1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book II. The Divine Pius stated in a Rescript addressed to Cæcilius Proculus, that, where a choice of slaves was bequeathed, the legatee could select three.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book XX. Whenever the choice of selection of a slave is bequeathed, the legatee can choose anyone that he wishes. 1When a slave is bequeathed in general terms, the right of selection also belongs to the legatee. 2Therefore, where an option is given, and the legatee chooses a slave belonging to another, or a freeman, it should be considered whether he has lost his right of selection. I think that he has not done so. 3Where a legatee, to whom has been left the choice of a hundred measures of wine, selects vinegar, he is not, by doing so, considered to have lost his right of selection, if the testator did not include vinegar under the head of wine.

3The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXIII. This, of course, will be the case, if he should select the vinegar before the wine was shown to him, and before it was tasted.

4Paulus, On Sabinus, Book III. Where the choice of a cup is left as a legacy, if the legatee makes a selection before all the cups have been shown to him, it is held that he still retains his right; unless he intended to choose one of those which he has seen when he knew that there were others.

5Africanus, Questions, Book V. The above-mentioned rule applies not only when this takes place through the fraud of the heir, but also when it happens for any other reason whatsoever.

6Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VI. The choice of several slaves is bequeathed. In order that the sale of the slaves belonging to the estate may not be hindered while the legatee is making his choice, it is the duty of the Prætor to decree that unless he avails himself of his right within a certain time fixed by the latter, he will not be entitled to an action to recover the legacy. But what if, after the time had elapsed, and before the heir had sold the slaves, the legatee should desire to make a selection? The Prætor is accustomed to appoint a time, in order that the heir may not sustain any loss. What course should be pursued, if the time prescribed by the Prætor having expired, the heir should manumit some or all of the slaves? Would not the Prætor be obliged to maintain their freedom? The action must not be refused where everything remains intact. The same rule will apply where the heir has given away some of the slaves, or sold them, after the prescribed time has elapsed.

7Paulus, Questions, Book X. Moreover, if the heir has sold some of the slaves and kept others, the legatee should not be heard if he wishes to make his selection out of those retained by the heir, as the latter has already disposed of the slaves belonging to the estate.

8Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VI. Where the choice of a slave is left to you, and the rest of them are bequeathed to me, it must be held by the Prætor that, unless you make a selection within a certain time, the right of action will be lost. 1Where, out of four bracelets, the two which I may choose are bequeathed to me, or only two are left; or where, in the first place, there were only two; the legacy is valid. 2Where the choice of a single slave is bequeathed to you and myself, and I make my selection, and do not change my mind, and you select the same slave, he will belong to both of us in common. If, however, I should die, or become insane, before you make your choice, the slave will not belong to us in common, because, as I have lost my mind, I am not considered to have given my consent. The more equitable rule, in this instance, will be that, as I have once made my choice, the slaves will belong to us as joint owners. 3If the choice of articles deposited with someone else is bequeathed to me, I can bring suit for the production of the same against the person with whom it was deposited; or I can proceed against the heir to compel him to bring an action on deposit against the party having the property, to compel him to give me an opportunity to make my selection.

9Julianus, Digest, Book XXXII. Where a bequest is made as follows, “I give and bequeath Stichus to Titius, if he does not select Pamphilus,” it is the same as if the bequest had been, “I do give and bequeath to Titius, either Stichus or Pamphilus, whichever one of them he may select.” 1If Stichus was ordered to be free under a condition, and I was left the choice of a slave, or one was bequeathed to me in general terms, the question arose, what would be the law? I said that it would be more convenient to decide that he who grants freedom to Stichus under some condition, and then bequeaths the choice of slaves, did not have Stichus in his mind at the time; just as it is established that he did not have him in view on whom he bestowed freedom without delay. In accordance with this, if I should choose or select Stichus, my act will be void, and I will still be entitled to make my selection from the others. 2In the same case, when I have been left the choice of slaves, and before I have made my selection the condition on which the freedom of a slave depended fails, the question arises, can I select Stichus? I think that the opinion of Mucianus should be adopted, by which it is held that freedom itself, and not the mere grant of it which has been resolved upon, annuls a legacy. Hence, if the condition upon which the grant of freedom depended should fail either during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death, and before the estate was entered upon, the legacy will be valid; for freedom which is granted absolutely, as well as where it is left under a condition, takes effect at the time when the estate is entered upon, and therefore I can select Stichus.

10The Same, Digest, Book XXXIV. Where a slave is bequeathed in general terms to Pamphilus, the slave of Lucius Titius, and then the master of Pamphilus manumits him after the time that the legacy becomes due, and Titius claims the slave, the legacy of Pamphilus is extinguished, because there is no slave belonging to the estate who can be selected. If, however, Titius should reject the legacy, it is established that Pamphilus can make his choice of a slave bequeathed to him; for although by the manumission of Pamphilus two persons, Titius and Pamphilus, are constituted legatees, still, the bequest of one and the same thing is left to them, and if Titius claims it, the option of Pamphilus is extinguished, and if he rejects it, Pamphilus can make his selection.

11The Same, Digest, Book XXXVI. If Eros is bequeathed to Seius, and a tract of land to Eros, and then the option of a slave is left to Mævius, and he chooses Eros, the land alone will belong to Seius, since at the time when the estate was entered upon he was the only one to whom the legacy could belong. For, where one of two joint-owners of a slave leaves him a bequest, the entire legacy will belong to the other joint-owner, as he is the only one who can acquire the legacy through the slave at the time when it becomes due.

12The Same, On Minicius, Book I. Where a slave is bequeathed in general terms, the better opinion is that all the heirs, if the choice is left to them, should give the same slave, and if they do not agree, they will be liable under the terms of the will.

13Paulus, On Plautius, Book VIII. Where the selection of a slave is left to me, and the testator bequeaths something to Stichus without granting him his freedom, the second legacy will only stand where the entire body of slaves is reduced to one individual, that is to say, Stichus; and the legacy will be valid, just as if it was bequeathed unconditionally. The opinion of Cato cannot be quoted in opposition to this, if a voluntary heir has been appointed, for the reason that the body of slaves may be diminished before the estate is entered upon, even if the testator should die immediately. Where, however, a necessary heir is appointed, the second legacy will be void in accordance with the rule of Cato. 1Pomponius says that where the purchaser of an estate asks that the party to whom the choice of slaves has been bequeathed shall make his selection, it should be considered whether the Prætor must compel the legatee to do so, just as if the appointed heir should make such a demand, for the reason that the purchaser can accomplish this by applying to the heir. I do not see why it cannot be done.

14Javolenus, On Cassius, Book II. Where the right to select a slave from the entire body of those forming part of an estate is bequeathed, and the heir manumits one of them before the choice is made, he cannot, in the meantime, confer his freedom upon him, but he will lose the slave whom he manumitted, because if he is chosen by the legatee, he will belong to him, but if he is rejected, he will then become free.

15The Same, Epistles, Book II. I made a bequest to a slave without granting him his freedom, and I then bequeathed to Mævius his choice of my slaves. He selected the same slave, and I ask whether what was bequeathed to the latter is also due to him. The answer was, I do not think that the legacy left to the said slave will belong to his master.

16Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV. It is established that where the choice of certain articles is bequeathed, it cannot be made before the estate is entered upon, and if it should be made, it will be void.

17The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVII. Where the choice of two slaves is bequeathed to Titius, and the remaining ones are left to Mævius; if the first legatee should fail to make his selection, all of the slaves will belong to Mævius, under the term “the remaining one.”

18Scævola, Questions, Book XIII. Where a slave is bequeathed, Neratius says that if Pamphilus is rejected the act will be void, and therefore the legatee will still have the right of selection.

19Paulus, Opinions, Book III. “The legatee may select such-and-such an article, or such-and-such an article.” Where no choice was made by the legatee, and he died after the time when the bequest was due, it was decided that the right of selection was transmitted to his heir.

20Labeo, Epitomes of the Last Works of Javolenus, Book II. It is stated in the First Book of Aufidius, that when a bequest was made as follows, “Let him take and have for himself any coverings for table-couches which he may wish,” if he mentioned those he wanted, and then, before he took them, should say that he wanted others, he cannot change his mind and take the others; because he had disposed of his entire right of selection under the legacy by his first statement, in which he indicated those which he would take, as the articles become his immediately, just as if he had said that he would take them.

21Scævola, Digest, Book XXII. A testator appointed his son and his wife his heirs, and disinherited his daughter, but left her a legacy of a hundred aurei, payable when she married in his family, and made the following provision in his will: “In addition to this, I bequeath to her ten slaves, to be selected by her mother, Sempronia, whom I wish to be selected by the said Sempronia, my wife, immediately after my estate is entered upon. I desire the said slaves to be given to my daughter when she marries in the family, and if any of the slaves should die before she marries, then I wish others, also to be selected by her mother, Sempronia, to be given in their stead, until the full number of said slaves come into her hands, but if her mother, Sempronia, should not select them, then she herself can choose those whom she may desire.” The mother having made the selection, the question arose whether the offspring of the slaves born before her marriage would belong to the girl, in addition to the original ten. The answer was that, as the testator had deferred the legacy of the slaves until the time of the marriage, any of the offspring of the female slaves born in the meantime would not belong to the daughter. It was also asked whether her mother, Sempronia, would be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the said slaves before the marriage of the daughter. The answer was that there was nothing in the case stated why they should not entirely belong to the mother.

22The Same, Digest, Book XVII. A husband by a codicil left to his wife certain lands in trust, and also four silver dishes which she might select. The question arose whether she could make her selection from all the dishes which were found at the time of the death of the testator. The answer was that she could do so.