Qui et a quibus manumissi liberi non fiunt et ad legem Aeliam Sentiam
(What Slaves, Having Been Manumitted, do not Become Free, by Whom This is Done; and on the Law of Ælia Sentia.)
1 Ulpianus libro primo ad Sabinum. Celsus libro duodecimo digestorum utilitatis gratia motus surdum ita natum manumittere posse ait.
1 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book I. Celsus, in the Twelfth Book of the Digest, having the public welfare in view, says that a person born deaf can manumit a slave.
2 Idem libro tertio ad Sabinum. Servo competere libertas non potest, si relegatus moratus sit in urbe.
2 The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. A slave cannot obtain his freedom if, after having been banished, he remains in the City.
3 Gaius libro secundo de legatis ad edictum urbicum. Si optio hominis data sit vel indistincte homo legatus sit, non potest heres quosdam servos vel omnes manumittendo aut evertere aut minuere ius electionis: nam optione sive electione servi data quodammodo singuli sub condicione legati videntur.
3 Gaius, Concerning Legacies; On the Urban Edict. If the choice of a slave is given by the testator, or the slave is bequeathed without mentioning any particular one, the heir cannot annul or diminish the right of selection belonging to the legatee by manumitting some of the slaves, or all of them. For where the option or choice of a slave is granted, each slave is held to have been bequeathed under a condition.
4 Ulpianus libro tertio disputationum. Servum pignori datum manumittere non possumus.
4 Ulpianus, Disputations, Book III. We cannot manumit a slave who has been given in pledge.
5 Iulianus libro sexagensimo quarto digestorum. Cum hereditas solvendo non est, quamvis heres locuples existat, libertas ex testamento competit. 1Si autem is qui solvendo non est hoc modo libertatem dederit ‘si creditoribus meis solidum solutum fuerit, Stichus liber esto’, non potest videri fraudandorum creditorum liberos esse iussisse. 2Si Titius nihil amplius in bonis quam Stichum et Pamphilum habeat eosque stipulanti Maevio ita promiserit ‘Stichum aut Pamphilum dare spondes?’, deinde, cum alium creditorem non haberet, Stichum manumiserit: libertas per legem Aeliam Sentiam rescinditur. quamvis enim fuit in potestate Titii, ut Pamphilum daret, tamen quamdiu eum non dederit, quia interim mori possit, non sine fraude stipulatoris Stichum manumisit. quod si solum Pamphilum dari promississet, non dubitarem, quin Stichus ad libertatem perveniret, quamvis similiter Pamphilus mori possit: multum enim interest, contineatur ipsa stipulatione is qui manumittitur an extra obligationem sit. nam et qui ob aureos quinque Stichum et Pamphilum pignori dederit, cum uterque eorum quinum aureorum sit, neuter manumitti potest: at si Stichum solum pignori dederit, Pamphilum non videtur in fraudem creditoris manumittere.
5 Julianus, Digest, Book LXIV. When an estate is not solvent, even though the heir may be wealthy, freedom will not be acquired under the will. 1If, however, an insolvent testator leaves a bequest of freedom as follows, “Let Stichus be free, if my creditors are paid in full,” he cannot be considered to have ordered his slaves to become free in order to defraud his creditors. 2If Titius has no other property than his slaves, Stichus and Pamphilus, and promises them to Mævius, under the following stipulation: “Do you promise to give either Stichus or Pamphilus?” and then, having no other creditor, he should manumit Stichus, the freedom of the latter will be annulled under the Lex Ælia Sentia. For although it was in the power of Titius to give Pamphilus, still, as long as he did not do so, he could not, without defrauding the stipulator, give Stichus, for the reason that Pamphilus might die in the meantime. If, however, he only promised to give Pamphilus, I have no doubt that Stichus will obtain his freedom; although in like manner, Pamphilus might die, as it makes a great deal of difference whether the slave who is manumitted was included in the stipulation or not. For anyone who pledges Stichus and Pamphilus as security for five aurei, when each of them is worth five aurei, can manumit neither; but if he was to give Stichus alone in pledge, he will not be considered to have manumitted Pamphilus for the purpose of defrauding his creditor.
6 Scaevola libro sexto decimo quaestionum. Iulianus de eo loquitur, qui in substantia nihil aliud habeat: nam si habeat, quare non dicetur unum posse manumitti? quia et uno mortuo solvendo est, et uno manumisso solvendo est, nec adventicii casus computandi sint: alioquin et qui unum incertum ex servis suis promisit, neminem manumittet.
6 Scævola, Questions, Book XVI. Julianus refers to a person who owned nothing but two slaves; for if he had other property, why can it not be held that he has the power to manumit one of said slaves? For if one of them should die, he will still be solvent, and if one of them should be manumitted, he will also be solvent, and accidents which may occur are not to be considered; otherwise, the person who promised one of the slaves and indicated which one could not manumit any slave.
7 Iulianus libro secundo ad Urseium Ferocem. Si quis integris facultatibus codicillos confirmavit, deinde, cum consilium creditorum fraudandorum cepisset, libertates codicillis dederit, optineri non potest, quo minus lege libertates interpellarentur: nam consilium testatoris fraudulentum non eo tempore observatur, quo codicilli confirmantur, sed quo libertas codicillis datur. 1Minor annis viginti cum servum manumittere vellet nec iustam causam ad consilium manumittendi haberet, tibi eum ut manumitteres dedit: negavit eum Proculus liberum esse, quoniam fraus legi facta esset.
7 Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book II. Where anyone who is in possession of all his property confirms a codicil, and then grants freedom to his slaves by the codicil, with the intention of defrauding his creditors, his bequest will be of no force or effect; as, under such circumstances, bequests of freedom are prevented By law. For the intention of the testator to commit the fraud is not referred to the time when the codicil was confirmed, but to the time when freedom was granted by the codicil. 1A minor of twenty years of age who desired to manumit a slave, without having any good reason to offer to the Council for doing so, gave him to you, so that you might manumit him. Proculus denied that the slave was free, because a fraud was committed against the law.
8 Africanus libro tertio quaestionum. Cum is, qui sub condicione debet, manumittat fideicommissi causa, lex Aelia Sentia locum habet. 1Si miles iure militari testamento facto libertates dederit in fraudem creditorum et non solvendo moriatur, impediuntur libertates.
8 Africanus, Questions, Book III. The Lex Ælia Sentia does not apply where a man who owes money under a condition manumits a slave by virtue of a trust. 1Where a soldier makes a will under military law, and bequeaths freedom to slaves for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and then dies insolvent, the bequest of freedom will be void.
9 Marcianus libro primo institutionum. Ille servus liber non erit, qui vi coegerit, ut eum dominus manumittat, et ille perterritus scripsit liberum eum esse. 1Item nec ille liber fieri potest, qui a domino non est defensus in capitali crimine posteaque absolutus est. 2Qui hac lege venierint, ne manumittantur, vel qui testamento prohibiti sint manumitti vel iussu praesidis provinciae, licet manumittantur, tamen ad libertatem non perveniunt.
9 Marcianus, Institutes, Book I. A slave will not become free who has compelled his master to manumit him, and the latter, having been intimidated, states in writing that he is free. 1Moreover, a slave will not become free who was not defended by his master for a capital crime, and afterwards was acquitted. 2Where slaves are sold under the condition that they shall not be manumitted, or where they are forbidden by will to be manumitted, or where this is done by order of the Governor of a province, and they should, nevertheless, be emancipated, they will not obtain their freedom.
10 Gaius libro primo rerum cottidianarum sive aureorum. In fraudem creditorum manumittere videtur, qui vel iam eo tempore, quo manumittit, solvendo non est vel datis libertatibus desiturus est solvendo esse. saepe enim de facultatibus suis amplius, quam in his est, sperant homines. quod frequenter accidit his, qui transmarinas negotiationes et aliis regionibus, quam in quibus ipsi morantur, per servos atque libertos exercent: quod saepe, adtritis istis negotiationibus longo tempore, id ignorant et manumittendo sine fraudis consilio indulgent servis suis libertatem.
10 Gaius, Diurnal or Golden Matters. A person is considered to defraud his creditors by manumitting a slave who was insolvent at the time that he manumitted him, or ceased to be solvent after granting him his liberty. For men very frequently think that their property is more valuable than it really is, which often happens to those who, through the agency of slaves and freedmen, conduct commercial enterprises beyond sea, and in countries in which they do not reside, because they are often impoverished by transactions of this kind for a long time without being aware of it; and they grant their slaves freedom by manumitting them as a favor, without any intention of committing fraud.
11 Marcianus libro tertio decimo institutionum. In fraudem civitatium manumissi ad libertatem non veniunt, ut senatus censuit. 1Sed nec in fraudem fisci datas libertates procedere principalibus constitutionibus cavetur. sed divi fratres rescripserunt, non utique, si debitor fisci manumiserit, libertates impediuntur, sed ita, si, cum non erat solvendo, in fraudem manumisit.
11 Marcianus, Institutes, Book XIII. Where a municipality is defrauded by the manumission of slaves, the latter do not obtain their freedom, as has been promulgated in a decree of the Senate. 1It is provided by the Imperial Constitutions that when the Treasury is defrauded by grants of freedom, the latter are void. The Divine Brothers, however, stated in a Rescript that grants of freedom are not annulled merely by the fact that the person who emancipated the slaves was a debtor to the Treasury, but that he committed fraud if he was insolvent when he did so.
12 Ulpianus libro quarto de adulteriis. Prospexit legis lator, ne mancipia per manumissionem quaestioni subducantur, idcircoque prohibuit ea manumitti certumque diem praestituit, intra quem manumittere non liceat. 1Ipsa igitur quae divertit omnes omnimodo servos suos manumittere vel alienare prohibetur, quia ita verba faciunt, ut ne eum quidem servum, qui extra ministerium eius mulieris fuit vel in agro vel in provincia, possit manumittere vel alienare: quod quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. 2Sed et si post divortium servum mulier paravit aut alia ratione adquisiit, aeque, quod ad verba attinet, manumittere non poterit: et ita Sextus quoque Caecilius adnotat. 3Pater vero in cuius potestate filia fuerit, ea tantum mancipia prohibetur manumittere alienareve, quae in usu filiae fuerunt tributa. 4Matrem quoque prohibuit manumittere alienareve ea mancipia, quae in ministerium filiae concesserat. 5Sed et avum et aviam prohibuit manumittere, cum horum quoque mancipia quaestione postulari posse lex voluerit. 6Sextus Caecilius recte ait angustissimum tempus legem praestitisse alienandis manumittendisve servis. finge, inquit, ream adulterii intra sexagesimum diem postulatam: quae cognitio tam facile expediri potuit adulterii, ut intra sexagesimum diem finiatur? et tamen licere mulieri quamvis postulatae adulterii servum suspectum in adulterio vel quaestioni necessarium, quod ad verba legis attinet, manumittere. sane in hunc casum subveniendum est, ut destinati servi quasi conscii vel quasi nocentes non debeant manumitti ante finitam cognitionem. 7Pater mulieris vel mater, si intra sexagesimum diem decedant, ex his servis, quos in ministerium filiae dederint, neque manumittere neque alienare poterunt.
12 Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book V. The legislator had in view that slaves should not by manumission be released from liability to torture; and therefore he forbade them to be manumitted, and prescribed a certain term within which it would not be lawful to set them free. 1Therefore, a woman who is separated from her husband is forbidden, under any circumstances, to manumit or alienate any of her slaves, because in the words of the law, “She cannot either manumit or alienate a slave who was not employed in her personal service, or on her land, or in the province,” which is, to a certain extent, a hardship, but it is the law. 2And even if the woman, after a divorce, purchases a slave, or obtains one in any way, she cannot manumit him under the provisions of the law. Sextus Cæcilius also mentions this. 3A father, however, whose daughter is under his control, is only forbidden to manumit or alienate such slaves as have been given to his daughter for her personal service. 4The law also prohibits a mother from manumitting or alienating any slaves which she has given for the service of her daughter. 5It also forbids a grandfather and grandmother fo manumit their slaves, as the intention of the law is that they also may be subjected to torture. 6Sextus Cæcilius very properly holds that the time prescribed by the law for alienating or manumitting slaves is too short. For he says, suppose a woman has been accused of adultery within the sixty days; how can the trial for adultery readily take place, so as to be concluded within the said sixty days? Still, according to the terms of the law the woman, even though she has been accused of adultery, is permitted, after this time, to manumit the slave who is suspected of having committed adultery with her, or another slave who should be put to torture. And, indeed, relief should be granted in this instance, so that slaves wlio are indicated as guilty, or who have knowledge of the crime, may not be manumitted before the trial is ended. 7If the father or mother of the woman should die within the sixty days, they can neither manumit nor alienate any of the slaves whom they have given to the daughter for her personal service.
13 Paulus libro tertio de adulteriis. Quod si intra diem sexagesimum manumiserint, erit servus statuliber.
13 Paulus, On Adultery, Book V. If a slave is manumitted before the sixty days have elapsed, he will be conditionally free.
14 Ulpianus libro quarto de adulteriis. Sed si maritus intra sexagesimum diem decesserit, an manumittere vel alienare iam possit supra scriptas personas, videamus. et non puto posse, quamvis accusatore mulier deficiatur marito, cum pater accusare possit. 1Et simpliciter quidem lex mulierem prohibuit intra sexagesimum diem divortii manumittere: 2Sive autem divertit sive repudio dimissa sit, manumissio impedietur. 3Sed si morte mariti solutum sit matrimonium vel aliqua poena eius, manumissio non impedietur. 4Sed et si bona gratia finierit matrimonium, dicetur manumissionem vel alienationem non impediri. 5Sed et si constante matrimonio mulier, dum divortium cogitat, manumittat vel alienet et hoc dilucidis probationibus fuerit adprobatum: quasi in fraudem legis hoc factum sit, non debet alienatio valere vel manumissio. 6Alienationem omnem omnino accipere debemus.
14 Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book IV. If a husband should die within the sixty days, let us see whether the woman can manumit or alienate the slaves above referred to. I do not think that she can do so, although she may have no other accuser than her husband, as the father of the latter can accuse her. 1The law simply prohibits a woman from manumitting her slaves within sixty days after the divorce. 2Manumission is also prohibited whether she is divorced or repudiated. 3If the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, or on account of any penalty to which he has rendered himself liable, manumission will not be prevented. 4Even if the marriage is terminated by agreement, it is held that manumission or alienation is not prevented. 5When the woman, during the existence of the marriage but while she is contemplating divorce, manumits or alienates a slave, and this is established by conclusive evidence, the alienation or manumission will not be valid, as having been done to evade the law. 6We must understand every kind of alienation to be meant.
15 Paulus libro primo ad legem Iuliam. Quaesitum est, an is, qui maiestatis crimine reus factus sit, manumittere possit, quoniam ante damnationem dominus est. et imperator Antoninus Calpurnio Critoni rescripsit ex eo tempore, quo quis propter facinorum suorum cogitationem iam de poena sua certus esse poterat, multo prius conscientia delictorum, quam damnatione ius dandae libertatis eum amississe. 1Iulianus ait, si postea, quam filio permisit pater manumittere, filius ignorans patrem decessisse manumisit vindicta, non fieri eum liberum. sed et si vivit pater et voluntas mutata erit, non videri volente patre filium manumississe.
15 Paulus, On the Lex Julia, Book I. The question arose whether anyone accused of the crime of lese majeste could manumit a slave, inasmuch as he was the owner of slaves before his conviction. The Emperor Antoninus stated in a Rescript addressed to Calpurnius Crito that, from the time when the accused party was certain of having the penalty inflicted upon him, he would lose the right of granting freedom rather through his consciousness of guilt, than from his condemnation for crime. 1Julianus says that, after a father has granted his son permission to manumit a slave, and the son, not being aware that his father is dead, manumits the slave, the latter will not become free. If, however, the father is living, and has changed his mind, his son will be considered to have manumitted the slave against the consent of his father.
16 Idem libro tertio ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. Si, cum fideicommissa libertas debeatur, minor viginti annis servum vendat, ut manumittatur, vel quia hac lege emerat, non impedietur alienatio. 1Si partem, quam in communi servo habet minor viginti annis, manumittendi causa tradat, nihil aget: sed si, cum ipse causam probare posset, tradiderit, nulla fraus intellegetur. 2Ne quis creditorum fraudandorum causa servum manumittat, hac lege cavetur: creditores autem appellantur, quibus quacumque ex causa actio cum fraudatore competat. 3Aristo respondit a debitore fisci, qui solvendo non erat, manumissum ita revocari in servitutem debere, si non diu in libertate fuisset, id est non minus decennio: plane ea, quae in fraudem fisci in sinus eius collata sunt, revocanda. 4Si sub condicione alicui pecunia debeatur, quasi statuliber erit a debitore manumissus, ut pendeat libertas ex condicione. 5Si voluntate patris filius manumiserit, sive pater sive filius sciat solvendo patrem non esse, libertas impedietur.
16 The Same, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book III. Where freedom is granted to a slave by a trust, and a minor of twenty years of age sells the slave under condition that he shall be manumitted, or purchases him under the same condition, the alienation will not be prevented. 1If a minor of twenty years of age relinquishes the share which he has in a slave owned in common, for the purpose of manumitting him, his act will be void. If, however, he can prove that there was a good reason for doing so, no fraud will be held to have been committed. 2It is provided by this law that no one shall manumit a slave for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. Those are designated creditors who are entitled to an action on any ground whatsoever against the person who intended to defraud him. 3Aristo gave it as his opinion that, where a slave was manumitted by an insolvent debtor of the Treasury, he could be returned to servitude, if he had not been free for a long time; that is to say, for not less than ten years. It is clear that anything which has been paid out for funeral expenses, with a view to defrauding the Treasury, can be recovered. 4Where money is due from a person who is insolvent to anyone under a condition, and a slave is manumitted by the debtor, his freedom will remain in suspense until the condition is complied with. 5If a son should manumit a slave with the consent of his father, and either the father or the son is aware that the former is not solvent, the grant of freedom will be void.
17 Idem libro singulari de libertatibus. Si privatus coactus a populo manumiserit, quamvis voluntatem accommodaverit, tamen non erit liber: nam et divus Marcus prohibuit ex adclamatione populi manumittere. 1Item non fit liber, si mentitus dominus, ne a magistratibus castigaretur, dixit esse liberum, si non fuit voluntatis manumittendi. 2In his, quos intra certa tempora non licet manumittere, si testamento acceperint libertatem, non testamenti facti, sed competentis libertatis tempus inspiciendum est.
17 The Same, On Grants of Freedom. If a private individual, being compelled by the people, should manumit a slave, the latter will, nevertheless, not be free even though his owner may have given his consent; for the Divine Marcus forbade the manumission of slaves caused by the clamor of the populace. 1Likewise, a slave is not emancipated if his master states falsely that he was free, in order to avoid punishment by the magistrates, if he has no intention of manumitting him. 2With reference to those whom it is not lawful to manumit within a certain time, if they receive their freedom by a will, the time when it was executed should not be considered, but the time when the slaves were entitled to be free.
18 Idem libro sexto decimo ad Plautium. Si mortis tempore solvendo sit hereditas, si tamen cum aditur desierit esse solvendo, libertas a testatore in fraudem creditorum relicta non competet: nam sicut aucta hereditas prodest libertatibus, ita nocet deminuta. 1Si is, cui libertas relicta est, iussus sit heredi dare tantum, quanti est, et liber esse, videamus, an adhuc fraus sit creditorum, quia heres mortis causa accepturus est, an vero, si alius pro eo vel ipse non de peculio det, nulla sit fraus. sed si heres locuples non proficit ad libertatem, nec qui dat pecuniam prodesse potest.
18 The Same, On Plautius, Book XVI. If the estate of the testator was solvent at the time of his death, but ceased to be so when it was accepted, any grant of freedom by the testator which defrauds the creditors is void. For, as the increase of an estate is of benefit to liberty, so also its diminution injures it. 1Where a slave to whom freedom is bequeathed is ordered to pay to the heir a sum of money equal to his value and become free, let us see whether any fraud is committed against the creditor, because the heir obtains the amount mortis causa; or, indeed, where a stranger pays the amount for the slave; or the slave himself pays it out of other property than his peculium; is any fraud perpetrated? But, as the fact that the heir is wealthy is of no advantage to the bequest of freedom, so neither should the person who pays the money be able to profit by it.
19 Modestinus libro primo regularum. Nulla competit libertas data ab eo, qui postea servus ipse pronuntiatus est.
19 Modestinus, Rules, Book I. Freedom granted by a person who is afterwards himself legally decided to be a slave is of no effect.
20 Idem libro singulari de enucleatis casibus. Si servo alieno libertas non consentiente domino data est, valere ex auctoritate iuris non potest, quamvis postea manumissor domino heres extitit, nam licet eius iure cognationis qui manumisit heres extitit, non ideo aditione hereditatis libertatis datio confirmatur.
20 The Same, On Cases Explained. Where freedom is bequeathed to a slave belonging to another, without the consent of his owner, the bequest is not valid according to law, even though the person who manumits him afterwards becomes the heir of the owner. For even if he becomes his heir by the right of relationship, the grant of freedom will be confirmed by his acceptance of the estate.
21 Idem libro primo pandectarum. Matrimonii causa manumitti ancilla a nullo alio potest quam qui eam uxorem ducturus est. quod si alter manumiserit matrimonii causa, alter eam uxorem ducat, non erit libera, adeo ut nec si intra sex quidem menses eam repudiatam postea manumissor uxorem duxerit, liberam eam fieri Iulianus respondit, quasi de his nuptiis senatus senserit, quae post manumissionem nullis aliis interpositis secutae fuerunt.
21 The Same, Pandects, Book I. A female slave cannot be manumitted on account of marriage by anyone but the man who intends to marry her; because if one man should manumit her for this reason, and another should marry her, she will not become free. Hence Julianus gave it as his opinion that she would not be liberated from servitude even if the person who manumitted and repudiated her should marry her within six months; on the ground that the Senate had reference to a marriage which should have taken place after the manumission, without any other preceding it.
22 Pomponius libro vicensimo quinto ad Quintum Mucium. Curator furiosi servum eius manumittere non potest.
22 Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXV. The curator of an insane person cannot manumit a slave belonging to the latter.
23 Idem libro quarto ex variis lectionibus. Semper in fraudem creditorum libertas datur ab eo, qui sciret se solvendo non esse, quamvis bene dedisset merenti hoc.
23 The Same, Various Passages, Book IV. Freedom is always considered to have been granted fraudulently with respect to creditors, when this is done by a person who knows that he is not solvent, even though it was granted to a slave who deserved it.
24 Terentius Clemens libro nono ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si quis, habens creditores, plures manumiserit, non omnium libertas impedietur, sed qui primi sunt, liberi erunt, donec creditoribus suum solvatur. quam rationem Iulianus solet dicere velut duobus manumissis, si unius libertate fraudentur, non utriusque, sed alterutrius impediri libertatem et plerumque postea scripti, nisi si quando maioris pretii sit is qui ante nominatus sit nec sufficiat posteriorem retrahi in servitutem, prior sufficiat: nam hoc casu sequenti loco scriptum solum ad libertatem perventurum.
24 Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IX. If anyone who has creditors should manumit several slaves, the grants of freedom to all of them will not be void, but only the first ones emancipated will become free; provided enough remains to satisfy the claims of the creditors. This rule was frequently stated by Julianus. For instance, where two slaves are manumitted, and the creditors will be defrauded by granting freedom to both, but not by granting it to either, one of them will not obtain his freedom; and this is generally he who is manumitted second, unless the first one designated is of greater value; and it will not be necessary to reduce the second to slavery if the value of the first will discharge the indebtedness, for, in this instance, the one which is mentioned in the second place will alone be entitled to his liberty.
25 Papinianus libro quinto responsorum. In fraudem creditorum testamento datae libertates prioribus creditoribus dimissis propter novos creditores irritae sunt.
25 Papinianus, Opinions, Book V. Where freedom is granted by will, in fraud of creditors, although the first creditors may be satisfied, the grants of freedom are void, so far as the others are concerned.
26 Scaevola libro quarto responsorum. Pignori obligatum servum debitoris heres manumisit: quaesitum est, an liber esset. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur, si pecunia etiam nunc deberetur, non esse manumissione liberum factum. Paulus: soluta ergo pecunia ex illa voluntate liber fit.
26 Scævola, Opinions, Book IV. The heir of a debtor manumitted a slave who had been given in pledge. The question arose whether he became free. The answer was that, according to the facts stated, if the debt was still unpaid, he would become free by the manumission. Paulus: Therefore, if the money was paid, he would be free.
27 Hermogenianus libro primo iuris epitomarum. In fraudem creditorum manumittitur liberque esse prohibetur, sive dies solvendae pecuniae iam cessit, sive in diem vel sub condicione sit debitum. diversa causa est legati sub condicione relicti: nam antequam condicio extiterit, inter creditores legatarius iste non habetur. ex omni autem causa creditoribus in hac parte lex Aelia Sentia prospexit, inter quos fideicommissarium etiam esse placuit. 1Pignori datus servus, antequam debiti nomine fiat satis, sine consensu creditorum manumitti non potest. sed pupilli creditoris citra tutoris auctoritatem consensus nihil libertati prodest, sicuti non prodest, si fructuarius pupillus manumissioni similiter consentiat.
27 Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. A slave is manumitted in fraud of creditors, and is forbidden to be free, whether the day for payment of the debt has already arrived, or whether the debt is payable within a certain time, or under some condition. The case of a legacy bequeathed under a condition is different, for the legatee will not be included among the creditors until the condition has been complied with. The Lex Ælia Sentia, in this respect, applies to creditors of every description whatsoever; and it has been decided that the beneficiary of a trust is also included among them. 1A slave who is given in pledge cannot be manumitted without the consent of the creditors before their claims have been satisfied. The consent of a creditor, who is a ward without the authority of his guardian, is of no benefit to a grant of freedom, just as no advantage results where, under similar circumstances, the ward, who is the usufructuary, consents to the manumission.
28 Paulus libro tertio sententiarum. Heres servum proprium, quem testator legaverat, manumittendo nihil agit, quia scientiae vel ignorantiae eius nullam placuit admitti rationem.
28 Paulus, Opinions, Book III. The act of an heir, who manumits his own slave that the testator bequeathed to him, is void, because it has been decided that neither his knowledge nor his ignorance of the bequest should be considered.
29 Gaius libro primo de manumissionibus. Generaliter pignori datus servus sine dubio pleno iure debitoris est et iustam libertatem ab eo consequi potest, si lex Aelia Sentia non impediat libertatem, id est si solvendo sit nec ob id creditores videantur fraudari. 1Sub condicione servus legatus pendente condicione pleno iure heredis est, sed nullam libertatem ab eo consequi potest, ne legatario iniuria fieret.
29 Gaius, On Manumissions, Book I. When a slave is given by way of pledge, in general terms, there is no doubt that he belongs to the debtor, and can legally obtain his freedom from him, if this is not prevented by the Lex Ælia Sentia; that is to say, if the owner is solvent, and his creditors do not appear to have been defrauded by his act. 1Where a slave is bequeathed under a condition, he belongs absolutely to the heir while the condition is pending; but he cannot obtain his freedom from him lest injury be done to the legatee.
30 Ulpianus libro quarto ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. Si quis hac lege servum emerit, ut manumittat, et non manumittente eo servus ad libertatem pervenerit ex constitutione divi marci, an possit ut ingratum accusare, videamus. et dici potest, cum non sit manumissor, hoc ius eum non habere. 1Si filius meus ex voluntate mea manumiserit, an ut ingratum eum accusandi ius habeam, dubitari poterit idcirco, quia non manumisi: sed pro eo habendus sum, ac si manumississem. 2Sed si castrensem servum filius meus manumittat, dubio procul hoc ius non habebo, quia non ipse manumisi: ipse plane filius accusare poterit. 3Tamdiu autem accusare quis poterit, quamdiu perseverat patronus. 4Quotiens autem patroni libertum volunt accusare, utrum omnium consensus necessarius sit an vero et unus possit, videamus. et est verius, si saltem in unum hoc commiserit, eum ut ingratum accusari, sed omnium consensum necessarium, si sint eiusdem gradus. 5Si pater libertum uni ex filiis adsignaverit, solum eum accusare posse Iulianus scripsit: solum enim patronum esse.
30 Ulpianus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book IV. If anyone should purchase a slave under the condition of manumitting him, and, not having done so, the slave obtains his freedom under the Constitution of the Divine Marcus, let us see whether he can be accused of ingratitude. It may be said that, as the purchaser did not manumit him, he is not entitled to this right of action. 1If my son should manumit my slave with my consent, it may be doubted whether I have the right to accuse him of ingratitude for the reason that I did not manumit him. I should, however, be considered as having manumitted him. 2But if my son manumits a slave forming part of his castrense peculium, there is no doubt that I will not have this right, because I, myself, did not manumit him. It is clear that my son himself can accuse him. 3Anyone can accuse a freedman of ingratitude as long as he remains his patron. 4If, however, several patrons desire to accuse their freedman of ingratitude, let us see whether the consent of all of them will be necessary, or whether only one can do so. The better opinion is that, if the freedman displayed ingratitude against only one of his patrons, he can accuse him; but the consent of all of them will be necessary, if they are all in the same degree. 5If a father should assign a freedman to one of his children, Julianus says he alone can accuse him of ingratitude, for he alone is his patron.
31 Terentius Clemens libro quinto ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Quaesitum est, si libertam patronus iureiurando adegisset, ne ea liberos impuberes habens nuberet, quid iuris esset. Iulianus dicit non videri contra legem Aeliam Sentiam fecisse eum, qui non perpetuam viduitatem libertae iniunxisset.
31 Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. The question arose, what would be the rule if a patron compelled his freedwoman to swear that she would not marry as long as her children are under the age of puberty? Julianus says that he would not be held to have acted against the Lex Ælia Sentia, as he did not enjoin her to remain in perpetual widowhood.
32 Idem libro octavo ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Si non voluntate patroni is, qui in eius potestate sit, iusiurandum adegerit vel stipulatus fuerit, ne nubat, nisi id patronus remittat aut liberabit libertam, incidet in legem: videbitur enim id ipsum dolo malo facere. 1Non prohibentur lege Aelia Sentia patroni a libertis mercedes capere, sed obligare eos: itaque si sponte sua libertus mercedem patrono praestiterit, nullum huius legis praemium consequetur. 2Is, qui operas aut in singulas eas certam summam promisit, ad hanc legem non pertinet, quoniam operas praestando potest liberari. idem Octavenus probat et adicit: obligare sibi libertum, ut mercedem operarum capiat, is intellegitur, qui hoc solum agit, ut utique mercedem capiat, etiamsi sub titulo operarum eam stipulatus fuerit.
32 The Same, On the Law of Julia et Papia, Book I. If he who is under the control of a patron should compel the woman to swear, or to enter into a stipulation not to marry against the consent of the patron, unless the latter releases the woman from her oath, or her promise, he will come within the provisions of the law, for he himself will be held to have acted in bad faith. 1Patrons are not prohibited by the Lex Ælia Sentia from receiving the wages of their freedmen, but they are forbidden to compel them to surrender them. Therefore, if a freedman voluntarily pays his wages to his patron, he will have no recourse against him under this law. 2This law does not apply to a freedman who has promised certain days of labor, or a sum of money, as by performing labor he can become free. Octavenus approves this opinion, and adds that a patron is understood to have compelled his freedman to pay him the wages of his labor, where his acts show that his intention was only to obtain the said wages, even if he stipulated for days of labor.