1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book I. Celsus, in the Twelfth Book of the Digest, having the public welfare in view, says that a person born deaf can manumit a slave.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. A slave cannot obtain his freedom if, after having been banished, he remains in the City.

3Gaius, Concerning Legacies; On the Urban Edict. If the choice of a slave is given by the testator, or the slave is bequeathed without mentioning any particular one, the heir cannot annul or diminish the right of selection belonging to the legatee by manumitting some of the slaves, or all of them. For where the option or choice of a slave is granted, each slave is held to have been bequeathed under a condition.

4Ulpianus, Disputations, Book III. We cannot manumit a slave who has been given in pledge.

5Julianus, Digest, Book LXIV. When an estate is not solvent, even though the heir may be wealthy, freedom will not be acquired under the will. 1If, however, an insolvent testator leaves a bequest of freedom as follows, “Let Stichus be free, if my creditors are paid in full,” he cannot be considered to have ordered his slaves to become free in order to defraud his creditors. 2Ad Dig. 40,9,5,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 255, Note 5.If Titius has no other property than his slaves, Stichus and Pamphilus, and promises them to Mævius, under the following stipulation: “Do you promise to give either Stichus or Pamphilus?” and then, having no other creditor, he should manumit Stichus, the freedom of the latter will be annulled under the Lex Ælia Sentia. For although it was in the power of Titius to give Pamphilus, still, as long as he did not do so, he could not, without defrauding the stipulator, give Stichus, for the reason that Pamphilus might die in the meantime. If, however, he only promised to give Pamphilus, I have no doubt that Stichus will obtain his freedom; although in like manner, Pamphilus might die, as it makes a great deal of difference whether the slave who is manumitted was included in the stipulation or not. For anyone who pledges Stichus and Pamphilus as security for five aurei, when each of them is worth five aurei, can manumit neither; but if he was to give Stichus alone in pledge, he will not be considered to have manumitted Pamphilus for the purpose of defrauding his creditor.

6Scævola, Questions, Book XVI. Julianus refers to a person who owned nothing but two slaves; for if he had other property, why can it not be held that he has the power to manumit one of said slaves? For if one of them should die, he will still be solvent, and if one of them should be manumitted, he will also be solvent, and accidents which may occur are not to be considered; otherwise, the person who promised one of the slaves and indicated which one could not manumit any slave.

7Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book II. Where anyone who is in possession of all his property confirms a codicil, and then grants freedom to his slaves by the codicil, with the intention of defrauding his creditors, his bequest will be of no force or effect; as, under such circumstances, bequests of freedom are prevented By law. For the intention of the testator to commit the fraud is not referred to the time when the codicil was confirmed, but to the time when freedom was granted by the codicil. 1A minor of twenty years of age who desired to manumit a slave, without having any good reason to offer to the Council for doing so, gave him to you, so that you might manumit him. Proculus denied that the slave was free, because a fraud was committed against the law.

8Africanus, Questions, Book III. The Lex Ælia Sentia does not apply where a man who owes money under a condition manumits a slave by virtue of a trust. 1Where a soldier makes a will under military law, and bequeaths freedom to slaves for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and then dies insolvent, the bequest of freedom will be void.

9Marcianus, Institutes, Book I. A slave will not become free who has compelled his master to manumit him, and the latter, having been intimidated, states in writing that he is free. 1Moreover, a slave will not become free who was not defended by his master for a capital crime, and afterwards was acquitted. 2Where slaves are sold under the condition that they shall not be manumitted, or where they are forbidden by will to be manumitted, or where this is done by order of the Governor of a province, and they should, nevertheless, be emancipated, they will not obtain their freedom.

10Gaius, Diurnal or Golden Matters. A person is considered to defraud his creditors by manumitting a slave who was insolvent at the time that he manumitted him, or ceased to be solvent after granting him his liberty. For men very frequently think that their property is more valuable than it really is, which often happens to those who, through the agency of slaves and freedmen, conduct commercial enterprises beyond sea, and in countries in which they do not reside, because they are often impoverished by transactions of this kind for a long time without being aware of it; and they grant their slaves freedom by manumitting them as a favor, without any intention of committing fraud.

11Marcianus, Institutes, Book XIII. Where a municipality is defrauded by the manumission of slaves, the latter do not obtain their freedom, as has been promulgated in a decree of the Senate. 1It is provided by the Imperial Constitutions that when the Treasury is defrauded by grants of freedom, the latter are void. The Divine Brothers, however, stated in a Rescript that grants of freedom are not annulled merely by the fact that the person who emancipated the slaves was a debtor to the Treasury, but that he committed fraud if he was insolvent when he did so.

12Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book V. The legislator had in view that slaves should not by manumission be released from liability to torture; and therefore he forbade them to be manumitted, and prescribed a certain term within which it would not be lawful to set them free. 1Therefore, a woman who is separated from her husband is forbidden, under any circumstances, to manumit or alienate any of her slaves, because in the words of the law, “She cannot either manumit or alienate a slave who was not employed in her personal service, or on her land, or in the province,” which is, to a certain extent, a hardship, but it is the law. 2And even if the woman, after a divorce, purchases a slave, or obtains one in any way, she cannot manumit him under the provisions of the law. Sextus Cæcilius also mentions this. 3A father, however, whose daughter is under his control, is only forbidden to manumit or alienate such slaves as have been given to his daughter for her personal service. 4The law also prohibits a mother from manumitting or alienating any slaves which she has given for the service of her daughter. 5It also forbids a grandfather and grandmother fo manumit their slaves, as the intention of the law is that they also may be subjected to torture. 6Sextus Cæcilius very properly holds that the time prescribed by the law for alienating or manumitting slaves is too short. For he says, suppose a woman has been accused of adultery within the sixty days; how can the trial for adultery readily take place, so as to be concluded within the said sixty days? Still, according to the terms of the law the woman, even though she has been accused of adultery, is permitted, after this time, to manumit the slave who is suspected of having committed adultery with her, or another slave who should be put to torture. And, indeed, relief should be granted in this instance, so that slaves wlio are indicated as guilty, or who have knowledge of the crime, may not be manumitted before the trial is ended. 7If the father or mother of the woman should die within the sixty days, they can neither manumit nor alienate any of the slaves whom they have given to the daughter for her personal service.

13Paulus, On Adultery, Book V. If a slave is manumitted before the sixty days have elapsed, he will be conditionally free.

14Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book IV. If a husband should die within the sixty days, let us see whether the woman can manumit or alienate the slaves above referred to. I do not think that she can do so, although she may have no other accuser than her husband, as the father of the latter can accuse her. 1The law simply prohibits a woman from manumitting her slaves within sixty days after the divorce. 2Manumission is also prohibited whether she is divorced or repudiated. 3If the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, or on account of any penalty to which he has rendered himself liable, manumission will not be prevented. 4Even if the marriage is terminated by agreement, it is held that manumission or alienation is not prevented. 5When the woman, during the existence of the marriage but while she is contemplating divorce, manumits or alienates a slave, and this is established by conclusive evidence, the alienation or manumission will not be valid, as having been done to evade the law. 6We must understand every kind of alienation to be meant.

15Paulus, On the Lex Julia, Book I. The question arose whether anyone accused of the crime of lese majeste could manumit a slave, inasmuch as he was the owner of slaves before his conviction. The Emperor Antoninus stated in a Rescript addressed to Calpurnius Crito that, from the time when the accused party was certain of having the penalty inflicted upon him, he would lose the right of granting freedom rather through his consciousness of guilt, than from his condemnation for crime. 1Julianus says that, after a father has granted his son permission to manumit a slave, and the son, not being aware that his father is dead, manumits the slave, the latter will not become free. If, however, the father is living, and has changed his mind, his son will be considered to have manumitted the slave against the consent of his father.

16The Same, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book III. Where freedom is granted to a slave by a trust, and a minor of twenty years of age sells the slave under condition that he shall be manumitted, or purchases him under the same condition, the alienation will not be prevented. 1If a minor of twenty years of age relinquishes the share which he has in a slave owned in common, for the purpose of manumitting him, his act will be void. If, however, he can prove that there was a good reason for doing so, no fraud will be held to have been committed. 2It is provided by this law that no one shall manumit a slave for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. Those are designated creditors who are entitled to an action on any ground whatsoever against the person who intended to defraud him. 3Aristo gave it as his opinion that, where a slave was manumitted by an insolvent debtor of the Treasury, he could be returned to servitude, if he had not been free for a long time; that is to say, for not less than ten years. It is clear that anything which has been paid out for funeral expenses, with a view to defrauding the Treasury, can be recovered. 4Where money is due from a person who is insolvent to anyone under a condition, and a slave is manumitted by the debtor, his freedom will remain in suspense until the condition is complied with. 5If a son should manumit a slave with the consent of his father, and either the father or the son is aware that the former is not solvent, the grant of freedom will be void.

17The Same, On Grants of Freedom. If a private individual, being compelled by the people, should manumit a slave, the latter will, nevertheless, not be free even though his owner may have given his consent; for the Divine Marcus forbade the manumission of slaves caused by the clamor of the populace. 1Likewise, a slave is not emancipated if his master states falsely that he was free, in order to avoid punishment by the magistrates, if he has no intention of manumitting him. 2With reference to those whom it is not lawful to manumit within a certain time, if they receive their freedom by a will, the time when it was executed should not be considered, but the time when the slaves were entitled to be free.

18The Same, On Plautius, Book XVI. If the estate of the testator was solvent at the time of his death, but ceased to be so when it was accepted, any grant of freedom by the testator which defrauds the creditors is void. For, as the increase of an estate is of benefit to liberty, so also its diminution injures it. 1Where a slave to whom freedom is bequeathed is ordered to pay to the heir a sum of money equal to his value and become free, let us see whether any fraud is committed against the creditor, because the heir obtains the amount mortis causa; or, indeed, where a stranger pays the amount for the slave; or the slave himself pays it out of other property than his peculium; is any fraud perpetrated? But, as the fact that the heir is wealthy is of no advantage to the bequest of freedom, so neither should the person who pays the money be able to profit by it.

19Modestinus, Rules, Book I. Freedom granted by a person who is afterwards himself legally decided to be a slave is of no effect.

20The Same, On Cases Explained. Where freedom is bequeathed to a slave belonging to another, without the consent of his owner, the bequest is not valid according to law, even though the person who manumits him afterwards becomes the heir of the owner. For even if he becomes his heir by the right of relationship, the grant of freedom will be confirmed by his acceptance of the estate.

21The Same, Pandects, Book I. A female slave cannot be manumitted on account of marriage by anyone but the man who intends to marry her; because if one man should manumit her for this reason, and another should marry her, she will not become free. Hence Julianus gave it as his opinion that she would not be liberated from servitude even if the person who manumitted and repudiated her should marry her within six months; on the ground that the Senate had reference to a marriage which should have taken place after the manumission, without any other preceding it.

22Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXV. The curator of an insane person cannot manumit a slave belonging to the latter.

23The Same, Various Passages, Book IV. Freedom is always considered to have been granted fraudulently with respect to creditors, when this is done by a person who knows that he is not solvent, even though it was granted to a slave who deserved it.

24Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. If anyone who has creditors should manumit several slaves, the grants of freedom to all of them will not be void, but only the first ones emancipated will become free; provided enough remains to satisfy the claims of the creditors. This rule was frequently stated by Julianus. For instance, where two slaves are manumitted, and the creditors will be defrauded by granting freedom to both, but not by granting it to either, one of them will not obtain his freedom; and this is generally he who is manumitted second, unless the first one designated is of greater value; and it will not be necessary to reduce the second to slavery if the value of the first will discharge the indebtedness, for, in this instance, the one which is mentioned in the second place will alone be entitled to his liberty.

25Papinianus, Opinions, Book V. Where freedom is granted by will, in fraud of creditors, although the first creditors may be satisfied, the grants of freedom are void, so far as the others are concerned.

26Scævola, Opinions, Book IV. The heir of a debtor manumitted a slave who had been given in pledge. The question arose whether he became free. The answer was that, according to the facts stated, if the debt was still unpaid, he would become free by the manumission. Paulus: Therefore, if the money was paid, he would be free.

27Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. A slave is manumitted in fraud of creditors, and is forbidden to be free, whether the day for payment of the debt has already arrived, or whether the debt is payable within a certain time, or under some condition. The case of a legacy bequeathed under a condition is different, for the legatee will not be included among the creditors until the condition has been complied with. The Lex Ælia Sentia, in this respect, applies to creditors of every description whatsoever; and it has been decided that the beneficiary of a trust is also included among them. 1A slave who is given in pledge cannot be manumitted without the consent of the creditors before their claims have been satisfied. The consent of a creditor, who is a ward without the authority of his guardian, is of no benefit to a grant of freedom, just as no advantage results where, under similar circumstances, the ward, who is the usufructuary, consents to the manumission.

28Paulus, Opinions, Book III. The act of an heir, who manumits his own slave that the testator bequeathed to him, is void, because it has been decided that neither his knowledge nor his ignorance of the bequest should be considered.

29Gaius, On Manumissions, Book I. When a slave is given by way of pledge, in general terms, there is no doubt that he belongs to the debtor, and can legally obtain his freedom from him, if this is not prevented by the Lex Ælia Sentia; that is to say, if the owner is solvent, and his creditors do not appear to have been defrauded by his act. 1Where a slave is bequeathed under a condition, he belongs absolutely to the heir while the condition is pending; but he cannot obtain his freedom from him lest injury be done to the legatee.

30Ulpianus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book IV. If anyone should purchase a slave under the condition of manumitting him, and, not having done so, the slave obtains his freedom under the Constitution of the Divine Marcus, let us see whether he can be accused of ingratitude. It may be said that, as the purchaser did not manumit him, he is not entitled to this right of action. 1If my son should manumit my slave with my consent, it may be doubted whether I have the right to accuse him of ingratitude for the reason that I did not manumit him. I should, however, be considered as having manumitted him. 2But if my son manumits a slave forming part of his castrense peculium, there is no doubt that I will not have this right, because I, myself, did not manumit him. It is clear that my son himself can accuse him. 3Anyone can accuse a freedman of ingratitude as long as he remains his patron. 4If, however, several patrons desire to accuse their freedman of ingratitude, let us see whether the consent of all of them will be necessary, or whether only one can do so. The better opinion is that, if the freedman displayed ingratitude against only one of his patrons, he can accuse him; but the consent of all of them will be necessary, if they are all in the same degree. 5If a father should assign a freedman to one of his children, Julianus says he alone can accuse him of ingratitude, for he alone is his patron.

31Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. The question arose, what would be the rule if a patron compelled his freedwoman to swear that she would not marry as long as her children are under the age of puberty? Julianus says that he would not be held to have acted against the Lex Ælia Sentia, as he did not enjoin her to remain in perpetual widowhood.

32The Same, On the Law of Julia et Papia, Book I. If he who is under the control of a patron should compel the woman to swear, or to enter into a stipulation not to marry against the consent of the patron, unless the latter releases the woman from her oath, or her promise, he will come within the provisions of the law, for he himself will be held to have acted in bad faith. 1Patrons are not prohibited by the Lex Ælia Sentia from receiving the wages of their freedmen, but they are forbidden to compel them to surrender them. Therefore, if a freedman voluntarily pays his wages to his patron, he will have no recourse against him under this law. 2This law does not apply to a freedman who has promised certain days of labor, or a sum of money, as by performing labor he can become free. Octavenus approves this opinion, and adds that a patron is understood to have compelled his freedman to pay him the wages of his labor, where his acts show that his intention was only to obtain the said wages, even if he stipulated for days of labor.