Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XL7,
De statuliberis
Liber quadragesimus
VII.

De statuliberis

(Concerning Slaves Who are to be Free Under a Certain Condition.)

1Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Sta­tu­li­ber est, qui sta­tu­tam et de­sti­na­tam in tem­pus vel con­di­cio­nem li­ber­ta­tem ha­bet. 1Fiunt au­tem sta­tu­li­be­ri vel con­di­cio­ne ex­pres­sa vel vi ip­sa. con­di­cio­ne ex­pres­sa quid est, ma­ni­fes­tum est. vi ip­sa, cum cre­di­to­ris frau­dan­di cau­sa ma­nu­mit­tun­tur: nam dum in­cer­tum est, an cre­di­tor iu­re suo uta­tur, in­ter­im sta­tu­li­be­ri sunt, quon­iam fraus cum ef­fec­tu in le­ge Ae­lia Sen­tia ac­ci­pi­tur.

1Paulus, On Sabinus, Book V. A slave who is to be conditionally free is one who will be entitled to his freedom at the expiration of a prescribed time, or upon the fulfillment of a certain condition. 1Slaves become free either under an express condition, or by the operation of the law itself. It is clear in what way this takes place under an express condition. They are manumitted by operation of law where they are liberated for the purpose of defrauding creditors. For as long as it is uncertain whether a creditor will avail himself of his rights, the slaves are conditionally free, because, by the Lex Ælia Sentia, the commission of a fraud under such circumstances must take effect.

2Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to ad Sa­binum. Qui sta­tu­li­be­ri cau­sam ad­pre­hen­dit, in ea con­di­cio­ne est, ut, si­ve tra­da­tur, sal­va spe li­ber­ta­tis alie­ne­tur, si­ve usu­ca­pia­tur, cum sua cau­sa usu­ca­pia­tur, si­ve ma­nu­mit­ta­tur, non per­dat spem or­ci­ni li­ber­ti. sed sta­tu­li­be­ri cau­sam non prius ser­vus nan­cis­ci­tur ni­si ad­ita vel ab uno ex in­sti­tu­tis he­redi­ta­te: ce­te­rum an­te ad­itio­nem si­ve tra­de­tur si­ve usu­ca­pie­tur si­ve ma­nu­mit­te­tur, spes sta­tu­tae li­ber­ta­tis in­ter­ci­dit. 1Sed si im­pu­be­ris ta­bu­lis li­ber­tas ser­vo sit ad­scrip­ta, an vi­vo pu­pil­lo, post ad­itio­nem vi­de­li­cet he­redi­ta­tis pa­tris, sta­tu­li­ber sit? Cas­sius ne­gat: Iu­lia­nus con­tra ex­is­ti­mat, quae sen­ten­tia ve­rior ha­be­tur. 2Plus scrip­sit Iu­lia­nus et si le­ga­tus sit ser­vus ab he­rede pa­tris, li­ber es­se ius­sus in pu­pil­la­ri­bus ta­bu­lis, prae­va­le­re li­ber­ta­tis da­tio­nem. 3Si pri­mis ta­bu­lis sub con­di­cio­ne ser­vus cum li­ber­ta­te ex par­te di­mi­dia he­res sit in­sti­tu­tus, an sta­tu­li­be­ri cau­sam op­ti­neat, ut ad­eun­te co­he­rede cum sua cau­sa usu­ca­pia­tur? cum a se­met­ip­so ac­ce­pe­rit li­ber­ta­tem, non pot­est sta­tu­li­be­ri cau­sam op­ti­ne­re. pla­ne si con­di­cio he­redi­ta­tis de­fi­ciat, quo ca­su se­cun­dum Iu­lia­num vel li­ber­ta­tem apis­ci­tur, di­cen­dum est sta­tu­li­be­ri cau­sam op­ti­ne­re, eo quod non a se­met­ip­so, sed a co­he­rede ac­ce­pis­se li­ber­ta­tem cre­di­tur. 4Quo­cum­que gra­du pu­pil­lo ser­vus cum li­ber­ta­te sub­sti­tu­tus sit, ne­ces­sa­rii cau­sam op­ti­net: quae sen­ten­tia uti­li­ta­tis cau­sa re­cep­ta est et a no­bis pro­ba­tur. Cel­sus quo­que pu­tat li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo cum li­ber­ta­te sub­sti­tu­tum sta­tu­li­be­ri cau­sam op­ti­ne­re.

2Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book IV. We understand the position of the slave who is to be free under a condition to be such that, whether he is delivered after having been sold, while still retaining the hope of his freedom, or whether he has been acquired for his own benefit by usucaption, or whether when he is manumitted, he does not abandon the expectation of becoming the freedman of the deceased. The slave is not placed in such a position unless the estate has been entered upon by one of the heirs. But if he should be alienated, or acquired by usucaption, or manumitted before the estate is entered upon, his hope of the freedom bequeathed to him will be lost. 1Where, however, freedom has been left to a slave under a pupillary substitution, will he become conditionally free during the lifetime of the minor, after the estate of his father has been accepted? Cassius denies that he will; but Julianus holds the opposite opinion, which is considered the more correct one. 2Julianus further says that if a slave is bequeathed to the heir of the father, and, in the pupillary substitution he is ordered to be free, the grant of freedom will take precedence. 3If a slave is appointed heir to half of the estate, with the grant of his freedom conditionally, by the first will, will he occupy the position of a slave, who is to be conditionally free, so that, if his co-heir enters upon the estate, he cannot under the circumstances be acquired by usucaption? He cannot occupy the position of a slave to be conditionally free, as he received freedom from himself. It is clear that it must be held that he will occupy the position of a slave to be conditionally free, if the condition under which he was appointed heir should not be complied with; in which case, according to Julianus, he will obtain his liberty because he is not held to have obtained it from himself but from his co-heir. 4In whatever degree a slave may have been substituted for a minor, with the bequest of his freedom, he occupies the position of a necessary heir. This opinion has been adopted on account of its convenience, and we approve it. Celsus, also, in the Fifteenth Book, thinks that a slave who is substituted with a bequest of his freedom occupies the position of one who is to be conditionally free.

3Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Sta­tu­li­be­ros con­di­cio­ni pa­re­re opor­tet, si ne­mo eos im­pe­diat et sit con­di­cio pos­si­bi­lis. 1Sed si in he­redis per­so­na ius­sus sit pa­re­re con­di­cio­ni, quid di­ci de­beat? si qui­dem par­uit con­di­cio­ni, sta­tim li­ber est et­iam in­vi­to he­rede. quod si non pa­ti­tur he­res pa­re­ri (pu­ta of­fert de­cem, quae da­re ius­sus erat), pro­cul du­bio li­ber est, quia per he­redem sta­re vi­de­tur, quo mi­nus con­di­cio­nem im­pleat. et par­vi re­fert, de pe­cu­lio ei of­fe­rat an ab alio ac­cep­ta: re­cep­tum est enim, ut ser­vus pe­cu­lia­res quo­que num­mos dan­do per­ve­niat ad li­ber­ta­tem, si­ve ip­si he­redi si­ve alii da­re ius­sus est. 2In­de quae­ri­tur, si for­te de­bea­tur pe­cu­nia huic ser­vo vel ab he­rede, quod in do­mi­ni ra­tio­nem plus ero­ga­ve­rat, vel ab ex­tra­neo, nec ve­lit he­res de­bi­to­rem con­ve­ni­re vel sta­tu­li­be­ro sol­ve­re pe­cu­niam: an de­beat ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re, qua­si mo­ram per he­redem pa­tia­tur. et aut le­ga­tum huic sta­tu­li­be­ro fuit pe­cu­lium aut non: si le­ga­tum pe­cu­lium fuit, Ser­vius scri­bit mo­ram eum li­ber­ta­tis pas­sum ob hoc ip­sum, quod ei ali­quid ex ra­tio­ne do­mi­ni­ca de­be­re­tur nec ei ab he­rede prae­sta­re­tur: quam sen­ten­tiam et La­beo pro­bat. idem Ser­vius pro­bat et si in eo mo­ram fa­ciat he­res, quod no­lit ex­ige­re a de­bi­to­ri­bus: nam per­ven­tu­rum ad li­ber­ta­tem ait. mi­hi quo­que vi­de­tur ve­rum quod Ser­vius ait. cum igi­tur ve­ram pu­te­mus sen­ten­tiam ser­vi, vi­dea­mus, an et si non fue­rit prae­le­ga­tum pe­cu­lium ser­vo, idem de­beat di­ci: con­stat enim sta­tu­li­be­rum de pe­cu­lio pos­se da­re vel ip­si he­redi ius­sum vel alii: et si eum da­re im­pe­diat, per­ve­niet sta­tu­li­ber ad li­ber­ta­tem. de­ni­que et­iam re­me­dii lo­co hoc mons­tra­tur do­mi­no sta­tu­li­be­ri, ut eum ex­tra­neo ius­sum da­re pro­hi­beat, ne et num­mos per­dat cum sta­tu­li­be­ro. pro­in­de de­fen­di pot­est et si non vult ex­ige­re vel ip­se sol­ve­re, ut hic ha­beat, un­de con­di­cio­ni pa­reat, li­ber­ta­tem com­pe­te­re: et ita Cas­sius quo­que scri­bit. 3Non so­lum au­tem si da­re ius­sum da­re pro­hi­beat, sta­tu­li­ber ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­nit, ve­rum et­iam si ascen­de­re Ca­pi­to­lium ius­sum ascen­de­re ve­tet, item si Capuae da­re ius­sum Capuam ire pro­hi­beat: nam qui pro­hi­bet ser­vum pro­fi­cis­ci, in­tel­le­gen­dus est im­pe­di­re ma­gis vel­le li­ber­ta­tem quam ope­ris ser­vi uti. 4Sed et si ius­sum co­he­redi da­re non pa­tia­tur unus ex he­redi­bus da­re, ae­que li­ber erit: sed is, cui ius­sus erat da­re et li­ber es­se, fa­mi­liae er­cis­cun­dae iu­di­cio ab eo qui im­pe­dit con­se­que­tur, quod sua in­ter­erat pro­hi­bi­tum sta­tu­li­be­rum non es­se. 5Si de­cem ius­sus da­re et li­ber es­se quin­que det, non per­ve­nit ad li­ber­ta­tem, ni­si to­tum det: in­ter­im igi­tur vin­di­ca­re quin­que num­mos do­mi­nus eo­rum pot­est. sed si re­si­duum fue­rit so­lu­tum, tunc et­iam id alie­na­tum, cu­ius an­te do­mi­nium non erat trans­la­tum. ita pen­de­bit prae­ce­den­tis sum­mae alie­na­tio, sic ta­men, ut non re­tro num­mi fiant ac­ci­pien­tis, sed tunc, cum re­si­dua sum­ma fue­rit ex­so­lu­ta. 6Si plus quam ius­sus erat de­de­rit sta­tu­li­ber, pu­ta de­cem ius­sus da­re vi­gin­ti de­dit, si­ve nu­me­ra­vit si­ve in sac­cu­lo de­dit, per­ve­nit ad li­ber­ta­tem et su­per­fluum pot­est re­pe­te­re. 7Si quis ser­vum ius­sum de­cem da­re et li­be­rum es­se ven­di­de­rit si­ne pe­cu­lio, utrum sta­tim li­ber sit (qua­si pro­hi­bi­tus vi­dea­tur de pe­cu­lio da­re hoc ip­so, quod si­ne pe­cu­lio dis­trac­tus est) an ve­ro cum fue­rit pro­hi­bi­tus pe­cu­lium tan­ge­re? et pu­to tunc de­mum li­be­rum fo­re, cum vo­lens da­re pro­hi­bea­tur, non sta­tim ubi ven­iit. 8Si quis ser­vum ius­sum de­cem da­re et li­be­rum es­se ope­ra­ri pro­hi­beat, vel si, quod ex ope­ris suis me­ret, abs­tu­le­rit ei he­res, vel si, quod ex mer­ce­di­bus suis co­egit, he­redi de­de­rit, an ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niat? et pu­to, si qui­dem ex ope­ris de­de­rit vel un­de­cum­que de­de­rit, ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ven­tu­rum: quod si pro­hi­bea­tur ope­ra­ri, non fo­re li­be­rum, quia ope­ra­ri do­mi­no de­bet. pla­ne si ei ab­la­ta fue­rit pe­cu­nia ex ope­ris col­lec­ta, li­be­rum fo­re ar­bi­tror, quia de pe­cu­lio da­re pro­hi­be­tur. sa­ne si tes­ta­tor vel ex ope­ris ut det ius­sit, pro­hi­bi­tum ope­ra­ri ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ven­tu­rum non du­bi­to. 9Sed et si ar­gen­to sub­trac­to vel re­bus aliis dis­trac­tis num­mos cor­ra­sos de­de­rit, per­ve­niet ad li­ber­ta­tem, quam­vis, si num­mos sub­trac­tos de­dis­set, ad li­ber­ta­tem non per­ve­ni­ret: nec enim vi­de­tur de­dis­se, sed ma­gis red­di­dis­se. sed nec si aliis sub­ri­pue­rit num­mos et he­redi de­de­rit, ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niet, quia avel­li num­mi ei qui ac­ce­pit pos­sunt. pla­ne si sic con­sump­ti fue­rint, ut nul­lo ca­su avel­li pos­sint, con­pe­tet li­ber­tas. 10Non so­lum au­tem si he­res mo­ram fa­cit li­ber­ta­ti, sed et si tu­tor vel cu­ra­tor vel pro­cu­ra­tor vel alius qui­vis, in cu­ius per­so­na con­di­cio­ni pa­ren­dum est, li­ber­ta­tem com­pe­te­re di­ce­mus. et sa­ne hoc iu­re uti­mur in sta­tu­li­be­ro, ut suf­fi­ciat per eum non sta­re, quo mi­nus con­di­cio­ni pa­reat. 11Si quis he­redi in die­bus tri­gin­ta pro­xi­mis mor­tis tes­ta­to­ris da­re ius­sus fue­rit, de­in­de he­res tar­dius ad­ie­rit, Tre­ba­tius et La­beo, si si­ne do­lo ma­lo tar­dius ad­ie­rit, dan­tem eum in­tra dies tri­gin­ta ad­itae he­redi­ta­tis ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re: quae sen­ten­tia ve­ra est. sed quid si da­ta ope­ra tra­xit? an ob id sta­tim, ut ad­ita est he­redi­tas, ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niat? quid enim si tunc ha­buit, post ad­itam ha­be­re de­siit? sed et hic ex­ple­ta vi­de­tur con­di­cio, quon­iam per eum non ste­te­rit, quo mi­nus im­plea­tur. 12Si quis sic ac­ce­pe­rit li­ber­ta­tem ‘cum de­cem da­re pot­erit, li­ber es­to’, Tre­ba­tius ait, li­cet ha­bue­rit de­cem vel ido­neus fue­rit ad ad­quiren­dum et con­ser­van­dum pe­cu­lium, ta­men non alias ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ven­tu­rum, ni­si de­de­rit aut per eum non ste­te­rit, quo mi­nus det: quae sen­ten­tia ve­ra est. 13Sti­chus an­nua bi­ma tri­ma die de­nos au­reos he­redi si de­de­rit, li­ber es­se ius­sus est. si pri­ma pen­sio­ne ste­tit per he­redem, quo mi­nus ac­ci­pe­ret de­cem, ex­spec­tan­dam es­se tri­mam pen­sio­nem pla­cet, quia et tem­pus ad­iec­tum est et ad­huc su­per­sunt duae pen­sio­nes. sed si ea­dem de­cem so­la ha­beat, quae op­tu­lit ad pri­mam pen­sio­nem, an et­iam ad se­quen­tem quo­que pro­sit, si of­fe­rat? et an et ad ter­tiam, si se­quens pen­sio non sit ac­cep­ta? et pu­to suf­fi­ce­re haec ea­dem et pae­ni­ten­tiae he­redi lo­cum non es­se: quod et Pom­po­nius pro­bat. 14Quid si ser­vus, qui an­nua bi­ma tri­ma die ius­sus est de­na da­re, to­ta si­mul of­fe­rat he­redi non ex­spec­ta­ta die? vel de­cem pri­mo an­no da­tis se­cun­do an­no vi­gin­ti op­tu­lit? be­ni­gnius est eum in li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re, cum utrius­que pro­vi­den­tia in­fer­tur et ser­vi, qua­te­nus ma­tu­rius in li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niat, et he­redis, qua­te­nus di­la­tio­ne in­ter­emp­ta ili­co ac­ci­piat, quod post tem­pus con­se­qui pot­erat. 15Si ita sit li­ber­tas ser­vo da­ta, si quin­quen­nio he­redi ser­vie­rit, de­in­de eum he­res ma­nu­mi­se­rit, sta­tim li­ber fit, qua­si per eum sit ef­fec­tum, quo mi­nus ei ser­viat: quam­vis si non pa­te­re­tur eum si­bi ser­vi­re, non sta­tim per­ve­ni­ret, quam si quin­quen­nium prae­ter­is­set. ra­tio hu­ius res evi­dens est: ma­nu­mis­sus enim am­plius ser­vi­re non pot­est: at is quem quis non pa­ti­tur si­bi ser­vi­re, post­ea pa­ti pot­est in­tra quin­quen­nii tem­pus. at­quin iam quin­quen­nio ei ser­vi­re non pot­est: sed vel mi­nus pot­est. 16Item Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit, si Are­thu­sae li­ber­tas ita sit da­ta, si tres ser­vos pe­pe­re­rit, et per he­redem ste­te­rit, quo mi­nus pe­pe­re­rit (pu­ta quod ei me­di­ca­men­tum de­dis­set, ne con­ci­pe­ret), sta­tim li­be­ram fu­tu­ram es­se: quid enim ex­spec­ta­mus? idem­que et si egis­set he­res, ut ab­or­tum fa­ce­ret, quia et uno ute­ro po­tuit tres ede­re. 17Item si he­redi ser­vi­re ius­sum sta­tu­li­be­rum he­res ven­di­dit et tra­di­dit, cre­do sta­tim ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re.

3The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXVII. Slaves of this description must comply with the condition prescribed, if no one prevents them from doing so, and the condition is possible. 1Where, however, the slave is ordered to comply with the condition with respect to the heir, what must be said?” If he complies with it he will immediately become free, although the heir may not consent. If the heir prevents him from complying with the condition, as, for instance, where he refuses ten aurei which the slave was ordered to pay him, there is no doubt that the slave will be free, because it is the fault of the heir that the condition was not fulfilled. And it makes little difference whether he tenders the amount out of his peculium, or whether he has obtained it from some other source, for it is established that a slave who pays money out of his peculium will be entitled to his freedom, whether he is ordered to pay it to the heir or to anyone else. 2Hence, the question arises, if a sum of money should be due to the said slave, either from the heir, because the slave had advanced it in transacting the business of his master, or from a stranger, and the heir does not wish to sue the debtor, or to pay the money to the slave, will the latter be entitled to his freedom on account of the delay he suffers through the fault of the heir? Either the peculium was bequeathed to the slave, or it was not; if it was bequeathed to him, Servius says that it is the heir who is responsible for the delay of the slave obtaining his freedom, because something is due to him from the estate of his master which is not paid by the heir. Labeo adopts this opinion. Servius also approves it, and says that if the heir causes delay for the reason that he is unwilling to collect money from the debtors of the slave, the latter will be entitled to his freedom. The opinion of Servius seems to me to be correct. Hence, as we think this opinion to be true, let us see whether the same rule should not apply, even where the peculium was not bequeathed as a preferred legacy to the slave. For it is settled that a slave, in order to be conditionally free, can make a payment out of his peculium whether he is ordered to do so to the heir, to himself, or to someone else; and if the heir should prevent him from doing so, the slave will be entitled to his freedom. Finally, this is given to the master of the slave as a remedy, that is, he is forbidden to pay to a stranger what he was ordered to pay, lest he may run the risk of losing both the money and the slave; hence it can be maintained that, if the heir does not wish to collect the claim from the debtors of the slave, or to pay him himself, so that he may have the means with which to comply with the condition, the slave will be entitled to his freedom. Cassius also adopted this opinion. 3Again, the slave will not only obtain his freedom when he is prevented from paying what he was ordered by the testator to pay, but also if he is forbidden to ascend to the Capitol, or if he is prevented from going to Capua; for anyone who hinders a slave from taking a journey is understood rather to desire that he shall lose his freedom than to wish to avail himself of his services. 4Where the slave is ordered to pay a co-heir, and another of the heirs prevents him from doing so, he will also become free; but he to whom he was ordered to make payment and become free will be entitled to an action in partition against the one who prevented him, in order to obtain the amount of his interest in not having the slave prevented from paying him. 5If a slave who is ordered to pay ten sesterces and become free pays five, he will not be entitled to his freedom unless he pays the entire sum. Therefore, in the meantime, the owner of the five sesterces can claim them, but if the balance should be paid, then the first five, the ownership of which had not previously passed to him to whom they were given will be acquired by him; hence, the transfer of the first sum paid will remain in suspense, so that the sesterces will not, by retroactive effect, become the property of him who received them, but only where the remainder of the amount has been paid. 6If the slave should pay more than he had been ordered to do (for instance, if he had been ordered to pay ten sesterces, and he pays twenty), whether he counted the coins, or gave them in a bag, he will obtain his freedom, and can recover the surplus. 7If anyone should sell, without his peculium, a slave who had been ordered to pay ten sesterces and become free, will the slave immediately obtain his liberty, because he has been prevented from making payment out of his peculium, for the reason that he was sold without it, or will he become free from the time that he was forbidden to touch his peculium? I think that he will only become free from the time when he wished to make payment, and was prevented from doing so, and not from the very day when he was sold. 8Where anyone prevents a slave, who was ordered to pay ten aurei and become free from working, or where the heir deprives him of what he has earned by his labor, or if he should give the heir whatever he has obtained in this way, will he be entitled to his freedom? I think that if he should pay him what he has earned by his labor, or anything that he has obtained from any source whatsoever, he will be entitled to his freedom. If, however, he was prevented from working, he will not become free, because he is obliged to work for his master. I think that it is clear that he will become free if he should be deprived by his master of money earned by his labor, because he has been deprived of the power to pay it out of his peculium; but if the testator ordered him to pay the said sum of money earned by his labor, and he is prevented from working, I have no doubt that he will be entitled to his freedom. 9If, however, the slave should have abstracted any silver plate, or sold other property and made payment out of the proceeds, he will obtain his freedom, although if he has paid money which he stole he will not do so; for he is not considered to have given the said money but rather to have returned it. But if he stole money belonging to other persons, and paid it to the heir, he will not obtain his freedom, for the reason that the money which was stolen can be recovered from him who received it; still, if it was used in such a way that it can, under no circumstances, be recovered, the slave will be entitled to his freedom. 10Moreover, not only where the heir delays in making a grant of freedom, but where a guardian, curator, agent, or anyone else by whom the condition should be complied with does so, we say that the slave will be entitled to his freedom. And, indeed, this is our practice, in the case of a slave who is to be conditionally free, and it is sufficient that it is not his fault that he does not comply with the condition. 11If anyone should be ordered to pay the heir within thirty days after the death of the testator, and the heir enters upon the estate after that time has elapsed, Trebatius and Labeo say that if he did so without acting fraudulently, the slave will obtain his freedom within thirty days after the acceptance of the estate. This opinion is correct. But what course must be pursued if the heir purposely delayed; will the slave be entitled to his freedom on this account from the time when the estate was entered upon? What if he had the money then, but did not have it after the estate was accepted? In this case, however, the condition is held to have been fulfilled, as the slave was not responsible for it not having been complied with in the first place. 12Where a slave receives his freedom under the following clause, “Let him be free when he can pay him ten aurei,” Trebatius says that, although he may have the ten aurei, or be in a position to obtain and keep his peculium, still he will not be entitled to his freedom unless he pays the money, or is not to blame for failing to pay it. This opinion is correct. 13Stichus was ordered to be free if he paid ten aurei to the heir annually for three years. If the heir was responsible for the nonpayment of the first instalment, it is established that the slave must wait until the date of the third payment, because the time is prescribed, and there are two payments remaining. If, however, the slave has only the ten aurei which he offered when the first payment was due, would it be of any advantage to him if he tendered them at the time of the second payment, or even at the time of the third, provided the second had not been accepted? I think that it would be sufficient for him to do so, and that the heir has no right to change his mind. Pomponius also adopts this opinion. 14What must be done if the slave who was ordered to make the three annual payments should tender the entire amount to the heir without waiting for it to become due? Or if, having paid ten aurei at the end of the first year, he should offer twenty at the end of the second? The more indulgent interpretation is that he will be entitled to his freedom, as benefit will accrue to both parties; for the slave will obtain his freedom sooner, and the heir will receive without delay what he would have obtained after a certain time. 15Where freedom is granted to a slave, if he serves the heir for five years, and the heir should manumit him, he immediately becomes free, as it is the fault of the heir that he did not serve him; although, if the heir did not wish him to do so, he would not become free until after the term of five years had elapsed. The reason for this is evident, as a manumitted slave can no longer remain in servitude. But the master who does not desire the slave to serve him can still permit this to be done within five years. The slave, however, cannot serve him for the entire term of five years but he can do so for a shorter period. 16Julianus, also, in the Sixteenth Book of the Digest, says that if Arethusa was granted her freedom under the condition that she should bring forth three slaves, and the heir was responsible for her not doing so (for instance, because he gave her some drug to prevent her from conceiving), she will immediately become free. For why should we wait? It is just the same as if the heir should cause her to have an abortion, because she could have three children at a birth. 17Likewise, if the heir should sell and deliver a slave who is to be liberated conditionally, and who has been ordered to serve him, I think that the slave will immediately be entitled to his freedom.

4Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Cum he­res rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa ab­es­set et pe­cu­niam sta­tu­li­ber ha­be­ret: vel ex­spec­ta­ri eum de­be­re, do­nec red­eat is cui da­re de­bet, vel de­po­ne­re in ae­dem pe­cu­niam con­sig­na­tam opor­tet, quo sub­se­cu­to sta­tim ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­nit. 1Non est sta­tu­li­ber, cui li­ber­tas in tam lon­gum tem­pus col­la­ta est, ut eo tem­po­re is qui ma­nu­mis­sus est vi­ve­re non pos­sit: aut si tam dif­fi­ci­lem, im­mo pae­ne in­po­s­si­bi­lem con­di­cio­nem ad­ie­ce­rit, ut ali­un­de ea li­ber­tas op­tin­ge­re non pos­sit, vel­uti si he­redi mi­lies de­dis­set aut cum mo­re­re­tur, li­be­rum es­se ius­sis­set: sic enim li­ber­tas in­uti­li­ter da­tur, et ita Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, quia nec ani­mus dan­dae li­ber­ta­tis est. 2Ser­vi­re Ti­tio an­no et li­ber es­se ius­sus Ti­tio mor­tuo non sta­tim li­ber fiet, sed cum an­nus trans­ie­rit, quod vi­de­tur non tan­tum sub con­di­cio­ne, sed et­iam ex tem­po­re da­ta li­ber­tas: et­enim ab­sur­dum est ma­tu­rius eum li­be­rum fie­ri, cum con­di­cio­nem non im­plet, quam fu­tu­rus fo­ret, si eam ex­ple­ret. 3Si duo­bus de­cem da­tis li­ber es­se ius­sus sit et unus quin­que ac­ci­pe­re no­lue­rit, me­lius est di­ce­re pos­se eum ea­dem quin­que al­te­ri of­fe­ren­tem ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re. 4‘Sti­chus si Ti­tio per tri­en­nium ser­vie­rit vel si il­li cen­tum ope­ras de­de­rit, li­ber es­to’. con­stat hoc mo­do li­ber­ta­tem uti­li­ter da­ri pos­se: nam et alie­nus ser­vus ser­vi­re no­bis pot­est, sic­uti li­ber, et mul­to ma­gis ope­ras da­re: ni­si tes­ta­tor ser­vi­tu­tis ap­pel­la­tio­ne do­mi­nium ma­gis quam ope­ram in­tel­le­xit. id­eo­que si pro­hi­bet he­res Ti­tio ser­vi­re, per­ve­nit ad li­ber­ta­tem. 5‘Sti­chus si he­redi meo an­no ser­vie­rit, li­ber es­to’: quae­ren­dum est, an­nus quo­mo­do ac­ci­pi de­beat, an qui ex con­ti­nuis die­bus tre­cen­tis se­xa­gin­ta quin­que con­stet an qui­bus­li­bet11Die Großausgabe liest qui­bus li­bet statt qui­bus­li­bet.. sed su­pe­rius ma­gis in­tel­le­gen­dum Pom­po­nius scri­bit. sed et si qui­bus­dam die­bus aut va­le­tu­do aut alia ius­ta cau­sa im­pe­d­imen­to fue­rit, quo mi­nus ser­viat, et hi an­no im­pu­tan­di sunt: ser­vi­re enim no­bis in­tel­le­gun­tur et­iam hi, quos cu­ra­mus ae­gros, qui cu­pien­tes ser­vi­re prop­ter ad­ver­sam va­le­tu­di­nem im­pe­diun­tur. 6Item si de­cem he­redi da­re ius­sus fue­rit, he­res et­iam per par­tes ac­ci­pe­re fa­vo­re li­ber­ta­tis co­gen­dus est. 7Ita li­ber es­se ius­sus ‘si Ti­tius Ca­pi­to­lium ascen­de­rit’: si Ti­tius no­lit ascen­de­re, im­pe­die­tur li­ber­tas. idem­que iu­ris est in si­mi­li­bus cau­sis et con­di­cio­ni­bus. 8Item Cas­sius ait ei, qui ser­vi­re ius­sus est an­no, il­lud tem­pus, quo in fu­ga sit vel in con­tro­ver­sia pro li­ber­ta­te, non pro­ce­de­re.

4Paulus, On Sabinus, Book V. When the heir is absent on business for the state, and the slave has the money ready for payment, he must wait until he to whom he is to pay it returns, or he must deposit it, sealed up, in a temple; and this having been done, he will immediately be entitled to his freedom. 1Ad Dig. 40,7,4,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 94, Note 8.A slave is not considered to become conditionally free whose liberty is deferred for so long a time that he who is to be manumitted cannot live until it has elapsed; or, if his owner has prescribed such a difficult, or even an impossible, condition that his freedom cannot be acquired by complying with it; as, for instance, if it was that he should pay a thousand times a certain sum to the heir, or if he should order him to be free from the time of his death. A grant of freedom made in this manner is void, as Julianus says, because there is, in fact, no intention of granting the slave his freedom. 2If a slave is ordered to be free on condition of serving Titius for a year, and Titius should die, the slave will not immediately become free, but he will after the expiration of a year, because freedom is considered to have been given him not only under a condition, but also from a certain date. For it would be absurd for him to become free sooner when he did not comply with the condition than he would if he did comply with it. 3Where a slave is ordered to be free on the payment of ten aurei to two persons, and one of them refuses to accept five, it is better to hold that the slave can obtain his freedom by tendering the said five aurei to the other party. 4“Let Stichus be free, if he serves Titius for three years, or renders him services worth a hundred solidi.” It is settled that freedom can be legally granted in this manner; for the slave of another can serve us as a freeman, and can, with greater propriety, render us his services; unless the testator, by the term services, meant ownership, rather than labor. Hence, if the heir prevents the slave from serving Titius, he will be entitled to his freedom. 5“Let Stichus be free if he serves my heir for a year.” The question might arise how ought the word “year” be understood in this case; should it be a term which contains three hundred and sixty-five consecutive days, or merely that many days? Pomponius says that the word should be understood in the former sense. If, however, illness, or some other just cause prevents the slave from serving during certain days, these ought to be included in the year. For those whom we take care of when ill are understood to serve us, if they are willing to do so but are precluded by bad health. 6If a slave is ordered to pay ten aurei to the heir, the latter will, through the indulgence conceded to freedom, be compelled to receive the money in separate payments. 7Where a slave was ordered to be free, “if Titius should ascend to the Capitol,” and Titius refuses to do so, the grant of freedom is annulled. This rule also applies to similar cases under the same conditions. 8Cassius, likewise, says that where a slave is ordered to serve for a year, the time when he was in flight or in litigation will not be included in favor of his freedom.

5Pom­po­nius li­bro oc­ta­vo ad Sa­binum. Sta­tu­li­ber ra­tio­nem red­de­re ius­sus re­li­quum quod ap­pa­ret sol­vit, de eo, quod ob­scu­rius est, sa­tis­da­re pa­ra­tus est. Ne­ra­tius et Aris­to rec­te pu­tant li­be­rum fo­re, ne mul­ti ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re non pos­sint in­cer­ta cau­sa ra­tio­nis et ge­ne­re neg­otii hu­ius­mo­di. 1Sta­tu­li­ber, qui non ra­tio­nes red­de­re, sed pe­cu­niam ius­sus est da­re, nu­me­ra­re de­bet, non fi­de­ius­so­rem da­re.

5Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Where a slave who was to become free conditionally was ordered to render an account, and paid what appeared to be the balance remaining in his hands, and offered to give security with reference to what remained in doubt, Neratius and Aristo very properly hold that he will become free; as otherwise, many slaves might not obtain their liberty because of the uncertainties of accounts and the nature of business of this kind. 1A slave who is to become free conditionally, and is ordered to pay a sum of money but not to render an account, should pay it, and not furnish a surety that he will do so.

6Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad Sa­binum. Si sta­tu­li­be­ra ser­va poe­nae fac­ta sit et post dam­na­tio­nem sta­tu­tae li­ber­ta­tis con­di­cio ex­sti­te­rit, quam­vis ip­si sta­tu­li­be­rae ni­hil pro­fi­ciat, par­tui ta­men pro­fi­ce­re opor­tet, ut per­in­de li­ber nas­ca­tur, at­que si ma­ter dam­na­ta non es­set. 1Quid ta­men si qua con­ce­pe­rit in ser­vi­tu­te, de­in­de ab hos­ti­bus cap­ta pe­pe­rit ibi post ex­is­ten­tem con­di­cio­nem, an li­be­rum pa­riat? et in­ter­im qui­dem quin ser­vus hos­tium sit, ne­qua­quam du­bium est: sed ve­rius est post­li­mi­nio eum li­be­rum fie­ri, quia, si ma­ter in ci­vi­ta­te es­set, li­ber nas­ce­re­tur. 2Pla­ne si apud hos­tes eum con­ce­pis­set et post ex­is­ten­tem con­di­cio­nem edi­dis­set, be­ni­gnius di­ce­tur com­pe­te­re ei post­li­mi­nium et li­be­rum eum es­se. 3Sta­tu­li­ber pa­ren­do con­di­cio­ni in per­so­na emp­to­ris per­ve­nit ad li­ber­ta­tem: et scien­dum hoc ad sta­tu­li­be­ros om­nis se­xus per­ti­ne­re. non so­lum au­tem si ven­ie­rit, haec con­di­cio ad eum trans­it qui emit, ve­rum et­iam ad om­nes, qui­cum­que quo­quo iu­re do­mi­nium in sta­tu­li­be­ro nac­ti sunt. si­ve igi­tur le­ga­tus sit ti­bi ab he­rede sta­tu­li­ber si­ve ad­iu­di­ca­tus si­ve usu­cap­tus a te si­ve tra­di­tus vel ali­quo iu­re tuus fac­tus, si­ne du­bio di­ce­mus pa­re­re con­di­cio­ni in per­so­na tua pos­se. sed et in he­rede emp­to­ris idem di­ci­tur. 4Si fi­lius fa­mi­lias he­res sit in­sti­tu­tus et sta­tu­li­ber fi­lio da­re ius­sus est et li­ber es­se, si­ve fi­lio si­ve pa­tri dan­do per­ve­nit ad li­ber­ta­tem, quia et ad pa­trem he­redi­ta­tis emo­lu­men­tum per­ve­nit. sed et si post mor­tem fi­lii pa­tri de­de­rit qua­si he­redis he­redi, li­ber erit: nam et si quis ex­tra­neo da­re ius­sus sit et li­ber es­se, de­in­de hic he­redi he­res ex­ti­te­rit, non qua­si in ex­tra­nei per­so­na, sed qua­si in he­redis con­di­cio­ni pa­re­bit. 5Sta­tu­li­ber de­cem da­re ius­sus et li­ber es­se, si quin­que da­tis dis­trac­tus sit, re­si­dua quin­que emp­to­ri da­bit. 6Si ser­vus tuus sta­tu­li­be­rum eme­rit, ti­bi da­tur, quod he­redi­bus da­re ius­sus est. sed et si tuo ser­vo de­de­rit, si mo­do is eum pe­cu­lia­ri no­mi­ne emit ne­que ei tu pe­cu­lium ad­emis­ti, pu­to li­be­rum fo­re, sci­li­cet ut eo mo­do ti­bi de­dis­se in­tel­le­ga­tur, per­in­de at­que si tua vo­lun­ta­te cui­vis alii tuo­rum ser­vo­rum de­dis­set. 7Si quis non da­re de­cem et li­ber es­se, sed ra­tio­ni­bus red­di­tis li­ber es­se ius­sus sit, an ad emp­to­rem haec con­di­cio trans­eat, vi­dea­mus. et alias scien­dum est eas de­mum con­di­cio­nes ad emp­to­rem trans­ire, quae sunt in dan­do: ce­te­rum hae, quae sunt in fa­cien­do, non trans­eunt, ut pu­ta si fi­lium eius lit­te­ras edo­cue­rit: hae enim per­so­nis eo­rum co­hae­rent, qui­bus ad­scri­bun­tur. ra­tio­num au­tem red­den­da­rum con­di­cio, quod ad re­li­qua qui­dem at­ti­net, in dan­da pe­cu­nia con­sis­tit, quod au­tem ad ip­sa vo­lu­mi­na ra­tio­num tra­den­da per­con­tan­das­que et exa­mi­nan­das ra­tio­nes et in dis­pun­gen­das at­que ex­cu­tien­das, fac­tum ha­bet. num quid er­go re­li­qua qui­dem et emp­to­ri dan­do per­ve­niat ad li­ber­ta­tem, ce­te­ra in per­so­na he­redis con­sis­tant? pu­to igi­tur et ad emp­to­rem re­li­quo­rum so­lu­tio­nem trans­mit­ti: sic fiet, ut di­vi­da­tur con­di­cio: et ita Pom­po­nius li­bro oc­ta­vo ex Sa­b­ino scrip­sit.

6Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVII. If a female slave who is to become free conditionally is sentenced to servitude as punishment for crime, and after her conviction the condition upon which her freedom is dependent is fulfilled, although it will be of no advantage to her, it will, nevertheless, benefit any child which she may have, for it will be born free, just as if its mother had not been convicted. 1What, however, would be the result if such a female slave should conceive while in servitude, and, having been captured by the enemy, should have a child after the condition upon which her freedom was dependent had been complied with; would her child be free at its birth? There is no doubt whatever that it would, in the meantime, be the slave of the enemy; but it is also true that it would become free by the right of postliminium, because if the mother had been in her own country the child would have been born free. 2It is clear that the more equitable opinion is that, if she should conceive while in the hands of the enemy, and bring forth the child after the condition had been fulfilled, it could profit by the right of postliminium and become free. 3A slave to be free conditionally will obtain his liberty from his purchaser if the condition is complied with. It must be remembered that this rule is applicable to slaves of both sexes. If the condition is fulfilled, it not only binds the person who purchased the slave, but also all those who have obtained ownership of him by any title whatsoever. Therefore, whether the slave has been bequeathed to you by the heir, or awarded to you in court, or acquired by you through usucaption, or transferred to you, or has become your property by any other right, we say that, beyond any doubt, the condition can be complied with so far as you are personally concerned. The same can be said with reference to the heir of the purchaser. 4Where a son under paternal control is appointed an heir, and a slave to be free conditionally is directed to pay to the son a certain sum of money, and be free, he will obtain his freedom by paying the said sum either to the son, or to his father; because the father is entitled to the benefit of the estate. If, however, he should pay the father after the death of the son, he will become free, as having made payment to the heir of the heir. For if a slave is ordered to pay a sum of money to a stranger, and become free, and the latter becomes the heir of the heir, he will comply with the condition not with reference to the stranger, but as it were, with reference to the heir. 5Where a slave is directed to pay ten aurei and become free, and he is sold after having paid five, he must pay the remaining five to the purchaser. 6If your slave should purchase another slave, who is to be free conditionally, he must pay you what he was ordered to pay to the heirs. If, however, he has paid your slave, I think that he will be free, provided your slave bought him with money belonging to his peculium, and you have not deprived him of it; so that, in this way, he will be understood to have paid you, just as if payment had been made to any one of your slaves with your consent. 7When a slave is ordered to be free, not upon the payment of a sum of money but if he renders his accounts, let us see whether this condition will pass to the purchaser. And it must be remembered that usually only those conditions which refer to the payment of money pass to a purchaser, and that such as refer to acts to be performed do not pass to him; for instance, if he gives his son instruction, for these conditions attach to the person of those upon whom they are imposed. The condition of rendering an account, however, which implies the existence of a balance, has reference to the payment of money; but the production of the books containing the amounts, and the calculation and examination of the accounts themselves, as well as their revision and investigation, have reference to acts to be performed. Therefore, can the slave obtain his freedom by paying the balance remaining in his hands to the purchaser, and by complying with the rest of the condition which concerns the heir? I think that the payment of the balance passes to the heir. Hence it happens that the condition may be divided. Pomponius, also, stated this opinion in the Eighth Book on Sabinus.

7Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Usus fruc­tus alie­na­to con­di­cio­nem sta­tu­li­be­ri se­cum non tra­hit.

7Paulus, On Sabinus, Book V. The alienation of the usufruct does not carry with it the condition upon which the slave is to become free.

8Pom­po­nius li­bro oc­ta­vo ad Sa­binum. Ita li­ber es­se ius­sus ‘si de­cem de­de­rit, li­ber es­to’ he­redi da­re de­bet: nam qui non ha­bet, cui det, he­redi dan­do ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­nit. 1Si par­tes suas quis­que he­redum di­ver­sis emen­ti­bus ven­di­de­rit, quas por­tio­nes he­redi­bus da­re sta­tu­li­ber de­buit, eas­dem da­bit emp­to­ri­bus. La­beo au­tem ait, si no­mi­na dum­ta­xat he­redum in tes­ta­men­to po­si­ta sint, vi­ri­les par­tes eis dan­das: si ve­ro ita ‘si he­redi­bus de­dit’, he­redi­ta­rias.

8Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Where a slave is ordered to be free if he pays ten aurei, he must pay them to the heir; for when there is no one designated to whom payment shall be made, the slave will be entitled to his freedom by paying the heir. 1If each one of the heirs sells his share in a slave to different purchasers, the slave must pay to every purchaser the same proportion of the sum which was due to each heir. Labeo, however, says that if the names of the heirs are only mentioned in the will, equal portions should be paid them; but if the testator said “If he pays my heirs,” the amounts will correspond to the shares of the estate to which the heirs are respectively entitled.

9Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad Sa­binum. Sta­tu­li­be­rum me­dio tem­po­re ser­vum he­redis es­se ne­mo est qui igno­ra­re de­beat: ea­prop­ter no­xae de­di pot­erit, sed de­di­tus spe­ra­re ad­huc li­ber­ta­tem pot­erit: nec enim de­di­tio spem il­li ad­imit li­ber­ta­tis. 1Si sta­tu­li­be­rum non ea­dem con­di­cio­ne he­res ven­dat, cau­sa eius im­mu­ta­bi­lis est et lue­re se ab eo pot­est si­mi­li mo­do ut ab he­rede. si ta­men sup­pres­se­rit con­di­cio­nem sta­tu­li­be­ri? et ex emp­to qui­dem te­ne­tur: gra­vio­res au­tem et­iam stel­lio­na­tus cri­men in­po­r­tant ei, qui sciens dis­si­mu­la­ta con­di­cio­ne sta­tu­tae li­ber­ta­tis sim­pli­ci­ter eum ven­di­de­rit. 2Il­lud trac­ta­tum est, an li­be­ra­tio con­tin­gat ei qui no­xae de­de­rit sta­tu­li­be­rum. et Oc­ta­ve­nus pu­ta­bat li­be­ra­ri: et idem di­ce­bat et si ex sti­pu­la­tu Sti­chum de­be­ret eum­que sta­tu­li­be­rum sol­vis­set: nam et si an­te so­lu­tio­nem ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­nis­set, ex­tin­gue­re­tur ob­li­ga­tio to­ta: ea enim in ob­li­ga­tio­ne con­sis­te­re, quae pe­cu­nia lui prae­sta­ri­que pos­sunt, li­ber­tas au­tem pe­cu­nia lui non pot­est nec re­pa­ra­ri pot­est. quae sen­ten­tia mi­hi vi­de­tur ve­ra. 3Sta­tu­li­be­ri con­di­cio ita de­mum im­mu­ta­bi­lis est, si ad­ita he­redi­tas fue­rit: ce­te­rum an­te ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem in pro­priam usu­ca­pi­tur ser­vi­tu­tem li­ber­ta­tis­que spes in­frin­gi­tur: sed ad­ita post­ea he­redi­ta­te spes li­ber­ta­tis fa­vo­re sui red­in­te­gra­bi­tur.

9Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVIII. No one should be ignorant of the fact that, in the meantime, the slave remains the property of the heir. Hence, he can be surrendered by way of reparation for damage caused by him, but even if this is done, he can still hope to obtain his freedom, for his surrender does not deprive him of it. 1If an heir sells a slave under a different condition than the one upon which his freedom is dependent, his status is not changed; and he can release himself from the control of the purchaser, just as he can do from that of the heir. If, however, the heir should conceal the condition upon which the slave is to be liberated, he will be liable to an action on purchase; and good authorities hold that anyone who knowingly conceals the condition under which a slave is to become free, and sells him absolutely, is guilty of swindling. 2Ad Dig. 40,7,9,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 250, Note 3.The question has been discussed whether he is released, who has delivered up a slave, that was to be conditionally free, by way of reparation for injury committed. Octavenus thinks that he is released, and says that the same rule will apply if someone owed Stichus on account of a stipulation, and delivered him to be free under a certain condition. For if he should obtain his freedom before payment had been made, the entire obligation would be extinguished; because only that is included in it which can be settled by the payment of money; freedom, however, cannot be discharged or replaced by money. This opinion seems to me to be correct. 3The position of a slave who is to be conditionally free is only unchangeable, if the estate is entered upon; for, before this is done, he can be acquired as a slave by usucaption, and the expectation of his freedom disappears. If, however, the estate is entered upon subsequently, his hope of freedom is restored through the favor with which it is regarded.

10Pau­lus li­bro quin­to ad Sa­binum. Si de­cem da­re ius­sum he­res ven­di­de­rit et tra­di­de­rit di­xe­rit­que ad­scrip­tum li­ber­ta­ti, si vi­gin­ti de­dis­set, ex emp­to erit ac­tio cum ven­di­to­re, aut, si du­pla pro­mis­sa est, ob evic­tio­nem dum­ta­xat du­plae re­pe­ti­tio erit, ex emp­to ob men­da­cium.

10Paulus, On Sabinus, Book V. If an heir sells a slave who had been ordered to pay ten aurei, and delivers him to the purchaser, and says that he was entitled to his freedom if he pays twenty aurei, an action on purchase will lie against the vendor. If double the amount had been promised, an action for double damages will lie on the ground of eviction, and an action on purchase on account of the false statement.

11Pom­po­nius li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Si he­res pe­cu­niam do­nas­set sta­tu­li­be­ro, ut si­bi eam da­ret et li­ber es­set, non fie­ri li­be­rum Aris­to ait: sed si in ple­num ei do­nas­set, fie­ri li­be­rum.

11Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIV. If the heir should make a donation of a sum of money to a slave, who is to be conditionally free, in order that he may pay it to him and be liberated, Aristo says that he will not become free, but if the heir should give him the money absolutely he will obtain his freedom.

12Iu­lia­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum. Si quis tes­ta­men­to li­ber­ta­tem ac­ce­pe­rit sub con­di­cio­ne, si ra­tio­nem de­de­rit, de­bet pro he­redi­ta­ria par­te he­redi­bus re­li­qua sol­ve­re, et­iam­si no­mi­na quo­run­dam he­redum sint in con­di­cio­ne po­si­ta.

12Julianus, Digest, Book VII. Where a slave receives his freedom by a will, under the condition of rendering an account, he must pay the balance remaining in his hands to the heirs, in proportion to their respective shares of the estate; even if the names of some of them are mentioned in the condition.

13Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Si quis ita li­ber­ta­tem de­dis­set ‘Sti­chus, si eum he­res meus tes­ta­men­to suo non ma­nu­mi­se­rit, li­ber es­to’, se­cun­dum vo­lun­ta­tem de­func­ti hoc sig­ni­fi­ca­ri vi­de­tur ‘si tes­ta­men­to suo he­res non ad­scrip­se­rit ei li­ber­ta­tem’. qua­re si qui­dem he­res li­ber­ta­tem ser­vo tes­ta­men­to suo de­de­rit, de­fec­tus con­di­cio­ne vi­de­tur: si non de­de­rit, im­ple­ta con­di­cio­ne ul­ti­mo vi­tae tem­po­re he­redis ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niet. 1Ser­vus com­mu­nis li­ber es­se ius­sus ita ‘si de­cem de­de­rit’ ex pe­cu­lio da­re pot­est, quod quo­cum­que mo­do ad­quisi­tum ha­bue­rit: nec re­fert, apud he­redem id an apud so­cium fue­rit et he­redi an ex­tra­neo da­re ius­sus sit. nam per om­nia cau­sae sta­tu­li­be­ri ap­pli­ca­tur: qui con­di­cio­nis im­plen­dae gra­tia alie­na­re pe­cu­lia­res num­mos pot­est. 2Si duo ser­vi ra­tio­ni­bus red­di­tis li­be­ri es­se ius­si fue­rint et se­pa­ra­tim ra­tio­nes ges­se­rint, non du­bie se­pa­ra­tim quo­que con­di­cio­ni pa­re­re pot­erunt. sed si ac­tus eo­rum com­mu­ni­ter ges­tus ita im­mix­tus fue­rit, ut se­pa­ra­ri non pos­sit, ne­ces­sa­rio al­ter ces­san­do al­te­rius li­ber­ta­tem im­pe­diet. nec vi­de­bi­tur con­di­cio in al­te­rius per­so­na im­ple­ta, ni­si id, quod com­pu­ta­tio­ne ra­tio­num ha­bi­ta re­li­quum fue­rit, aut uter­que aut al­ter to­tum sol­ve­rit. 3Qui ita li­ber ius­sus est ‘si iu­ra­ve­rit se Ca­pi­to­lium ascen­su­rum’, con­fes­tim ut iu­ra­ve­rit, quam­vis Ca­pi­to­lium non ascen­de­rit, li­ber erit. 4Ser­vus he­redis rem ip­sius he­redis da­re ius­sus et li­ber es­se ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­niet, quia pot­est tes­ta­tor et si­ne ul­la dan­di con­di­cio­ne he­redis ser­vum ma­nu­mit­ti iu­be­re. 5Haec scrip­tu­ra ‘Sti­chus cum erit an­no­rum tri­gin­ta, li­ber es­to. Sti­chus si de­cem non de­de­rit, li­ber ne es­to’ hanc vim ha­bet ‘Sti­chus si de­cem de­de­rit et ad an­nos tri­gin­ta per­ve­ne­rit, li­ber es­to’: nam­que ad­emp­tio li­ber­ta­tis vel le­ga­ti sub con­di­cio­ne fac­ta in­ci­pit con­tra­riam con­di­cio­nem le­ga­to vel li­ber­ta­ti, quae prius da­ta erat, in­ie­cis­se.

13The Same, Digest, Book XLIII. Where a testator bequeaths a grant of freedom as follows, “Let Stichus be free, if my heir does not manumit him by his will,” the intention of the testator is held to be that the slave will be free if the heir does not grant him freedom by his will. Hence, if the heir should emancipate the slave by his will, the condition is considered to have failed; if he does not emancipate him, the condition will be fulfilled at the time of the death of the heir, and the slave will obtain his freedom. 1If a slave held in common is ordered to be free under the condition of his paying ten aurei, he can pay the said sum out of his peculium, no matter in what way he may have obtained it; nor does it make any difference whether the peculium was in the hands of the heir, or in those of a joint-owner; or whether the slave was ordered to pay the money to the heir, or to a stranger. For it is a rule of general application that slaves who are to be free conditionally can alienate property belonging to their peculium for the purpose of complying with a condition upon which their freedom is dependent. 2Where two slaves are ordered to be free on condition of rendering their accounts, and they have transacted business separately, there is no doubt that they can also comply with the condition separately. If, however, their administration has been conducted in common, and is so confused that it cannot be divided, it necessarily happens that if one of them fails to render an account, he will prevent the other from obtaining his freedom; nor will the condition be held to have been complied with with reference to one of them, unless both or either should pay all which may be found to be due as a balance after examination of the accounts. 3Where a slave is ordered to be free under the condition that he will swear that he will ascend to the Capitol, and immediately takes such an oath, he will become free even if he does not ascend to the Capitol. 4The slave of the heir, who is ordered to deliver property belonging to the heir himself, and be free, will be entitled to his freedom, because the testator can order the slave of the heir to be manumitted without imposing the condition of giving anything. 5The following clause, “Let Stichus be free when he is thirty years old; Stichus shall not be free unless he pays ten aurei,” has the same effect as if it had been said that they should let Stichus be free if he pays ten aurei and reaches the age of thirty years. For the deprivation of freedom, or of the legacy which is bequeathed under a certain condition, is considered to impose the contrary condition upon the legacy or the grant of freedom previously made.

14Al­fe­nus Va­rus li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum. Ser­vus, qui tes­ta­men­to do­mi­ni, cum de­cem he­redi de­dis­set, li­ber es­se ius­sus erat, he­redi mer­ce­dem re­fer­re pro ope­ris suis so­le­bat: cum ex mer­ce­de he­res am­plius de­cem re­ce­pis­set, ser­vus li­be­rum es­se aie­bat: de ea re con­su­le­ba­tur. re­spon­dit non vi­de­ri li­be­rum es­se: non enim pro li­ber­ta­te, sed pro ope­ris eam pe­cu­niam de­dis­se nec ma­gis ob eam rem li­be­rum es­se, quam si fun­dum a do­mi­no con­du­xis­set et pro fruc­tu fun­di pe­cu­niam de­dis­set. 1Ser­vus cum he­redi an­no­rum sep­tem ope­ras de­dis­set, li­ber es­se ius­sus erat: is ser­vus fu­ge­rat et an­num in fu­ga fe­ce­rat. cum sep­tem an­ni prae­ter­is­sent, re­spon­dit non es­se li­be­rum: non enim fu­gi­ti­vum ope­ras do­mi­no de­dis­se: qua­re ni­si to­ti­dem dies, quot afuis­set, ser­vis­set, non fo­re li­be­rum. sed et si ita scrip­tum es­set, ut tum li­ber es­set, cum sep­tem an­nis ser­vis­set, po­tuis­se li­be­rum es­se, si tem­pus fu­gae re­ver­sus ser­vis­set.

14Alfenus Varus, Digest, Book IV. A slave, who was ordered to be free by the will of his master under the condition of paying ten aurei to the heir, paid to the latter the wages of his labor, and as the heir received from the same a larger sum than ten aurei, the slave alleged that he was free. Advice was taken on this point. The answer was that the slave did not appear to be free, as the money which he had paid was not in consideration of his freedom, but on account of the labor which he had performed; and that he was no more free on this account than if he had leased a tract of land from his master and paid him the money instead of giving him the crops. 1A slave was ordered to be free after he had given his services to the heir for the term of seven years. He took to flight and remained absent for a year. When the seven years had expired, the opinion was given that he was not free, for he had not rendered his services to his master while he was a fugitive, and he would not become free until he had served his master for the number of days that he was absent. If, however, it had been stated in the will that he should be free after he had served seven years, he could become free if he served his master for the time of his flight, after his return.

15Afri­ca­nus li­bro no­no quaes­tio­num. Mor­tuo he­rede si sta­tu­li­ber lo­cu­ple­tio­rem he­redi­ta­tem tan­ta pe­cu­nia, quan­tam da­re sit ius­sus, fe­ce­rit, vel­uti cre­di­to­ri­bus sol­ven­do, ci­ba­ria fa­mi­liae dan­do: sta­tim eum ad li­ber­ta­tem es­se ven­tu­rum ex­is­ti­ma­vit. 1He­res cum sta­tu­li­be­rum de­cem da­re ius­sum ven­de­ret, con­di­cio­nem pro­nun­tia­vit et tra­di­tio­ni le­gem di­xit, ut si­bi po­tius quam emp­to­ri ea­dem de­cem da­ren­tur: quae­re­ba­tur, utri eo­rum sta­tu­li­ber pe­cu­niam dan­do li­ber­ta­tem con­se­que­re­tur. re­spon­dit he­redi eum da­re de­be­re. sed et si ta­lem le­gem di­xis­set, ut ex­tra­neo ali­cui sta­tu­li­ber pe­cu­niam da­ret, re­spon­dit et hoc ca­su con­ven­tio­nem va­le­re, quia he­redi vi­de­tur sol­ve­re, qui vo­lun­ta­te eius alii sol­vit.

15Africanus, Questions, Book IX. If a slave who was ordered to pay a certain sum of money at the death of the heir should have enriched the estate by an amount equal to that which he was ordered to pay, for instance, if he had paid the creditors, or had furnished the slaves with food, it was held that he would immediately be entitled to his liberty. 1An heir, who sold a slave who was to become free on the payment of ten aurei, stated at the time when he sold him that the condition was that the said ten aurei should be paid to him and not to the purchaser. The question arose, to which of the two must the slave pay the money in order to obtain his freedom? The answer was that he must pay it to the heir. If, however, he had stated the condition to be that the slave should make payment to a stranger, the opinion was given that the agreement would be valid, because the slave is considered to pay the heir, if he pays someone else with the former’s consent.

16Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to re­gu­la­rum. Sta­tu­li­be­ra quid­quid pe­pe­rit, hoc ser­vum he­redis est.

16Ulpianus, Rules, Book IV. If a female slave who is to be free conditionally has a child, it will be the slave of the heir.

17Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Si de­cem he­redi de­dis­set, ius­sus est li­ber es­se: de­cem ha­bet et tan­tun­dem do­mi­no de­bet: dan­do haec de­cem non li­be­ra­bi­tur. nam quod sta­tu­li­be­ro ex pe­cu­lio suo da­re ex­plen­dae con­di­cio­nis cau­sa con­ces­sum est, ita in­ter­pre­ta­ri de­be­mus, ut non et­iam ex eo da­re pos­sit, quod ex­tra pe­cu­lium est. nec me prae­terit hos num­mos pe­cu­lia­res pos­se di­ci, quam­vis, si ni­hil prae­ter­ea ser­vus ha­beat, pe­cu­lium nul­lum sit. sed du­bi­ta­ri non opor­tet, quin haec mens fue­rit id con­sti­tuen­tium, ut qua­si ex pa­tri­mo­nio suo dan­di eo no­mi­ne ser­vo po­tes­tas es­set, quia id ma­xi­me si­ne in­iu­ria do­mi­no­rum con­ce­di vi­de­ba­tur. quod si ul­tra quis pro­gre­die­tur, non mul­tum ab­erit, quin et­iam eos num­mos, quos do­mi­no sub­ri­pue­rit, dan­do sta­tu­li­be­rum con­di­cio­ni sa­tis­fac­tu­rum ex­is­ti­met.

17Neratius, Parchments, Book III. A slave is ordered to be free if he pays ten aurei to the heir. He has the amount, but he owes an equal sum to his master. He will not be free by payment of these ten aurei, because where a slave is permitted to pay money out of his peculium for the purpose of complying with a condition, we must understand this to mean that he must not pay what does not belong to his peculium. I am perfectly aware that this money can be said to form part of his peculium; although if the slave had nothing else, he would have no peculium. But it cannot be doubted that the intention of those who established the rule was that the slave should have the power of making payment out of his peculium, just as out of his patrimony, because this could be conceded as being done without any injury to his master. If, however, anyone should go farther, the case would not differ much from one where a person might hold that the slave complied with the condition by the payment of money which he had stolen from his master.

18Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de li­ber­ta­ti­bus dan­dis. Si tri­en­nio de­na da­re ius­sus pri­mo an­no vi­gin­ti op­tu­le­rit, non ac­ci­pien­te he­rede non sta­tim li­ber est, quia et si ac­ce­pis­set he­res, non­dum li­ber es­set.

18Paulus, On the Granting of Freedom. If a slave is ordered to pay ten aurei annually for three years, and offers ten the first year, and the heir does not accept it, he will not immediately become free, for the reason that even if the heir did accept it, he would not be free.

19Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Si ser­vus li­ber es­se ius­sus sit et le­ga­tum ei da­tum, si fi­lius quar­tum de­ci­mum an­num com­ple­ve­rit, et fi­lius an­te de­ces­se­rit: li­ber­tas fa­vo­re com­pe­tet die ve­nien­te, le­ga­ti au­tem con­di­cio de­fi­cit.

19Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIV. Where a slave is ordered to be free, and a legacy is left to him to vest when the son of the testator shall reach his fourteenth year, and the son dies before that time, the slave will become free when the term has expired, on account of indulgence with which freedom is regarded; but the condition upon which the legacy is dependent is held to have failed.

20Pau­lus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Si pe­cu­lium ser­vo le­ga­tum sit, qui ius­sus est alii da­re de­cem et sic li­ber es­se, et he­res eum pro­hi­bue­rit da­re, de­in­de ma­nu­mis­sus pe­cu­lium pe­tat ex cau­sa le­ga­ti, an per do­li ex­cep­tio­nem eam sum­mam, quam da­tu­rus es­set, de­du­ce­re he­res pos­sit, ut ip­si pro­sit, non ma­nu­mis­so, quod ea pe­cu­nia da­ta non est? an ve­ro in­dig­nus sit he­res, qui con­tra vo­lun­ta­tem de­func­ti fe­cit, eam pe­cu­niam lu­cra­ri? et cum ser­vo ni­hil ab­sit et li­ber­tas ei com­pe­tit, in­vi­dio­sum est he­redem frau­da­ri. 1De il­lo quae­ri­tur, si in­vi­to he­rede det aut ne­scien­te, an fa­ciat num­mos ac­ci­pien­tis. et Iu­lia­nus ve­re ex­is­ti­mat ex hac cau­sa con­ces­sam vi­de­ri sta­tu­li­be­ris alie­na­tio­nem num­mo­rum et­iam in­vi­to he­rede et id­eo fa­ce­re eos ac­ci­pien­tis pe­cu­niam. 2Quod si he­redi da­re ius­sus est de­cem et eam sum­mam he­res de­beat ser­vo: si ve­lit ser­vus eam pe­cu­niam com­pen­sa­re, erit li­ber. 3Is, cui ser­vus pe­cu­niam da­re ius­sus est ut li­ber es­set, de­ces­sit. Sa­b­inus, si de­cem ha­buis­set pa­ra­ta, li­be­rum fo­re, quia non sta­ret per eum, quo mi­nus da­ret. Iu­lia­nus au­tem ait fa­vo­re li­ber­ta­tis con­sti­tu­to iu­re hunc ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ven­tu­rum, et­iam­si post­ea ha­be­re coe­pe­rit de­cem. ad­eo au­tem con­sti­tu­to po­tius iu­re quam ex tes­ta­men­to ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­nit, ut, si ei­dem et le­ga­tum sit, mor­tuo eo cui da­re ius­sus est ad li­ber­ta­tem qui­dem per­ve­niet, non au­tem et le­ga­tum ha­bi­tu­rus est: id­que et Iu­lia­nus pu­tat, ut in hoc ce­te­ris le­ga­ta­riis si­mi­lis sit. di­ver­sa cau­sa est eius, quem he­res pro­hi­bet con­di­cio­ni pa­re­re: hic enim ex tes­ta­men­to ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­nit. 4He­redi au­tem ius­sum da­re et­iam he­redis he­redi da­re pos­se di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sit: et si hoc sen­sit tes­ta­tor, et­iam in le­ga­ta­rio idem di­cen­dum est. 5Quae­dam con­di­cio­nes na­tu­ra sui nec pos­sunt eo­dem tem­po­re im­ple­ri, sed ne­ces­sa­riam ha­bent tem­po­ris di­vi­sio­nem, vel­ut cum de­cem ope­ra­rum ius­sus est da­re, quia ope­rae per sin­gu­los dies dan­tur. igi­tur et si sin­gu­los au­reos det sta­tu­li­ber, pot­est di­ci eum im­ples­se con­di­cio­nem. alia cau­sa est ope­ra­rum, quia hae ne­ces­sa­rio sin­gu­lae eden­dae sunt. sed et si he­res ac­ci­pe­re no­lue­rit, non sta­tim li­ber erit, sed cum tem­pus trans­ie­rit, per quod ope­ra­rum quan­ti­tas con­sum­ma­tur. idem di­cen­dum est, si ius­sum Capuam ire et li­be­rum es­se he­res pro­hi­beat ire: tunc enim erit li­ber, cum per­ve­ni­re Capuam po­tuis­set: in­es­se enim vi­de­tur tem­pus tam ope­ra­rum prae­sta­tio­ni quam iti­ne­ri. 6Si ita quis ac­ce­pe­rit li­ber­ta­tem ‘Sti­chus, si he­res eum non ma­nu­mi­se­rit, li­ber es­to’, pot­erit ab he­rede ma­nu­mit­ti: non con­tra vo­lun­ta­tem tes­ta­to­ris ad­imi­tur ei li­ber­tus. sed non tam con­ti­nuum tem­pus ex­igen­dum est, ut prae­ci­pi­ta­ri co­ga­tur he­res vel ex per­egri­na­tio­ne ce­le­rius re­ver­ti ad ma­nu­mit­ten­dum vel ad­mi­nis­tra­tio­nem re­rum ne­ces­sa­ria­rum in­ter­mit­te­re, nec rur­sus tam lon­gum, ut, quam­diu vi­vat, pro­tra­ha­tur ma­nu­mis­sio, sed mo­di­cum, quo pri­mum pos­sit si­ne mag­no in­com­mo­do suo he­res ma­nu­mit­te­re. quod si tem­pus ad­iec­tum fue­rit, il­lud spec­ta­bi­tur.

20Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVI. When his peculium is bequeathed to a slave who was ordered to pay ten aurei to a stranger, and become free, but the heir prevents him from paying it, and the slave, having afterwards been manumitted, demands his peculium by virtue of the legacy, can the heir, by means of an exception on the ground of bad faith, deduct from his peculium the sum which the slave should have paid in order that he, and not the manumitted slave, may be benefited, because the money was not paid; or will the heir be considered unworthy to profit by the money, having acted contrary to the will of the deceased? As the slave lost nothing, and gained his freedom, it would be invidious for the heir to be fraudulently deprived of the money. 1In this case the question arises, if the slave should pay the money without the knowledge or consent of the heir, whether it would belong to the person who received it. Julianus very properly thinks that, in this instance, the right of the slave to pay the money is admitted even against the consent of the heir; and therefore it will become the property of him who receives it. 2Ad Dig. 40,7,20,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 288, Note 12; Bd. II, § 289, Note 26.If a slave is ordered to pay ten aurei to the heir, and the latter owes that sum to the slave, if the slave wishes to set off the amount, he will become free. 3A man to whom a slave was ordered to pay a certain sum of money in order to become free, died. Sabinus holds that if he had the ten aurei ready for payment, he would become free, because it was not his fault that they were not paid. Julianus, however, says that on account of the favor with which liberty is regarded, and by the law, as established, the slave will obtain his freedom even if the money was paid after his death, hence he obtains his freedom rather under the law than by virtue of the will; so that if a legacy was bequeathed to him at the time of the death of the person to whom he was directed to pay the money, he will obtain his freedom, but he will not be entitled to the legacy. Julianus is of the same opinion, so that, in this instance, he resembles other legatees. The case of a slave whom the heir prevents from complying with the condition is, however, different; for, in this instance, he obtains his freedom under the will. 4The Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript that a slave who is ordered to pay a sum of money to the heir can pay it to the heir of the latter; and, if this was the intention of the testator, the same rule must be held to apply to a legatee. 5There are certain conditions which, by their nature, cannot be complied with simultaneously, but require a division of time; as, for example, where a slave is ordered to give the value of ten aurei in labor, because labor is reckoned by days. Therefore, if a slave who is to be free conditionally pays the aurei, one by one, he can be said to have complied with the condition. The case of labor is, however, different because it can necessarily only be performed a part of the time. But if the heir refuses to accept it, the slave will not become free immediately, but after the time required for the labor to be performed has elapsed. The same rule will apply where the slave is ordered to go to Capua and be free, and the heir forbids him to go; for then he will be free when the time necessary for him to go to Capua has expired, for time is considered essential in the performance of labor, as well as in making a journey. 6If a slave should receive his freedom as follows, “Let Stichus be free if my heir should not manumit him,” he can be manumitted by the heir, and he is not deprived of his liberty contrary to the will of the testator. But so short a time is not required that the heir will be compelled to hasten or to return from his journey immediately in order to manumit the slave, or to desist from the transaction of necessary business for that purpose. Nor, on the other hand, can the manumission be protracted for his lifetime, but the heir should emancipate the slave as soon as he can do so without great inconvenience to himself. If a time for the manumission has been prescribed, it must be taken into consideration.

21Pom­po­nius li­bro sep­ti­mo ex Plau­tio. La­beo li­bro pos­te­rio­rum ita re­fert: ‘Ca­le­nus dis­pen­sa­tor meus, si ra­tio­nes di­li­gen­ter trac­tas­se vi­de­bi­tur, li­ber es­to sua­que om­nia et cen­tum ha­be­to’. di­li­gen­tiam de­si­de­ra­re eam de­be­mus, quae do­mi­no, non quae ser­vo fue­rit uti­lis. erit au­tem ei di­li­gen­tiae con­iunc­ta fi­des bo­na non so­lum in ra­tio­ni­bus or­di­nan­dis, sed et­iam in re­li­quo red­den­do. et quod ita scrip­tum est ‘vi­de­bi­tur’, pro hoc ac­ci­pi de­bet ‘vi­de­ri pot­erit’: sic et ver­ba le­gis duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum ve­te­res in­ter­pre­ta­ti sunt ‘si aqua plu­via no­cet’, id est ‘si no­ce­re pot­erit’. et si quae­re­re­tur, cui eam di­li­gen­tiam pro­ba­ri opor­teat, he­redum ar­bi­tra­tum vi­ri bo­ni mo­re agen­tium se­qui de­be­bi­mus, vel­uti si is, qui cer­tam pe­cu­niam de­dis­set, li­ber es­se ius­sus est, non ad­scrip­to eo, cui si de­dis­set, eo mo­do pot­erit li­ber es­se, quo pos­set, si ita fuis­set scrip­tum ‘si he­redi de­dis­set’. 1Pac­tu­me­ius Cle­mens aie­bat, si ita sit fi­dei­com­mis­sum re­lic­tum ‘cui eo­rum vo­les, ro­go re­sti­tuas’, si nul­lum ele­gis­set cui re­sti­tue­ret, om­ni­bus de­be­ri im­pe­ra­to­rem An­to­ni­num con­sti­tuis­se.

21Pomponius, On Plautius, Book VII. Labeo, in his Book of Last Works, states the following case: “Let Galenus, my steward, be free, if he appears to have carefully conducted my business, and let him retain all his property, and receive a hundred aurei in addition.” In this instance we should require such diligence as will benefit the master and not the slave. Moreover, good faith should be added to the diligence, not only in keeping the accounts, but also in the payment of any balance which may remain. By the word “appears” is meant “can be considered to have.” The ancients interpreted the following words of the Law of the Twelve Tables, “If rain-water causes damage,” to mean if it can cause damage. And if this question is asked before whom the abovementioned diligence must be established, we must answer that this ought to be decided by the heirs in accordance with the judgment of a reliable citizen; for instance, if a slave is ordered to be free on condition of his paying a certain sum of money, and it is not stated to whom he shall pay it, he will become free just as he would if the testator had written, “If he should pay the sum to my heir.” 1Pactumeius Clemens said that if a trust had been bequeathed as follows, “I charge you to deliver it to whichever of them you choose,” and the heir did not make any choice as to whom he should deliver the property, he must deliver it to all, and this was decreed by the Emperor Antoninus.

22Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad Vi­tel­lium. Qui pe­cu­niam da­re ius­sus est, ni­si ad­iec­tum sit, cui det, he­redi­bus da­re de­bet pro par­ti­bus he­redi­ta­riis: pro ea enim par­te quis­que ac­ci­pe­re de­bet, pro qua do­mi­nus est. 1Si qui­dam ex he­redi­bus, qui­bus da­re de­beat, no­mi­na­ti sint, da­bit his pro he­redi­ta­riis por­tio­ni­bus. 2Si he­redi­bus no­mi­na­tis et­iam ex­tra­neus iunc­tus sit, ex­tra­neo vi­ri­lis, ce­te­ris he­redi­ta­riae da­ri de­bent: et si non so­lum Ti­tium, sed et­iam alios ad­ie­cis­set, hos vi­ri­lem par­tem ha­bi­tu­ros, co­he­redes au­tem he­redi­ta­rias Iu­lia­nus scri­bit.

22Paulus, On Vitellius, Book III. Where a slave was ordered to pay a certain sum of money, and the person to whom he was to pay it was not mentioned, he must pay it to the heirs in proportion to their respective shares of the state, for each one of them must receive a share in proportion to his ownership of the slave. 1Where certain heirs are mentioned by the testator as those to whom the slave is required to make payment, he must do so in proportion to their respective shares of the estate. 2If a stranger is joined with the heirs who are mentioned, the full share must be paid to him, and amounts in proportion to their respective shares of the estate should be paid to the others. If the testator not only added Titius, but others besides, they will each be entitled to a full share, and their co-heirs to amounts in proportion to their interest of the estate; as is stated by Julianus.

23Cel­sus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum. ‘Si in­tra quin­quen­nium Sti­chus cen­tum de­de­rit, li­ber es­to’: nec Ti­tio vel he­redi vel emp­to­ri post quin­quen­nium da­bit. 1Si ra­tio­nes red­di­dis­set, li­be­rum es­se ius­sum non pa­ti­tur he­res re­bus pe­cu­lia­ri­bus ven­di­tis re­li­qua sol­ve­re: per­in­de li­ber est, qua­si con­di­cio­ni pa­rue­rit.

23Celsus, Digest, Book XXII. “Let Stichus be free if he pays a hundred aurei in five years.” The slave, after the five years have elapsed, can pay the said amount to the heir of the purchaser. 1Where the slave was ordered to be free if he rendered his accounts, and the heir, after the property belonging to the peculium has been sold, does not permit the slave to pay over the balance in his hands, he will be free just as if he had complied with the condition.

24Mar­cel­lus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. ‘Sti­chus, si he­redi meo de­cem pro­mi­se­rit vel ope­ras da­tu­rum se iu­ra­ve­rit, li­ber es­to’. pot­est ex­ple­ri con­di­cio, si pro­mi­se­rit: nam spopon­dis­se ali­qua sig­ni­fi­ca­tio­ne di­ci pot­est, et­iam­si non sit se­cu­ta ob­li­ga­tio.

24Marcellus, Digest, Book XVI. “Let Stichus be free if he promises my heir ten aurei, or swears to give him his services.” The condition will be fulfilled if the slave makes the promise, for it can be said that he has, to a certain extent, bound himself, even if the obligation may not be compulsory.

25Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro no­no dif­fe­ren­tia­rum. Sta­tu­li­be­ros ve­num­da­ri pos­se le­ges duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum pu­ta­ve­runt: du­ris au­tem con­di­cio­ni­bus in ven­di­tio­ne mi­ni­me one­ran­di sunt, vel­uti ne in­tra lo­ca ser­viant ne­ve um­quam ma­nu­mit­tan­tur.

25Modestinus, Differences, Book IX. The Laws of the Twelve Tables are held to permit slaves, who are to be free conditionally, to be sold. In making the sale, rigorous conditions should, however, hot be imposed; for example, that the slave should not serve in a certain country, or should never be manumitted.

26Idem li­bro no­no re­gu­la­rum. Li­ber­ta­te ser­vo sub con­di­cio­ne ra­tio­nis red­di­tae tes­ta­men­to da­ta he­res non so­lum scrip­tam ra­tio­nem ex­igit, ve­rum et­iam quae si­ne scrip­tu­ra ab eo ad­mi­nis­tra­ta est. 1Ser­vus ius­sus red­di­ta ra­tio­ne ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re, li­cet nul­lam ad­mi­nis­tra­ve­rit ra­tio­nem, ni­hi­lo mi­nus erit li­ber.

26The Same, Rules, Book IX. Where freedom has been granted to a slave by a will, under the condition that he renders his account, the heir can not only require a written account, but also one of any business which has been transacted without having been committed to writing. 1Where a slave was ordered to obtain his freedom after having rendered his account, he will still become free even if he has not transacted any business.

27Idem li­bro pri­mo pan­dec­ta­rum. Si is, cui da­re ius­sus est, red­eme­rit sta­tu­li­be­rum eum­que rur­sus alii ven­di­de­rit, no­vis­si­mo emp­to­ri da­bit: iam enim cum apud eum, cui da­re ius­sus est, do­mi­nium quo­que ser­vi per­ve­nit, si eum alie­net, con­di­cio­nem quo­que ab eo ad emp­to­rem trans­ire Iu­lia­no pla­cuit.

27The Same, Pandects, Book I. If the person to whom the slave is ordered to make payment should purchase him, and then sell him to another, he must pay the last purchaser, for Julianus decided that if he to whom the slave was ordered to make payment obtains the ownership of him, and alienates him, the condition will also pass to the purchaser.

28Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro sex­to ex Cas­sio. Si he­redi­tas eius, qui ser­vum, in­tra dies tri­gin­ta mor­tis suae si ra­tio­nes red­di­dis­set, li­be­rum es­se ius­se­rat, post dies tri­gin­ta ad­ita est, iu­re qui­dem stric­to ita ma­nu­mis­sus li­ber es­se non pot­est, quon­iam con­di­cio­ne de­fi­ci­tur: sed fa­vor li­ber­ta­tis eo rem per­du­xit, ut re­spon­dea­tur ex­ple­tam con­di­cio­nem, si per eum, cui da­ta es­set, non sta­ret quo mi­nus ex­ple­re­tur. 1Sta­tu­li­ber, an­te­quam con­di­cio li­ber­ta­tis op­ti­ge­rit, si quid com­pa­ras­set, pe­cu­lio le­ga­to non ces­su­rum in li­bris Gaii Cas­sii scrip­tum est, ni­si id le­ga­tum in tem­pus li­ber­ta­tis col­la­tum es­set. vi­dea­mus, ne, cum pe­cu­lium et ac­ces­sio­nem et de­ces­sio­nem ha­beat, aug­men­tum quo­que eius pe­cu­lii, si mo­do ab he­rede ei ab­la­tum non sit, le­ga­to ces­su­rum sit: et ma­gis hoc iu­re uti­mur.

28Javolenus, On Cassius, Book VI. Where the estate of a person who directed that his slave should become free within thirty days after his death, if he rendered his accounts, was not entered upon until after the thirty days had expired, the manumitted slave cannot become free by the strict construction of the law, as the condition was not fulfilled; but the indulgence with which freedom is regarded causes the condition to be considered as complied with, if it was not the fault of the person upon whom it was imposed that this was not done. 1It is stated in the Books of Gaius Cassius that if a slave, who is to be conditionally free, should acquire any property before the condition upon which his liberty is dependent is complied with, it will not be embraced in the bequest of his peculium, unless the legacy was made to include the time when he was free. As the peculium is susceptible of both increase and diminution, let us see whether its increase by the heir will form part of the legacy, provided the slave is not deprived of it. This is our present practice.

29Pom­po­nius li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Sta­tu­li­be­ri a ce­te­ris ser­vis nos­tris ni­hi­lo pae­ne dif­fe­runt. et id­eo quod ad ac­tio­nes vel ex de­lic­to ve­nien­tes vel ex neg­otio ges­to con­trac­tu per­ti­net, eius­dem con­di­cio­nis sunt sta­tu­li­be­ri cu­ius ce­te­ri. et id­eo in pu­bli­cis quo­que iu­di­ciis eas­dem poe­nas pa­tiun­tur, quas ce­te­ri ser­vi. 1Quin­tus Mu­cius scri­bit: pa­ter fa­mi­lias in tes­ta­men­to scrip­se­rat ‘si An­dro­ni­cus ser­vus meus he­redi meo de­de­rit de­cem, li­ber es­to’. de­in­de de his bo­nis coe­pe­rat con­tro­ver­sia es­se: qui se le­ge he­redem aie­bat es­se, is eam he­redi­ta­tem ad se per­ti­ne­re di­ce­bat, al­ter, qui he­redi­ta­tem pos­si­de­bat, aie­bat tes­ta­men­to se he­redem es­se. se­cun­dum eum sen­ten­tia dic­ta erat, qui tes­ta­men­to aie­bat se he­redem es­se. de­in­de An­dro­ni­cus quae­re­bat, si ip­si vi­gin­ti de­dis­set, quon­iam se­cun­dum eum sen­ten­tia dic­ta est, fu­tu­rus­ne es­set li­ber an ni­hil vi­dea­tur sen­ten­tia, qua vi­cit, ad eam rem va­le­re? qua­prop­ter si vi­gin­ti he­redi scrip­to de­dis­set et res con­tra pos­ses­so­rem iu­di­ca­ta es­set, il­lum in ser­vi­tu­te fo­re. La­beo hoc, quod Quin­tus Mu­cius scri­bit, ita pu­tat ve­rum es­se, si re ve­ra le­ge ab in­tes­ta­to he­res fuit is qui vi­cit: nam si in­iu­ria iu­di­cis vic­tus es­set scrip­tus ve­rus he­res ex tes­ta­men­to, ni­hi­lo mi­nus eum par­uis­se con­di­cio­ni ei dan­do et li­be­rum fo­re. sed ve­ris­si­mum est, quod et Aris­to Cel­so re­scrip­sit, pos­se da­ri pe­cu­niam he­redi ab in­tes­ta­to, se­cun­dum quem sen­ten­tia dic­ta est, quon­iam lex duo­de­cim ta­bu­la­rum emp­tio­nis ver­bo om­nem alie­na­tio­nem com­ple­xa vi­de­re­tur: non in­ter­es­se, quo ge­ne­re quis­que do­mi­nus eius fie­ret et id­eo hunc quo­que ea le­ge con­ti­ne­ri, se­cun­dum quem sen­ten­tia dic­ta est, et li­be­rum fu­tu­rum eum, qui ei de­dis­set pe­cu­niam. hunc au­tem, id est pos­ses­so­rem he­redi­ta­tis, cui da­ta es­set sum­ma, si vic­tus es­set he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne, cum ce­te­ris hanc quo­que pe­cu­niam vic­to­ri re­sti­tue­re de­be­re.

29Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XVIII. Slaves who are to be free conditionally scarcely differ, in any respect, from our other slaves. Therefore, they are in the same position as the others with reference to legal actions, whether these arise from crimes, from business transacted, or from contracts. The result of which is that in public prosecutions they are liable to the same penalties as other slaves. 1Quintus Mucius says that the head of a household stated in his will, “Let my slave Andronicus be free, provided he pays ten aurei to my heirs.” A controversy then arose with reference to the estate. One person declared that he was the heir, and alleged that it belonged to him, and another who was in possession of the estate said that he was the heir under the will. Judgment was rendered in favor of the one who said that he was the heir under the will. Then Andronicus asked, if he should pay twenty aurei to the latter, whether he would become free, as judgment had been rendered in his favor; or whether the judgment which the successful party had obtained had no reference to the matter in question; hence, if he paid the ten aurei to the appointed heir, and the case should be decided against the possessor, he would remain in slavery. Labeo thinks that the opinion of Quintus Mucius can only be true, if the heir who gained the case should be decided to be the heir at law; for if the appointed heir should be found to have lost his case, through a just decision, and be held entitled to the estate under the will, the slave by paying him, will, nevertheless, comply with the condition, and will become free. The opinion given by Aristo to Celsus is, however, perfectly correct, namely, that the money can be paid to the heir at law in favor of whom judgment has been rendered; as under the provisions of the Twelve Tables the term “purchase” is understood to have included every kind of alienation, and it makes no difference in what way any of the parties became the master of the slave; and therefore, he in favor of whom judgment was rendered is included in the law, and the slave who paid the money will be free. Moreover, if he who is in possession and to whom the money was paid should be beaten in a contest for the estate, he will be obliged to surrender the money together with the property to the party who is successful.

30Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo ex va­riis lec­tio­ni­bus. Si ita li­ber es­se ius­sus sit ‘Sti­chus, si eum he­res non alie­na­ve­rit, li­ber es­to’, et­iam­si sta­tu­li­ber est, alie­na­ri ta­men pot­erit.

30The Same, On Various Lessons, Book VII. Where a slave is ordered to be free as follows, “Let Stichus be free, if my heir does not alienate him,” even if he is to be free conditionally, he can, nevertheless, be alienated.

31Gaius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Si ser­vo sub con­di­cio­ne ra­tio­num edi­ta­rum le­ga­tum sit, per eam con­di­cio­nem eum ius­sum es­se le­ga­tum ac­ci­pe­re, ut pe­cu­niam re­li­quo­rum red­dat, non du­bi­ta­tur. 1Et id­eo cum quae­si­tum est ‘Sti­chus cum ra­tio­nes de­de­rit, cum con­tu­ber­na­li sua li­ber es­to’ an mor­tuo Sti­cho an­te con­di­cio­nem con­tu­ber­na­lis eius li­be­ra es­se pos­sit: Iu­lia­nus di­xit quaes­tio­nem es­se in hac spe­cie, quae et in le­ga­tis agi­ta­tur ‘il­li cum il­lo do’, an al­te­ro de­fi­cien­te al­ter ad le­ga­tum ad­mit­ta­tur: quod ma­gis si­bi pla­ce­re, per­in­de ac si ita scrip­tum es­set ‘il­li et il­li’. aliam et­iam es­se quaes­tio­nem, an con­tu­ber­na­li quo­que con­di­cio iunc­ta sit: quod ma­gis es­set. ita­que si nul­la re­li­qua Sti­chus ha­bue­rit, sta­tim eam li­be­ram es­se, si ha­bue­rit re­li­qua, de­be­re eam nu­me­ra­re pe­cu­niam: nec ta­men li­ci­tu­rum ex suo pe­cu­lio da­re, quia id il­lis per­mis­sum sit, qui prin­ci­pa­li­ter pro sua li­ber­ta­te pe­cu­niam da­re iu­ben­tur.

31Gaius, On tine Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. If a legacy is bequeathed to a slave on the condition of his rendering his accounts, there is no doubt that, under the condition by which he is directed to receive the legacy, he must pay over any balance remaining in his hands. 1Therefore, when inquiry was made with reference to the following clause, “Let Stichus, together with his female companion, be free, after he has rendered his accounts,” and Stichus should die before the condition is complied with, will his companion be free? Julianus says that there is a point in this case which also arises with respect to legacies, as where a testator says, “I give to So-and-So together with So-and-So,” and one of the parties is lacking, the other is permitted to take the legacy; because the better opinion is that the case is just as if the testator had said, “I give to So-and-So and So-and-So.” It is also said that there is another question, namely, whether the condition is also imposed upon the female companion. It is held that this is the case; hence, if Stichus has no balance in his hands, the woman will immediately become free; but if a balance remained in his hands, she must pay the money, nor will it be lawful for her to take it out of the peculium, because this is only permitted to those who are directed to make payment in their own names, in consideration of the freedom which is granted them.

32Li­cin­nius Ru­fi­nus li­bro pri­mo re­gu­la­rum. Si duo­bus he­redi­bus in­sti­tu­tis ser­vus li­ber es­se ius­sus sit, si de­cem he­redi­bus de­de­rit, ab al­te­ro ex he­redi­bus ven­ie­rit et tra­di­tus fue­rit, pro par­te al­te­ri ex he­redi­bus, a quo non ven­ie­rit, dan­do pe­cu­niam li­ber erit.

32Licinius Rufinus, Rules, Book I. Where two heirs are appointed, and a slave is ordered to be free if he pays ten aurei to the heirs, and he is sold and delivered by one of the latter, he will become free by paying half of the sum to the other heir by whom he was not sold.

33Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do quaes­tio­num. Sta­tu­li­be­ro­rum iu­ra per he­redem fie­ri non pos­sunt du­rio­ra.

33Papinianus, Questions, Book II. The rights of slaves who are to be conditionally free cannot be injuriously affected by the heir.

34Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Ser­vus si he­redi de­cem de­de­rit, li­ber es­se ius­sus est: sta­tu­li­be­rum he­res eum ma­nu­mi­sit ac post­ea de­func­tus est. he­redis he­redi pe­cu­nia dan­da non est: quod enim pla­cuit he­redis he­redi da­ri opor­te­re, tunc me­mi­ne­ris lo­cum ha­be­re, cum prior he­res do­mi­nus ac­cep­tu­rus pe­cu­niam fuit. quae cau­sa fa­cit am­bu­la­to­riam, ut ita di­xe­rim, con­di­cio­nem: duae sunt enim cau­sae, per quas in pri­mi he­redis per­so­na con­di­cio im­ple­tur, do­mi­nii ra­tio, item per­so­nae de­mons­tra­tio: prior cau­sa trans­it in om­nem suc­ces­so­rem, ad quem per­ve­ne­rit sta­tu­li­ber per do­mi­nii trans­la­ti con­ti­nua­tio­nem, se­quens per­so­nae dum­ta­xat eius, qui de­mons­tra­tus est, ad­hae­ret. 1Im­pe­ra­tor An­to­ni­nus re­scrip­sit ius­sum ra­tio­nes red­de­re et li­be­rum es­se, si he­res cau­sa­bi­tur ac­ci­pe­re ra­tio­nes, ni­hi­lo mi­nus li­be­rum fo­re. quod re­scrip­tum ita ac­ci­pi de­bet, ut, si re­li­qua non tra­hat, li­ber sit: quod si tra­hat, ita de­mum, si op­tu­lit eam quan­ti­ta­tem, quae re­fun­di de­buit ex fi­de ve­ri­ta­tis: non enim li­ber­ta­ti suf­fi­cit he­redem in mo­ra fuis­se, si non id fiat per sta­tu­li­be­rum, quod re­mo­ta mo­ra li­ber­ta­ti ad­itum da­ret. quid enim si ita ma­nu­mis­sum ‘Da­ma si in His­pa­niam pro­fec­tus an­no pro­xi­mo fruc­tus co­ege­rit, li­ber es­to’ Ro­mae re­ti­neat he­res ne­que pro­fi­cis­ci pa­tia­tur? num­quid dic­tu­ri su­mus sta­tim an­te fruc­tus co­ac­tos li­be­rum fo­re? nam et cum Ro­mae sti­pu­la­tio con­ci­pi­tur ita ‘cen­tum in His­pa­nia da­re spon­des?’, in­es­se tem­pus sti­pu­la­tio­ni, quo pos­sit in His­pa­niam per­ve­ni­re, nec an­te iu­re agi pla­cuit. sed si he­res ac­cep­tis ra­tio­ni­bus et re­li­quis com­pu­ta­tis do­na­re se ea sta­tu­li­be­ro non ha­ben­ti quod in­fe­rat pro­scri­bat aut et­iam lit­te­ris ad eum mis­sis pa­lam fa­ciat, con­di­cio li­ber­ta­tis im­ple­ta vi­de­bi­tur. quid er­go, si ne­get se re­li­qua tra­xis­se at­que id­eo, quia per he­redem ste­te­rit, ut ac­ci­piat ra­tio­nes, li­be­rum fac­tum, he­res au­tem ne­que se fe­cis­se mo­ram et re­li­qua de­be­re sta­tu­li­be­rum con­ten­dat? apud eum qui de li­ber­ta­te co­gnos­cit, an con­di­cio sit im­ple­ta, con­sta­bit: cu­ius of­fi­cio con­ti­ne­bi­tur de mo­ra con­si­de­ra­re nec mi­nus com­pu­ta­re ra­tio­nes et, si re­li­qua tra­hi com­pe­re­rit, non es­se li­be­rum pro­nun­tia­re. sed si num­quam ne­ga­vit re­li­qua de­be­re, cum au­tem con­ve­ni­ret he­redem et ra­tio­nes of­fer­ret, pro­fes­sus sit re­fu­su­rum, quid­quid in re­li­quis es­se con­sti­te­rit et eius pe­cu­niae reum nu­me­ra­re pa­ra­tum ido­neum op­tu­lit et he­res in mo­ra fuit: sen­ten­tia pro li­ber­ta­te di­ce­tur.

34The Same, Questions, Book XXI. A slave was ordered to be free if he paid ten aurei to the heir. The heir manumitted the slave, and afterwards died. In this instance, the money should not be paid to the heir of the heir; for when it was decided that he must pay the heir of the heir, you will remember that this applied where the first heir who was to receive the money was the master of the slave; which rendered the condition (so to speak), ambulatory. There are, in fact, two reasons for which the condition should be complied with so far as the first heir is concerned; the first one is the ownership, and the second the designation of the person. The first reason applies to every successor to whom the slave may pass through the continuation of the ownership which is transferred; but the second one only has reference to the person who is especially designated. 1The Emperor Antoninus stated in a Rescript that where a slave was ordered to render his accounts and become free, if the heir should delay in receiving the accounts, the slave will, nevertheless, become free. This rescript should be understood to apply where the slave will become free if he does not defer the payment of the balance in his hands, but if he delays to do so, it will only become operative if he tenders the amount which should be refunded in good faith; for it will not be sufficient for the heir to be in default to enable the slave to be manumitted where nothing was done by him which would have contributed to his freedom, if the heir had not been in default. But what if a slave was manumitted as follows, “Let Damas be free, if he goes to Spain next year to gather the harvest,” and the heir retains him at Rome, and will not suffer him to depart? Can we say that he will immediately be free before the crops are gathered? For if a stipulation is made at Rome, as follows: “Do you promise to pay me a hundred aurei in Spain?” The time during which you may be able to reach Spain is included in the stipulation, and it has been decided that legal proceedings cannot be instituted until this time has elapsed. If, however, the heir, after having allowed the accounts, and calculated the balance due from the slave, declares publicly that he donates the amount to the latter, because he has nothing to pay it with, or if he states this openly in a letter sent to him; the condition upon which his freedom is dependent is held to have been complied with. But what course should be pursued if the slave should deny that he has delayed payment of the balance, and therefore, because the heir is to blame for not receiving his accounts, he should become free, and the heir maintains that he was not responsible for delay, and that the slave should pay over the balance in his hands? It shall be determined by the magistrate who has jurisdiction of the case whether the condition was complied with or not, and it is part of his duty to investigate the alleged default, as well as to cast up the accounts, and if he should ascertain that payment of the balance was delayed, to decide that the slave is not free. If, however, the slave never denied that a balance was due, and should sue the heir in order to be able to render his accounts, and it was established that he was prepared to pay any balance that might remain, and offered a good surety for the payment of the money, and the heir was found to be in default, judgment must be given in favor of freedom.

35Idem li­bro no­no re­spon­so­rum. Non vi­de­bi­tur per sta­tu­li­be­rum non sta­re, quo mi­nus con­di­cio li­ber­ta­tis ex­is­tat, si de pe­cu­lio, quod apud ven­di­to­rem ser­vus ha­buit, pe­cu­niam con­di­cio­nis of­fer­re non pos­sit: ad alie­num enim pe­cu­lium vo­lun­tas de­func­ti por­ri­gi non po­tuit. idem erit et si pe­cu­lio ser­vus ven­ie­rit et ven­di­tor fi­de rup­ta pe­cu­lium re­ti­nue­rit: quam­quam enim ex emp­to sit ac­tio, ta­men apud emp­to­rem pe­cu­lium ser­vus non ha­buit.

35The Same, Opinions, Book IX. The slave will be considered responsible for failure to comply with the condition upon which his liberty is dependent if he cannot pay the money out of the peculium which he had when under the control of the vendor; because the will of the deceased does not extend to his peculium under another owner. The same rule will apply where the slave was sold with his peculium, and the vendor retains it in violation of his contract; for although an action on purchase will lie, still, the slave did not have the peculium when he was under the control of the purchaser.

36Idem li­bro se­cun­do de­fi­ni­tio­num. In ta­bu­lis se­cun­dis fi­lio ser­vum da­ta li­ber­ta­te sub­sti­tu­tum iu­re sta­tu­li­be­ri pru­den­tes mu­nie­runt: quod uti­li­tas re­ci­pit, sci­li­cet ut cum sua cau­sa alie­na­re­tur, ne pa­tris tes­ta­men­tum puer fi­lius re­scin­dat. quae iu­ris auc­to­ri­tas ci­tra di­lec­tum or­di­nis ad se­cun­dum quo­que vel ter­tium sub­sti­tu­tum por­rec­ta est.

36The Same, Definitions, Book II. Persons learned in the law have placed in the class of slaves to be conditionally free one who has been substituted for a son with the grant of his freedom by a second will. This rule is useful, as it prevents a son, who is a minor, from annulling his father’s will by permitting the slave to be alienated subject to the charge of his freedom. This interpretation of the law extends, without any distinction, to every case where the slave is substituted either in the second or the third degree.

37Gaius li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ca­si­bus. Si ita scrip­tum sit: ‘Sti­chum Ti­tio do, ut eum ma­nu­mit­tat: si non ma­nu­mi­se­rit, li­ber es­to’, sta­tim Sti­chum li­be­rum es­se.

37Gaius, On Special Cases. If it is stated in a will, “I give Stichus to Titius, in order that he may manumit him, and if he does not do so, let him be free,” Stichus will immediately become free.

38Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ad Ne­ra­tium. Non om­ne ab he­redis per­so­na in­ter­ve­niens in­pe­d­imen­tum sta­tu­li­be­ro pro ex­ple­ta con­di­cio­ne ce­dit, sed id dum­ta­xat, quod im­pe­dien­dae li­ber­ta­tis fac­tum est.

38Paulus, On Neratius, Book I. Not every impediment for which the heir is responsible has the same effect as compliance with the condition by the slave, but only where this is done for the purpose of preventing him from obtaining his freedom.

39Ia­vo­le­nus li­bro quar­to ex pos­te­rio­ri­bus La­beo­nis. ‘Sti­chum At­tio do le­go et, si is ei num­mos cen­tum de­de­rit, li­ber es­to’. si ser­vus ex tes­ta­men­to num­mos At­tio de­dis­set, eos re­pe­te­re he­redem non pos­se La­beo ex­is­ti­mat, quia At­tius eos a ser­vo suo ac­ce­pe­rit, non ab he­redis ser­vo. eum au­tem sta­tu­li­be­rum es­se Quin­tus Mu­cius, Gal­lus et ip­se La­beo pu­tant: Ser­vius, Ofi­lius non es­se. su­pe­rio­rem sen­ten­tiam pro­bo, ita ta­men, ut is ser­vus he­redis, non le­ga­ta­rii sit, ut­po­te cum le­ga­tum sta­tu­li­ber­ta­te tol­la­tur. 1‘Sti­chus li­ber es­to, quan­do aes alie­num meum so­lu­tum cre­di­to­ri­bus­ve meis sa­tis­fac­tum erit’. quam­vis he­res lo­cu­ples ex­ti­tis­set, ta­men non prius Sti­chum li­be­rum fu­tu­rum, quam cre­di­to­res pe­cu­niam aut sa­tis ac­ce­pis­sent alio­ve quo mo­do si­bi ca­vis­sent, La­beo Ofi­lius re­spon­de­runt. 2Si he­res ser­vo pe­cu­niam ad neg­otian­dum de­dis­set, sta­tu­li­be­rum eam ip­sam nu­me­ran­do li­be­ra­ri ex tes­ta­men­to non pos­se La­beo Tre­ba­tius re­spon­de­runt, quia red­de­re eam ma­gis quam da­re vi­de­re­tur. ego pu­to, si pe­cu­lia­res num­mi fue­runt, ex tes­ta­men­to eum li­be­rum fu­tu­rum. 3‘Da­ma ser­vus cum he­redi meo an­no­rum sep­tem ope­ras sol­ve­rit, li­ber es­to’ et is ser­vus in­tra sep­tem an­nos in iu­di­cio pu­bli­co es­set et sep­ti­mus an­nus prae­ter­is­set, Ser­vius ait eum non li­be­ra­ri de­be­re, La­beo, et si post­ea sol­vis­set an­no­rum sep­tem ope­ras, li­be­rum fu­tu­rum: quod ve­rum est. 4‘Si Sti­chus At­tiae mil­le num­mos de­de­rit, li­ber es­to’. At­tia vi­vo tes­ta­to­re de­ces­sit: non pos­se Sti­chum li­be­rum es­se La­beo Ofi­lius re­spon­de­runt: Tre­ba­tius, si an­te tes­ta­men­tum fac­tum At­tia de­ces­sis­set, idem: si post­ea, eum li­be­rum fu­tu­rum. La­beo­nis et Ofi­lii sen­ten­tia ra­tio­nem qui­dem ha­bet, sed hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut is ser­vus ex tes­ta­men­to li­ber sit. 5Si ser­vus ope­ras ex­tra­neo da­re ius­sus es­set, nul­lus no­mi­ne ser­vi suas ope­ras dan­do li­be­ra­re ser­vum pot­est: quod in pe­cu­nia ali­ter ob­ser­va­tur, ut­po­te cum ex­tra­neus pro eo ser­vo dan­do pe­cu­niam ser­vum li­be­ra­ret.

39Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book IV. “I give and bequeath Stichus to Attius, and if he pays him a hundred sesterces, let him be free.” If the slave pays the sesterces to Attius under the terms of the will, Labeo holds that the heir cannot recover them, because Attius received them from his own slave, and not from the slave of the heir. Quintus Mucius, Gallus, and Labeo himself think that the slave should be considered conditionally free, and Servius and Ofilius think that he should not. I adopt the former opinion, that is to say, that the slave belongs to the heir and not to the legatee, just as if the legacy had been taken away by the grant of freedom. 1“Let Stichus be free, when my debts are paid, or my creditors are satisfied.” Even though the heir should be rich, Stichus will, nevertheless, not be free before the creditors have received their money, or their claims have been satisfied, or security has been furnished them in some other way; which is the opinion of Labeo and Ofilius. 2Labeo and Trebatius held that if the heir should give a slave money for the purpose of transacting business he cannot become free under the terms of the will, by paying this money, because he is considered rather to have returned it than to have paid it. I think, however, that if the money formed part of his peculium, he will become free under the testamentary provision. 3“Let my slave Damas be free, after he has given his services to my heir for seven years.” The slave was implicated in a capital crime during the seven years, and the last year having elapsed, Servius stated that he should not be liberated. Labeo, however, held that he would be free after having served his master for seven years. This opinion is correct. 4Ad Dig. 40,7,39,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 92, Note 8.“Let Stichus be free, if he pays a thousand sesterces to Attia.” Attia died during the lifetime of the testator. Labeo and Ofilius were of the opinion that Stichus could not become free. Trebatius agreed with them, if Attia died before the will was made; but if she died afterwards, he held that the slave would be free. The opinion of Labeo and Ofilius is reasonable, but it is our practice to consider the slave as free under the terms of the will. 5Where a slave is ordered to serve a stranger, no one can liberate him by furnishing his own labor in the name of the slave. The rule, however, is different where the payment of money is concerned; as, for instance, where a stranger liberates a slave by paying money in his behalf.

40Scae­vo­la li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to di­ges­to­rum. Sti­cho li­ber­tas da­ta est: ‘ab he­redi­bus meis pe­to fi­dei­que eo­rum com­mit­to, ut ra­tio­ni­bus red­di­tis Sti­chum ma­nu­mit­tant’. quae­si­tum est, cum am­pla pe­cu­nia ex­ac­ta post mor­tem tes­ta­to­ris si­bi com­mis­sa re­li­que­tur et quas­dam sum­mas a co­lo­nis ex­ac­tis ra­tio­ni­bus non in­tu­le­rit he­redi­ta­tem­que spo­lia­ve­rit aper­tis clam hor­reis sub­la­tis­que su­pel­lec­ti­li et ves­te et apo­the­cis ex­haus­tis: an non prius ei fi­dei­com­mis­sa li­ber­tas de­bea­tur, quam ea, quae ma­la ra­tio­ne re­li­qua­tus est quae fu­ra­tus est, re­po­sue­rit. re­spon­dit non prius ei fi­dei­com­mis­sam li­ber­ta­tem prae­stan­dam, quam et re­li­qua et om­nia, quae per eum ab­es­sent, re­sti­tuis­set. 1‘Pam­phi­lus li­ber es­to pe­cu­lio suo he­redi­bus ve­re da­to’. quae­si­tum est, cum plus do­mi­no de­beat quam in pe­cu­lio ha­beat et om­nes res, quas in pe­cu­lio ha­be­bat, bo­na fi­de he­redi­bus de­de­rat, an li­ber­tas ex tes­ta­men­to com­pe­tat. re­spon­dit ni­hil pro­po­ni, cur non com­pe­te­ret. 2Pam­phi­lo li­ber­to, quem he­redem ex par­te in­sti­tue­rat, Sti­chum ser­vum prae­le­ga­ve­rat et ei li­ber­ta­tem his ver­bis de­de­rat: ‘ita ut, si ti­bi ex die mor­tis meae per an­nos con­ti­nuos quin­que mens­truos se­xa­ge­nos de­de­rit, tunc eum ma­nu­mit­tas’. Pam­phi­lus an­te quin­quen­nium mo­riens he­redi­bus in­sti­tu­tis fi­lio et uxo­re de eo­dem Sti­cho ita ca­vit: ‘Sti­chus ser­vus, qui mi­hi tes­ta­men­to pa­tro­ni mei cer­ta con­di­cio­ne re­lic­tus est, iu­beo det prae­stet fi­lio et uxo­ri meae si­ne ul­la con­tro­ver­sia et eum tem­po­re per­ac­to ma­nu­mit­tant’. quae­si­tum est, si Sti­chus se­xa­ge­nos num­mos mens­truos non prae­sti­te­rit, an im­ple­to quin­quen­nio fi­dei­com­mis­sa li­ber­tas ei de­bea­tur. re­spon­dit, ni­si prae­sti­tis­set, fi­dei­com­mis­sam li­ber­ta­tem non de­be­ri. 3Ser­vus tes­ta­men­to ita ma­nu­mis­sus est: ‘Sti­chus ser­vus meus ac­tor si ra­tio­nem om­nem ac­tus sui he­redi meo red­di­de­rit eo­que no­mi­ne sa­tis­fe­ce­rit, li­ber es­to ei­que, cum li­ber erit, da­ri vo­lo vi­gin­ti et pe­cu­lium suum’. quae­si­tum est, an, si ra­tio­nes, quas egit per mul­tos an­nos si­ne sub­scrip­tio­ne tes­ta­to­ris, he­redi red­de­re pa­ra­tus sit, li­ber ex tes­ta­men­to fiat, cum prop­ter gra­vem va­le­tu­di­nem tes­ta­tor non po­tue­rit ra­tio­ni­bus sub­scri­be­re, tes­ta­men­to ta­men sub­scrip­se­rit. re­spon­dit, si ex fi­de ra­tio red­de­re­tur re­li­qua­que in­fe­ran­tur, li­be­rum fo­re. 4Item quae­ro, an ea, quae ex­ac­ta sunt per ad­iu­to­res eius ne­que ka­len­da­rio il­la­ta sunt aut frau­du­len­ter ac­ta, huic ad­scri­bi pos­sint, cum es­set is prae­po­si­tus. re­spon­dit, si id es­set, quod cul­pae eius de­be­ret im­pu­ta­ri, spec­ta­re ad ra­tio­nis red­den­dae ne­ces­si­ta­tem. 5Item quae­ro, an eo­rum quo­que no­mi­ne ra­tio ha­be­ri de­beat, quod ne­que a con­duc­to­ri­bus prae­dio­rum ne­que a vi­li­cis pen­sio­nes ex­ege­rit et in­su­per et­iam pro­mu­tuum eis de­de­rit. re­spon­dit su­pra re­spon­sum est. 6Item quae­ro, an eo no­mi­ne te­n­ea­tur, quod om­nem rem suam, id est pe­cu­lium, ex­por­ta­ve­rit, an­te­quam ra­tio­nes red­de­ret. re­spon­dit ni­hil eam rem im­pe­di­re con­di­cio­nem, si mo­do ra­tio red­de­re­tur. 7Ti­tius tes­ta­men­to ser­vos ac­to­res sin­gu­los di­ver­sis per­so­nis le­ga­vit cum ad­iec­tio­ne ‘si ra­tio­nes he­redi red­di­de­rint’: de­in­de pro­prio ca­pi­te ita scrip­sit: ‘om­nes ac­to­res, quos le­ga­vi vel ma­nu­mi­se­ro, in­tra quar­tum men­sem mor­tis meae ra­tio­nes red­de­re vo­lo et do­mi­nis, qui­bus a me le­ga­ti sint, red­di’. in­fra de­in­de alios ac­to­res li­be­ros es­se ius­sit ae­que cum hac ad­iec­tio­ne ‘si ra­tio­nes he­redi red­di­de­rint’. quae­ro, cum per he­redem fiat, quo mi­nus red­dan­tur, utrum sta­tu­li­be­ri es­se de­si­nant an ni­hi­lo mi­nus quan­do­que pos­sint red­di­ta ra­tio­ne et re­li­quis il­la­tis li­ber­ta­tem ex tes­ta­men­to con­se­qui. re­spon­dit le­ga­ta qui­dem et li­ber­ta­tes non alias com­pe­te­re, quam ra­tio­nes red­di­tae es­sent aut per he­redem sta­ret, quo mi­nus red­de­ren­tur: ve­rum iu­di­ca­tu­ro aes­ti­man­dum, utrum tem­pus con­di­cio­ni le­ga­to­rum li­ber­ta­tium­que ad­di­tum vi­dea­tur an, li­be­ro tem­po­re red­de­re vo­len­ti­bus re­li­qua, he­redi­bus quat­tuor men­ses ap­po­si­ti sint, sol­li­ci­to tes­ta­to­re cunc­ta­tio­ni et mo­ram eo­rum pro­scri­ben­te. me­lius au­tem est prae­sump­tio­nem pro sta­tu­li­be­ris es­se. 8Ar­gen­ta­rius co­ac­tor cum pae­ne to­tam for­tu­nam in no­mi­ni­bus ha­be­ret, ser­vis ac­to­ri­bus li­ber­ta­tem ita de­dit: ‘quis­quis mi­hi he­res erit, si Da­ma ser­vus meus ac­tus sui, qui agi­tur no­mi­ne eius et Pam­phi­li con­ser­vi sui, he­redi meo ra­tio­nes red­di­de­rit pa­ria­que fe­ce­rit a die mor­tis meae in­tra men­sem sex­tum, li­ber es­to’. quae­si­tum est, an haec ver­ba ‘pa­ria­que fe­cit’ ad om­nia no­mi­na per­ti­neant ex­cep­tis per­di­tis, ut hoc sig­ni­fi­cent ‘si om­nem pe­cu­niam ab om­ni­bus ex­ege­rint et he­redi sol­ve­rint vel eo no­mi­ne sa­tis­fe­ce­rint’ et, si in ex­ac­tio­ne no­mi­num ces­sa­ve­rint in­tra sex men­ses, li­ber­tas il­lis non com­pe­tat. re­spon­dit ma­ni­fes­tam es­se con­di­cio­nem ver­bis tes­ta­men­ti su­pra scrip­tis po­si­tam: igi­tur ita de­mum li­be­ros fo­re, si aut ei pa­reant aut per he­redem stet, quo mi­nus pa­reant.

40Scævola, Digest, Book XXIV. Freedom was granted to Stichus as follows, “I request my heirs, and I charge them to manumit Stichus, after he renders his accounts.” As the slave had collected a great deal of money after the death of the testator, which remained in his hands, and had not included in his own accounts certain sums paid by tenants; and had despoiled the estate by secretly opening warehouses and stealing furniture and clothing, and exhausting cellars of their contents, the question arose whether freedom under the trust should be granted him before he accounted for what fraudulently remained in his hands, and returned what he had stolen. The answer was that freedom should not be granted him under the terms of the trust until he had made restitution of the balance remaining in his hands, and everything which had been lost by his agency. 1“Let Pamphilus be free, if he gives all of his peculium to my heirs.” As the slave owed more to his master than there was in the peculium, and had transferred everything belonging to his peculium in good faith to the heirs, the question arose whether he was entitled to freedom under the terms of the will. The answer was that there was nothing in the case stated to show that he was not entitled to it. 2A testator bequeathed his slave Stichus as a preferred legacy to his freedman, Pamphilus, whom he had appointed heir to a portion of his estate; and he bequeathed freedom to Stichus, as follows: “You will manumit him if, during the five continuous years from the day of my death, he pays you sixty sesterces every month.” Pamphilus, having died before the expiration of five years, and having appointed his son and his wife his heirs, made the following testamentary provision with reference to Stichus: “I direct that my slave, Stichus, who was bequeathed to me under a certain condition by the will of my patron, shall give and pay to my son and to my wife, without any dispute, the amount for which he is liable, and if this is done, they shall manumit him after the prescribed time has elapsed.” If Stichus should not pay the sixty sesterces every month, the question arose whether he would be entitled to his freedom under the trust, after the five years had expired. The answer was that unless he made the payments he would not be entitled to the freedom granted to him under the terms of the trust. 3A slave was manumitted by a will as follows: “Let Stichus, my slave, who is also my steward, be free, if he renders an account of his entire administration to my heir, and satisfies him in this respect; and when he becomes free, I wish twenty aurei and his peculium to be given to him.” The question arose, if the slave was prepared to render accounts of his administration for the many years during which he had conducted it without the signature of the testator approving them whether he would become free under the will, as the testator had not been able to sign the accounts because of his serious illness, but could, nevertheless, sign his will. The answer was that the slave would become free if his accounts were rendered in good faith, and the balance remaining in his hands was paid. 4I also ask whether any sums collected by the assistants of the slave, which either were not entered upon his register at all, or were entered fraudulently, will render him liable, as he was placed over his assistants. The answer was, if the matter was one for which he could be held accountable, the necessity for his rendering a statement of the same should be taken into consideration. 5I also ask if an account should be rendered of the rents which he had not collected from the lessees of land, or from tenants, over and above any sums which he may have advanced to them. The answer was that this has already been decided. 6I also ask whether he will be liable on the ground that he had removed all his property, that is to say, his peculium, before rendering his account. The answer was that this was no impediment to the performance of the condition, provided the account was rendered. 7Titius bequeathed to different persons by will each of the slaves employed by his steward, on condition that they should render their accounts to his heir. Then, in another clause of his will, he said: “I wish all the stewards whom I have bequeathed, or may manumit, to render their accounts within four months after my death, to their owners to whom they have been bequeathed by me.” He then, lower down, ordered others of his stewards to be free, adding, “If they render their accounts to my heir.” As it was the fault of the heir that their accounts were not rendered, I also ask whether the slaves ceased to be free under the condition; or whether they could, nevertheless, obtain their freedom under the will, by rendering their accounts and paying the balances remaining in their hands. The answer was that the legacies and grants of freedom would not take effect, unless the accounts were rendered, or if it was the fault of the heir that this was not done; but that it must be determined by the court whether time seemed to be included in the condition under which the legacies and the grants of freedom were to become operative; or whether the four months were added by the testator for the purpose of preventing further delay and to afford abundance of time for the rendering of the accounts to the heirs. It is, however, better to hold that the presumption is in favor of the slaves. 8The collector of a banker, almost all of whose fortune consisted of claims, gave freedom to his agents, who were his slaves, as follows: “No matter who may be my heir, if Damas, my slave, renders an account to him of the administration which he has carried on in his own name, and in that of Pamphilus, his fellow-slave, I wish both of them to be placed on an equal footing, and to become free within six months.” The question arose if the words, “to be placed on an equal footing,” applied to all the claims except the bad debts, so that the meaning of it was if they collected all that was due from all the debtors, and paid the heir, or satisfied him in some other way, and if they did not collect the claims within six months, whether they would not be entitled to their freedom. The answer was, that it was clear that the condition was inserted in the above-mentioned clause of the will, and therefore that the slaves would be free if they complied with it, or the heir was responsible for their not doing so.

41La­beo li­bro pri­mo pi­tha­non a Pau­lo epi­to­ma­to­rum. Si quem ser­vum tuum ad cer­tum tem­pus sta­tu­li­be­rum re­lin­que­re vis, ni­hil in­ter­est, utro mo­do ca­veas, ‘si ser­vie­rit’ an ‘si tri­en­nio ope­ras de­de­rit, li­ber es­to’. 1Paulus. Si quis li­ber es­se ius­sus fue­rit, si de­cem he­redi pro­mis­sis­set, quam­quam ea pro­mis­sio nul­lam rem ha­bi­tu­ra est, ta­men pro­mit­ten­do li­be­ra­bi­tur.

41Labeo, Epitomes of Probabilities, by Paulus, Book I. If you desire to permit one of your slaves to be liberated from servitude within a certain time, it makes no difference whether you make this provision under the condition that he “shall serve,” or “render his services for the term of three years, in order to become free.” 1Paulus: If anyone is ordered to be free if he promises to pay ten aurei to the heir, although a promise of this kind will be of no effect, he will, nevertheless, be liberated by making it.

42La­beo li­bro ter­tio pi­tha­non. Si quis eun­dem ho­mi­nem uxo­ri suae le­ga­ve­rit et, cum ea nup­sis­set, li­be­rum es­se ius­se­rit et ea ex le­ge nup­se­rit, li­ber fiet is ho­mo.

42The Same, Probabilities, Book III. Where anyone bequeaths a slave to his wife, and orders him to be free in case she marries again, the slave will become free under this condition if she should marry a second time.