Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLIII20,
De aqua cottidiana et aestiva
Liber quadragesimus tertius
XX.

De aqua cottidiana et aestiva

(Concerning the Edict Which Has Reference to Water Used Every Day and to Such as is Only Used During the Summer.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­tua­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Ait prae­tor: ‘Uti hoc an­no aquam, qua de agi­tur, non vi non clam non pre­ca­rio ab il­lo du­xis­ti, quo mi­nus ita du­cas, vim fie­ri ve­to’. 1Hoc in­ter­dic­tum pro­hi­bi­to­rium et in­ter­dum re­sti­tu­to­rium est et per­ti­net ad aquam cot­ti­dia­nam. 2Cot­ti­dia­na au­tem aqua non il­la est, quae cot­ti­die du­ci­tur, sed ea, qua quis cot­ti­die uti, si vel­let: quam­quam cot­ti­dia­nam in­ter­dum hie­me du­ce­re non ex­pe­diat, et­si pos­sit du­ci. 3Duo au­tem ge­ne­ra sunt aqua­rum: est cot­ti­dia­na, est et aes­ti­va. cot­ti­dia­na ab aes­ti­va usu dif­fert, non iu­re. cot­ti­dia­na ea est, quae du­ci ad­si­due so­let vel aes­ti­vo tem­po­re vel hi­ber­no, et­iam­si ali­quan­do duc­ta non est: ea quo­que di­ci­tur cot­ti­dia­na, cu­ius ser­vi­tus in­ter­mis­sio­ne tem­po­ris di­vi­sa est. aes­ti­va au­tem ea est, qua aes­ta­te so­la uti ex­pe­dit, sic­uti di­ci­mus ves­ti­men­ta aes­ti­va, sal­tus aes­ti­vos, cas­tra aes­ti­va, qui­bus in­ter­dum et­iam hie­me, ple­rum­que au­tem aes­ta­te uta­mur. ego pu­to pro­ban­dum ex pro­pos­i­to uten­tis et ex na­tu­ra lo­co­rum aquam aes­ti­vam a cot­ti­dia­na dis­cer­ni: nam si sit ea aqua, quae per­pe­tuo du­ci pos­sit, ego ta­men aes­ta­te so­la ea utar, di­cen­dum est hanc aquam es­se aes­ti­vam: rur­sum si ea sit aqua, quae non ni­si aes­ta­te du­ci pos­sit, aes­ti­va di­ce­tur: et si ea sint lo­ca, quae na­tu­ra non ad­mit­tant aquam ni­si aes­ta­te, di­cen­dum erit rec­te aes­ti­vam di­ci. 4Quod au­tem scrip­tum est in in­ter­dic­to: ‘uti hoc an­no aquam du­xis­ti’ hoc est: non cot­ti­die, sed hoc an­no vel una die vel noc­te. er­go cot­ti­dia­na qui­dem aqua alia est, quae cot­ti­die du­ci pos­sit, vel hie­me vel aes­ta­te, et­si ali­quo mo­men­to tem­po­ris duc­ta sit, aes­ti­va ea, quae cot­ti­die qui­dem du­ci pos­sit, vel so­la aes­ta­te, du­ca­tur au­tem aes­ta­te tan­tum, non et hie­me, non quia non pos­sit et hie­me, sed quia non so­let. 5Lo­qui­tur au­tem prae­tor in hoc in­ter­dic­to de ea aqua so­la, quae per­en­nis est: nul­la enim alia aqua du­ci pot­est, ni­si quae per­en­nis est. 6Quam­quam ad per­en­nes aquas di­xe­ri­mus hoc in­ter­dic­tum per­ti­ne­re, ad eas ta­men per­en­nes per­ti­net, quae du­ci pos­sunt. ce­te­rum sunt quae­dam, quae, et­si per­en­nes sunt, du­ci ta­men non pos­sunt, ut pu­ta pu­tea­les et quae ita sunt sum­mer­sae, ut de­flue­re ex­tra ter­ram et usui es­se non pos­sint. sed hu­ius­mo­di aquis, quae du­ci non pos­sint, haus­tus ser­vi­tus im­po­ni pot­est. 7Haec in­ter­dic­ta de aqua, item de fon­te ad eam aquam per­ti­ne­re vi­den­tur, quae a ca­pi­te du­ci­tur, non ali­un­de: ha­rum enim aqua­rum et­iam ser­vi­tus iu­re ci­vi­li con­sti­tui pot­est. 8Ca­put aquae il­lud est, un­de aqua nas­ci­tur: si ex fon­te nas­ca­tur, ip­se fons: si ex flu­mi­ne vel la­cu, pri­ma in­ci­lia vel prin­ci­pia fos­sa­rum, qui­bus aquae ex flu­mi­ne vel ex la­cu in pri­mum ri­vum com­pel­li so­lent. pla­ne si aqua su­do­ri­bus ma­nan­do in ali­quem pri­mum lo­cum ef­flue­re at­que ibi ap­pa­re­re in­ci­pit, eius hoc ca­put di­ce­mus, ubi pri­mum emer­git. 9Et qua­li­ter sit con­sti­tu­tum ius aquae, di­cen­dum est hoc in­ter­dic­tum lo­cum ha­be­re. 10Sed et­si iu­re aqua non de­be­tur ali­cui, si ta­men iu­re du­ce­re se pu­ta­vit, cum non in iu­re, sed in fac­to er­ra­vit, di­cen­dum est eo­que iu­re uti­mur, ut in­ter­dic­to hoc uti pos­sit: suf­fi­cit enim, si iu­re se du­ce­re pu­ta­vit nec vi nec clam nec pre­ca­rio du­xit. 11Il­lud quae­ri­tur, utrum ea tan­tum aqua his in­ter­dic­tis con­ti­nea­tur, quae ad agrum ir­ri­gan­dum per­ti­net, an ve­ro om­nis, et­iam ea, quae ad usum quo­que et com­mo­dum nos­trum. et hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut haec quo­que con­ti­nea­tur. prop­ter quod et­iam si in ur­ba­na prae­dia quis aquam du­ce­re ve­lit, hoc in­ter­dic­tum lo­cum ha­be­re pot­est. 12Prae­ter­ea La­beo scri­bit, et­si qui­dam duc­tus aqua­rum non sit fun­di, quia quo­cum­que du­ci pos­sint, ta­men ad hoc in­ter­dic­tum per­ti­ne­re. 13Idem La­beo scri­bit, et­iam­si prae­tor hoc in­ter­dic­to de aquis fri­gi­dis sen­tiat, ta­men de ca­li­dis aquis in­ter­dic­ta non es­se de­ne­gan­da: nam­que ha­rum quo­que aqua­rum usum es­se ne­ces­sa­rium: non­num­quam enim re­fri­ge­ra­tae usum ir­ri­gan­dis agris prae­stant. his ac­ce­dit, quod in qui­bus­dam lo­cis et cum ca­li­dae sunt, ir­ri­gan­dis ta­men agris ne­ces­sa­riae sunt, ut Hie­rapo­li: con­stat enim apud Hie­rapo­li­ta­nos in Asia agrum aqua ca­li­da ri­ga­ri. et quam­vis ea sit aqua, quae ad ri­gan­dos non sit ne­ces­sa­ria, ta­men ne­mo amb­iget his in­ter­dic­tis lo­cum fo­re. 14Si­ve au­tem in­tra ur­bem sit aqua si­ve ex­tra ur­bem, hoc in­ter­dic­to lo­cus erit. 15Il­lud ta­men hic in­tel­le­gen­dum est eo­dem mo­do prae­to­rem du­ci aquam ius­sis­se, quo duc­ta est hoc an­no. pro­in­de ne­que am­plio­ris mo­di, ne­que alia per­mis­sis­se pot­est vi­de­ri. qua­re si alia aqua sit, quam quis ve­lit du­ce­re, quam hoc an­no du­xit, vel ea­dem, per aliam ta­men re­gio­nem ve­lit du­ce­re, im­pu­ne ei vis fiet. 16Il­lud La­beo di­cit om­nes par­tes il­lius fun­di, in quem lo­ci aqua du­ci­tur, eius­dem nu­me­ro es­se. er­go et si for­te ac­tor con­fi­nem agrum eme­rit et ex agro, in quem hoc an­no aquam du­xe­rit, post­ea fun­di emp­ti no­mi­ne ve­lit aquam du­ce­re, ita de­mum eum rec­te hoc in­ter­dic­to (ut de iti­ne­re ac­tu­que) uti pu­tant, ut se­mel in suum in­gres­sus in­de egre­di qua ve­lit pos­sit, ni­si ei no­ci­tum sit, ex quo aquam du­cit. 17Item quae­ri­tur, si quis aquae, quam hoc an­no du­ce­bat, aliam aquam ad­mis­cue­rit, an im­pu­ne pro­hi­bea­tur. et ex­tat Ofi­lii sen­ten­tia ex­is­ti­man­tis rec­te eum pro­hi­be­ri, sed eo lo­ci, in quo pri­mum aquam aliam in ri­vum ad­mit­tit: et Ofi­lius in to­ta aqua rec­te eum pro­hi­be­ri ait. ego Ofi­lio ad­sen­tio non pos­se di­vi­di, quia non pot­est ita in par­te vis fie­ri, ut non in to­ta aqua fiat. 18Tre­ba­tius, cum am­plior nu­me­rus pe­co­ris ad aquam ap­pel­le­tur, quam de­bet ap­pel­li, pos­se uni­ver­sum pe­cus im­pu­ne pro­hi­be­ri, quia iunc­tum pe­cus ei pe­co­ri, cui ad­pul­sus de­bea­tur, to­tum cor­rum­pat pe­co­ris ad­pul­sum. Mar­cel­lus au­tem ait, si quis ius ha­bens pe­co­ris ad aquam ap­pel­len­di plu­ra pe­co­ra ad­pul­se­rit, non in om­ni­bus pe­co­ri­bus eum pro­hi­ben­dum: quod est ve­rum, quia pe­co­ra se­pa­ra­ri pos­sunt. 19Aris­to pu­tat eum de­mum in­ter­dic­tum hoc ha­be­re, qui se pu­tat suo iu­re uti, non eum, qui scit se nul­lum ius ha­be­re et uti­tur. 20Idem ait eum, qui hoc an­no aquam du­xe­rit nec vi nec clam nec pre­ca­rio et eo­dem an­no vi­tio­se usus est, rec­te ta­men hoc in­ter­dic­to usu­rum: quod re­fer­ri ad id tem­pus, quod si­ne vi­tio fue­rit: es­se enim ve­rum hoc an­no non vi non clam non pre­ca­rio usum. 21Quae­si­tum est, si quis an­te an­num aquam du­xit, de­in­de se­quen­ti tem­po­re, hoc est in­tra an­num, aqua in­flu­xe­rit ip­sa si­bi me non du­cen­te, an hoc in­ter­dic­to lo­cus sit. et re­fert Se­ve­rus Va­le­rius com­pe­te­re ei hoc in­ter­dic­tum, qua­si du­xis­se vi­dea­tur, li­cet pe­ni­tus pro­spi­cien­ti­bus non vi­de­tur is­te du­xis­se. 22Item quae­si­tum est, si quis, dum pu­tat ter­tio quo­que die ha­be­re se ius aquae du­cen­dae, du­xe­rit una die, an rec­te et si­ne cap­tio­ne pos­ses­so­ris rec­te du­xis­se vi­dea­tur, ut hoc in­ter­dic­tum ha­beat: ait enim prae­tor: ‘uti hoc an­no aquam du­xis­ti’ id est al­ter­nis die­bus. il­lud au­tem ni­hil in­ter­est, utrum quin­to die aqua de­bea­tur an al­ter­nis die­bus an cot­ti­die ei, qui hoc in­ter­dic­to uti ve­lit: nam cum suf­fi­ciat vel uno die hoc an­no aquam du­xis­se, ni­hil re­fert, qua­lem aquae duc­tum ha­bens du­xe­rit: dum, si quis, cum quin­to quo­que die ute­re­tur, qua­si al­ter­nis die­bus du­cens in­ter­di­xe­rit, ni­hil ei prod­es­se vi­de­tur. 23Prae­ter­ea il­lud scien­dum est, si, cum aquam du­xis­ses, ad­ver­sa­rius te pro­hi­bue­rit, de­in­de tu in­ter­im ius aquae du­cen­dae amis­e­ris, in re­sti­tu­tio­nem hoc venire, ut ti­bi prae­ste­tur per hoc in­ter­dic­tum quod amis­is­ti: et hoc ve­rum pu­to. 24Si fun­dum, ad quem aquam du­ce­bas, ven­di­de­ris et tra­di­de­ris, ni­hi­lo mi­nus in­ter­dic­tum ti­bi uti­le est. 25Com­pe­tit hoc in­ter­dic­tum ad­ver­sus eum, qui pro­hi­bet me aquam du­ce­re, et ni­hil in­ter­est, utrum quis do­mi­nium fun­di ha­beat an non. id­cir­co­que is te­ne­tur in­ter­dic­to: nam et si ser­vi­tus coe­pit ad­ver­sus quem­vis pos­se vin­di­ca­ri. 26Si in­ter ri­va­les, id est qui per eun­dem ri­vum aquam du­cunt, sit con­ten­tio de aquae usu, utro­que suum usum es­se con­ten­den­te, du­plex in­ter­dic­tum utri­que com­pe­tit. 27La­beo pu­tat per hoc in­ter­dic­tum pro­hi­be­ri quem, ne quid in il­lo fun­do fa­ciat fo­diat se­rat suc­ci­dat pu­tet ae­di­fi­cet, qua­re ex re ea aqua, quam il­le hoc an­no per fun­dum tuum si­ne vi­tio du­xit, in­qui­ne­tur vi­tie­tur cor­rum­pa­tur de­te­rior­ve fiat: et si­mi­li­ter de aes­ti­va aqua de­be­re in­ter­di­ci ait. 28Si quis hoc ces­se­rit, ne li­ceat si­bi aquam quae­re­re, ea ces­sio va­let. 29De­in­de ait prae­tor: ‘Uti prio­re aes­ta­te aquam, qua de agi­tur, nec vi nec clam nec pre­ca­rio ab il­lo du­xis­ti, quo mi­nus ita du­cas, vim fie­ri ve­to. in­ter he­redes emp­to­res et bo­no­rum pos­ses­so­res in­ter­di­cam’. 30Hoc in­ter­dic­tum de aqua aes­ti­va pro­po­ni­tur. 31Quia au­tem di­xi­mus aes­ti­vam aquam ali­quo di­sta­re ab aqua cot­ti­dia­na, scien­dum est et­iam in­ter­dic­tis di­sta­re, quod qui de aqua cot­ti­dia­na in­ter­di­cit, ita in­ter­di­cit: ‘uti hoc an­no aquam du­xis­ti’, at qui de aes­ti­va, sic: ‘uti prio­re aes­ta­te’, nec im­me­ri­to: nam quia hie­me non uti­tur, re­fer­re se non ad prae­sen­tem aes­ta­tem, sed ad prio­rem de­buit. 32Aes­ta­tem in­ci­pe­re (sic pe­ri­tio­res tra­di­de­runt) ab ae­qui­noc­tio ver­no et fi­ni­ri ae­qui­noc­tio au­tum­na­li: et ita se­nis men­si­bus aes­tas at­que hiems di­vi­di­tur. 33Prio­rem aes­ta­tem ex com­pa­ra­tio­ne dua­rum aes­ta­tium ac­ci­pi. 34Prop­ter hoc, si aes­ta­te in­ter­di­ca­tur, non­num­quam an­num et sex men­ses con­ti­ne­re: quod ita con­tin­git, si in­itio ver­ni ae­qui­noc­tii duc­ta sit aqua et se­quen­ti aes­ta­te pri­die ae­qui­noc­tium au­tum­na­le in­ter­di­ca­tur: et pro­in­de, si hie­me in­ter­di­ca­tur, et­iam in bi­en­nium haec res ex­ten­de­tur. 35Si quis hie­me tan­tum aquam so­li­tus fuit du­ce­re, aes­ta­te non fuit so­li­tus, uti­le in­ter­dic­tum ei com­pe­tit. 36Qui hac aes­ta­te du­xit, non su­pe­rio­re, uti­le in­ter­dic­tum ha­bet. 37Ait prae­tor: ‘in­ter he­redes et emp­to­res et bo­no­rum pos­ses­so­res in­ter­di­cam’. haec ver­ba non so­lum ad aes­ti­vam aquam, ve­rum et­iam ad cot­ti­dia­nam quo­que re­fe­ren­da es­se scien­dum est: nam sic­uti de iti­ne­re ac­tu­que et suc­ces­so­ri­bus dan­tur in­ter­dic­ta et emp­to­ri, ita haec quo­que dan­da prae­tor pu­ta­vit. 38Ait prae­tor: ‘Quo ex cas­tel­lo il­li aquam du­ce­re ab eo, cui eius rei ius fuit, per­mis­sum est, quo mi­nus ita uti per­mis­sum est du­cat, vim fie­ri ve­to. quan­do­que de ope­re fa­cien­do in­ter­dic­tum erit, dam­ni in­fec­ti ca­ve­ri iu­be­bo’. 39Hoc in­ter­dic­tum ne­ces­sa­rio pro­pos­i­tum est. nam­que su­pe­rio­ra in­ter­dic­ta ad eos per­ti­nent, qui a ca­pi­te du­cunt vel im­po­si­ta ser­vi­tu­te vel quia pu­tant im­po­si­tam: ae­quis­si­mum vi­sum est ei quo­que, qui ex cas­tel­lo du­cit, in­ter­dic­tum da­ri. id est ex eo re­cep­ta­cu­lo, quod aquam pu­bli­cam sus­ci­pit. cas­tel­lum ac­ci­pe. 40Si ex cas­tel­lo per­mis­sum est, dan­dum erit in­ter­dic­tum: 41Per­mit­ti­tur au­tem aquam ex cas­tel­lo vel ex ri­vo vel ex quo alio lo­co pu­bli­co du­ce­re. 42Id­que a prin­ci­pe con­ce­di­tur: alii nul­li com­pe­tit ius aquae dan­dae. 43Et da­tur in­ter­dum prae­diis, in­ter­dum per­so­nis. quod prae­diis da­tur, per­so­na ex­tinc­ta non ex­tin­gui­tur: quod da­tur per­so­nis, cum per­so­nis amit­ti­tur id­eo­que ne­que ad alium do­mi­num prae­dio­rum ne­que ad he­redem vel qua­lem­cum­que suc­ces­so­rem trans­it. pla­ne ei, ad quem do­mi­nium trans­it, im­pe­tra­bi­le est: nam si do­cue­rit prae­diis suis aquam de­bi­tam, et­si no­mi­ne eius flu­xis­se, a quo do­mi­nium ad se trans­iit, in­du­bi­ta­te im­pe­trat ius aquae du­cen­dae, nec est hoc be­ne­fi­cium, sed in­iu­ria, si quis for­te non im­pe­tra­ve­rit. 44Me­mi­nis­se au­tem de­be­mus in hoc in­ter­dic­to to­tam quaes­tio­nem fi­ni­ri ad­sig­na­tio­nis: non enim prae­pa­rat hoc in­ter­dic­tum cau­sam, ut su­pe­rio­ra in­ter­dic­ta, nec ad pos­ses­sio­nem tem­po­ra­riam per­ti­net, sed aut ha­bet ius ad­sig­na­tum si­bi aut non ha­bet, et in­ter­dic­tum to­tum fi­ni­tur.

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXX. The Prætor says: “I forbid force be used against you to prevent you from conducting the water in question the same way in which you have conducted it during the past year, provided you have not done so, either by violence, or clandestinely, or under a precarious title.” 1This interdict is prohibitory, and is sometimes restitutory, and has reference to water in daily use. 2Water in daily use is not such as is made use of constantly, but is that which anyone can use every day if he so desires; although sometimes, while it may not be convenient to conduct it during the winter, one, nevertheless, has the right to do so. 3There are two kinds of servitudes relating to water, one of them for its daily use, and the other for its use in the summer. That which can be used every day differs from that which is used in the summer, for the former is such as is conducted constantly both in summer and in winter, although sometimes it is not made use of. That which is called water for daily use has its servitude divided by intervals of time. That which is for use during the summer is such as is only convenient to use during that season, as we are accustomed to speak of summer clothing, summer resorts, and summer camps, which we make use of occasionally during the winter, but for the most part during the summer. I think water that is used in the summer, and that which is for daily use, should be distinguished by considering the intention of the parties, and the nature of the places where it is used; for if it is such that it can always be conducted, but I only use it in summer, it must be said that this is summer water. Moreover, if it can only be conducted during the summer, it is also summer water. If the places are such that, by their nature, the water can only be introduced during the summer, it must be held that it will properly be called summer water. 4When it is stated in the interdict, “as you have conducted the water during the past year,” this means not every day, but even only one day or night during the entire year. Therefore, daily water is such as can be conducted every day during the winter or summer, although there may be times when it is not conducted. Summer water is such as can be conducted every day, but is used only in summer, and not in winter; not because this cannot be done during the winter, but because it is not usually the case. 5Again, the Prætor, in this interdict, only refers to water which runs continuously, for water cannot be conducted unless its flow is constant. 6Although we stated that this interdict only has reference to water which flows continuously, it also relates to such as can be conducted. For there is certain water which, though its flow is continuous, still cannot be conducted; as, for instance, well water, and such as is so deep underground that it cannot be raised to the surface so as to be of use. A servitude for drawing water of this kind, which cannot be conducted, may be imposed. 7These interdicts with reference to water and springs are considered only to apply to water which is drawn from its source, and not from anywhere else, for a servitude can be imposed upon water of this kind under the Civil Law. 8The source of water is the place where it originates, and is the spring itself, if it proceeds from a spring. If, however, it is derived from a river or a lake, the first parts of the trench by which it is conducted from the said river or lake into the canal is considered to be its source. If water, oozing through the ground, first appears in some place or other, it is clear that we must call the place where it first emerges from the earth its source. 9And, no matter in what way the right to water may be established, it must be held that this interdict will apply. 10If, however, the right to the water does not legally belong to anyone, but he thinks that he has the legal right to conduct it, and does so, as, in this instance, the error is not in law, but in fact, it must be held, and it is also our practice, that he is entitled to avail himself of this interdict; for it is sufficient if he thought that he had the legal right to conduct the water, and did not do so either by violence, or clandestinely, or under a precarious title. 11The question is asked whether these interdicts only have reference to water which is used for irrigating land, or whether they apply to all water, even such as is employed for our use and convenience. It is our practice to consider that they have reference to all kinds of water. Hence this interdict will be applicable, even where anyone desires to bring water into his houses in the city. 12Moreover, Labeo says that even where there are certain aqueducts which do not belong to the land, because they can be used by anyone, the interdict still will apply. 13Labeo also says that even if the Prætor, in this interdict, meant to refer to cold water, the interdicts should, nevertheless, not be refused where warm water is concerned, as the use of water of this kind is necessary, for sometimes it is employed instead of cold water in irrigating fields. In addition to this, in some places warm water is indispensable for the purpose of irrigation, as, for example, at Hieropolis, since it is a fact that the Hieropolitans irrigate their lands in Asia with warm water. And although water of this kind may not be absolutely necessary for irrigation purposes, still no one doubts that these interdicts will apply under such circumstances. 14There will be ground for this interdict whether the water is in a town or out of it. 15It, however, must be understood that the Prætor orders the water to be conducted in the same way as it was conducted during the past year, hence this cannot be done in a larger quantity, or in a different place. Therefore, if the water which anyone wishes to conduct is different from that which he conducted during the past year, or if it was the same and he desires to conduct it through a different part of his premises, force may be used to prevent him from doing so. 16Labeo says that every portion of the land through which the water is conducted is entitled to the benefit of the servitude. Hence, if the plaintiff has purchased an adjoining field, and wishes to conduct the water which he has used during the past year into the field which he has recently purchased, he can legally avail himself of this interdict, as is the case of rights of way; so that, once having entered upon his own land, he can enter upon the other wherever he pleases, unless he is prevented by the person from whom the servitude of the water was obtained. 17The question is also asked where anyone mixes other water with that which he has used during the preceding year, whether he can be prevented from doing so with impunity. An opinion of Ofilius is extant, who thinks that he can legally be prevented from doing so, but only in the place where he first allows the water to run into his canal. Ofilius says that he can legally be prevented with reference to his entire right to the water. I concur in the opinion of Ofilius that the right cannot be divided, because violence cannot be employed with reference to a portion of the water, where this is not applicable to all of it. 18Trebatius holds that if a larger number of cattle are driven to a watering-place than the owner has a right to take there, all of them can be prevented from coming, because those which have been added to the cattle which had the right to drink will annul the right of all of them to make use of the privilege. Marcellus, however, says that if he who has the right to conduct a certain number of cattle to a watering-place conducts more than that number, he should not be prevented from bringing all of them. This is true, because cattle can be separated. 19Aristo holds that he alone is entitled to employ this interdict who thinks that he has a right to do so; and not he who, well knowing that he has no such right, makes use of it. 20He also says that he who, during the past year, conducted water without violence, or clandestinely, or under a precarious title, but whose enjoyment during part of the same year was subject to one or the other of these defects, can still properly make use of this interdict for the time when he did so, and no such defect existed, should be taken into consideration; as it is true that there was a period during the past year when he enjoyed the servitude without employing violence, or acting clandestinely, or relying on precarious title. 21The question arose, where anyone has conducted water for a longer period than a year, and during the following time, that is, within the year, the water flowed of itself, without his conducting it, whether there would be ground for this interdict. Severus Valerius says that the interdict will lie in his favor, as he is considered to have conducted the water, although, strictly speaking, he may not be held actually to have done so. 22The question was also asked, if anyone thought that he had the right to conduct water every other day, and conducted it only one day, whether he could be held to have done so properly, and without deceiving the possessor of the land where the water originated, so that he would be entitled to make use of this interdict. For the Prætor says, “as you have conducted the water during the past year,” that is, on alternate days, it makes no difference whether the water was due every fifth day, or every other day, or daily, so far as he who desires to avail himself of the interdict is concerned; for as it is sufficient to have conducted the water only one day during the past year it is of no consequence what right to conduct it the person has, since if anyone who has the right to conduct it every fifth day wishes to avail himself of the interdict, alleging that he has the right to conduct the water every other day, he will be held to have no right to do so. 23Moreover, it must be noted that if, when you are conducting water, your adversary prohibits you from doing so, and then in the meantime, you lose your right to conduct it, you can, by means of this interdict, obtain restitution by recovering what you have lost. I think that this opinion is correct. 24If you should sell and deliver the land upon which you are accustomed to conduct water, you can still avail yourself of the interdict. 25This interdict will lie against anyone who prevents me from conducting the water, and it makes no difference whether he has the ownership of the land or not, as he will still be liable under the interdict, for, after the servitude has once become operative, it can be claimed against anyone whomsoever. 26If a dispute arises between two rivals (that is to say, between two persons who conduct water through the same canal), with reference to the water, and each one of them claims to have the exclusive right, a double interdict will lie in their favor. 27Labeo thinks that, under this interdict, a man will be prevented from building anything on the land through which the water is conducted, or from digging or sowing there, or from cutting down any trees, or from erecting any building by means of which the water which he conducted during the past year under a good title through your land may be polluted, vitiated, spoiled, or deteriorated. He says that, in like manner, the interdict can be employed in the case of summer water. 28If anyone relinquishes the right to draw water, the abandonment will be valid. 29The Prætor further says, “I forbid violence to be employed to prevent you from drawing water, as you have done during the past summer, without the exertion of force, or clandestinely, or under a precarious title. I will grant this interdict to heirs, purchasers, and prætorian possessors of property.” 30This interdict has reference to summer water. 31As we have stated that a difference exists between water used only during the summer and that which may be used daily, it must also be noted that a difference exists between the interdicts; for the one which has reference to water used daily contains the following clause, “As you have conducted the water during the past year,” and that which relates to water used only during the summer contains the following clause, “As you have conducted it during the past summer.” This is not unreasonable, for as the individual in question did not use the water during the winter, he should refer, not to the present summer, but to the previous one. 32Learned men have decided that summer begins from the vernal equinox, and terminates at the autumnal equinox. Hence summer and winter are divided by the period of six months. 33Last summer is calculated from the comparison of two summer seasons. 34On this account, if an interdict is issued during the summer, sometimes the period includes a year and six months. This happens where water is conducted at the beginning of the vernal equinox, and the interdict is issued during the next summer, on the day before the autumnal equinox. Hence, if it is issued in the winter, the period will include two years. 35If anyone has been accustomed to conduct the water only during the winter, and not during the summer, he can avail himself of the interdict. 36Anyone is entitled to an available interdict who has conducted the water during this summer and not during the previous one. 37The Prætor says: “I will grant an interdict to heirs, purchasers, and prætorian possessors of property.” It should be observed that these words not only have reference to water used during the summer, but also to that used every day, for, as interdicts are granted to successors with reference to rights of way, so the Prætor thought that these also should be granted. 38The Prætor says: “I forbid violence to be employed to prevent anyone from conducting water from a reservoir on his premises to whom the right to do so has been conceded. Whenever an interdict with reference to the construction of some work should be issued I will order security against threatened injury to be furnished.” 39It was necessary to propose this interdict, for, as the preceding ones have reference to persons who conduct water from its source on account of a servitude having been imposed, or because they think that this has been done, it seemed to be just that an interdict should be granted to one who conducted water from a reservoir, that is to say, from the receptacle which contains water for the use of the public and which is designated a reservoir. 40If permission is given to conduct water from a reservoir, an interdict should be granted. 41Moreover, permission will be given to conduct water from a reservoir, a stream, or from any other public place. 42This permission is granted by the Emperor, and no one else has a right to give it. 43This right is sometimes granted to land, and sometimes to persons. When it is granted to land, it is not extinguished with the death of the party interested; but when it is granted to persons, it is lost by their death, and therefore does not pass to any other owner of the land, or to heirs or other successors. It is clear that the right can be claimed by him to whom the ownership of the land is transmitted. For if he proves that the water is due to his land, and has flowed in the name of him by whom the ownership has been transmitted to himself, he can undoubtedly obtain the right to conduct it; for this is not a favor, but it will be an injustice if it should not be obtained. 44We should also remember that, in this interdict, the entire question of the assignment of the right to the water is determined. For this interdict is not merely preliminary, as those formerly described are, nor does it only relate to temporary possession, but the party interested either has had the right assigned to himself, or he has not, and the interdict effectually disposes of the whole matter.

2Pom­po­nius li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. Si diur­na­rum aut noc­tur­na­rum ho­ra­rum aquae duc­tum ha­beam, non pos­sum alia ho­ra du­ce­re, quam qua ius ha­beam du­cen­di.

2Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXXII. If I have the right to conduct the water during the day or the night, I cannot do so at different hours than those during which I am entitled to conduct it.

3Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. Hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut et­iam non ad ir­ri­gan­dum, sed pe­co­ris cau­sa vel amoe­ni­ta­tis aqua du­ci pos­sit. 1Ex flu­mi­ne aquam du­ce­re plu­res pos­sunt, ita ta­men, ut vi­ci­nis non no­ceant, vel, si an­gus­tus am­nis sit, et­iam ei, qui in alia ri­pa sit. 2Si aquam ex flu­mi­ne pu­bli­co du­xe­ris et flu­men re­ces­se­rit, non potes sub­se­qui flu­men, quia ei lo­co ser­vi­tus im­po­si­ta non sit, quam­vis is lo­cus meus sit. sed si al­lu­vio­ne pau­la­tim ac­ces­se­rit fun­do tuo, sub­se­qui potes, quia lo­cus to­tus flu­mi­nis ser­viat duc­tio­ni. sed si cir­cum­flue­re coe­pe­rit mu­ta­to al­veo, non potes, quia me­dius lo­cus non ser­viat in­ter­rup­ta­que sit ser­vi­tus. 3Aqua, quae in ri­vo nas­ci­tur, ta­ci­te lu­cri fit ab eo qui du­cit. 4Duc­tus aquae, cu­ius ori­go me­mo­riam ex­ces­sit, iu­re con­sti­tu­ti lo­co ha­be­tur. 5Is, qui aquae cot­ti­dia­nae ius ha­bet, vel fis­tu­lam in ri­vo po­ne­re vel aliud quod­li­bet fa­ce­re pot­est, dum­mo­do ne fun­dum do­mi­no aut aqua­gium ri­va­li­bus de­te­rius fa­ciat. 6Si aqua du­ca­tur, su­pra eam alia aqua per pon­tem, qui su­pra ri­vum fac­tus sit, iu­re du­ci­tur, dum in­fe­rio­ri ri­vo non no­cea­tur.

3The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXIV. We have adopted the rule that water can be conducted, not only for irrigating purposes, but also for the use of cattle, and even for pleasure. 1Several persons can conduct water from a river, provided they do not cause any damage to their neighbors, or even those who are on the opposite bank, if the stream narrows. 2If you have conducted water from a public river, and it leaves its bed, you cannot follow it up, even though the place where it now runs belongs to me, because the servitude was not imposed upon that land. You can, however, follow it up, if the river should gradually accrue to your land by alluvial deposit, because the entire locality is subject to the servitude of conducting the water of the river. But if the river, having changed its bed, begins to surround it, you cannot then follow it up, because the abandoned bed is not subject to the servitude which, in consequence, is interrupted. 3The water which originates in a brook is tacitly considered to be for the benefit of him who conducts it from thence. 4An aqueduct, whose origin is beyond the memory of man, is considered to have been lawfully established in the place through which it passes. 5He who is entitled to conduct water for daily use can place pipes in a stream, or do anything else; provided he causes no damage to the land of his neighbor, or interferes with the right of others to use water from the same source. 6Anyone who has a right to conduct water can also legally conduct other water above it by means of an aqueduct constructed upon the shore, provided no injury is done to the conduit below.

4Iu­lia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Lu­cio Ti­tio ex fon­te meo ut aquam du­ce­ret, ces­si: quae­si­tum est, an et Mae­vio ce­de­re pos­sim, ut per eun­dem aquae duc­tum aquam du­cat: et si pu­ta­ve­ris pos­se ce­di per eun­dem aquae duc­tum duo­bus, quem­ad­mo­dum uti de­beant. re­spon­dit: sic­ut iter ac­tus via plu­ri­bus ce­di vel si­mul vel se­pa­ra­tim pot­est, ita aquae du­cen­dae ius rec­te ce­de­tur. sed si in­ter eos, qui­bus aqua ces­sa est, non con­ve­nit, quem­ad­mo­dum utan­tur, non erit in­iquum uti­le iu­di­cium red­di, sic­ut in­ter eos, ad quos usus fruc­tus per­ti­net, uti­le com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do iu­di­cium red­di ple­ris­que pla­cuit.

4Ad Dig. 43,20,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 449, Note 1.Julianus, Digest, Book XLI. I granted to Lucius Titius the privilege of conducting water from my spring. The question arose whether I could grant to Mævius the right to conduct water by the same aqueduct. If you think that this action can be granted to two persons to conduct it by the same aqueduct, how ought they to avail themselves of the right? The answer was that as a right of way can be granted to several persons conjointly, or separately; so, in like manner, the right to conduct water can legally be granted to them. If the parties do not agree among themselves, in what way shall they make use of it? It will not be inequitable to grant them a prætorian action, just as many authorities have decided that a suit of this kind can be granted in partition to several persons who are entitled to the enjoyment of an usufruct.

5Idem li­bro quar­to ex Mi­n­icio. Cum con­stet non so­lum tem­po­ri­bus, sed et­iam men­su­ris pos­se aquam di­vi­di, pot­est eo­dem tem­po­re alius cot­ti­dia­nam, alius aes­ti­vam aquam du­ce­re, ita ut aes­ta­te di­vi­da­tur in­ter eos aqua, hie­me so­lus du­cat is qui cot­ti­dia­nae ius ha­beat. 1In­ter duos, qui eo­dem ri­vo aquam cer­tis ho­ris se­pa­ra­tim du­ce­bant, con­ve­nit, ut per­mu­ta­tis in­ter se tem­po­ri­bus aqua ute­ren­tur: quae­ro, cum am­plius tem­po­re ser­vi­tu­ti­bus prae­fi­ni­to ita du­xis­sent, ut ne­uter eo­rum suo tem­po­re usus es­set, num ius uten­di amis­sis­sent. ne­ga­vit amis­sis­se.

5The Same, On Minicius, Book IV. It is established that the use of water can be divided not only by seasons, but also by measurement. One person can have the right to conduct it for daily use, and another to do so during the summer; so that the water will be divided between them during the summer, and, during the winter, he alone can conduct it who has the right to its daily use. 1It was agreed between two persons who were entitled to the privilege of conducting water by the same aqueduct, at different hours, that the hours for its use should be changed. If they had conducted it for a longer period than was necessary, as prescribed by the servitude, so that neither of them used it during the specified time for which it had been granted him, I ask whether they had lost the right to its use. It was denied that they had lost it.

6Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. De in­ter­dic­to de aqua aes­ti­va, item cot­ti­dia­na quae­ren­tes pri­mum con­sti­tuen­dum ex­is­ti­ma­ba­mus, quae es­set aqua aes­ti­va, de qua pro­prium in­ter­dic­tum ad prio­ris aes­ta­tis tem­pus re­la­tum red­di so­let, hoc est aes­ti­va aqua utrum­ne ex iu­re aes­ti­vo dum­ta­xat tem­po­re uten­di di­ce­re­tur, an ex men­te pro­pos­i­to­que du­cen­tis, quod aes­ta­te eam du­cen­di con­si­lium ha­be­ret, an ex na­tu­ra ip­sius aquae, quod aes­ta­te tan­tum du­ci pot­est, an ex uti­li­ta­te lo­co­rum, in quae du­ce­re­tur. pla­ce­bat igi­tur aquam ob has duas res, na­tu­ram suam uti­li­ta­tem­que lo­co­rum in quae de­du­ci­tur, pro­prie ap­pel­la­ri, ita ut, si­ve eius na­tu­ra erit, ut ni­si aes­ta­te du­ci non pos­sit, et­iam­si hie­me quo­que de­si­de­ra­re­tur, si­ve om­ni tem­po­re an­ni du­ci eam ip­sius na­tu­ra per­mit­te­ret, si uti­li­tas per­so­nis, in quam du­ci­tur, aes­ta­te dum­ta­xat usum eius ex­ige­ret, aes­ti­va rec­te di­ce­re­tur.

6Neratius, Parchments, Book III. While we are examining the interdicts which have reference to water used during the summer, we think that we should first determine what summer water is, concerning which an interdict is usually granted relating to the preceding season; that is to say, whether summer water should be decided to be such as one only has a right to use during the summer, whether the intention of him who has the right to conduct it during that season ought to be taken into account; whether this designation depends upon the nature of the water itself, which can only be conducted during the summer; or whether the advantage to the places to which it is conducted should be considered. Hence it was held that the water was properly so called on account of two things; namely, its nature, and the benefit of the land upon which it is conveyed; so that if its nature is such that it can only be conducted during the summer, even though it is also desired to do this during the winter; or if its nature permits it to be conducted during any season of the year, and the benefit to the places where it is taken only requires its use during the summer by the persons entitled to it, it is very properly called summer water.

7Pau­lus li­bro quin­to sen­ten­tia­rum. Si de via iti­ne­re ac­tu aquae duc­tu aga­tur, hu­ius­mo­di cau­tio prae­stan­da est, quam­diu quis de iu­re suo do­ceat, non se im­pe­di­tu­rum agen­tem et aquam du­cen­tem et iter fa­cien­tem. quod si ne­get ius es­se ad­ver­sa­rio agen­di aquae du­cen­dae, ca­ve­re si­ne prae­iu­di­cio amit­ten­dae ser­vi­tu­tis de­be­bit, do­nec quaes­tio fi­nie­tur, non se usu­rum.

7Paulus, Decisions, Book V. If proceedings are instituted with reference to a right of way, or the right to conduct water, security must be furnished that, as long as the plaintiff attempts to prove his right to the servitude, no obstacle will be offered to his conducting the water, or using the right of way. If, however, he denies that his adversary has any right to use the right of way, or to conduct the water, he should, without any apprehension of losing the servitude, furnish security that he will not make use of it until the case has been disposed of.

8Scae­vo­la li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ὅρων. Cui per fun­dum iter aquae de­be­tur, qua­cum­que vult in eo ri­vum li­cet fa­ciat, dum ne aquae duc­tum in­ter­ver­te­ret.

8Scævola, Observations. He who is entitled to a right of way through land for the purpose of conducting water is permitted to construct a canal through any part thereof that he wishes, provided he does not interfere with some other aqueduct.