De duobus reis constituendis
(Concerning the Liability of Two or More Promisors.)
1 Modestinus libro secundo regularum. Qui stipulatur, reus stipulandi dicitur: qui promittit, reus promittendi habetur.
1 Modestinus, Rules, Book II. The person who stipulates is called the contractor of the stipulation; he who promises is considered the contractor of the promise.
2 Iavolenus libro tertio ex Plautio. Cum duo eandem pecuniam aut promiserint aut stipulati sunt, ipso iure et singuli in solidum debentur et singuli debent: ideoque petitione acceptilatione unius tota solvitur obligatio.
2 Javolenus, On Plautius, Book III. When two persons have promised or stipulated for the same sum of money, each of them binds and is bound for the full amount by operation of law. Therefore, having made the demand, the entire obligation is discharged by the release of one of them.
3 Ulpianus libro quadragensimo septimo ad Sabinum. In duobus reis promittendi frustra timetur novatio: nam licet ante prior responderit posterior etsi ex intervallo accipiatur, consequens est dicere pristinam obligationem durare et sequentem accedere: et parvi refert, simul spondeant an separatim promittant, cum hoc actum inter eos sit, ut duo rei constituantur: neque ulla novatio fiet. 1Ubi duo rei facti sunt, potest vel ab uno eorum solidum peti: hoc est enim duorum reorum, ut unusquisque eorum in solidum sit obligatus possitque ab alterutro peti. et partes autem a singulis peti posse nequaquam dubium est, quemadmodum et a reo et fideiussore petere possumus. utique enim cum una sit obligatio, una et summa est, ut, sive unus solvat, omnes liberentur, sive solvatur, ab altero liberatio contingat.
3 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVII. Novation does not take effect where there are two promisors. For although one may answer first, and the other bind himself after an interval, the result will be that we must hold that the first obligation continues to exist, and that the second is accessory. It makes little difference whether the parties answered together, or separately, when it is their intention that there shall be two joint-debtors, and that a novation shall not take place. 1Where there are two joint-promisors, the entire amount can be demanded of one of them. For it is the nature of the obligation contracted by two joint-promisors that each one of them shall be bound for the entire amount, and that it can be demanded from either; and there is no doubt that half can be demanded from each one, just as can be done from the principal debtor and the surety. For, as there is but one obligation, only one sum of money is due, and if one of them pays it, both will be discharged from liability; or if it is paid by the other, discharge from liability will also result.
4 Pomponius libro vicensimo quarto ad Sabinum. Duo rei promittendi sive ita interrogati ‘spondetis?’ respondeant ‘spondeo’ aut ‘spondemus’, sive ita interrogati ‘spondes?’ respondissent ‘spondemus’, recte obligantur.
4 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXIV. Two joint-promisors are legally liable whether they are asked, “Do you both promise?” and they answer “I do” or “We do,” or if they are asked, “Do you promise as individuals?” and they answer, “We promise.”
5 Iulianus libro vicensimo secundo digestorum. Nemo est qui nesciat alienas operas promitti posse et fideiussorem adhiberi in ea obligatione. et ideo nihil prohibet duos reos stipulandi constitui vel promittendi, sicuti si ab eodem fabro duo rei stipulandi easdem operas stipulentur: et ex contrario duo fabri eiusdem peritiae easdem operas promittere intelleguntur et duo rei promittendi fieri.
5 Julianus, Digest, Book XXII. There is no one who is not aware that the services of others can be promised, and.that a surety can be furnished in an obligation of this kind, and therefore that nothing prevents the contract of two stipulators or two promisors from being entered into under such circumstances; as, for instance, where two joint-stipulators make an agreement for the same work to be performed by the same artisan; and, on the other hand, where two artisans, skilled in the same trade, promise to perform the same labor, and become joint-promisors.
6 Idem libro quinquagensimo secundo digestorum. Duos reos promittendi facturus si utrumque interrogavero, sed alter dumtaxat responderit, verius puto eum qui responderit obligari: neque enim sub condicione interrogatio in utriusque persona fit, ut ita demum obligetur, si alter quoque responderit. 1Duobus autem reis constitutis quin liberum sit stipulatori vel ab utroque vel ab altero dumtaxat fideiussorem accipere, non dubito. 2Sed si a duobus reis stipulandi interrogatus respondisset uni se spondere, ei soli tenetur. 3Duo rei sine dubio ita constitui possunt, ut et temporis ratio habeatur, intra quod uterque respondeat: modicum tamen intervallum temporis, item modicus actus, qui modo contrarius obligationi non sit, nihil impedit, quo minus duo rei sunt. fideiussor quoque interrogatus inter duorum reorum responsa si responderit, potest videri non impedire obligationem reorum, quia nec longum spatium interponitur nec is actus, qui contrarius sit obligationi.
6 The Same, Digest, Book LII. If I expect to have two joint-promisors, and interrogate both of them but only one answers, I think that the better opinion is that the one who answers is liable; for the interrogatory is not put to both of them under the condition that no obligation will be incurred if only one should reply. 1Where there are two joint-promisors, I entertain no doubt that the stipulator is at liberty to receive a surety from both, or only from one of them. 2Where anyone who is interrogated by two joint-stipulators answers one of them that he promises, he will be liable to him alone. 3Two joint-promisors can undoubtedly be bound in such a way that the time in which each of them gives his answer shall be taken into consideration. A reasonable interval of time, as well as an ordinary transaction (provided it is not contrary to the obligation), does not prevent two joint-promisors from becoming liable. A surety, also, who having been interrogated, answers between the two replies of the joint-promisor, is not considered to have interfered with their liability, because a long period of time has not intervened, and no act at variance with the terms of the obligation has been performed.
7 Florentinus libro octavo institutionum. Ex duobus reis promittendi alius in diem vel sub condicione obligari potest: nec enim impedimento erit dies aut condicio, quo minus ab eo, qui pure obligatus est, petatur.
7 Florentinus, Institutes, Book VIII. One of two joint-promisors can be bound from a specified day, or conditionally, for neither the day nor the condition will present any obstacle to prevent him who is absolutely liable from being sued.
8 Ulpianus libro primo responsorum. His verbis: ‘eaque praestari stipulanti tibi spopondimus’ interesse, quid inter contrahentes actum sit: nam si duo rei facti sint, eum qui absens fuit non teneri, praesentem autem in solidum esse obligatum, aut si minus, in partem fore obstrictum.
8 Ulpianus, Opinions, Book I. The intention of the contracting parties must be determined from the following words, “What we have promised to furnish you, as stipulator,” for if both of them have become joint-promisors, and one is absent, he will not be bound, but the one who is present will be liable for the entire amount; or if they are not joint-promisors, he only will be liable for his share.
9 Papinianus libro vicensimo septimo quaestionum. Eandem rem apud duos pariter deposui utriusque fidem in solidum secutus, vel eandem rem duobus similiter commodavi: fiunt duo rei promittendi, quia non tantum verbis stipulationis, sed et ceteris contractibus, veluti emptione venditione, locatione conductione, deposito, commodato testamento, ut puta si pluribus heredibus institutis testator dixit: ‘Titius et Maevius Sempronio decem dato’. 1Sed si quis in deponendo penes duos paciscatur, ut ab altero culpa quoque praestaretur, verius est non esse duos reos, a quibus inpar suscepta est obligatio. non idem probandum est, cum duo quoque culpam promisissent, si alteri postea pacto culpa remissa sit, quia posterior conventio, quae in alterius persona intercessit, statum et naturam obligationis, quae duos initio reos fecit, mutare non potest. quare si socii sint et communis culpa intercessit, etiam alteri pactum cum altero factum proderit. 2Cum duos reos promittendi facerem ex diversis locis, Capuae pecuniam dari stipulatus sim, ex persona cuiusque ratio proprii temporis habebitur: nam etsi maxime parem causam suscipiunt, nihilo minus in cuiusque persona propria singulorum consistit obligatio.
9 Papinianus, Questions, Book XXVII. If I deposit the same article, at the same time, with two persons, relying upon the good faith of both of them, for its full value: or if I loan the same article, in like manner, to two persons, they become joint-promisors; for the reason that liability is incurred not only under the terms of the stipulation, but also in other contracts, for instance, purchase, sale, hiring, lease, deposit, loan, or will; just as if, for example, a testator, after having appointed several heirs, had said, “Let Titius and Mævius pay ten aurei to Sempronius.” 1If anyone, while depositing property with two persons, provides that only one of them shall be liable for negligence, it is perfectly evident that they are not joint-promisors, as different obligations have been imposed upon them. The same opinion should not, however, be adopted where both of them promised to be liable for negligence, if afterwards, under an agreement, one of them was released from liability for negligence; because the subsequent agreement made with one of them cannot change the legal position and natural obligation which rendered them both joint-promisors in the beginning. Therefore, if they are partners, and were both guilty of negligence, the agreement made with one of them will also benefit the other. 2When I stipulate with two joint-promisors that money shall be paid to me at different places in Capua, the time having reference to each one of them must be taken into consideration. For although they have assumed what is in fact a single obligation, it is still susceptible of modification, so far as each of the promisors is concerned.
10 Idem libro trigensimo septimo quaestionum. Si duo rei promittendi socii non sint, non proderit alteri, quod stipulator alteri reo pecuniam debet.
10 The Same, Questions, Book XXXVII. If two joint-promisors are not partners, the fact that the stipulator owes a sum of money to one of them will be of no advantage to the other.
11 Idem libro undecimo responsorum. Reos promittendi vice mutua fideiussores non inutiliter accipi convenit. reus itaque stipulandi actionem suam dividere si velit (neque enim dividere cogendus est), poterit eundem ut principalem reum, item qui fideiussor pro altero exstitit, in partes convenire, non secus ac si duos promittendi reos divisis actionibus conveniret. 1Cum tabulis esset comprehensum ‘illum et illum centum aureos stipulatos’ neque adiectum ‘ita ut duo rei stipulandi essent’, virilem partem singuli stipulati videbantur. 2Et e contrario cum ita cautum inveniretur: ‘tot aureos recte dari stipulatus est Iulius Carpus, spopondimus ego Antoninus Achilleus et Cornelius Dius’, partes viriles deberi, quia non fuerat adiectum singulos in solidum spopondisse, ita ut duo rei promittendi fierent.
11 The Same, Opinions, Book XI. It is established that the acceptance of joint-promisors, who have become sureties for one another, is not illegal. Therefore, if the stipulator wishes to divide his action (for he is not compelled to divide it) he can sue the same person both as principal debtor, and surety for the other, to recover different parts of the amount due; just as if he proceed by separate actions against the two principal joint-promisors. 1Where it was stated in a written contract that So-and-So and So-and-So stipulated for a hundred aurei, and it was not added that they jointly stipulated, it was held that each of them had only stipulated for his share. 2On the other hand, where it is provided as follows, “Julius Carpus stipulates to pay so many aurei, and we, Antoninus Achilles, and Cornelius Dius, promise to pay them,” each of the promisors will owe his respective share; because it was not added that each had promised to be liable in full, so as to render them all jointly responsible.
12 Venuleius libro secundo stipulationum. Si ex duobus, qui promissuri sint, hodie alter, alter postera die responderit, Proculus non esse duos reos ac ne obligatum quidem intellegi eum, qui postera die responderat, cum actor ad alia negotia discesserit vel promissor, licet peractis illis rebus responderit. 1Si a Titio et pupillo sine tutoris auctoritate stipulatus fuero eadem decem, vel a servo, et quasi duos reos promittendi constitui, obligatum Titium solum Iulianus scribit, quamquam, si servus spoponderit, in actione de peculio eadem observari debent, ac si liber fuisset.
12 Venuleius, Stipulations, Book II. If, of two persons who are about to bind themselves by a promise, one answers to-day, and the other on the following day, they will not be jointly liable, and he who has answered on the next day is not even regarded as liable at all—as the stipulator, or the promisor turned aside for the transaction of other business—even though he made his reply after the said transaction had been concluded. 1If I stipulate for ten aurei with Titius and a ward without the authority of his guardian, or with a slave, and I have accepted them as two jointly liable promisors, Julianus says that Titius alone will be bound; although if a slave should promise, the same rule must be observed in an action for his peculium, as if he had been free.
13 Idem libro tertio stipulationum. Si reus promittendi altero reo heres extiterit, duas obligationes eum sustinere dicendum est. nam ubi quidem altera differentia obligationum esse possit, ut in fideiussore et reo principali, constitit alteram ab altera perimi: cum vero eiusdem duae potestatis sint, non potest repperiri qua altera potius quam alteram consummari. ideoque et si reus stipulandi heres exstiterit, duas species obligationis eum sustinere.
13 The Same, Stipulations, Book III. If a promisor should become the heir of the person jointly liable with him, it must be said that he is bound by two obligations; for where there is some difference between the obligations, as in the case of a surety and the principal debtor, it is established that one obligation is annulled by the other. When, however, the obligations are of the same nature, it cannot be determined why one of them should be disposed of rather than the other. Hence, if one joint-stipulator should become the heir of the other, he will be entitled to two distinct obligations.
14 Paulus, Manuals, Book II, And, even in prætorian stipulations, there can be two joint-stipulators.
15 Gaius libro secundo de verborum obligationibus. Si id, quod ego et Titius stipulamur, in singulis personis proprium intellegatur, non poterimus duo rei stipulandi constitui, veluti cum usum fructum aut dotis nomine dari stipulemur: idque et Iulianus scribit. idem ait, et si Titius et Seius decem aut Stichum, qui Titii sit, stipulati fuerint, non videri eos duos reos stipulandi, cum Titio decem tantum, Seio Stichus aut decem debeantur: quae sententia eo pertinet, ut, quamvis vel huic vel illi decem solverit vel Seio Stichum, nihilo minus alteri obligatus manet. sed dicendum est, ut, si decem alteri solverit, ab altero liberetur.
15 Gaius, On Oral Obligations. If Titius and I stipulate for anything, and it is understood to have reference to one of us in particular, we cannot act as joint-stipulators for the entire amount; as, for example, where we stipulate for an usufruct, or that property shall be given us by way of dowry, and this was stated by Julianus. He also says that if Titius and Seius stipulate for ten aurei, or Stichus, who belongs to Titius, they should not be considered as two joint-stipulator s, as only ten aurei will be due to Titius, and Stichus, or ten aurei will be due to Seius. The result of this opinion is, that whether he pays either of the stipulators ten aurei, or delivers Stichus to Seius, he will still remain liable to the other; but it must be held that if he pays ten aurei to either of them, he will be released from liability, so far as the other is concerned.
16 Idem libro tertio de verborum obligationibus. Ex duobus reis stipulandi si semel unus egerit, alteri promissor offerendo pecuniam nihil agit.
16 The Same, On Oral Obligations, Book III. If only one of two joint-stipulator s institutes legal proceedings at a time, the promisor will not be released by tendering money to the other.
17 Paulus libro octavo ad Plautium. Sive a certis personis heredum nominatim legatum esset, sive ab omnibus excepto aliquo, Atilicinus Sabinus Cassius pro hereditariis partibus totum eos legatum debituros aiunt, quia hereditas eos obligat. idem est, cum omnes heredes nominantur.
17 Paulus, On Plautius, Book VIII. Where certain heirs are specifically charged with a legacy, or all are charged excepting one, Atilicinus, Sabinus and Cassius say that they are all liable for the legacy in proportion to their respective shares of the estate, because the estate binds them. The same rule applies where all the heirs are mentioned.
18 Pomponius libro quinto ex Plautio. Ex duobus reis eiusdem Stichi promittendi factis alterius factum alteri quoque nocet.
18 Pomponius, On Plautius, Book V. Where two joint-promisors are bound to deliver the same slave, the act of one prejudices the other.
19 Idem libro trigensimo septimo ad Quintum Mucium. Cum duo eandem pecuniam debent, si unus capitis deminutione exemptus est obligatione, alter non liberatur. multum enim interest, utrum res ipsa solvatur an persona liberetur. cum persona liberatur manente obligatione, alter durat obligatus: et ideo si aqua et igni interdictum est [ed. maior alicuius] <ed. minor alicui> fideiussor postea ab eo datus tenetur.
19 The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXXVII. Where two joint-promisors owe the same sum of money, and one of them is released from his obligation through having forfeited his civil rights, the other will not be released. For it makes a great deal of difference whether the money itself is paid, or the person is released; since when one is released and the obligation continues to exist, the other will remain liable; therefore, if one of them has been excluded from water and fire, the surety of the other will afterwards be liable.