reference to fraud cannot be included in the release, for this does not constitute a part of the debt, as what is due is one thing, and what is released is another. 6If anyone stipulates for Stichus, or ten aurei, under a condition, and receipts for Stichus, or ten aurei, and while the condition is pending, Stichus dies, the ten aurei will remain in the obligation, just as if a release had not been given. 7If a release is granted to a surety, where the principal debtor was liable on account of the property, but not by words, will he also be released? It is our practice that, although the principal debtor may not be bound by words, still he will be discharged from liability on account of the release granted to his surety. 8When a surety is given for a legacy payable under a condition, and a release is given him, the legacy will be due as soon as the condition upon which its payment is dependent is complied with. 9Where anyone stipulates with a surety as follows, “Do you promise to be responsible for what I shall lend to Titius?” and then, before he lends him the money, he gives a release to the surety, the principal debtor will not be discharged, but when the money is lent to him he will be liable. For, although we think that the surety is not released before the money is lent to the principal debtor, still the latter cannot be discharged by a release which precedes his obligation. 10The guardian or curator of an insane person cannot consent to a release, nor can an agent do so, but all these persons must make novations; for, in this way, they can grant releases. Nor can a release be made for their benefit, but if a novation is made first, they can be discharged by means of a release. We are accustomed to apply this remedy with reference to an absent person, when we stipulate with someone for the purpose of making a novation of what the former owes us, and in this way we release him with whom we have stipulated. The result is that the absent person is released by the novation, and the one who is present is freed from liability by a release. 11An heir, as well as prætorian successors, can release others, and be released in this manner. 12Where one of several joint-stipulators grants a release, it will apply to the entire amount which is due.

14Pau­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Ni­si con­sen­tiat ac­cep­ti­la­tio cum ob­li­ga­tio­ne et ni­si ve­rum est, quod in ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne de­mons­tra­tur, im­per­fec­ta est li­be­ra­tio, quia ver­bis ver­ba ea de­mum resol­vi pos­sunt, quae in­ter se con­gruunt.

14Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XII. Unless the release agrees with the stipulation, and what is stated in the release is true, it is imperfect; because words cannot be annulled by words, unless they agree with one another.

15Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Si is qui Sti­chum pro­mi­sit ita in­ter­ro­get: ‘quod Sti­chum pro­mi­si, Sti­chum et Pam­phi­lum ha­bes­ne ac­cep­tos?’, pu­to rec­te ac­cep­to la­tum et pro su­per­va­cuo Pam­phi­li men­tio­nem fac­tam, quem­ad­mo­dum si is qui de­cem pro­mi­sit ita in­ter­ro­get: ‘quod ti­bi de­cem pro­mi­si, vi­gin­ti ha­bes­ne ac­cep­ta?’, et­iam de­cem no­mi­ne erit li­be­ra­tus.

15Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXVII. If anyone, who has promised Stichus, makes the following interrogation, “As I have promised Stichus, do you acknowledge the receipt of Stichus and Pamphilus?” I think that the receipt is valid, and that the mention of Pamphilus is merely superfluous; just as where a man who has promised ten aurei makes the following interrogation, “As I have promised you ten aurei, do you acknowledge the receipt of twenty?” he will be released from liability for ten.

16Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Si ex plu­ri­bus ob­li­ga­tis uni ac­cep­to fe­ra­tur, non ip­se so­lus li­be­ra­tur, sed et hi, qui se­cum ob­li­gan­tur: nam cum ex duo­bus plu­ri­bus­que eius­dem ob­li­ga­tio­nis par­ti­ci­pi­bus uni ac­cep­to fer­tur, ce­te­ri quo­que li­be­ran­tur, non quon­iam ip­sis ac­cep­to la­tum est, sed quon­iam vel­ut sol­vis­se vi­de­tur is, qui ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne so­lu­tus est. 1Si iu­di­ca­ti fi­de­ius­sor sit da­tus ac­cep­tus ei­que ac­cep­to la­tum sit, li­be­ra­bi­tur et iu­di­ca­tus.

16Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VII. Where a release is granted to one of several persons, who are liable, he alone will not be released, but also all of those who are liable with him; for whenever a release is granted to one of two or more persons who are liable under the same obligation, the others are also discharged, not because the release was granted to them, but because he who was freed from liability by the release was considered to have paid the debt. 1If a surety is granted for the payment of a judgment, and a release is given him, the person against whom the judgment was rendered will also be discharged from liability.

17Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo quar­to di­ges­to­rum. Qui ho­mi­nem aut de­cem sti­pu­la­tus est, si quin­que ac­cep­to fe­ce­rit, par­tem sti­pu­la­tio­nis per­emit et pe­te­re quin­que aut par­tem ho­mi­nis pot­est.

17Julianus, Digest, Book LIV. Where anyone stipulates for a slave or ten aurei, and receives a receipt for five, he extinguishes a part of the stipulation, and he can demand five, or the half of a slave.

18Flo­ren­ti­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo in­sti­tu­tio­num. Et uno ex plu­ri­bus con­trac­ti­bus vel cer­tis vel in­cer­tis vel, qui­bus­dam ex­cep­tis, ce­te­ris et om­ni­bus ex cau­sis una ac­cep­ti­la­tio et li­be­ra­tio fie­ri pot­est. 1Eius rei sti­pu­la­tio, quam ac­cep­tio se­qua­tur, a Gal­lo Aqui­lio ta­lis ex­po­si­ta est: ‘quid­quid te mi­hi ex qua­cum­que cau­sa da­re fa­ce­re opor­tet opor­te­bit prae­sens in diem­ve, qua­rum­que re­rum mi­hi te­cum ac­tio quae­que ad­ver­sus te pe­ti­tio vel ad­ver­sus te per­se­cu­tio est erit­ve, quod­ve tu meum ha­bes te­nes pos­si­des: quan­ti quae­que ea­rum re­rum res erit, tan­tam pe­cu­niam da­ri sti­pu­la­tus est Au­lus Age­rius, spopon­dit Nu­me­rius Ne­gi­dius’. ‘quod Nu­me­rius Ne­gi­dius Au­lo Age­rio pro­mi­sit spopon­dit, id ha­be­ret­ne a se ac­cep­tum, Nu­me­rius Ne­gi­dius Au­lum Age­rium ro­ga­vit, Au­lus Age­rius Nu­me­rio ne­gi­dio ac­cep­tum fe­cit’.

18Florentinus, Institutes, Book VIII. A release and a discharge from liability can be granted either in one, or in several contracts, whether they are certain or uncertain; or with reference to some, reserving the others; or for all of them, for any reason whatsoever. 1The following is the formula of a stipulation and a release, drawn up by Gallus Aquilius: “All that you owe, or shall owe me for any reason whatsoever, either now or after a certain date, for which I can now, or shall be able to bring suit against you, on a claim, or a right to collect; or any property of mine which you have, hold, or possess, and all the value of any of the things aforesaid, Aulus Agerius has stipulated for, and Numerius Nigidius has promised to pay. And Numerius Nigidius has asked Aulus Agerius if he acknowledges the receipt of what he promised him, and Aulus Agerius has granted a release for the same to Numerius Nigidius.”

19Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do re­gu­la­rum. Si ac­cep­to la­tum fue­rit ei, qui non ver­bis, sed re ob­li­ga­tus est, non li­be­ra­tur qui­dem, sed ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li vel pac­ti con­ven­ti se tue­ri pot­est. 1In­ter ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem et apo­cham hoc in­ter­est, quod ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne om­ni mo­do li­be­ra­tio con­tin­git, li­cet pe­cu­nia so­lu­ta non sit, apo­cha non alias, quam si pe­cu­nia so­lu­ta sit.

19Ulpianus, Rules, Book II. If a release should be granted to someone who is not bound by words, but by the property, he will not, indeed, be freed from liability, but he can defend himself by an exception on the ground of bad faith, or on that of an informal agreement. 1The following difference exists between a release and a receipt: by a release, absolute discharge from liability takes place, even if the money has not been paid; but a receipt does not have this effect, unless the money has actually been paid.

20Idem li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. Si ac­cep­to fue­rit la­ta ob rem iu­di­ca­tam clau­su­la, Mar­cel­lus ait ce­te­ras par­tes sti­pu­la­tio­nis eva­nuis­se: prop­ter hoc enim tan­tum in­ter­po­nun­tur, ut res iu­di­ca­ri pos­sit.

20The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVII. Where a release has been granted with reference to the clause providing for the payment of a judgment, Marcellus says that the remaining parts of the stipulation are extinguished, because they cannot be interposed except to enable the case to be decided.

21Ve­nu­leius li­bro un­de­ci­mo sti­pu­la­tio­num. Si sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­tum mi­hi da­tum no­van­di cau­sa sti­pu­la­tus sum et an­te ex­is­ten­tem con­di­cio­nem ac­cep­tum fe­ce­ro, Ner­va fi­lius ait, et­iam­si con­di­cio ex­ti­te­rit, ne­que ex tes­ta­men­to com­pe­ti­tu­ram ac­tio­nem, quia no­va­tio fac­ta sit, ne­que ex sti­pu­la­tu, quae ac­cep­ti­la­tio­ne so­lu­ta sit.

21Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XI. If I stipulate for the purpose of making a novation on account of a legacy which was bequeathed to me under a condition, and I release my right to it before the condition is fulfilled, Nerva, the son, says that even if the condition should be fulfilled, I will not be entitled to an action under the will, because a novation took place, nor can I bring one under the stipulation, as the right to do so has been extinguished by the release.

22Gaius li­bro ter­tio de ver­bo­rum ob­li­ga­tio­ni­bus. Ser­vus nec ius­su do­mi­ni ac­cep­tum fa­ce­re pot­est.

22Gaius, On Oral Obligations, Book III. A slave cannot give a release by the order of his master.

23La­beo li­bro quin­to pi­tha­non a Pau­lo epi­to­ma­to­rum. Si ego ti­bi ac­cep­tum fe­ci, ni­hi­lo ma­gis ego a te li­be­ra­tus sum. Paulus: im­mo cum lo­ca­tio con­duc­tio, emp­tio ven­di­tio con­ven­tio­ne fac­ta est et non­dum res in­ter­ces­sit, utrim­que per ac­cep­ti­la­tio­nem, tam­et­si ab al­ter­utra par­te dum­ta­xat in­ter­ces­sit, li­be­ran­tur ob­li­ga­tio­ne.

23Labeo, Epitomes of Probabilities, by Paulus, Book V. If I should make a release to you, I will not, for that reason, be freed from liability, so far as you are concerned. Paulus: But when a hiring, a lease, a purchase, or a sale has been made under an agreement, and the property has not yet been delivered, even though only one of the contracting parties may have consented to a release, all of them, however, will be discharged.