Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLIV4,
De doli mali et metus exceptione
Liber quadragesimus quartus
IV.

De doli mali et metus exceptione

(Concerning the Exception Founded on Fraud and Fear.)

1Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Quo lu­ci­dius in­tel­le­gi pos­sit haec ex­cep­tio, prius de cau­sa vi­dea­mus, qua­re pro­pos­i­ta sit, de­in­de, quem­ad­mo­dum do­lo fiat, per quae in­tel­le­ge­mus, quan­do ob­stet ex­cep­tio: de­in­de ad­ver­sus quas per­so­nas lo­cum ha­beat. no­vis­si­me in­spi­cie­mus, in­tra quae tem­po­ra com­pe­tit ex­cep­tio. 1Id­eo au­tem hanc ex­cep­tio­nem prae­tor pro­pos­uit, ne cui do­lus suus per oc­ca­sio­nem iu­ris ci­vi­lis con­tra na­tu­ra­lem ae­qui­ta­tem pro­sit. 2Sed an do­lo quid fac­tum sit, ex fac­to in­tel­le­gi­tur. 3Et qui­dem do­lo fit tam in con­trac­ti­bus quam in tes­ta­men­tis quam in le­gi­bus.

1Paulus, On the Edict, Book VII. In order that this exception may be more clearly understood, let us first consider the reason why it was introduced, and afterwards ascertain how fraud can be committed. By this means we will learn when this exception operates as a bar, and also against what persons it can be employed. Finally, we shall examine within what time it must be pleaded. 1The Prætor introduced this exception in order that no one could, by means of the Civil Law, profit by his own fraud against the rules of natural equity. 2In order to ascertain whether a fraudulent act has been committed, the facts of the case must be taken into consideration. 3Fraud is committed in contracts, in wills, and in the execution, of the laws.

2Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Pa­lam est au­tem hanc ex­cep­tio­nem ex ea­dem cau­sa pro­pos­i­tam, ex qua cau­sa pro­pos­i­ta est de do­lo ma­lo ac­tio. 1Se­qui­tur, ut vi­dea­mus, in qui­bus cau­sis lo­cum ha­beat ex­cep­tio et qui­bus per­so­nis ob­icia­tur. et qui­dem il­lud ad­no­tan­dum est, quod spe­cia­li­ter ex­pri­men­dum est, de cu­ius do­lo quis que­ra­tur, non in rem ‘si in ea re ni­hil do­lo ma­lo fac­tum est’, sed sic ‘si in ea re ni­hil do­lo ma­lo ac­to­ris fac­tum est’. do­ce­re igi­tur de­bet is, qui ob­icit ex­cep­tio­nem, do­lo ma­lo ac­to­ris fac­tum, nec suf­fi­ciet ei os­ten­de­re in re es­se do­lum: aut si al­te­rius di­cat do­lo fac­tum, eo­rum per­so­nas spe­cia­li­ter de­be­bit enu­me­ra­re, dum­mo­do hae sint, qua­rum do­lus no­ceat. 2Pla­ne ex per­so­na eius, qui ex­cep­tio­nem ob­icit, in rem op­po­ni­tur ex­cep­tio: ne­que enim quae­ri­tur, ad­ver­sus quem com­mis­sus sit do­lus, sed an in ea re do­lo ma­lo fac­tum sit a par­te ac­to­ris. 3Cir­ca pri­mam spe­ciem, qui­bus ex cau­sis ex­cep­tio haec lo­cum ha­beat, haec sunt, quae trac­ta­ri pos­sunt. si quis si­ne cau­sa ab ali­quo fue­rit sti­pu­la­tus, de­in­de ex ea sti­pu­la­tio­ne ex­pe­ria­tur, ex­cep­tio uti­que do­li ma­li ei no­ce­bit: li­cet enim eo tem­po­re, quo sti­pu­la­ba­tur, ni­hil do­lo ma­lo ad­mi­se­rit, ta­men di­cen­dum est eum, cum li­tem con­tes­ta­tur, do­lo fa­ce­re, qui per­se­ve­ret ex ea sti­pu­la­tio­ne pe­te­re: et si cum in­ter­po­ne­re­tur, ius­tam cau­sam ha­buit, ta­men nunc nul­lam ido­neam cau­sam ha­be­re vi­de­tur. pro­in­de et si cre­di­tu­rus pe­cu­niam sti­pu­la­tus est nec cre­di­dit et si cer­ta fuit cau­sa sti­pu­la­tio­nis, quae ta­men aut non est se­cu­ta aut fi­ni­ta est, di­cen­dum erit no­ce­re ex­cep­tio­nem. 4Item quae­ri­tur, si quis pu­re sti­pu­la­tus sit cer­tam quan­ti­ta­tem, quia hoc ac­tum sit, sed post sti­pu­la­tio­nem in­ter­po­si­tam pac­tus sit, ne in­ter­im pe­cu­nia us­que ad cer­tum diem pe­ta­tur, an no­ceat ex­cep­tio do­li. et qui­dem et de pac­to con­ven­to ex­ci­pi pos­se ne­qua­quam amb­igen­dum est: sed et si hac quis ex­cep­tio­ne uti ve­lit, ni­hi­lo mi­nus pot­erit: do­lo enim fa­ce­re eum, qui con­tra pac­tum pe­tat, ne­ga­ri non pot­est. 5Et ge­ne­ra­li­ter scien­dum est ex om­ni­bus in fac­tum ex­cep­tio­ni­bus do­li ori­ri ex­cep­tio­nem, quia do­lo fa­cit, qui­cum­que id, quod qua­qua ex­cep­tio­ne eli­di pot­est, pe­tit: nam et si in­ter in­itia ni­hil do­lo ma­lo fa­cit, at­ta­men nunc pe­ten­do fa­cit do­lo­se, ni­si si ta­lis sit igno­ran­tia in eo, ut do­lo ca­reat. 6Non ma­le dic­tum est, si cre­di­tor usu­ras in fu­tu­rum ac­ce­pe­rit, de­in­de pe­cu­niam ni­hi­lo mi­nus pe­tat, an­te­quam id tem­pus prae­ter­eat, cu­ius tem­po­ris usu­ras ac­ce­pit, an do­li ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­la­tur. et pot­est di­ci do­lo eum fa­ce­re: ac­ci­pien­do enim usu­ras dis­tu­lis­se vi­de­tur pe­ti­tio­nem in id tem­pus, quod est post diem usu­ra­rum prae­sti­ta­rum, et ta­ci­te con­ve­nis­se in­ter­im se non pe­ti­tu­rum. 7Item quae­ri­tur: si sta­tu­li­be­rum mer­ca­tus quis fue­rit ius­sum de­cem da­re, cum hoc igno­ra­ret, et du­plam sti­pu­la­tus fue­rit, de­in­de de­cem ac­ce­pe­rit evic­to eo in li­ber­ta­tem age­re ex du­plae sti­pu­la­tio­ne pot­est, sed ni­si de­cem, quae im­plen­dae con­di­cio­nis cau­sa ac­ce­pe­rit, de­du­xe­rit, ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ven­dus erit: et haec ita Iu­lia­nus quo­que scribsit. si ta­men ex re emp­to­ris vel ex pe­cu­lio, quod ad emp­to­rem per­ti­ne­bat, pe­cu­niam de­de­rit sta­tu­li­ber, pot­est di­ci ex­cep­tio­nem non no­ce­re, quia do­lo non fa­ce­ret.

2Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. It is clear that this exception was formulated for the same reason that the action on the ground of bad faith was introduced. 1In the next place, let us see in what cases there is ground for this exception, and against whom it may be pleaded. And, indeed, it must be noted, that he whose fraudulent act is complained of must be expressly mentioned, and that the formula in rem, “If any fraudulent act has been committed with reference to the matter,” should not be employed, but the following one, namely, “If no fraud has been committed by you as plaintiff.” Therefore, the party who pleads the exception must prove that the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud, and it will not be sufficient for him to show that fraud has merely been committed with reference to the case; or, if he alleges it has been committed by certain persons, he must specifically enumerate them; provided they are the parties responsible for the act by which he alleges that he has been injured. 2It is evident that the exception is employed in a proceeding in rem if we take into account the person who pleads it, for there is no doubt against whom the fraud was committed, but there is one as to whether or not the plaintiff committed it. 3The following matters may be discussed with reference to the First Section, where the causes giving rise to the exception are enumerated. If anyone stipulates with another without any consideration, and then institutes proceedings by virtue of this agreement, an exception on the ground of fraud can properly be pleaded against him; for although, at the time that the stipulation was entered into, he may not have been guilty of any fraudulent act, still it must be said that he committed fraud when he joined issue in the case, and persisted in asserting his claim under the said stipulation. And even if, at the time that the stipulation was made, he had a just cause of action, still it is held that one did not exist at the time of the joinder of issue. Hence, if anyone about to lend money enters into a stipulation, and the money is not lent, although there was a good consideration for the contract, still, as it was not executed, or was terminated, it must be said that the exception can be properly pleaded. 4The question is also asked, if anyone should stipulate absolutely for the payment of a certain sum of money, for the reason that this was the intention of the parties; but, after the stipulation was entered into, it was agreed that the money should not be demanded until a certain time, will an exception on the ground of fraud operate as a bar. And, indeed, there is no doubt whatever that an exception can be pleaded on the ground of an informal contract, as anyone who wishes to make use of this exception can do so; for it cannot be denied that he who makes a demand in violation of a contract which he entered into is guilty of fraud. 5Generally speaking, it should be noted that, in all cases where exceptions in factum are available, an exception on the ground of fraud can be pleaded in bar, because anyone is guilty of fraud who makes a demand which can be successfully opposed by any exception whatever; for if he did not commit fraud in the beginning, still, by making the claim now he is acting fraudulently, unless he was so ignorant of the facts as not to be guilty of bad faith. 6It has not improperly been asked, if a creditor accepts interest in advance on a loan, and persists in demanding payment of the principal before the time has passed for which he has collected the interest, whether he can be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. It may be said that he is guilty of fraud, for by accepting the interest he is understood to have deferred collection of the debt until the time had elapsed for which interest was paid, and that he tacitly agreed not to demand payment in the meantime. 7The question also arises, if anyone should buy a slave who was to be free on condition of paying ten aurei, and the purchaser, being ignorant of this fact, stipulated that, in case of the eviction of the slave, he should be entitled to double his price, and then received the ten aurei from the slave, and as the latter had been evicted, and had obtained his freedom, whether the purchaser could bring an action for double the amount by virtue of the stipulation. He would be barred by an exception, unless he deducted the ten aurei which he received for the purpose of complying with the condition. This was also stated by Julianus. If, however, the slave had paid the money out of the property of the purchaser, or out of his peculium which belonged to the latter, it may be said that an exception could not properly be pleaded, because he was not guilty of fraud.

3Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Item si ob id, quod, an­te­quam do­mi­nium ad me trans­fe­ra­tur, ven­di­to­ri de­de­rit de­cem, agam ex emp­to, ut de­cem re­ci­piam, ita pu­to com­pe­te­re mi­hi ac­tio­nem, si pa­ra­tus sim ex du­plae sti­pu­la­tio­ne eum li­be­ra­re.

3Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXI. But if, before the ownership of the slave was transferred to me, he should pay the ten aurei to the vendor, and I should bring an action on purchase in order to recover the ten aurei, I think that I would be entitled to this action, if I was ready to release him from the stipulation to pay double the amount of the price.

4Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Apud Cel­sum quae­ri­tur, si, cum Ti­tio man­das­sent cre­di­to­res he­redi­ta­rii, ut ad­iret he­redi­ta­tem, unus non man­das­set de­ci­pien­di eius cau­sa, man­da­tu­rus alio­quin, si non fo­ret hic ad­itu­rus, de­in­de agat, an ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­la­tur: et ait Cel­sus do­li eum ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­len­dum. 1Iu­lia­nus scribsit, si quis, cum ae­ger es­set, cen­tum au­reos uxo­ris suae con­so­bri­no spopon­dis­set, vo­lens sci­li­cet eam pe­cu­niam ad mu­lie­rem per­ve­ni­re, de­in­de con­va­lue­rit, an ex­cep­tio­ne uti pos­sit, si con­ve­nia­tur. et re­fert La­beo­ni pla­cuis­se do­li ma­li uti eum pos­se. 2Si in ar­bi­trum com­pro­mis­se­ri­mus, de­in­de cum non ste­tis­sem ob ad­ver­sam va­li­tu­di­nem, poe­na com­mis­sa est, an uti pos­sim do­li ex­cep­tio­ne? et ait Pom­po­nius prod­es­se mi­hi do­li ex­cep­tio­nem. 3Item quae­ri­tur, si cum eo, a quo ti­bi se­xa­gin­ta de­be­ren­tur, com­pro­mis­se­ris, de­in­de per im­pru­den­tiam poe­nam cen­tum sti­pu­la­tus fue­ris. La­beo pu­tat con­ve­ni­re of­fi­cio ar­bi­tri iu­be­re tan­tum ti­bi da­ri, quan­tum re ve­ra de­bea­tur, et, si non fiat, non ve­ta­re, ne quid am­plius pe­ta­tur: sed et­iam­si id omis­sum fue­rit, pe­ti pos­se quod de­be­tur La­beo di­cit, et si for­te poe­na pe­ta­tur, do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­nem pro­fu­tu­ram. 4Si quis pu­pil­lo sol­ve­rit si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te id quod de­buit ex­que ea so­lu­tio­ne lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus sit pu­pil­lus, rec­tis­si­me di­ci­tur ex­cep­tio­nem pe­ten­ti­bus no­ce­re: nam et si mu­tuam ac­ce­pe­rit pe­cu­niam vel ex quo alio con­trac­tu lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus sit, dan­dam es­se ex­cep­tio­nem. idem­que et in ce­te­ris erit di­cen­dum, qui­bus non rec­te sol­vi­tur: nam si fac­ti sint lo­cu­ple­tio­res, ex­cep­tio lo­cum ha­be­bit. 5Item La­beo scri­bit, si quis fu­gi­ti­vum es­se sciens eme­rit ser­vum et si sti­pu­la­tus fue­rit fu­gi­ti­vum non es­se, de­in­de agat ex sti­pu­la­tu, non es­se eum ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­len­dum, quon­iam hoc con­ve­nit (quam­vis ex emp­to ac­tio­nem non ha­be­ret): sed, si non con­ve­nis­set, ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­le­tur. 6Quod si is, cui pe­cu­nia de­bea­tur, cum de­bi­to­re de­ci­dit et no­men eius ven­di­dit Se­io, cui de­bi­tor man­da­ve­rat, ut no­men eme­ret, de­que ea re emp­tor sti­pu­la­tus est, de­in­de cre­di­tor eam pe­cu­niam re­ti­net, quam per iu­di­cem abs­tu­lit, an emp­tor ex sti­pu­la­tu pos­sit ex­per­i­ri? et Ofi­lius pu­tat, si ven­di­tor no­mi­nis pa­ra­tus non sit red­de­re, quan­tum ab emp­to­re ac­ce­pe­rit, non no­ci­tu­ram ex­cep­tio­nem do­li ma­li: et pu­to sen­ten­tiam Ofi­lii ve­ram. 7La­beo ait, si de ho­mi­ne pe­ti­tio se­cun­dum ac­to­rem fue­rit iu­di­ca­tum et ius­su iu­di­cis sa­tis­da­tum sit ho­mi­nem in­tra cer­tum diem tra­di, et, si tra­di­tus non fuis­set, poe­nam sti­pu­la­tus sit, pe­ti­to­rem, qui et ho­mi­nem vin­di­cat et poe­nam pe­tit, ex­cep­tio­ne es­se re­pel­len­dum: in­iquum enim es­se et ho­mi­nem pos­si­de­re et poe­nam ex­ige­re. 8Item quae­ri­tur, si unio­nes ti­bi pig­no­ri de­de­ro et con­ve­ne­rit, ut so­lu­ta pe­cu­nia red­de­ren­tur, et hi unio­nes cul­pa tua per­ie­rint et pe­cu­niam pe­tas. ex­stat Ner­vae et Ati­li­ci­ni sen­ten­tia di­cen­tium ita es­se ex­ci­pien­dum: ‘si in­ter me et te non con­ve­nit, ut so­lu­ta pe­cu­nia unio­nes mi­hi red­dan­tur’: sed est ve­rius ex­cep­tio­nem do­li ma­li no­ce­re de­be­re. 9Si mi­nor mi­hi in­fan­tem do­na­ve­rit, de­in­de eum vin­di­cet, ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li re­pel­len­dus est, ni­si ali­men­ta red­dat et si quis alius sump­tus pro­ba­bi­lis in eum fac­tus sit. 10Prae­ter­ea scien­dum est, si quis quid ex tes­ta­men­to con­tra vo­lun­ta­tem pe­tat, ex­cep­tio­ne eum do­li ma­li re­pel­li so­le­re: et id­eo he­res, qui non ha­bet vo­lun­ta­tem, per ex­cep­tio­nem do­li re­pel­li­tur. 11Si quis ex un­cia he­res sit scrip­tus, ex qua du­cen­ta con­se­qui po­tuit, de­in­de prop­ter hoc le­ga­tum, in quo cen­tum erant, prae­tu­lit, ne mo­les­tiis he­redi­ta­riis im­pli­ca­re­tur: an, si le­ga­tum pe­tat, ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li sum­mo­vea­tur? et ait Iu­lia­nus non es­se eum sum­mo­ven­dum. quod si a sub­sti­tu­to pre­tium ac­ce­pit vel quod pre­tii lo­co ha­be­ri pos­set, ne ad­eat he­redi­ta­tem, pe­tens le­ga­tum do­lo, in­quit, fa­ce­re in­tel­le­ge­tur ac per hoc do­li ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­le­tur. 12Quae­si­tum est, si, cum fun­di usum fruc­tum ha­be­rem, eum fun­dum vo­len­te me ven­di­de­ris, an vin­di­can­ti mi­hi usum fruc­tum ex­cep­tio sit ob­icien­da. et hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut ex­cep­tio do­li no­ceat. 13Mar­cel­lus ait ad­ver­sus do­li ex­cep­tio­nem non da­ri re­pli­ca­tio­nem do­li. La­beo quo­que in ea­dem opi­nio­ne est: ait enim in­iquum es­se com­mu­nem ma­li­tiam pe­ti­to­ri qui­dem prae­mio es­se, ei ve­ro, cum quo age­re­tur, poe­nae es­se, cum lon­ge ae­quum sit ex eo, quod per­fi­de ges­tum est, ac­to­rem ni­hil con­se­qui. 14Con­tra se­na­tus con­sul­ti quo­que Ma­ce­do­nia­ni ex­cep­tio­nem de do­lo dan­dam re­pli­ca­tio­nem amb­igen­dum non es­se eam­que no­ce­re de­be­re et­iam con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus et sen­ten­tiis auc­to­rum ca­ve­tur. 15La­beo et si ex sti­pu­la­tu ac­tio com­pe­tat prop­ter do­li clau­su­lam, ta­men no­ce­re do­li ex­cep­tio­nem ait, si ad­ver­sus ea in­quit, fac­tum erit: pos­se enim pe­ti­to­rem, an­te­quam sti­pu­la­tio com­mit­ta­tur, ni­hil do­lo ma­lo fe­cis­se et tunc fa­ce­re cum pe­tat: prop­ter quod ex­cep­tio­nem es­se ne­ces­sa­riam. 16Ad­ver­sus pa­ren­tes pa­tro­nos­que ne­que do­li ex­cep­tio ne­que alia qui­dem, quae pa­tro­ni pa­ren­tis­ve opi­nio­nem apud bo­nos mo­res sug­gil­let, com­pe­te­re pot­est: in fac­tum ta­men erit ex­ci­pien­dum, ut, si for­te pe­cu­nia non nu­me­ra­ta di­ca­tur, ob­icia­tur ex­cep­tio pe­cu­niae non nu­me­ra­tae. ni­hil au­tem in­ter­est, utrum pa­tro­nus ex suo con­trac­tu an ve­ro ex alie­no con­ve­nia­tur: sem­per enim re­ve­ren­tia ei ex­hi­ben­da est tam vi­vo quam de­func­to. si au­tem cum he­rede li­ber­ti pa­tro­nus agat, pu­to ex­ci­pe­re de­be­re de do­lo pa­tro­ni he­redem li­ber­ti. li­ber­tum au­tem de do­lo pa­tro­ni, et­si ab he­rede eius con­ve­nia­tur, mi­ni­me ex­cep­tio­nem ob­iec­tu­rum: nam­que con­ve­nit tam vi­vo quam mor­tuo pa­tro­no a li­ber­to ho­no­rem ex­hi­be­ri. in sti­pu­la­tio­ne pla­ne do­li clau­su­la non erit de­tra­hen­da, quia ex do­li clau­su­la non de do­lo ac­tio in­ten­di­tur, sed ex sti­pu­la­tu. 17In hac ex­cep­tio­ne et de do­lo ser­vi vel al­te­rius per­so­nae iu­ri nos­tro sub­iec­tae ex­ci­pe­re pos­su­mus et de eo­rum do­lo, qui­bus ad­quiri­tur. sed de ser­vo­rum et fi­lio­rum do­lo, si qui­dem ex pe­cu­lia­ri eo­rum neg­otio ac­tio in­ten­da­tur, in in­fi­ni­tum ex­cep­tio ob­icien­da est: si au­tem non ex pe­cu­lia­ri cau­sa, tum de eo dum­ta­xat ex­ci­pi opor­tet, qui ad­mis­sus sit in ip­so neg­otio quod ge­ri­tur, non et­iam si post­ea ali­quis do­lus in­ter­ve­nis­set: ne­que enim es­se ae­quum ser­vi do­lum am­plius do­mi­no no­ce­re, quam in quo ope­ra eius es­set usus. 18Quae­si­tum est, an de pro­cu­ra­to­ris do­lo, qui ad agen­dum tan­tum da­tus est, ex­ci­pi pos­sit. et pu­to rec­te de­fen­di, si qui­dem in rem suam pro­cu­ra­tor da­tus sit, et­iam de prae­terito eius do­lo, hoc est si an­te ac­cep­tum iu­di­cium do­lo quid fe­ce­rit, es­se ex­ci­pien­dum, si ve­ro non in rem suam, do­lum prae­sen­tem in ex­cep­tio­nem con­fe­ren­dum. si au­tem is pro­cu­ra­tor sit, cui om­nium re­rum ad­mi­nis­tra­tio con­ces­sa est, tunc de om­ni do­lo eius ex­ci­pi pos­se Ne­ra­tius scri­bit. 19Man­da­vi Ti­tio, ut a te sti­pu­la­re­tur, de­in­de Ti­tius Se­io, et sti­pu­la­tus a te Se­ius est et iu­di­cium edi­dit: ait La­beo ex­ci­pien­dum es­se tam de meo quam et Se­ii do­lo. 20Item quae­ri­tur, si de­bi­tor meus te cir­cum­ve­nie­bat te­que mi­hi reum de­de­rit ego­que abs te sti­pu­la­tus fue­ro, de­in­de pe­tam, an do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio ob­stet. et ma­gis est, ut non ti­bi per­mit­ta­tur de do­lo de­bi­to­ris mei ad­ver­sus me ex­ci­pe­re, cum non ego te cir­cum­ve­ne­rim: ad­ver­sus ip­sum au­tem de­bi­to­rem meum poteris ex­per­i­ri. 21Sed et si mu­lier post ad­mis­sum do­lum de­bi­to­rem suum ma­ri­to in do­tem dele­ga­ve­rit, idem pro­ban­dum erit de do­lo mu­lie­ris non es­se per­mit­ten­dum ex­ci­pe­re, ne in­do­ta­ta fiat. 22Apud Iu­lia­num quae­si­tum est, si he­res so­ce­ri, a quo dos pe­te­re­tur, ex­ci­pe­ret de do­lo ma­ri­ti et mu­lie­ris, cui pe­cu­nia quae­re­re­tur, an ob­sta­tu­ra es­set ex­cep­tio ex per­so­na mu­lie­ris. et ait Iu­lia­nus, si ma­ri­tus ex pro­mis­sio­ne do­tis ab he­rede so­ce­ri pe­tat et he­res ex­ci­piat de do­lo fi­liae, cui ea pe­cu­nia ad­quire­re­tur, ex­cep­tio­nem ob­sta­re: dos enim, quam ma­ri­tus ab he­rede so­ce­ri pe­tit, in­tel­le­gi­tur, in­quit, fi­liae ad­quiri, cum per hoc do­tem sit ha­bi­tu­ra. il­lud non ex­pli­cat Iu­lia­nus, an et de do­lo ma­ri­ti ex­ci­pi pos­sit: pu­to au­tem eum hoc sen­ti­re, ut et­iam de do­lo ma­ri­ti no­ceat ex­cep­tio, li­cet vi­dea­tur nul­la dos fi­liae, ut ait, quae­ri. 23Il­la et­iam quaes­tio ven­ti­la­ta est apud ple­ros­que, an de do­lo tu­to­ris ex­cep­tio pu­pil­lo ex­pe­rien­ti no­ce­re de­beat. et ego pu­to uti­lius, et­si per eas per­so­nas pu­pil­lis fa­ve­tur, ta­men di­cen­dum es­se, si­ve quis eme­rit a tu­to­re rem pu­pil­li si­ve con­trac­tum sit cum eo in rem pu­pil­li, si­ve do­lo quid tu­tor fe­ce­rit et ex eo pu­pil­lus lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus est, pu­pil­lo no­ce­re de­be­re, nec il­lud es­se di­stin­guen­dum, cau­tum sit ei an non, sol­ven­do sit an non tu­tor, dum­mo­do rem ad­mi­nis­tret: un­de enim di­vi­nat is, qui cum tu­to­re con­tra­hit? pla­ne si mi­hi pro­po­nas col­lu­sis­se ali­quem cum tu­to­re, fac­tum suum ei no­ce­bit. 24Si quis non tu­tor, sed pro tu­to­re neg­otia ge­rat, an do­lus ip­sius no­ceat pu­pil­lo, vi­dea­mus. et pu­tem non no­ce­re: nam si is, qui pro tu­to­re neg­otia ge­re­bat, rem ven­di­de­rit et usu­cap­ta sit, ex­cep­tio­nem non no­ce­re pu­pil­lo rem suam per­se­quen­ti, et­iam­si ei cau­tum sit, quia huic re­rum pu­pil­li ad­mi­nis­tra­tio con­ces­sa non fuit. 24aSe­cun­dum haec ma­gis opi­nor de do­lo tu­to­ris ex­cep­tio­nem pu­pil­lo es­se ob­icien­dam. 25Quae in tu­to­re di­xi­mus, ea­dem in cu­ra­to­re quo­que fu­rio­si di­cen­da erunt, sed11Die Großausgabe fügt et ein. in prod­igi vel mi­no­ris vi­gin­ti quin­que an­nis. 26De do­lo au­tem ip­sius mi­no­ris vi­gin­ti quin­que an­nis ex­cep­tio uti­que lo­cum ha­be­bit: nam et de pu­pil­li do­lo in­ter­dum es­se ex­ci­pien­dum ne­qua­quam amb­igen­dum, est ex ea ae­ta­te, quae do­lo non ca­reat. de­ni­que Iu­lia­nus quo­que sae­pis­si­me scribsit do­li pu­pil­los, qui pro­pe pu­ber­ta­tem sunt, ca­pa­ces es­se. quid enim, si de­bi­tor ex dele­ga­tu pu­pil­li pe­cu­niam cre­di­to­ri eius sol­vit? fin­gen­dus est, in­quit, pu­bes es­se, ne prop­ter ma­li­tiae igno­ran­tiam bis ean­dem pe­cu­niam con­se­qua­tur. idem ser­van­dum in fu­rio­so ait, si, cum ex­is­ti­ma­re­tur com­pos men­tis es­se, ius­se­rit de­bi­to­rem cre­di­to­ri sol­ve­re, vel si quod ex­egit, do­mi ha­beat. 27De auc­to­ris do­lo ex­cep­tio emp­to­ri non ob­ici­tur. si au­tem ac­ces­sio­ne auc­to­ris uti­tur, ae­quis­si­mum vi­sum est ei, qui ex per­so­na auc­to­ris uti­tur ac­ces­sio­ne, pa­ti do­lum auc­to­ris: et perae­que tra­di­tur rei qui­dem co­hae­ren­tem ex­cep­tio­nem et­iam emp­to­ri no­ce­re, eam au­tem, quae ex de­lic­to per­so­nae oria­tur, no­ce­re non opor­te­re. 28Si, cum le­gi­ti­ma he­redi­tas Gaii Se­ii ad te per­ve­ni­ret et ego es­sem he­res in­sti­tu­tus, per­sua­se­ris mi­hi per do­lum ma­lum, ne ad­eam he­redi­ta­tem, et post­ea­quam ego re­pu­dia­vi he­redi­ta­tem, tu eam Sem­pro­nio ces­se­ris pre­tio ac­cep­to is­que a me pe­tat he­redi­ta­tem: ex­cep­tio­nem do­li ma­li eius, qui ei ces­sit, non pot­est pa­ti. 29Si quis au­tem ex cau­sa le­ga­ti vin­di­cet aut is, cui ex cau­sa do­na­tio­nis res prae­sti­ta est, vin­di­cet, an de do­lo ex­cep­tio­nem pa­tia­tur ex cau­sa eius, in cu­ius lo­cum suc­ces­se­rit? et ma­gis pu­tat Pom­po­nius sum­mo­ven­dum: et ego pu­to ex­cep­tio­ne eos es­se re­pel­len­dos, cum lu­cra­ti­vam cau­sam sint nanc­ti: aliud est enim eme­re, aliud ex his cau­sis suc­ce­de­re. 30Idem trac­tat Pom­po­nius et in eum, qui pig­ne­ri ac­ce­pit, si Ser­via­na vel hy­po­the­ca­ria ac­tio­ne ex­pe­ria­tur: nam et hunc pu­tat Pom­po­nius sum­mo­ven­dum, quia res ad eum qui do­lo fe­cit re­ver­su­ra est. 31Auc­to­ris au­tem do­lus, sic­ut di­xi­mus, emp­to­ri non ob­ici­tur. sed hoc in emp­to­re so­lo ser­va­bi­mus: item in eo, qui per­mu­ta­ve­rit vel in so­lu­tum ac­ce­pit: item in si­mi­li­bus, qui vi­cem emp­to­rum con­ti­nent. ce­te­rum si no­xae de­di­tus quis sit, Pom­po­nius pu­tat pas­su­rum ex­cep­tio­nem, quam il­le pa­te­re­tur, qui no­xae de­dit. pro­in­de ex qua­cum­que alia cau­sa, quae pro­pe lu­cra­ti­vam ha­bet ad­quisi­tio­nem, quae­sis­se quis vi­dea­tur, pa­tie­tur ex­cep­tio­nem do­li ex per­so­na eius, in cu­ius lo­cum suc­ces­sit: suf­fi­cit enim, si is, qui pre­tium de­dit vel vi­ce pre­tii, cum sit bo­na fi­de emp­tor, ut non pa­tia­tur do­li ex­cep­tio­nem ex per­so­na auc­to­ris, uti­que si ip­se do­lo ca­ret. ce­te­rum si ip­se do­lo non ca­reat, per­ve­nie­tur ad do­li ex­cep­tio­nem et pa­tie­tur de do­lo suo ex­cep­tio­nem. 32Si a Ti­tio fun­dum eme­ris qui Sem­pro­nii erat is­que ti­bi tra­di­tus fue­rit pre­tio so­lu­to, de­in­de Ti­tius Sem­pro­nio he­res ex­ti­te­rit et eun­dem fun­dum Mae­vio ven­di­de­rit et tra­di­de­rit: Iu­lia­nus ait ae­quius es­se prae­to­rem te tue­ri, quia et, si ip­se Ti­tius fun­dum a te pe­te­ret, ex­cep­tio­ne in fac­tum com­pa­ra­ta vel do­li ma­li sum­mo­ve­re­tur et, si ip­se eum pos­si­de­ret et Pu­bli­cia­na pe­te­res, ad­ver­sus ex­ci­pien­tem ‘si non suus es­set’ re­pli­ca­tio­ne ute­re­ris, ac per hoc in­tel­le­ge­re­tur eum fun­dum rur­sum ven­di­dis­se, quem in bo­nis non ha­be­ret. 33Me­tus cau­sa ex­cep­tio­nem Cas­sius non pro­posue­rat con­ten­tus do­li ex­cep­tio­ne, quae est ge­ne­ra­lis: sed uti­lius vi­sum est et­iam de me­tu op­po­ne­re ex­cep­tio­nem. et­enim di­stat ali­quid do­li ex­cep­tio­ne, quod ex­cep­tio do­li per­so­nam com­plec­ti­tur eius, qui do­lo fe­cit: enim­ve­ro me­tus cau­sa ex­cep­tio in rem scrip­ta est ‘si in ea re ni­hil me­tus cau­sa fac­tum est’, ut non in­spi­cia­mus, an is qui agit me­tus cau­sa fe­cit ali­quid, sed an om­ni­no me­tus cau­sa fac­tum est in hac re a quo­cum­que, non tan­tum ab eo qui agit. et quam­vis de do­lo auc­to­ris ex­cep­tio non ob­icia­tur, ve­rum­ta­men hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut de me­tu non tan­tum ab auc­to­re, ve­rum a quo­cum­que ad­hi­bi­to ex­cep­tio ob­ici pos­sit. 34Il­lud scien­dum est hanc ex­cep­tio­nem de me­tu eum ob­ice­re de­be­re, qui me­tum non a pa­ren­te pas­sus est, in cu­ius fuit po­tes­ta­te: ce­te­rum pa­ren­ti li­ce­re de­te­rio­rem con­di­cio­nem li­be­ro­rum in re­bus pe­cu­lia­riis fa­ce­re. sed si se abs­ti­nue­rit he­redi­ta­te pa­ter­na, suc­cur­ren­dum ei erit, ut alio­quin suc­cur­ri­tur.

4Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. The question is asked by Celsus, if the creditors of an estate, with a single exception, should direct Titius to enter upon it, and this one did this for the purpose of deceiving him, but would also have directed him to accept if he had known that Titius would not have consented to do so, and he then brings an action, will he be barred by an exception? Celsus says that he will be barred. 1Julianus asks, if a man who is ill promises a hundred aurei to his wife’s cousin, with the understanding that the money shall come into the hands of his wife, and he afterwards recovers, whether he can plead an exception on the ground of bad faith when suit is brought against him. Julianus says that it was held by Labeo that he could interpose an exception on the ground of fraud. 2If we should consent to a compromise, and appoint an arbiter, and I do not appear at the appointed time, on account of bad health, and the penalty becomes due, can I avail myself of an exception on the ground of bad faith? Pomponius says that I will be entitled to the benefit of such an exception. 3It is also asked, what course must be pursued if you compromise with a debtor who owes you the sum of sixty aurei, and through mistake you stipulate for the penalty of a hundred? Labeo holds that it is the duty of the arbiter to order as much to be paid to you as is actually due, and if this is not done, there is no reason why the excess should not be collected. But he also says, that even if the arbiter failed to state the amount which should be collected, and the penalty should be demanded, an exception on the ground of fraud can be pleaded. 4If a debtor pays a ward what he owes him, without the authority of his guardian, and the ward becomes enriched to that extent by this payment, it is very properly held that if he attempts to collect the amount a second time, he will be barred by an exception. For if he was pecuniarily benefited by having loaned money, or by having obtained it by means of some other contract, an exception should be granted. The same rule must be said to apply to all other cases in which payment is illegally made, for if the parties are pecuniarily benefited there will be ground for an exception. 5Ad Dig. 44,4,4,5ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 355: Der Verkäufer ist nicht bloß zur Vertretung heimlicher, sondern schlechthin aller nicht angezeigten und nicht völlig unerheblichen Mängel verpflichtet, sofern er nicht beweisen kann, daß der Käufer sie gekannt hat oder kennen mußte.Labeo also says that if anyone should purchase a slave knowing that he had the habit of running away, and stipulated with the vendor that this was not the case, and he afterwards brings an action based on the stipulation, he cannot be barred by an exception, as this was the agreement, although he will not be entitled to an action on purchase. If, however, such an agreement was not made, he will be barred by an exception. 6A certain man to whom money was due settled the account with his debtor, and sold his claim to Seius, whom the debtor had directed to purchase it, and the purchaser entered into a stipulation with reference to the transaction, and the creditor then retains the money which he had obtained by a judgment. Can the purchaser bring an action under the stipulation? Ofilius holds that if the vendor of the claim was not ready to pay over the entire amount which he received from the purchaser, an exception on the ground of fraud cannot be properly pleaded against him. I think that the opinion of Ofilius is correct. 7Labeo says that where suit has been brought for a slave, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and security given by order of court for the slave to be delivered within a certain time, and a penalty has been stipulated for if he should not be delivered, the plaintiff will be barred by an exception if he claims both the slave and the penalty; for to retain possession of the slave and also to exact the penalty would be unjust. 8If I give you valuable pearls in pledge, and it is agreed between us that they shall be returned when the debt is paid, and the pearls are lost through your negligence, the question arises whether you can collect the money. An opinion of Nerva and Atilicinus is extant, who hold that I am entitled to an exception, as follows, “If no agreement was made between you and myself that the pearls should be returned to me if the money was paid.” The better opinion, however, is that an exception on the ground of fraud can be pleaded in bar. 9If a minor should give me a young slave, and afterwards bring an action to recover him, he can be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud, unless he repays the amount furnished for his support, and any other reasonable expenses incurred on account of said slave. 10Ad Dig. 44,4,4,10Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 564, Note 7.It should, moreover, be noted that if anyone brings suit under a will, against the wishes of the deceased, he can be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. Hence, an heir can be barred by an exception of this kind, if he acts contrary to the wishes of the deceased. 11Where an heir was appointed to the twelfth of an estate, which might be worth two hundred aurei, but preferred to receive a legacy instead, which was only worth a hundred, and did this to avoid being annoyed by the settlement of the estate, and brings an action to recover the legacy, can he be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud? Julianus says that he cannot. But if he received the amount, or what might be considered equivalent to it, from a substituted heir, in order to avoid accepting the estate, and then brings an action to recover the legacy, Julianus says that he is considered to be guilty of fraud, and can be barred by an exception on this ground. 12Ad Dig. 44,4,4,12Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 215, Note 11.Where I have the usufruct of a tract of land, arid you sell me the land with my consent, the question arises whether I can be opposed by an exception if I bring suit to recover the usufruct? It is our practice that this exception, which is based on bad faith, operates as a bar. 13Marcellus says that a replication on the ground of bad faith should not be granted against an exception on the same ground. Labeo concurs in this opinion, for he says that, as both parties are guilty of bad faith, it would be unjust for an advantage to be obtained by the plaintiff and a penalty imposed upon the defendant, for it is far more equitable that the plaintiff should not reap any benefit from a matter in which he has acted deceitfully. 14There is no doubt that a replication on the ground of bad faith can be granted against the exception of the Macedonian Decree of the Senate, and it is also provided by the Imperial Constitutions and set forth in the opinions of various authorities that such a replication has the effect of a plea in bar. 15Labeo says that, although an action based on a stipulation will lie by virtue of the clause relating to fraud which it contains, still an exception on the ground of fraud may be properly pleaded, if, as he says, anything has been done contrary to the terms of the agreement; for it might be that the plaintiff, before the stipulation was entered into, did not commit any fraudulent act, but did so at the time that he asserted the claim on account of which an exception was necessary. 16Neither an exception on the ground of fraud, nor any other which can unfavorably affect the reputation of a patron or a relative in the ascending line, can be pleaded against them. Still an exception in factum can be pleaded, for instance, if it is alleged that the money forming the basis of the claim was not paid, an exception on this ground may be interposed. It, however, makes no difference whether a patron is sued on his own contract, or on one made by another, for respect must always be shown to him living or dead. If, however, a patron brings an action against the heir of his freedman, I think that the latter can interpose an exception based on the bad faith of the patron. The freedman himself, however, can, by no means, plead an exception based on the bad faith of his patron, even if he is sued by the heir of the latter, for it is proper that honor should be shown by a freedman to his patron not only while he is living, but also after his death. It is clear that a clause relating to fraudulent conduct should not be omitted from the stipulation, because an action on fraud arising from such a clause is not brought, but one is brought by virtue of the stipulation. 17We can make use of this exception both on account of the fraudulent conduct of a slave, or of any other person subject to our authority, as well as of those by whose fraudulent acts we acquire anything. So far as the fraudulent conduct of slaves and children is concerned, if any action is brought having reference to their peculium, this exception should be pleaded in every instance. If, however, the peculium is not involved, an exception on the ground of bad faith should only be interposed with reference to the matter in question, and not where some fraud was committed afterwards; for it would not be just for the fraudulent acts of the slave to injure his master more than where he made use of his services. 18The question arose whether an exception on the ground of bad faith can be pleaded in the case of an agent who has only been appointed to bring the suit. I think that it can be properly maintained that if the said agent was appointed for the purpose of acting in his own behalf (that is to say, if he should commit any fraudulent act before issue was joined), an exception on this ground can be interposed. If, however, he was not acting in his own behalf, an exception can be pleaded only with reference to the fraud committed since proceedings were begun. But when the agent is one to whom the administration of all the business of the principal has been entrusted, Neratius says that an exception can be pleaded on account of any fraudulent act which he may have committed. 19I directed Titius to enter into a stipulation for you, Titius afterwards directed Seius to do so, and Seius stipulated for you, and brought suit. Labeo says that you can effectually interpose an exception based on my fraudulent act as well as on that of Seius. 20It is also asked, if my debtor should swindle you, and appoint you in his place, and I having made a stipulation with you, bring an action to enforce it, will an exception on the ground of fraud operate as a bar? The better opinion is, that you will not be permitted to plead an exception against me on the ground of the bad faith of my debtor, as I did not swindle you, but you can bring an action on that ground against my debtor. 21If, however, a woman should delegate her debtor to her husband, for her dowry, after she had been guilty of fraud, the same rule should be adopted, and the debtor should not be permitted to plead an exception based on the fraudulent conduct of the woman, for fear that she might remain unendowed. 22In a case where the heir of a father-in-law is sued to recover a dowry, and pleads an exception based on the fraud of the husband and wife for whose benefit the money is claimed, the question was asked by Julianus whether the exception will operate as a bar, so far as the woman is personally concerned. Julianus says that if the husband sues the heir of his father-in-law for the dowry, and the latter pleads an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the daughter, by whom the money would be obtained, the exception will be effective as a bar; for he holds that the dowry which the husband demands from the heir of the father-in-law is understood to be acquired by the daughter who, by means of it, will obtain her dowry. He does not state whether the heir can also plead an exception based on the fraudulent conduct of the husband. I think, however, that he was also of the opinion that an exception based on the fraud of the husband would operate as a bar, although in this instance, as he says, it could not be held that a dowry was acquired by the daughter. 23The question whether an exception based on the fraud of a guardian can be effectually pleaded against a ward who brings an action has been discussed by several authorities. I think that even though the interest of wards is favored by such persons, it should still be held that, where anyone fraudulently purchases the property of a ward from his guardian, or makes a fraudulent contract with him concerning the property of his ward, or where the guardian is guilty of any other fraudulent conduct, and the ward is pecuniarily benefited thereby, the latter should be barred by an exception. Nor is it necessary to make any inquiry as to whether security has been given to the ward or not, or whether his guardian is solvent or insolvent, provided he is administering the affairs of the guardianship; for how can he who enters into a contract with a guardian divine these things? If you suggest that someone has entered into collusion with the guardian it is clear that he will be injured by his own act. 24If someone who was not the guardian, but acted as such, is guilty of fraud, let us see whether it will injure the ward. I do not think that it will do so, for when, a person who is transacting the business of a guardian sells any property belonging to the ward, and it is obtained by usucaption, the ward will not be prevented from following his own property by an exception, even if he was furnished security, because the administration of his affairs was not granted to this individual. 24aAccording to this, I think that an exception based on the fraud of the guardian can be pleaded against the ward. 25What we have stated with reference to a guardian can also be said to apply to the curator of an insane person, as well as to the case of a spendthrift, and a minor under the age of twenty-five years. 26An exception based on fraud committed by a minor of twenty-five years of age can also be pleaded, for sometimes such an exception can undoubtedly be interposed if the minor is of an age when he can legally be guilty of a fraudulent act. Julianus very frequently stated that minors who are near the age of puberty are capable of committing fraud. But what if the debtor of a ward pays a creditor of the latter, to whom he had been delegated? He says that it must be supposed that the ward has arrived at puberty, to avoid the debtor being liable to pay the money twice, under the pretext that the ward does not know what fraud is. The same rule should be observed in the case of an insane person, if, when he was presumed to be of sound mind, he should order his debtor to pay one of his creditors, or if he should have in his house the money for a debt which he has collected. 27Ad Dig. 44,4,4,27Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.An exception based on the fraud of the vendor cannot be pleaded against the purchaser. If, however, the latter should avail himself of the addition of the time that the property was in the possession of the vendor, it seems to be perfectly just that he should be responsible for the fraud of the vendor, as he profits by his possession in this way. And, likewise, it is held that an exception which has reference to the property will bar the purchaser, but one which is based upon an offence committed by the person will not do so. 28Ad Dig. 44,4,4,28Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.If the estate of Gaius Seius should come into your hands as the heir at law, and I should be appointed heir, and you fraudulently persuade me not to accept the estate, and I afterwards reject it, and you assign your rights to Sempronius after having been paid by him, and he brings suit against me to recover the estate, an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the person who assigned him his rights cannot be pleaded by me against Sempronius. 29Ad Dig. 44,4,4,29Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.If, however, anyone claims an estate by virtue of a legacy, or he to whom property was given by way of donation does so, can an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the party whom he succeeded be pleaded against him? Pomponius thinks that he would be barred by such an exception. I also think that those should be barred who are pecuniarily benefited by obtaining such rights, for it is one thing to purchase them, and another to succeed to them. 30Ad Dig. 44,4,4,30Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.Pomponius discusses the same question with reference to anyone who receives property in pledge, where the Servian or Hypothecary Action is brought, for he holds that he should be barred because otherwise the property would revert to the person who was guilty of fraud. 31Ad Dig. 44,4,4,31Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.The bad faith of the vendor, however, as we have already stated, cannot be pleaded against the purchaser. We observe this rule only with reference to purchasers, and to those who have exchanged property, or received it in payment, as well as to such as occupy the position of purchasers. If, however, a slave has been surrendered by way of reparation for damage, Pomponius thinks that the person who demands the slave, as well as the one who gave him up can have the exception pleaded against him. Hence, where anyone is pecuniarily benefited by acquiring property in any way whatever, an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the person to whose rights he succeeds can be pleaded against him. For it is sufficient if he who has paid the price, or something instead of it, and is a bona fide purchaser, should not suffer through the bad faith of the vendor, provided he himself is not guilty of fraud. If, however, he himself is not free from fraud, he will be liable to the exception on that ground, and must suffer for his own fraudulent act. 32If you purchase a tract of land from Titius, which belongs to Sempronius, and it is delivered to you when you pay the price, and Titius afterwards becomes the heir of Sempronius, and sells and delivers the same land to Mævius, Julianus says that the Prætor must protect you in your rights, because if Titius himself should sue you to recover the land, he will be barred by an exception in factum, on the ground of fraud. If Titius himself should be in possession of the land, and you should sue him by the Publician Action, and he should plead an exception against you on the ground that the property is his, you can avail yourself of a replication, as from this it is evident that he, a second time, sold land which did not belong to him. 33Cassius did not introduce an exception on the ground of fear, but was content with that based on fraud, which is one of general application. It, however, seems more proper to establish an exception on the ground of fear as a plea in bar; as this, in some respects, differs from one based on fraud, because the latter includes the person of the party who committed the fraud, for an exception on the ground of fraud is a proceeding in rem; as, for instance, “where no act has been committed through fear,” so that we do not examine whether the party who brings the action did anything to cause fear, but whether anything was done in the transaction by any person whomsoever, and not merely by the plaintiff, for the purpose of intimidating the defendant. And, although an exception on the ground of the fraud of the vendor cannot be pleaded against the purchaser, still, it is our practice to hold that an exception can be pleaded in bar, where fear has been caused not only by the vendor, but by anyone whomsoever. 34It should be noted that this exception on the ground of fear ought not to be pleaded where a son has been intimidated by his father, while under his control. The father, however, is permitted to diminish the amount of the peculium of the son, but if the latter should reject the paternal estate, relief should be granted him, as is ordinarily done.

5Pau­lus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Pu­re mi­hi de­bes de­cem: ea ti­bi sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­vi. in­ter­im he­res si pe­tat, do­li ex­cep­tio­ne non est sum­mo­ven­dus, cum pos­sit et­iam de­fi­ce­re con­di­cio: ita­que le­ga­to­rum sti­pu­la­tio­nem in­ter­po­ne­re de­be­bit. sed si non ca­veat he­res, do­li ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­bi­tur: ex­pe­dit enim le­ga­ta­rio re­ti­ne­re sum­mam, quam mit­ti in pos­ses­sio­nem re­rum he­redi­ta­ria­rum. 1Si cui le­ga­ta sit via et is le­ge Fal­ci­dia lo­cum ha­ben­te to­tam eam vin­di­cet non ob­la­ta aes­ti­ma­tio­ne quar­tae par­tis, sum­mo­ve­ri eum do­li ex­cep­tio­ne Mar­cel­lus ait, quon­iam suo com­mo­do he­res con­su­lit. 2Si do­na­vi ali­cui rem nec tra­di­de­ro, et il­le cui do­na­vi non tra­di­ta pos­ses­sio­ne in eo lo­co ae­di­fi­ca­ve­rit me scien­te, et cum ae­di­fi­ca­ve­rit, nanc­tus sim ego pos­ses­sio­nem, et pe­tat a me rem do­na­tam, et ego ex­ci­piam, quod su­pra le­gi­ti­mum mo­dum fac­ta est: an de do­lo re­pli­can­dum est? do­lo enim fe­ci, qui pas­sus sum eum ae­di­fi­ca­re et non red­do im­pen­sas. 3Ac­to­ris, qui ex­igen­dis pe­cu­niis prae­po­si­tus est, et­iam pos­te­rior do­lus do­mi­no no­cet. 4Si ser­vus ven­iit ab eo, cui hoc do­mi­nus per­mi­sit, et red­hi­bi­tus sit do­mi­no: agen­ti ven­di­to­ri de pre­tio ex­cep­tio op­po­ni­tur red­hi­bitio­nis, li­cet iam is qui ven­di­dit do­mi­no pre­tium sol­ve­rit (et­iam mer­cis non tra­di­tae ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­tur et qui pe­cu­niam do­mi­no iam sol­vit) et id­eo is qui ven­di­dit agit ad­ver­sus do­mi­num. ean­dem cau­sam es­se Pe­dius ait eius, qui neg­otium nos­trum ge­rens ven­di­dit. 5Si eum, qui vo­le­bat mi­hi do­na­re su­pra le­gi­ti­mum mo­dum, dele­ga­ve­ro cre­di­to­ri meo, non pot­erit ad­ver­sus pe­ten­tem uti ex­cep­tio­ne, quon­iam cre­di­tor suum pe­tit. in ea­dem cau­sa est ma­ri­tus: nec hic enim de­bet ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­ri, qui suo no­mi­ne agit. num­quid er­go nec de do­lo mu­lie­ris ex­ci­pien­dum sit ad­ver­sus ma­ri­tum, qui do­tem pe­tit, non duc­tu­rus uxo­rem, ni­si do­tem ac­ce­pis­set? ni­si iam di­ver­tit. ita­que con­dic­tio­ne te­ne­tur de­bi­tor qui dele­ga­vit vel mu­lier, ut vel li­be­ret de­bi­to­rem vel, si sol­vit, ut pe­cu­nia ei red­da­tur. 6Non sic­ut de do­lo ac­tio cer­to tem­po­re fi­ni­tur, ita et­iam ex­cep­tio eo­dem tem­po­re dan­da est: nam haec per­pe­tuo com­pe­tit, cum ac­tor qui­dem in sua po­tes­ta­te ha­beat, quan­do uta­tur suo iu­re, is au­tem cum quo agi­tur non ha­beat po­tes­ta­tem, quan­do con­ve­nia­tur.

5Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVII. You owe me ten aurei unconditionally. I bequeath you that sum under a condition. If, in the meantime, my heir should bring an action to collect the amount you owe the estate, he cannot be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith, as the condition may fail to be fulfilled, therefore he should stipulate for the payment of the legacy. If, however, the heir Joes not give security, he will be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith; for it is to the interest of the legatee to retain the amount in his hands rather than to be placed in possession of the property of the estate. 1If a right of way is bequeathed to anyone, and the Falcidian Law being applicable, he should bring an action to recover the entire right of way, without tendering the appraised value of the fourth part of the same, Marcellus says that he can be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith, as the heir must provide for his own interest. 2Where I gave a tract of land to anyone but did not deliver it, and the person to whom I gave it without delivery of possession should build upon said land with my knowledge, and after he has done so I should obtain possession, and he should bring an action against me for what I have given him; and I should interpose the exception that the donation exceeds the limit prescribed by law, can a replication on the ground of bad faith be pleaded? This can be done, for I acted in bad faith when I permitted him to build, and did not reimburse him for his expenses. 3Where a slave has been appointed for the collection of money which is due, any act of bad faith subsequently committed by him will prejudice his master. 4Ad Dig. 44,4,5,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 421, Note 2.If a slave is sold by someone who was permitted by his master to dispose of him, and he is then returned to his master, an exception based on his return can be pleaded against the vendor, if he brings suit to recover the price of the slave, even though he who sold him has paid the purchase money to his master. He also will be barred by an exception based on the non-delivery of merchandise who has already paid the money to the owner of the same, and therefore, he who sold the merchandise can bring an action against the owner. Pedius says that the rule is the same where anyone who transacts our affairs makes a sale. 5If I delegate to my creditor someone who intends to donate property to me over and above the amount prescribed by law, he cannot make use of an exception against the creditor, if the latter brings suit, because he only claims what he is entitled to. The same rule applies to a husband, for he should not be barred by an exception who acts in his own name. Therefore, can it not also be said that an exception on the ground of the fraud of a wife cannot be pleaded against her husband, when he sues for her dowry, as he would not have married the woman without a dowry, unless a separation had already taken place? Hence the donor, or a woman who has delegated, or released a debtor, is liable to a personal action brought by the latter, either to obtain his release, or, if he has paid what was due, in order that the money may be refunded to him. 6The case is not the same where an exception on the ground of fraud is granted, as it is where a right of action is extinguished within a certain time; for the exception is perpetual, as the plaintiff has the power to avail himself of his privilege whenever he desires to do so, but the defendant can only plead the exception after he has been sued.

6Gaius li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Si ope­ra cre­di­to­ris ac­ci­de­rit, ut de­bi­tor pe­cu­niam, quam so­lu­tu­rus erat, per­de­ret, ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li cre­di­tor re­mo­ve­bi­tur. idem est et si cre­di­to­ri eius nu­me­ra­tam pe­cu­niam ra­tam cre­di­tor non ha­beat.

6Ad Dig. 44,4,6Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 342, Note 12.Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXX. If, through the agency of a creditor, his debtor should happen to lose the money which he was about to pay him, the creditor will be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. The same rule will apply when the creditor does not ratify the payment of money by his debtor to his own creditor.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Iu­lia­nus ait: si pe­cu­niam, quam me ti­bi de­be­re ex­is­ti­ma­bam, ius­su tuo spopon­de­rim ei cui do­na­re vo­le­bas, ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li pot­ero me tue­ri et prae­ter­ea con­dic­tio mi­hi ad­ver­sus sti­pu­la­to­rem com­pe­tit, ut me li­be­ret. 1Idem Iu­lia­nus ait, si ei, quem cre­di­to­rem tuum pu­ta­bas, ius­su tuo pe­cu­niam, quam me ti­bi de­be­re ex­is­ti­ma­bam, pro­mi­se­ro, pe­ten­tem do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­ri de­be­re, et am­plius agen­do cum sti­pu­la­to­re con­se­quar, ut mi­hi ac­cep­tam fa­ciat sti­pu­la­tio­nem. et ha­bet haec sen­ten­tia Iu­lia­ni hu­ma­ni­ta­tem, ut et­iam ad­ver­sus hunc utar ex­cep­tio­ne et con­dic­tio­ne, cui sum ob­li­ga­tus.

7Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. Julianus says that if I think that I owe you money, and by your order I promise to pay it to someone to whom you wish to donate it, I can protect myself by an exception on the ground of bad faith; and, in addition to this, I will be entitled to an action against the stipulator to compel him to release me. 1Julianus also says that, if you think that a certain person is your creditor, and by your direction I promise to pay him a sum of money which I believe that I owe you, and he brings suit to recover it, he should be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud; and further, if I institute proceedings against the stipulator, I can compel him to release me from the agreement. This opinion of Julianus is equitable, so that I can make use of an exception, as well as bring a personal action against the person to whom I obligated myself.

8Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Plau­tium. Do­lo fa­cit, qui pe­tit quod red­di­tu­rus est. 1Sic, si he­res dam­na­tus sit non pe­te­re a de­bi­to­re, pot­est uti ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li de­bi­tor et age­re ex tes­ta­men­to.

8Paulus, On Plautius, Book VI. He is guilty of fraud who demands something which he should return. 1If an heir has been charged not to collect anything from a debtor of the estate, the latter can avail himself of an exception on the ground of fraud, and can also bring suit under the terms of the will.

9Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Si pro­cu­ra­tor rei pe­cu­nia ac­cep­ta dam­na­ri se pas­sus sit et cum do­mi­no iu­di­ca­ti aga­tur, tue­bi­tur se do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne. nec hoc, quod ac­ce­pe­rit pro­cu­ra­tor, au­fer­ri ab eo pot­est: nam tur­pi­ter ac­cep­ta pe­cu­nia ius­tius pe­nes eum est qui de­cep­tus sit quam qui de­ce­pit.

9The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXII. If the agent for a defendant suffers judgment to be rendered against him, after the money has been paid, and proceedings to enforce the judgment have been instituted against his principal, the latter can protect himself by pleading an exception on the ground of fraud. Nor can he be compelled to give up what he entrusted to his agent, for it is more just to permit money which has been dishonorably obtained to remain in the hands of the person who was deceived than under the control of him who was responsible for the deceit.

10Mar­cia­nus li­bro ter­tio re­gu­la­rum. Cum vir aut uxor in area si­bi do­na­ta ali­quid ae­di­fi­cas­set, ple­ris­que pla­cet do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne po­si­ta rem ser­va­ri pos­se.

10Marcianus, Rules, Book III. When either a husband or a wife builds upon land which one of them has given to the other, it is the opinion of several authorities that they can hold the property by means of an exception on the ground of fraud.

11Ne­ra­tius li­bro quar­to mem­bra­na­rum. Si pro­cu­ra­tor agit, de do­lo eius ex­ci­pi non de­bet, quia alie­na lis est is­que rei ex­tra­neus, ne­que alie­nus do­lus no­ce­re al­te­ri de­bet. si post li­tem con­tes­ta­tam do­lo quid fe­ce­rit, an ex­cep­tio eo no­mi­ne in iu­di­cium ob­icien­da sit, du­bi­ta­ri pot­est, quia li­tis con­tes­ta­tio­ne res pro­cu­ra­to­ris fit eam­que suo iam quo­dam­mo­do no­mi­ne ex­equi­tur. et pla­cet de pro­cu­ra­to­ris do­lo ex­ci­pien­dum es­se. idem de tu­to­re, qui pu­pil­li no­mi­ne aget, di­cen­dum est. 1In uni­ver­sum au­tem haec in ea re re­gu­la se­quen­da est, ut do­lus om­ni­mo­do pu­nia­tur, et­si non ali cui, sed ip­si, qui eum ad­mi­sit, dam­no­sus fu­tu­rus erit.

11Neratius, Parchments, Book IV. Where an agent brings an action, an exception based on his bad faith should not be interposed against him, because the suit is that of another, and he is a stranger to it, and the bad faith of one person should not injure another. If he commits a fraudulent act after issue has been joined, it may be doubted whether an exception on this ground can be pleaded; because, by the trial of the case, it becomes that of the agent, and he conducts it, to some extent, in his own name. It has been decided that an exception can be pleaded on account of fraud committed by the agent. The same rule will apply to the case of a guardian who brings an action in the name of his ward. 1In general, however, the following rule should be observed in matters of this kind, that is to say, that fraud should always be punished, even if it will not injure anyone but the person who committed it.

12Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num. Qui ae­qui­ta­te de­fen­sio­nis in­frin­ge­re ac­tio­nem pot­est, do­li ex­cep­tio­ne tu­tus est.

12Papinianus, Questions, Book III. Where the justice of the defence affords means for the dismissal of an action, the defendant can be protected by an exception on the ground of fraud.

13Pau­lus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo quaes­tio­num. Li­be­ris ex­he­reda­tis, qui ni­hil ex pa­tris iu­di­cio me­rue­runt, rup­to tes­ta­men­to ius suum con­ser­van­dum est, nec op­po­ne­tur do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio. quod non so­lum in per­so­na eo­rum, sed in he­redi­bus in per­so­na li­be­ro­rum quo­que eo­rum op­ti­nen­dum est.

13Paulus, Questions, Book XIV. When a will is broken, the rights of children who have been disinherited and who have received nothing from their father’s will should be preserved, and an exception on the ground of bad faith cannot be pleaded against them. This not only applies to them personally, but also to their heirs and descendants.

14Idem li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Pau­lus re­spon­dit eum, qui in alie­no so­lo ae­di­fi­cium ex­tru­xe­rit, non alias sump­tus con­se­qui pos­se, quam pos­si­deat et ab eo do­mi­nus so­li rem vin­di­cet, sci­li­cet op­po­si­ta do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne.

14The Same, Opinions, Book III. Paulus gave it as his opinion that where a man builds a house upon the land of another, he cannot recover the expenses he incurred unless he was in possession, and the owner brings an action against him to recover the land, in which case, he can oppose him by an exception on the ground of fraud.

15Scae­vo­la li­bro quin­to re­spon­so­rum. Fi­de­ius­sor evic­tio­nis no­mi­ne con­dem­na­tus id prae­dium, quod evic­tum est, et om­nia prae­sta­re pa­ra­tus est, quae iu­re emp­ti con­ti­nen­tur: quae­ro, an agen­tem emp­to­rem ex­cep­tio­ne ex cau­sa iu­di­ca­ti do­li ma­li sum­mo­ve­re pot­est. re­spon­dit ex­cep­tio­nem qui­dem op­po­ni pos­se, iu­di­cem au­tem aes­ti­ma­tu­rum, ut pro dam­nis emp­to­ri sa­tis­fiat.

15Scævola, Opinions, Book V. A surety having had judgment rendered against him on account of eviction was ready to return the land from which the purchaser was evicted, and everything else which was included in the contract of sale. If the purchaser pleads the exception based on res judicata, I ask whether he can be barred by one on the ground of fraud. The answer was that the exception can be pleaded against him, but that the judge will see that he satisfied the purchaser for all the damage which the latter has sustained.

16Her­mo­ge­nia­nus li­bro sex­to iu­ris epi­to­ma­rum. Si de­bi­tor a fu­rio­so dele­ga­tus cre­di­to­ri eius sol­vat, quem com­po­tem men­tis es­se ex­is­ti­ma­bat, et ita cum eo aga­tur: ex­cep­tio­ne do­li in id, quod in rem fu­rio­si pro­ces­sit, de­fen­di­tur.

16Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book VI. If a debtor delegated by an insane person whom he supposed to be of sound mind should pay the creditor of the latter, and for this reason suit should be brought against him, he can protect himself by an exception based on fraud, on the ground that the insane person profited by the transaction.

17Scae­vo­la li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum. Pa­ter pro fi­lia do­tem pro­mi­se­rat et pac­tus erat, ut ip­se ale­ret fi­liam suam eius­que om­nes: idem ho­mo rus­ti­ca­nus ge­ne­ro scrip­sit qua­si usu­ras prae­ter­itas ex do­tis pro­mis­sio­ne: quae­si­tum est, cum ip­se fi­liam suam ex­hi­bue­rit et ma­ri­tus nul­lam im­pen­sam fe­ce­rit, an ex chi­ro­gra­pho ex sti­pu­la­tu agen­ti ge­ne­ro ex­cep­tio ob­sta­re de­beat. re­spon­dit, si, ut pro­po­na­tur, pa­ter, cum ex­hi­be­ret, per er­ro­rem pro­mis­sis­set, lo­cum fo­re do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ni. 1Avus ne­po­ti­bus ex fi­lia le­ga­vit sin­gu­lis cen­te­na et ad­ie­cit haec ver­ba: ‘ignos­ci­te, nam po­tue­ram vo­bis am­plius re­lin­que­re, ni­si me Fron­to pa­ter ves­ter ma­le ac­ce­pis­set, cui de­de­ram mu­tua quin­de­cim, quae ab eo re­ci­pe­re non po­tui: pos­tre­mo hos­tes, qui mi­hi fe­re om­nem sub­stan­tiam abs­tu­le­runt’. quae­si­tum est, an, si avi he­res ab his ne­po­ti­bus pa­tris sui he­redi­bus pe­tat quin­de­cim, con­tra vo­lun­ta­tem de­func­ti fa­ce­re vi­dea­tur et do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­vea­tur. re­spon­dit ex­cep­tio­nem ob­sta­tu­ram. 2Ex qua­dran­te he­res scrip­tus a co­he­rede ex do­dran­te in­sti­tu­to emit por­tio­nem cer­ta quan­ti­ta­te, ex qua ali­quam sum­mam in no­mi­ni­bus ex ka­len­da­rio uti da­ret, sti­pu­lan­ti spopon­dit: de­func­to ven­di­to­re he­redi­ta­tis fal­sum tes­ta­men­tum Sep­ti­cius ac­cu­sa­re coe­pit et he­redi­ta­tem ab emp­to­re pe­tit et ne quid ex ea mi­nue­ret, im­pe­tra­vit: quae­si­tum est, co­gni­tio­ne fal­si pen­den­te an he­redes ex sti­pu­la­tu pe­ten­tes do­li ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ven­tur. re­spon­dit he­redes ven­di­to­ris, si an­te even­tum co­gni­tio­nis per­gant pe­te­re, ex­cep­tio­ne do­li ma­li pos­se sum­mo­ve­ri. 3Ma­ri­to et fi­lio com­mu­ni ex par­te di­mi­dia scrip­tis he­redi­bus fi­liam suam ex prio­re ma­tri­mo­nio ita he­redem in­sti­tuit: ‘Mae­via fi­lia mea ex sex un­ciis he­res mi­hi es­to, si cum co­he­redi­bus tuis pa­rem ra­tio­nem fe­ce­ris pro mea por­tio­ne in diem mor­tis meae eius ac­tus, qui pen­det ex tu­te­la tua, quam Ti­tius pa­ter meus, avus tuus ad­mi­nis­tra­vit’. quae­si­tum est, an, quia sub con­di­cio­ne in­sti­tu­ta fi­lia es­set, si omit­te­ret he­redi­ta­tem, uti sal­vam tu­te­lae ac­tio­nem ha­be­ret, le­ga­ta si­bi a ma­tre da­ta con­se­qui pos­sit. re­spon­dit se­cun­dum ea quae pro­po­ne­ren­tur eam, de qua quae­re­re­tur, con­tra vo­lun­ta­tem pe­te­re et id­eo ex­cep­tio­nem do­li ob­sta­tu­ram.

17Scævola, Digest, Book XXVII. A father promised a dowry for his daughter, and entered into an agreement that he would support her and all her family. This foolish man made a note payable to his son-in-law in lieu of the interest due on the promise to give a dowry. As he had supported his daughter, and her husband had been at no expense on this account, the question arose whether an exception on the ground of bad faith could be pleaded in bar against the son-in-law, if he brought suit under the stipulation for the purpose of collecting the note? The answer was, that if her father had supported her, as was stated, and had made the promise by mistake, then an exception on the ground of bad faith could be interposed. 1A grandfather bequeathed a hundred sesterces to each one of his grandchildren by his daughter, and added the following words, “I ask you to pardon me, for I could have left you much more if your father Fronto had not treated me badly, for I lent him fifteen aurei-which I could not collect, and finally, the enemy deprived me of almost all my property.” If the heir of the grandfather should bring an action to collect the fifteen aurei from the said grandchildren, who were the heirs of their father, the question arose, would he be considered to have acted against the will of the deceased, and could he be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud? The answer was that the exception would operate as a bar. 2An heir who was appointed to the fourth of an estate purchased for a certain sum of money the share of his co-heir who had been appointed heir to three-fourths of it, executed promissory notes for the deferred payments, and bound himself by a stipulation. The vendor of the estate died; Septitius attacked the will as being forged, and having brought suit to recover the estate from the purchaser, obtained an order of court to prevent him from disposing of any part of it. The question arose whether the heirs who brought suit under the stipulation, while a case involving the genuineness of the will was pending, could be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. The answer was that the heirs of the vendor could be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud if they persisted in demanding payment of the notes before the case relating to the will was decided. 3A woman, having appointed her husband and her son heirs to equal portions of her estate, also appointed a daughter whom she had had by a former marriage her heir, as follows: “Let my daughter, Mævia, be the heir to six-twelfths of my estate, if she accounts to her co-heirs for what I shall owe her at the time of my death, growing out of the accounts of her guardianship, which my father, Titius, her grandfather, administered.” As this daughter had been appointed under a condition, if she should reject the estate in order to preserve the right of action on guardianship, the question arose whether she could claim the legacy which had been bequeathed to her by her mother. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, she made the claim in question contrary to the wishes of her mother, and therefore she would be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith.