Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLII4,
Quibus ex causis in possessionem eatur
Liber quadragesimus secundus
IV.

Quibus ex causis in possessionem eatur

(Concerning the Reasons for Possession Being Granted.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Tres fe­re cau­sae sunt, ex qui­bus in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ti so­let: rei ser­van­dae cau­sa, item le­ga­to­rum ser­van­do­rum gra­tia et ven­tris no­mi­ne. dam­ni enim in­fec­ti no­mi­ne si non ca­vea­tur, non in uni­ver­so­rum no­mi­ne fit mis­sio, sed rei tan­tum, de qua dam­num ti­me­tur.

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XII. There are about three causes for which it is customary to place a creditor in possession of the property of his debtor: first, in order to protect it; second, to preserve a legacy; and third, in behalf of an unborn child. When possession is granted for the prevention of threatened injury, if security is not furnished, alj the property is not included, but only that from whose fall damage is expected to result.

2Idem li­bro quin­to ad edic­tum. Prae­tor ait: ‘in bo­na eius, qui iu­di­cio sis­ten­di cau­sa fi­de­ius­so­rem de­dit, si ne­que po­tes­ta­tem sui fa­ciet ne­que de­fen­de­re­tur, iri iu­be­bo’. 1Po­tes­ta­tem au­tem sui non fa­cit, qui id agit, ne ad­ver­sa­rius eius co­piam sui ha­beat: er­go la­ti­tan­tis bo­na iu­bet pos­si­de­ri. 2Quid si non la­ti­tet, sed ab­sens non de­fen­da­tur? non­ne vi­de­tur po­tes­ta­tem sui non fa­ce­re? 3De­fen­di au­tem vi­de­tur, qui per ab­sen­tiam suam in nul­lo de­te­rio­rem cau­sam ad­ver­sa­rii fa­ciat. 4Haec ver­ba ‘de­fen­de­re­tur’ παρατατικῶς scrip­ta sunt, ut ne­que suf­fi­ciat um­quam de­fen­dis­se, si non du­ret de­fen­sio, ne­que ob­sit, si nunc of­fe­ra­tur.

2The Same, On the Edict, Book V. The Prætor says: “I will order possession to be taken of the property of him who gave a surety for his appearance in court, if he does not permit access to himself, and is not defended.” 1He does not give access to himself who acts in such a way as to prevent his adversary from approaching him. Hence, if the Prætor orders possession to be taken of the property of a person who conceals himself. 2But what if he does not conceal himself, but, being absent, is not defended? Can it be held that he does not permit access to himself? 3He is considered to be in a position to defend himself who does not render the condition of his adversary any worse by his absence. 4The words, “If he is not defended,” are capable of a broader and more extensive interpretation, so that it is not sufficient if the party has begun to defend himself, and his defence does not continue; and it is no disadvantage to him if, at present, he offers to defend himself for the first time.

3Idem li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Apud Iu­lia­num quae­ri­tur, si com­mu­nem rem cum Ti­tio pa­ter pu­pil­li ha­bue­rit et com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do iu­di­cio pu­pil­lus non de­fen­da­tur ni­hil­que erit, cu­ius no­mi­ne prop­ter per­so­nam pa­tris con­dem­na­tio fie­ri de­beat: utrum venire bo­na pa­tris opor­teat an ve­ro rei ser­van­dae cau­sa pos­si­dean­tur. et ait Iu­lia­nus, si qui­dem pa­ter ali­quos fruc­tus per­ce­pit aut fe­ce­rit rem de­te­rio­rem, bo­na eius venire pos­sunt: si ve­ro ni­hil sit, prop­ter quod pa­tris bo­na ven­eant, pu­pil­li pos­si­de­ri. Mar­cel­lus au­tem no­tat per­quam in­iquum es­se eum, qui ni­hil cum pu­pil­lo con­tra­xit, ex­pec­ta­re eius pu­ber­ta­tem. quae sen­ten­tia ha­bet ra­tio­nem: id­eo­que cum con­trac­tus ex per­so­na pa­tris de­scen­dat, di­cen­dum erit non es­se ex­spec­tan­dam pu­pil­li pu­ber­ta­tem. 1Con­trac­tum cum pu­pil­lo pot­est di­ci et si cum ser­vo eius con­trac­tum sit: com­pe­tit enim ad­ver­sus eum de pe­cu­lio ac­tio. un­de pro­ban­dum est ex om­ni­bus cau­sis, ex qui­bus ad­ver­sus pu­pil­lum ac­tio da­tur, hoc idem ser­van­dum. et fa­ci­lius erit hoc pro­ban­dum in ser­vo, qui in rem do­mi­ni ver­tit aut ius­su eius aut si in­sti­to­ria cum eo agi pos­sit. 2Ego pu­to: et si cum tu­to­re eius con­trac­tum est, ex qua cau­sa ac­tio in pu­pil­lum da­tur, ma­gis est, ut edic­to lo­cus sit, qua­si cum eo con­trac­tum sit. 3Si pu­pil­lus he­res ex­ti­te­rit ali­cui ex­que ea cau­sa le­ga­ta de­beat, vi­den­dum est, an huic edic­to lo­cus sit: ma­gis­que est, ut Mar­cel­lus scri­bit, et­iam pu­pil­li pos­se bo­na pos­si­de­ri es­se­que in ar­bi­trio he­redi­ta­rio­rum cre­di­to­rum, quid po­tius eli­gant: et­enim vi­de­tur im­pu­bes con­tra­he­re, cum ad­iit he­redi­ta­tem.

3The Same, On the Edict, Book LIX. The following question is raised by Julianus. If the father of a minor holds property in joint ownership with Titius, and an action in partition is brought against the minor, but is not defended, there will be no reason, on this account, for judgment to be rendered against the father; but must the property of the father be sold, or can it be taken possession of for its preservation, in behalf of the plaintiff? Julianus says that if the father has collected any of the crops, or caused the property in question to deteriorate, his own property can be sold. If, however, there is no reason why the property of the father should be sold, possession of that of the minor can be taken. Marcellus, however, observes that it would be unjust for him who had not made any contract with the minor to be compelled to wait till he arrives at puberty; which opinion is reasonable. Therefore, as the contract is derived from the father, it must be held that it is not necessary to wait until the minor reaches the age of puberty. 1It can be said that there is a contract with a minor, where one has been entered into with a slave, for, in this case an action De peculio will lie against him; hence the rule should be adopted that an action must be granted in every case where one can be brought against the ward; and there is much more reason for doing this in the case of a slave, who was acting for the benefit of his master, or by his order, or has been appointed to represent him in some transaction. 2I think that where a contract has been made with his guardian, on account of which an action is granted against the ward, the better opinion is that there will be ground for the application of the Edict, just as if the contract had been made directly with the ward. 3If a minor becomes the heir of anyone, and, for this reason, is charged with the payment of a legacy, let us see whether there is ground for the application of this Edict. The better opinion is, as Marcellus says, that possession can be taken of the property of a minor, and that the creditors of the estate have the right to choose what course they prefer to adopt; for a minor under the age of puberty is held to make a contract when he accepts an estate.

4Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Sed et is, qui mis­cuit se, con­tra­he­re vi­de­tur.

4Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. He, likewise, who interferes with matters connected with the estate, is considered to enter into a contract.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Haec au­tem lo­cum ha­bent, quo­tiens pu­pil­lus non de­fen­da­tur a quo­cum­que, si­ve a tu­to­re vel cu­ra­to­re, si­ve ha­beat tu­to­rem pu­pil­lus si­ve non ha­beat: ce­te­rum si ex­is­tat ali­quis, qui de­fen­de­re sit pa­ra­tus, ces­sa­bit rei ser­van­dae cau­sa pos­ses­sio. 1Non de­fen­di pu­pil­lum con­sta­re de­bet li­que­re­que prae­to­ri, ut sic per­mit­tat bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem. hoc au­tem con­sta­re de­bet sic: evo­can­di sunt ad prae­to­rem tu­to­res pu­pil­li, ut de­fen­dant: si au­tem non ha­bet tu­to­res, re­qui­ren­di co­gna­ti vel ad­fi­nes et si qui alii for­te sunt, quos ve­ri­si­mi­le est de­fen­sio­nem pu­pil­li pu­pil­lae non omis­su­ros vel prop­ter ne­ces­si­tu­di­nem vel prop­ter ca­ri­ta­tem vel qua alia ra­tio­ne: li­ber­ti et­iam si qui sunt ido­nei, evo­can­di ex­qui­ren­da­que de­fen­sio. si aut ne­gent se de­fen­de­re aut non ne­gent, sed ta­ceant, tunc prae­tor pos­ses­sio­nem da­bit, tam­diu sci­li­cet, quo­ad non de­fen­da­tur: si de­fen­di coe­pe­rit pu­pil­lus vel pu­pil­la, de­si­net pos­si­de­ri. idem est et in fu­rio­so. 2Ait prae­tor: ‘si is pu­pil­lus in suam tu­te­lam ve­ne­rit ea­ve pu­pil­la vi­ri­po­tens fue­rit et rec­te de­fen­de­tur: eos, qui bo­na pos­si­dent, de pos­ses­sio­ne de­ce­de­re iu­be­bo’. 3Rec­te de­fen­di quid sit, vi­dea­mus, utrum tan­tum co­piam sui fa­ce­re et ad sus­ci­pien­dum iu­di­cium pa­ra­tum es­se an ve­ro et sa­tis­da­re om­ni­mo­do. et qui­dem non so­lum ip­sis se de­fen­de­re vo­len­ti­bus hoc edic­tum scrip­tum est, sed in rem: et ‘rec­te de­fen­de­tur’ hoc est vel a se vel ab alio quo­cum­que. sed si alius de­fen­dat, erit ne­ces­sa­ria sa­tis­da­tio, si ip­se, non pu­to ne­ces­sa­riam sa­tis­da­tio­nem. er­go ob­la­ta de­fen­sio­ne de­ici pot­erit in­ter­dic­to red­di­to.

5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. These things also occur whenever a minor is not defended by anyone, nor by a guardian or a curator, whether he has a guardian or not. If, however, someone appears who is ready to defend him, possession for the purpose of preserving the property will not take place. 1It should be known that the minor is not defended, and the Prætor must ascertain this fact, in order to permit possession to be taken of the property. This can be effected in the following manner. The guardians of the ward should be summoned before the Prætor, in order to undertake his defence. If he has no guardian, his relatives, or those connected with him by affijiity, or any other whom it is probable will not fail to conduct the defence of the male or female minor, either on account of their near relationship, or because of the affection they may entertain towards him, or her, or for any other reason, shall be called upon for this purpose. Even freedmen, if they “are qualified, can be summoned and required to conduct the defence. Where, however, they refuse to do so, or while not absolutely refusing, keep silent, the Prætor shall then grant possession, so long as the minor is not defended. As soon, however, as the defence of the minor is undertaken, the property will cease to be possessed under the order of the Prætor. The same rule applies in the case of insane persons. 2The Prætor says: “If the male or female minor should reach the age of puberty and is properly defended, I shall order those who are in the possession of his or her property to relinquish it.” 3Let us see what the words, “Properly defended,” mean: whether it is sufficient for the party to appear and be ready to comply with the judgment, or whether security must be given under all circumstances. The terms of the Edict do not merely refer to the persons of the parties desiring to defend themselves, but it also has reference to the property itself. And the words, “Properly defended,” mean to be defended by themselves, or by any other person whomsoever. If the defence is undertaken by another, security must be furnished, but if the minor defends himself, I do not think that this is requisite; therefore, if a defence is offered, the Prætor can eject the party in possession by means of an interdict.

6Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. In pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ti so­let cre­di­tor et si sub con­di­cio­ne ei pe­cu­nia pro­mis­sa sit. 1Cum di­ci­tur: ‘et eius, cu­ius bo­na pos­ses­sa sunt a cre­di­to­ri­bus, ven­eant, prae­ter­quam pu­pil­li et eius, qui rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa si­ne do­lo ma­lo afuit’, in­tel­le­gi­mus eius, qui do­lo ma­lo afue­rit, pos­se venire. 2Si ab hos­ti­bus quis cap­tus sit, cre­di­to­res eius in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ten­di sunt, ut ta­men non sta­tim bo­no­rum ven­di­tio per­mit­ta­tur, sed in­ter­im bo­nis cu­ra­tor de­tur.

6Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVII. A creditor is usually placed in possession, even where the money is promised conditionally. 1Where it is stated, “And let his property which is in possession of the creditors be sold, unless he is a minor, or absent on public business, without fraud,” we must understand that the property of anyone who is absent with fraudulent intent can be sold. 2When anyone is captured by the enemy, his creditors should be placed in possession of his property, in such a way, however, that it shall not be sold immediately, but that, in the meantime, a curator may be appointed.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Ful­ci­nius ex­is­ti­mat cre­di­to­res rei ser­van­dae cau­sa mis­sos in pos­ses­sio­nem ex his re­bus ali non de­be­re. 1Prae­tor ait: ‘Qui frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa la­ti­ta­bit, si bo­ni vi­ri ar­bi­tra­tu non de­fen­de­tur, eius bo­na pos­si­de­ri ven­di­que iu­be­bo’. 2Cum hoc edic­tum lo­cum ha­beat, non suf­fi­cit la­ti­ta­re, sed et ne­ces­se est frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa id fie­ri: ne­que quod frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa si­ne la­ti­ta­tio­ne fit, sa­tis est ad pos­ses­sio­nem et ven­di­tio­nem, sed opor­tet frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa la­ti­ta­re. et est fre­quen­tis­si­ma haec cau­sa pos­ses­sio­nis: nam in usu la­ti­tan­tium bo­na pos­si­den­tur. 3Si quis pos­se­de­rit bo­na ali­cu­ius qua­si la­ti­tan­tis, qui non la­ti­ta­bat, et ven­di­de­rit, con­se­quens erit di­ce­re ven­di­tio­nem bo­no­rum se­cu­tam nul­lius mo­men­ti es­se. 4Quid sit au­tem la­ti­ta­re, vi­dea­mus. la­ti­ta­re est non, ut Ci­ce­ro de­fi­nit, tur­pis oc­cul­ta­tio sui: pot­est enim quis la­ti­ta­re non tur­pi de cau­sa, vel­uti qui ty­ran­ni cru­de­li­ta­tem ti­met aut vim hos­tium aut do­mes­ti­cas sed­itio­nes. 5Sed is, qui frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa la­ti­tet, non ta­men prop­ter cre­di­to­res, et­si haec la­ti­ta­tio cre­di­to­res frau­det, in ea ta­men erit cau­sa, ne hinc pos­si­de­ri bo­na eius pos­sint, quia non hoc ani­mo la­ti­tet, ut frau­det cre­di­to­res: ani­mus enim la­ti­tan­tis quae­ri­tur, quo ani­mo la­ti­tet, ut frau­det cre­di­to­res an alia ex cau­sa. 6Quid er­go, si duas cau­sas la­ti­tan­di ha­buit vel plu­res, in­ter quas et­iam frau­dan­di cre­di­to­res? an ven­di­tio rec­te pro­ce­dat? et pu­to pro­ban­dum, si plu­res cau­sae sint la­ti­ta­tio­nis, in­ter quas est et frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa, no­ce­re de­be­re pos­se­que hinc bo­na ven­di. 7Quid si ad­ver­sus quos­dam oc­cul­ta­re se con­si­lium non est, ad­ver­sus quos­dam est, quid di­ce­mus? et rec­tis­si­me Pom­po­nius scri­bit non ad­ver­sus om­nes la­ti­ta­tio­nem ex­igen­dam, sed ad­ver­sus eum, quem quis de­ci­pe­re et frau­da­re la­ti­ta­tio­ne de­sti­nat. utrum er­go om­nes bo­na eius ven­de­re pos­sunt, quia la­ti­tat, hoc est et­iam hi, ad­ver­sus quos non la­ti­tat, quia ve­rum est eum la­ti­ta­re, an ve­ro is so­lus, ad­ver­sus quem la­ti­tat? et qui­dem ve­rum est eum la­ti­ta­re et frau­da­tio­nis cau­sa la­ti­ta­re, et­si non ad­ver­sus me la­ti­tet: sed il­lud spec­tan­dum Pom­po­nius pu­tat, an ad­ver­sus me, eum­que so­lum pos­se hinc ven­di­tio­nem im­pe­tra­re, ad­ver­sus quem la­ti­te­tur. 8La­ti­ta­re au­tem est cum trac­tu ali­quo la­te­re, quem­ad­mo­dum fac­ti­ta­re fre­quen­ter fa­ce­re. 9Ad­eo au­tem la­ti­ta­tio ani­mum et af­fec­tum oc­cul­tan­tis se de­si­de­rat, ut rec­te dic­tum sit fu­rio­sum hinc ven­di­tio­nem pa­ti non pos­se, quia non se oc­cul­tat, qui suus non est. 10Pla­ne si non de­fen­da­tur fu­rio­sus, cu­ra­to­rem ei dan­dum, aut bo­na eius ut pos­si­dean­tur, no­mi­na­tim per­mit­ten­dum est. La­beo au­tem scri­bit, si non in­ve­nia­tur cu­ra­tor vel de­fen­sor fu­rio­si, sed et si cu­ra­tor da­tus eum non de­fen­dat, tunc re­mo­ven­dum eum et opor­te­re prae­to­rem da­re cu­ra­to­rem ali­quem ex cre­di­to­ri­bus, ut non am­plius, quam ne­ces­se est, ex bo­nis fu­rio­si ven­eat: ea­que ser­van­da La­beo ait, quae so­lent ser­va­ri, cum ven­ter in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ti­tur. 11Pla­ne in­ter­dum bo­na eius cau­sa co­gni­ta ven­den­da erunt, si ur­gueat aes alie­num et di­la­tio dam­num sit al­la­tu­ra cre­di­to­ri­bus, ita au­tem ven­den­da, ut quod su­per­sit, fu­rio­so de­tur, quia do­mi­nis eius sta­tus et ha­bi­tus a pu­pil­li con­di­cio­ne non mul­tum ab­hor­ret: quod qui­dem non est si­ne ra­tio­ne. 12Idem­que et in prod­igo di­cen­dum est ce­te­ris­que, qui cu­ra­to­rem ope iu­van­tur: nec enim quis­quam pro­prie la­ti­ta­re eos di­xe­rit. 13Il­lud scien­dum est pos­se quem in ea­dem ci­vi­ta­te es­se et la­ti­ta­re, et in alia ci­vi­ta­te et non la­ti­ta­re. et­enim qui in alia ci­vi­ta­te sit co­piam­que sui fa­ciat in pu­bli­co ibi­que pa­reat, an la­ti­tet, vi­dea­mus. et ho­die hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut si­ve quis eo­dem lo­ci agat si­ve per­egre agat, si ta­men oc­cur­sum cre­di­to­ris evi­tet, la­ti­ta­re vi­dea­tur. de­ni­que eum quo­que, qui in fo­ro eo­dem agat, si cir­ca co­lum­nas aut sta­tio­nes se oc­cul­tet, vi­de­ri la­ti­ta­re ve­te­res re­spon­de­runt, et pos­se quem ad­ver­sus al­te­rum la­ti­ta­re, ad­ver­sus al­te­rum non. con­stat au­tem, ut ip­se eius pos­sit bo­na ven­de­re, ad­ver­sus quem la­ti­tat. 14Si in diem vel sub con­di­cio­ne de­bi­tor la­ti­tet, an­te­quam dies vel con­di­cio ve­niat, non pos­sunt bo­na eius venire: quid enim in­ter­est, de­bi­tor quis non sit an non­dum con­ve­ni­ri pos­sit? nam et si non sit de­bi­tor, idem di­ce­mus. idem erit di­cen­dum et si quis ha­beat qui­dem ac­tio­nem, sed ta­lem, quae per ex­cep­tio­nem re­pel­li­tur. 15Si quis ac­tio­ne de pe­cu­lio fi­lii vel ser­vi no­mi­ne con­ve­ni­ri pos­sit, si la­ti­tet, eo iu­re uti­mur, ut pos­sint bo­na eius pos­si­de­ri et venire, tam­et­si ni­hil fue­rit in pe­cu­lio, quia es­se pot­est et rei iu­di­ca­tae tem­pus spec­ta­mus, utrum sit an non sit, et quod te­n­eat ac­tio, et­iam si ni­hil in pe­cu­lio fue­rit. 16Item vi­dea­mus, si quis ad­ver­sus in rem ac­tio­nem la­ti­tet, an bo­na eius pos­si­de­ri ve­num­que da­ri pos­sint. ex­tat Ne­ra­tii sen­ten­tia ex­is­ti­man­tis bo­na es­se ven­den­da: et hoc re­scrip­to Ha­d­ria­ni con­ti­ne­tur, quo iu­re uti­mur. 17Cel­sus au­tem Sex­to re­spon­dit, si fun­dum, quem pe­te­re vo­lo, Ti­tius pos­si­deat ne­que ab­sens de­fen­da­tur, com­mo­dius se ex­is­ti­ma­re in fun­di pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ten­dum quam bo­na eius pos­si­de­ri. hoc ad­no­tan­dum est Cel­sum con­sul­tum non de la­ti­tan­te, sed de ab­sen­te. 18Idem Cel­sus ex­is­ti­mat, si is, a quo he­redi­ta­tem pe­te­re ve­lim, la­ti­tat, com­mo­dis­si­me fie­ri pos­se, ut in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­tar re­rum, quas pro he­rede vel pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­det: sed si do­lo fe­cit, quo mi­nus pos­si­de­ret, bo­na eius pos­si­den­da et ven­den­da sunt. 19Di­vus quo­que Pius in per­so­na eius, qui he­redi­ta­tem pos­si­dens co­piam sui non fa­cie­bat, re­scrip­sit in pos­ses­sio­nem re­rum he­redi­ta­ria­rum ad­ver­sa­rium in­du­cen­dum: in quo re­scrip­to et fruc­tum per­ci­pe­re ius­sit eum, qui per ni­miam con­tu­ma­ciam pos­ses­so­ris he­redi­ta­tis, ut lu­cro eius ce­dat, in pos­ses­sio­nem in­duc­tus est re­rum he­redi­ta­ria­rum.

7Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIX. Fulcinius thinks that creditors placed in possession of property for its preservation should not be supported by means of the said property. 1The Prætor says: “I will order the property of anyone who fraudulently conceals himself to be taken possession of and sold, if he is not defended in such a way as to be approved by a good citizen.” 2For this Edict to become applicable, it will not be sufficient for the party to conceal himself, but this must be done with fraudulent intent. Nor in order to authorize possession and sale of the property, will it be sufficient for him to be guilty of fraud without concealment, but he must conceal himself for the purpose of committing fraud. This is the most frequent cause for granting possession, as it is customary for the property of debtors who conceal themselves to be seized. 3If anyone should obtain possession of the property of another on the ground that he is concealing himself, when in fact he has not done so, and sells it, the result will be that the sale will be held to be of no force or effect. 4But let us see what is understood by concealment. Concealment is not (as Cicero defines it) a dishonorable seclusion of one’s self, for anyone can conceal himself for some reason which is not dishonorable; as for instance, if he fears the cruelty of a tyrant, the violence of enemies, or domestic sedition. 5He, however, who conceals himself fraudulently, but not on account of his creditors (although concealment of this kind defrauds his creditors), is still not in such a position that possession can be taken of his property on this ground, because he does not conceal himself with a view to defraud his creditors. Hence, the intention of the person in concealing himself must be ascertained, whether it is for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, or for some other reason. 6But what if he had two or more motives for concealment, and among them that of defrauding his creditors; could the sale of his property legally take place? I think the opinion should be adopted that, if there were several reasons for his concealment, and the intent to defraud his creditors was one of them, this would be prejudicial, and his property could be sold on this account. 7If, however, he intended to conceal himself from some of his creditors, and not from others; what shall we say in this instance? Pomponius very properly holds that it is not necessary to require that the debtor should conceal himself from all his creditors, but that, if he only conceals himself from one of them, with the intention of deceiving and defrauding him by means of his seclusion, this will be sufficient. Then will all his creditors have a right to take and sell his property, because he remains concealed, that is to say, even those from whom he does not hide, merely because it is a fact that he is concealed; or can only that creditor whom he is avoiding do so? And indeed, it is a fact that he is hidden for the sake of committing fraud, even though he may not hide himself from me. If he is only concealing himself from me, Pomponius thinks that it should be considered whether I alone will have the right to sell his property for this reason. 8The term “conceal himself” refers to concealment during a considerable time; just as the word factitare signifies to do anything frequently. 9Moreover, to such an extent does concealment demand the existence of fraudulent intent and desire of the party secluding himself, that it has been very properly held that an insane person cannot render himself liable to have his property sold on this ground, because a man who is not of sound mind cannot conceal himself. 10If it is evident that an insane person is not defended, a curator should be appointed for him, or permission to take possession of his property should expressly be granted. Moreover, Labeo says that if no curator or defender can be found for an insane person, or if the curator who has been appointed does not undertake his defence, he should then be removed, and the Prætor must appoint another curator, in order that no more property of the said insane person may be sold than is necessary. Labeo holds that the same formalities should be observed as where an unborn child is placed in possession. 11It is clear that sometimes his property should be sold, after proper cause is shown, if the payment of his debts is urgent, and delay may injure his creditors. The sale, however, should be made in such a way that any surplus may be returned to the insane person; because the condition of a man of this kind does not differ greatly from that of a minor. This opinion is not unreasonable. 12The same rule must be said to apply to the case of a spendthrift, and to others who require the services of a guardian, but no one can properly say that they are trying to conceal themselves. 13It should be noted that anyone can stay in the same city and remain concealed, or in another city, and not be concealed. For, let us see whether one who is in another city, and shows himself in public, and appears everywhere, can be considered as lying concealed. Our practice at present is, that a person is held to conceal himself if he avoids meeting his creditors in any place where he may be, whether in the same town where they are, or in another, or in a distant country. In short, the ancient authorities were of the opinion that a person was to be considered as concealing himself, even if he was in the Public Forum, and hid behind columns of buildings, for the purpose of avoiding his creditors. Anyone can conceal himself from one creditor and not from another. Moreover, it was established that the creditor from whom the debtor conceals himself is the one who can sell his property. 14If a man who owes a debt payable after a certain time, or under some condition, conceals himself, his property cannot be sold before the time arrives, or the condition is complied with. For what difference is there between a person who is not a debtor, and one who cannot yet be sued? The same rule must be adopted if there is no debtor; and it also applies where a creditor is entitled to an action which can be barred by an exception. 15If anyone who is liable to an action De peculia, on account of his son or his slave, conceals himself, it is our practice to permit his property to be seized and sold, even though nothing may be found in the peculium, because something might eventually be found there; and, at the time that the judgment is rendered, we ascertain whether there is anything in the peculium or not, for the reason that the action will lie even when there is nothing in the peculium. 16Let us see whether the property of a man who conceals himself to avoid appearing in a real action can be taken in execution and sold. An opinion of Neratius is extant in which he says that his property can be sold. This is also stated in a Rescript of Hadrian, and is our practice at present. 17Celsus, in reply to Sextus, gave it as his opinion that, if Titius is in possession of a tract of land which I intend to bring suit to recover and he, being absent, is not defended, it would be better for me to be placed in possession of the said land than to levy on all his property. It must, however, be noted that Celsus was consulted with reference to a person who was absent, and not with reference to one who purposely concealed himself. 18Celsus also thinks that if a person from whom I intend to claim an estate conceals himself, the best plan would be to place me in possession of the property, which is held in the capacity of either heir or possessor. If, however, he was guilty of fraud in order to avoid remaining in possession, all his property should be levied on and sold. 19The Divine Pius stated in a Rescript, with reference to a man who, being in possession of an estate, secluded himself, that his adversary should be placed in possession of the property of the estate. In the same Rescript he also directed that he who is placed in possession of the property of an estate on account of the contumacy of a former possessor of the same shall be entitled to the income from said property.

8Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si diu in­cer­tum sit, he­res ex­ta­tu­rus nec ne sit, cau­sa co­gni­ta per­mit­ti opor­te­bit bo­na rei ser­van­dae cau­sa pos­si­de­re, et, si ita res ur­gueat vel con­di­cio bo­no­rum, et­iam hoc erit con­ce­den­dum, ut cu­ra­tor con­sti­tua­tur

8The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. If it remains uncertain for a long time whether there is any heir to an estate or not, after proper cause has been shown, permission should be granted for possession to be taken of the property for the purpose of preserving it. If the matter is urgent, or a condition must be complied with, it would, be well to obtain permission to appoint a curator.

9Pau­lus li­bro quin­qua­gen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. unus ex cre­di­to­ri­bus. 1Si al­ter ex he­redi­bus in­tra tem­po­ra si­bi prae­sti­tu­ta de­li­be­ret ad­ire he­redi­ta­tem, al­ter ve­ro ne­get se ad­itu­rum, vi­den­dum est, quid cre­di­to­ri­bus agen­dum sit. et pla­cet in­ter­im eos in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ten­dos cus­to­diae cau­sa, do­nec ap­pa­reat, is qui de­li­be­rat utrum ad­gnos­cat par­tem suam an non ad­gnos­cat.

9Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVII. He shall be one of the creditors. 1If one of two heirs deliberates as to whether he will accept an estate within the time prescribed by law, and the other refuses to accept it, let us see what step should be taken by the creditors. It is established that, in the meantime, they shall be placed in possession of the estate, for the purpose of taking care of it, until the heir who is deliberating determines whether he will accept or reject his share.

10Ul­pia­nus li­bro octagen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Si pu­pil­lus prae­sens sit, tu­to­rem au­tem non ha­beat, pro ab­sen­te ha­ben­dus est.

10Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXXI. If a ward is present, but has no guardian, he should be considered as being absent.

11Pau­lus li­bro oc­ta­vo ad Plau­tium. Si fi­lio fa­mi­lias le­ga­tum vel fi­dei­com­mis­sum sub con­di­cio­ne re­lic­tum sit, di­cen­dum est tam ip­sum quam pa­trem in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ten­dos es­se, quia am­bo spem com­mo­di ha­bent.

11Paulus, On Plautius, Book VIII. Where a legacy or a trust has been conditionally bequeathed to a son under paternal control, it must be said that he himself, as well as his father, ought to be placed in possession, for the reason that both of them anticipate a benefit.

12Pom­po­nius li­bro vi­cen­si­mo ter­tio ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Cum le­ga­to­rum vel fi­dei­com­mis­si ser­van­di cau­sa, vel quia dam­ni in­fec­ti no­bis non ca­vea­tur, bo­na pos­si­de­re prae­tor per­mit­tit, vel ven­tris no­mi­ne in pos­ses­sio­nem nos mit­tit, non pos­si­de­mus, sed ma­gis cus­to­diam re­rum et ob­ser­va­tio­nem no­bis con­ce­dit.

12Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXIII. When, for the purpose of preserving a legacy or a trust, or because security is not furnished us against threatened injury, we are permitted by the Prætor to take possession of property or he places us in possession in the name of an unborn child, we do not actually hold possession, but he merely grants us power to guard and watch over the property.

13Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Ad co­gni­tio­nem im­pe­ra­to­rum a prae­si­de pro­vin­ciae re­mis­sus et­si in ce­te­ris li­ti­bus Ro­mae de­fen­de­re se non co­gi­tur, ta­men in pro­vin­cia de­fen­den­dus est: nam et ex­ilio tem­po­ra­rio pu­ni­ti, si de­fen­sor non ex­is­tat, bo­na ven­eunt.

13Papinianus, Opinions, Book XIV. A man who is sent by the Governor of a province before the Tribunal of the Emperor is not compelled to defend any other action at Rome, and he still should be defended in the province; for the property of a person who is punished by temporary exile can be sold if a defender does not appear for him in court.

14Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Si quis cre­di­to­rem pro­hi­bue­rit bo­na de­bi­to­ris in­gre­di, da­tur in eum ac­tio, quan­ti ea res sit. 1Sed et si quis le­ga­to­rum ser­van­do­rum cau­sa mis­sus in pos­ses­sio­nem ad­mis­sus non est, si le­ga­ti con­di­cio pen­deat, li­cet pos­sit de­fi­ce­re, aes­ti­ma­tur ta­men id quod le­ga­tum est, quia in­ter­est eius cau­tum ha­be­re. 2Cre­di­tor au­tem con­di­cio­na­lis in pos­ses­sio­nem non mit­ti­tur, quia is mit­ti­tur, qui pot­est bo­na ex edic­to ven­de­re.

14Paulus, Questions, Book II. If anyone should prevent a creditor from obtaining possession of the property of his debtor, an action for the amount of the value of the property shall be granted against him in favor of the creditor. 1Where anyone is placed in possession of property for the purpose of preserving his legacy, he will not be permitted to take possession, if the condition on which the legacy is dependent is in suspense; and although it may fail to be fulfilled, still, the property bequeathed should be appraised, because it is to the interest of the legatee to have security. 2Moreover, a creditor, the payment of whose claim is conditional, is not placed in possession; because he only is given possession who has a right to sell the property under the Edict.

15Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Is, qui rem per­mu­ta­tam ac­ce­pit, emp­to­ri si­mi­lis est: item is, qui rem in so­lu­tum ac­ce­pit vel qui li­te aes­ti­ma­ta re­ti­nuit vel ex cau­sa sti­pu­la­tio­nis non ob li­be­ra­li­ta­tem est con­se­cu­tus.

15Ad Dig. 42,4,15Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 342, Note 6b.Ulpianus, Trusts, Book VI. He who has received property in exchange resembles a purchaser, and he also who receives property in payment, and one who accepts the amount of its appraisement in court, as well as he who acquires anything by virtue of a stipulation, and not through liberality, occupy the same legal position.