Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXXIII4,
De dote praelegata
Liber trigesimus tertius
IV.

De dote praelegata

(Concerning the Preferred Legacy of a Dowry.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro no­no de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Cum dos rele­ga­tur, ve­rum est id do­tis le­ga­to in­es­se, quod ac­tio­ne de do­te in­erat. 1Et id­eo si in­ter vi­rum et uxo­rem con­ve­ne­rat, ut mor­te vi­ri so­lu­to ma­tri­mo­nio fi­lio com­mu­ni in­ter­ve­nien­te dos apud ma­ri­ti he­redem re­ma­ne­ret, et ma­ri­tus de­ce­dens do­tem rele­ga­ve­rit, sta­ri pac­to non de­bet ob hoc quod dos rele­ga­ta est. ve­rum et ci­tra rele­ga­tio­nem hoc pro­ba­ri de­bet: nam quod est ad­mis­sum pos­se de­te­rio­rem con­di­cio­nem do­tis fie­ri in­ter­ve­nien­ti­bus li­be­ris, to­tiens lo­cum ha­bet, quo­tiens ip­sa in ma­tri­mo­nio de­ce­dit vel di­vor­tium in­ter­ve­nit. 2Et ve­rum est com­mo­dum in do­te rele­ga­ta es­se re­prae­sen­ta­tio­nis, quam­vis an­nua die dos prae­sta­re­tur: 3Est et il­lud, quod ob res do­na­tas ho­die post se­na­tus con­sul­tum nul­la fit ex­ac­tio, si mo­do vo­lun­ta­tem non mu­ta­vit tes­ta­tor. 4Im­pen­sae au­tem ip­so iu­re do­tem mi­nuunt. sed quod di­xi­mus ip­so iu­re do­tem im­pen­sis mi­nui, non ad sin­gu­la cor­po­ra, sed ad uni­ver­si­ta­tem erit re­fe­ren­dum. 5Ad­eo au­tem do­tis ac­tio­nem con­ti­net do­tis rele­ga­tio, ut, si vi­vus eam uxo­ri (sci­li­cet qui­bus li­cet ca­si­bus) sol­ve­rit, ces­set le­ga­tum. 6Sed et si man­ci­pia fue­rint in do­te non aes­ti­ma­ta et haec de­mor­tua sint, le­ga­tum do­tis in his eva­nes­cit. 7Sed et si do­tem pro­mi­se­rit mu­lier ne­que de­de­rit et de­ce­dens ma­ri­tus uxo­ri do­tem prae­le­ga­ve­rit, mu­lier ni­hil am­plius quam li­be­ra­tio­nem ha­be­bit: nam et si quis ita le­ga­ve­rit ‘cen­tum quae in ar­ca ha­beo’ aut ‘quae il­le apud me de­po­suit’, si nul­la sint, ni­hil de­be­ri con­stat, quia nul­la cor­po­ra sint. 8Si quis uxo­ri fun­dum Ti­tia­num his ver­bis le­gas­set: ‘is enim fun­dus prop­ter il­lam ad me per­ve­nit’, om­ni­mo­do de­be­tur fun­dus: nam quid­quid de­mons­tra­tae rei ad­di­tur sa­tis de­mons­tra­tae, frus­tra est. 9Cel­sus li­bro vi­ce­si­mo di­ges­to­rum scri­bit, si so­cer nurui do­tem rele­ga­vit, si qui­dem ius ac­tio­nis de do­te vo­luit rele­ga­re, nul­lius mo­men­ti es­se le­ga­tum, quip­pe nup­ta est: sed si vo­luit eam re­ci­pe­re do­ta­lem pe­cu­niam, in­quit, uti­le erit le­ga­tum. si ta­men haec do­tem re­ce­pe­rit, ni­hi­lo mi­nus ma­ri­tus do­tis per­se­cu­tio­nem ha­be­bit, si­ve he­res in­sti­tu­tus es­set, fa­mi­liae her­cis­cun­dae iu­di­cio, si­ve non, uti­li ac­tio­ne. ego pu­to, quon­iam non hoc vo­luit so­cer, ut bis do­tem he­res prae­stet, mu­lie­rem agen­tem ex tes­ta­men­to ca­ve­re de­be­re de­fen­su iri he­redem ad­ver­sus ma­ri­tum. er­go et ma­ri­tus idem de­be­bit ca­ve­re ad­ver­sus mu­lie­rem de­fen­su iri, si prior agat. 10Per con­tra­rium apud Iu­lia­num li­bro tri­ge­si­mo sep­ti­mo quae­ri­tur, si so­cer fi­lio suo ex­he­redato do­tem nu­rus le­gas­set: et ait agi qui­dem cum ma­ri­to ex­he­redato de do­te non pos­se, ve­rum­ta­men ip­sum do­tem per­se­cu­tu­rum ex cau­sa le­ga­ti: sed non alias eum le­ga­tum con­se­cu­tu­rum, quam si ca­ve­rit he­redes ad­ver­sus mu­lie­rem de­fen­su iri. et dif­fe­ren­tiam fa­cit in­ter eum, cui dos rele­ga­ta est, et or­ci­num li­ber­tum, cui pe­cu­lium le­ga­tum est: nam­que eum de pe­cu­lio pos­se con­ve­ni­ri ait, he­redem non pos­se, quia pe­cu­lium de­siit pe­nes se ha­be­re: at do­tis ac­tio ni­hi­lo mi­nus com­pe­tit, et­si do­tem de­sie­rit ha­be­re. 11Idem Iu­lia­nus quae­rit, si do­tem ma­ri­to rele­ga­ve­rit so­cer, an do­te so­lu­ta mu­lie­ri le­ga­tum ma­ri­ti ex­tin­gua­tur. et di­cit ex­tin­gui, quia ni­hil es­set iam, quod ma­ri­to pos­set prae­sta­ri. 12Idem quae­rit, si dos alii le­ga­ta es­set eam­que ro­ga­tus sit mu­lie­ri re­sti­tue­re, an lex Fal­ci­dia in le­ga­to lo­cum ha­be­ret. et di­cit ha­be­re: sed quod mi­nus est in fi­dei­com­mis­so, mu­lie­rem do­tis ac­tio­ne con­se­cu­tu­ram. ego quae­ro, an com­mo­da re­prae­sen­ta­tio­nis in hoc le­ga­to sic ob­ser­ven­tur at­que si dos ip­si mu­lie­ri fuis­set rele­ga­ta. et pu­to ha­be­re. 13Idem Iu­lia­nus quae­rit, si mu­lie­ri dos sit rele­ga­ta ea­que ro­ga­ta do­tem re­sti­tue­re, an Fal­ci­dia lo­cum ha­beat. et ne­gat ha­be­re, quon­iam fi­dei­com­mis­sum quo­que ne­gat va­le­re. quod si prae­ter­ea quid uxo­ri le­ga­tum sit, pu­tat ex re­si­duo fi­dei­com­mis­sum prae­sta­ri: quod uti­que ha­bi­ta ra­tio­ne Fal­ci­diae mu­lie­ri prae­sta­bi­tur. sed et ma­ri­to ex par­te he­redi in­sti­tu­to a so­ce­ro do­te prae­le­ga­ta le­ga­tum do­tis Fal­ci­diam pas­su­rum, vi­de­li­cet quia ad­huc con­stan­te ma­tri­mo­nio in­de­bi­ta dos vi­de­tur rele­ga­ta, ve­rum quod Fal­ci­dia rec­ci­dit, in fa­mi­liae her­cis­cun­dae iu­di­cio ma­ri­tum prae­cep­tu­rum, quem­ad­mo­dum to­tam do­tem prae­ci­pe­ret, si non es­set rele­ga­ta. 14Me­la scrip­sit, si fun­dus in do­te sit et spe­cia­li­ter sit le­ga­tus, mox ge­ne­ra­li­ter dos rele­ga­ta, non bis, sed se­mel de­be­ri fun­dum. 15Ibi­dem Me­la con­iun­git, si fun­dus in do­te fuit lo­ca­tus a ma­ri­to ad cer­tum tem­pus, uxo­rem non alias fun­dum ex rele­ga­tio­ne con­se­qui, quam si ca­ve­rit se pas­su­ram co­lo­num frui, dum­mo­do ip­sa pen­sio­nes per­ci­piat.

1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XIX. Where a dowry is bequeathed, it is certain that everything is included in it which is embraced in the dotal action. 1Therefore, where an agreement has been made between husband and wife, that, if the marriage should be dissolved by the death of the husband, and a son should be born, the dowry shall remain in the hands of the heir of the husband, and the latter, at his death, shall bequeath the dowry, the agreement will not stand, because the dowry was bequeathed. It should, however, be executed if the dowry was not bequeathed; for the established rule that the condition of the dowry cannot become worse through the intervention of children becomes applicable whenever the woman dies during marriage, or a divorce takes place. 2It is true that there is the advantage of payment where a dowry is bequeathed, as otherwise it would only be payable annually. 3There is also the advantage that, according to the Decree of the Senate, no demand can be made for property donated, provided the testator did not change his mind. 4Moreover, expenses which have been incurred diminish the dowry to that extent by operation of law, and what we have said concerning this does not refer to separate articles, but to the entire dowry. 5Ad Dig. 33,4,1,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 658, Note 3.The bequest of a dowry includes also the dotal action, so that if the husband, while living, restored it to his wife, as is permitted in certain cases, the legacy will be annulled. 6But if slaves, whose value had not been appraised, should be included in the dowry, and they should be dead, the legacy of the dowry, so far as they are concerned, will be void. 7If the wife promised a dowry, but did not give it, and the husband, at his death, should leave it as a preferred legacy to his wife; she will be entitled to nothing more than a release from liability. For if anyone should make a bequest as follows: “I bequeath a hundred aurei, which I have in my chest,” or “Which So-and-So has deposited with me;” and there should be no such sum, it is established that nothing will be due, because the property in question was not in existence. 8If anyone should bequeath the Titian Estate to his wife, as follows, “Since the said land has come into my hands through her;” the land will undoubtedly be due; for where anything is added for the purpose of pointing out something which has already been designated, it is superfluous. 9Celsus in the Twentieth Book of the Digest says that if a father-in-law bequeaths her dowry to his daughter-in-law, and he intends to leave a right of action with reference to the dowry, the legacy will be of no force or effect, as she is already married; but if he wished her to receive the money which she brought as dowry, he says that the legacy will be valid. When, however, she has received her dowry, the husband will, nevertheless, have the right to claim it by means of a prætorian action, whether an heir has been appointed in a suit for partition, or not. I think that, as the father-in-law did not intend his heir to pay the dowry twice, if the woman should bring an action under the will, she should furnish him security to defend the heir against the husband. Therefore, the husband also should furnish security to defend him against his wife, if he should be the first to institute proceedings. 10Ad Dig. 33,4,1,10Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 484, Note 20.On the other hand, it is stated by Julianus in the Thirty-seventh Book, that if a father-in-law should bequeath the dowry of his daughter-in-law to his disinherited son, while she cannot bring the dotal action against her disinherited husband, he himself can claim the dowry, on the ground of a legacy; but he cannot obtain it unless he furnishes security to defend the heir against the woman. He makes this difference between the person to whom the dowry is bequeathed, and a freedman liberated by the will, and to whom his peculium was bequeathed; for he says that the heir cannot be sued on account of the peculium for the reason that it is no longer in his possession, but the dotal action can, nevertheless, be brought against him, even though he has ceased to have control of the dowry. 11Julianus also asks, where the father-in-law bequeathed the dowry to the husband, and it has been paid to the wife, whether the legacy of the husband will be extinguished. He says that it will be extinguished, because there is nothing more which the heir can pay to the husband. 12He also asks, in case the dowry should be bequeathed to someone else who is charged to return it to the woman, whether the Falcidian Law will apply to the legacy. He says that it will apply, but that she can by the dotal action recover any deficiency which the trust may have suffered on this account. I ask whether the benefit of payment should be taken into consideration in this legacy, as if the dowry had been paid directly to the wife herself. I think that this ought to be done. 13Julianus also asks, if a dowry is bequeathed to a wife, and she is asked to pay it to another, whether the Falcidian Law will apply, and he says that it will not, as the trust is invalid. He thinks, however, that where anything, in addition, is bequeathed to the wife, the residue of the trust should be discharged and therefore what is paid her will be subject to the operation of the Falcidian Law. Where, however, the husband is appointed heir to a portion of the father-in-law’s estate, and the dowry is bequeathed by the latter as a preferred legacy, the bequest of the dowry will be subject to the Falcidian Law, for the reason that, as the marriage still exists, the dowry is considered not to be due to the woman. But whatever has been deducted through the operation of the Falcidian Law can be recovered by the husband in an action for partition, just as he could recover the entire dowry if it had not been bequeathed to his wife. 14Mela says that if a tract of land forming part of the dowry has been especially bequeathed, and after the dowry has been bequeathed in general terms, the land will be due not twice, but only once. 15Mela adds, in the same place, that where land forming a part of a dowry has been leased by the husband for a certain time, the wife cannot obtain it under the bequest, unless she furnishes security to permit the tenant to enjoy it, provided she herself receives the rent.

2Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Cum quis uxo­ri suae do­tem rele­gat fi­dei­que com­mis­sum ab ea re­lin­quit, hoc fi­dei­com­mis­sum ex com­mo­do, quod ex rele­ga­tio­ne mu­lier sen­tit, aes­ti­ma­bi­tur, et ita Cel­sus quo­que li­bro vi­ce­si­mo di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit. quod si ne­ces­sa­riae fue­runt im­pen­sae, quae ip­so iu­re do­tem mi­nuunt, am­plius di­ci pot­est, si tan­ta quan­ti­tas do­tis, quam ma­ri­tus ac­ce­pit, ei rele­ga­ta est, opor­te­re di­ci et­iam eam quan­ti­ta­tem pos­se fi­dei­com­mis­sum ero­ga­re, quae ip­so iu­re do­tem mi­nuit: es­se enim mu­lie­rem le­ga­ta­riam ne­mo est qui du­bi­tet. sed et si non dos, sed pro do­te ali­quid uxo­ri fue­rit le­ga­tum, ad­huc qua­si dos rele­ga­ta ac­ci­pi­tur. hoc am­plius Iu­lia­nus scribsit, et­si non fue­rit ad­iec­tum pro do­te es­se le­ga­tum, hoc ta­men ani­mo re­lic­tum, ad­huc eius es­se con­di­cio­nis. uxor igi­tur si ro­ge­tur vel do­tem vel quod pro do­te le­ga­tum est vel quod in vi­cem do­tis ei ad­scrip­tum est re­sti­tue­re, non co­ge­tur ni­si ea­te­nus, qua­te­nus di­xi­mus, re­sti­tue­re: et id­eo he­res in­sti­tu­ta ro­ga­ta­que quan­ti­ta­tem he­redi­ta­tis re­sti­tue­re id de­mum re­sti­tuet, quod quan­ti­ta­tem do­tis ex­ce­dit id­que quod ex re­prae­sen­ta­tio­nis com­mo­do sen­tit. nam et si quis, cum a nuru do­tem ac­ce­pis­set, fi­lium suum he­redem in­sti­tue­rit eum­que ro­ga­ve­rit, quid­quid ad eum ex he­redi­ta­te per­ve­nis­set, re­sti­tue­re, mox mor­te uxo­ris do­tem fue­rit lu­cra­tus, id non re­sti­tuet quod ex do­te per­ce­pit, quia ma­tri­mo­nii cau­sa id lu­cra­tus est, non ex pa­tris iu­di­cio. 1Mu­lier do­tem pro­mi­sit qua­drin­gen­to­rum et de­dit fun­dos duos in du­cen­ta, prae­ter­ea no­mi­na de­bi­to­rum in re­si­dua du­cen­ta: mox ma­ri­tus eius de­ce­dens pro do­te fun­dos ei duos non eos, quos in do­tem ac­ce­pe­rat, re­li­quit et prae­ter­ea duos il­los do­ta­les, quos aes­ti­ma­tos ac­ce­pe­rat, re­li­quit fi­dei­que eius com­mi­sit, ut, quid­quid ad se ex he­redi­ta­te eius per­ve­nis­set, id re­sti­tue­ret Se­io cum mo­re­re­tur: quae­re­ba­tur, quan­tum es­set in fi­dei­com­mis­so mu­lie­re de­func­ta. di­ce­bam uxo­rem hanc, quae ro­ga­ta est, quid­quid ad se per­ve­ne­rit ex tes­ta­men­to, re­sti­tue­re, in ea es­se con­di­cio­ne, ut id de­mum re­sti­tue­re ro­ge­tur, quod de­duc­ta do­tis quan­ti­ta­te ad eam per­ve­nit: do­tem enim re­ce­pis­se eam ma­gis quam ac­ce­pis­se, sal­vo eo, quod ex com­mo­do re­prae­sen­ta­tio­nis ab ea fi­dei­com­mit­ti po­tuit. pro­in­de id qui­dem, quod pro do­te ma­ri­tus ei re­li­quit, non co­ge­tur re­sti­tue­re, ni­si plus fuit in eo quam in quan­ti­ta­te do­tis: re­si­duum ve­ro, quod prae­ter­ea il­li re­lic­tum est, cum fruc­ti­bus co­ge­tur re­sti­tue­re. ha­be­bit igi­tur prae­ci­puam do­tem cum suis fruc­ti­bus: id ve­ro, quod ex­trin­se­cus ei re­lic­tum est, cum fruc­ti­bus, qui ad eam per­ve­ne­rint, re­sti­tuet.

2Ulpianus, Disputations, Book V. Where a husband bequeaths a dowry to his wife, and charges her with a trust, the trust shall be estimated in proportion to the benefit which the woman will receive from immediate payment of her dowry. Celsus also says the same in the Twentieth Book of the Digest. But if certain necessary expenses were incurred, which, by operation of law, diminished the dowry, and all of it which the husband received is bequeathed to her, it should be held that the entire amount of the expense which diminished the dowry by law must be deducted from the trust, for no one can doubt that the woman is the legatee. If, however, not the dowry, but something in lieu thereof was bequeathed to the wife, this will be understood to be the same as if the dowry was the subject of the bequest. Julianus goes still farther, for he says that even if it should not be stated that the property was bequeathed in lieu of the dowry, it still will be considered to have been left with that intention. Therefore, if the wife was requested to give up either the dowry or something which was left to her in lieu of it, she will not be compelled to do so, except to the extent which we have stated. Hence if she was appointed heir, and charged with the transfer of a certain portion of the estate, she would only be compelled to deliver what was in excess of her dowry, and the value of the benefit which he received from immediate payment. For if anyone who has received a dowry from his daughter-in-law should appoint his son his heir, and ask him to deliver to someone else all of the estate which might come into his hands, and he should afterwards obtain the benefit of the dowry through the death of his wife, he will not be compelled to give up the dowry which he had received, for the reason that he profited by it on account of his marriage, and not through the will of his father. 1A woman promised a dowry of four hundred aurei, and gave two tracts of land for two hundred of it, and afterwards gave the other two hundred in notes of debtors. Her husband, dying afterwards, left to her, instead of her dowry, two tracts of land which were not the same ones which he had received as part of her dowry; and, in addition to them, the two dotal tracts of land whose value had been appraised; and he charged her by a trust that she would, at the time of her death, deliver to Seius all of his estate which might come into her hands. The question arose, what would be the amount of the trust after the death of the woman? I said that the wife, who was charged to deliver everything which came into her hands under the will, was in a position to be asked to transfer only what she had received after the deduction of the amount of her dowry; for she was entitled to the dowry rather because it was due to her, than as having received it as a legacy, with the exception of what could be claimed under the trust as constituting the benefit resulting from immediate payment. Hence, she will not be compelled to deliver the land which her husband left to her in lieu of her dowry, unless it was of greater value or extent than that which she had brought as such. She, however, will be obliged to give up any excess, together with the profits over and above what had been left to her. Therefore he will be entitled to the dowry with its profits, and anything which was left to her outside of this she must surrender, along with the profits which she obtained from the same.

3Iu­lia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo quar­to di­ges­to­rum. Qui ita le­gat uxo­ri suae: ‘Ti­tiae am­plius quam do­tem au­reos tot he­res meus dam­nas es­to da­re’, ma­ni­fes­tus est do­tem quo­que rele­gas­se.

3Julianus, Digest, Book XXXIV. Where anyone bequeaths a legacy to his wife, as follows: “Let my heir give so many aurei to Titia in addition to her dowry,” it is clear that he also intended to leave her the dowry.

4Afri­ca­nus li­bro quin­to quaes­tio­num. Cum vol­ga­ri mo­do dies le­ga­to­rum pro­fer­tur, ni­hil eam rem ad do­tis rele­ga­tio­nem per­ti­ne­re ait, quia suum diem ha­beat.

4Africanus, Questions, Book V. Where certain dates are fixed for the payment of legacies, as is customary, Africanus says that this does not refer to the legacy of a dowry, because it has its own time of payment.

5Mar­cia­nus li­bro ter­tio re­gu­la­rum. Do­te rele­ga­ta non est he­res au­dien­dus, si ve­lit ob do­na­tio­nes in mu­lie­rem fac­tas so­lu­tio­nem dif­fer­re vel ob im­pen­sas alias, quam quae ip­so iu­re do­tem mi­nuunt: aliud est enim mi­no­rem es­se fac­tam do­tem, quod per ne­ces­sa­rias im­pen­sas ac­ci­dit, aliud pig­no­ris no­mi­ne re­ti­ne­ri do­tem ob ea, quae mu­lie­rem in­vi­cem prae­sta­re ae­quum est.

5Ad Dig. 33,4,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 658, Note 4.Marcianus, Rules, Book III. Where a dowry has been bequeathed, the heir should not be heard, if he wishes to defer payment of it to the woman on account of donations which have been made to her by her husband, or because of other expenses than those which, by operation of law, diminish a dowry, for it is one thing for a dowry to be diminished by necessary expenses, and another where it is retained because of a pledge; since it is but just that the woman should contribute her share of the indebtedness for which it was given as security.

6La­beo li­bro se­cun­do pos­te­rio­rum a Ia­vo­le­no epi­to­ma­to­rum. Cum scrip­tum es­set: ‘quae pe­cu­nia prop­ter uxo­rem meam ad me venit quin­qua­gin­ta, tan­tun­dem pro ea do­te he­res meus da­to’, quam­vis qua­dra­gin­ta do­tis fuis­sent, ta­men quin­qua­gin­ta de­be­re Al­fe­nus Va­rus Ser­vium re­spon­dis­se scri­bit, quia pro­pos­i­ta sum­ma quin­qua­gin­ta ad­iec­ta sit. 1Item ei, quae do­tem nul­lam ha­be­bat, vir sic le­ga­ve­rat: ‘quan­ta pe­cu­nia do­tis no­mi­ne’ et re­li­qua, ‘pro ea quin­qua­gin­ta he­res da­to’. de­be­ri ei le­ga­tum Ofi­lius Cas­cel­lius, item et Ser­vii au­di­to­res ret­tu­le­runt: per­in­de ha­ben­dum es­se ac si ser­vus ali­cui mor­tuus aut pro eo cen­tum le­ga­ta es­sent. quod ve­rum est, quia his ver­bis non dos ip­sa, sed pro do­te pe­cu­nia le­ga­ta vi­de­tur.

6Labeo, On the Last Epitomes by Javolenus, Book II. Where the following was inserted into a will, “Let my heir give to my wife the sum of fifty aurei, which came into my hands through her and as much more in lieu of her dowry,” Alfenus Verus says that Servius was of the opinion that, although the dowry was only composed of forty aurei, fifty were, nevertheless, due, because an additional sum of fifty was added. 1Likewise, where a husband made a bequest to his wife, who had not brought him any dowry, in the following terms, “Let my heir give the sum of fifty aurei, instead of the money which I received from my wife by way of dowry,” Ofilius, Cascellius, and the pupils of Servius assert that the legacy is due to her; and hence it must be considered similar to the case where a slave, who is dead, has been bequeathed to someone, or a hundred aurei has been left in his stead. This is correct, because by these words not the dowry itself, but money in lieu of it is held to have been bequeathed.

7Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo quaes­tio­num. Pa­ter do­tem a nuru ac­cep­tam fi­lio ex­he­redato le­ga­vit: he­res pa­tris op­po­si­ta do­li ex­cep­tio­ne non an­te sol­ve­re le­ga­tum co­gen­dus est, quam ei cau­tum fue­rit de in­dem­ni­ta­te so­lu­to ma­tri­mo­nio. 1Sed si, prius­quam le­ga­tum fi­lio sol­ve­re­tur, mu­lier do­tem suam re­ci­pe­ra­vit, frus­tra fi­lius de le­ga­to aget. 2Sed si lex Fal­ci­dia lo­cum in le­ga­to do­tis ad­ver­sus fi­lium ex­he­redatum ha­bue­rit et mu­lier so­lu­tio­nem ra­tam fe­ce­rit, prop­ter eam quan­ti­ta­tem, quam he­res re­ti­nue­rit, uti­lis ac­tio do­tis ei da­bi­tur. quod si ra­tum non ha­beat, de­fen­di qui­dem de­be­bit he­res a vi­ro, qui se de­fen­su­rum pro­mi­sit: sed si to­tam li­tem vir so­lus sub­ie­rit, ac­tio iu­di­ca­ti, si cau­tum non erit, pro ea quan­ti­ta­te, quae iu­re Fal­ci­diae pe­ten­da est, ad­ver­sus he­redem da­bi­tur. 3Sed si, prius­quam le­ga­tum fi­lio sol­ve­re­tur, mu­lier di­ver­tit, quam­quam ip­sa non­dum prae­ci­pe­re do­tem pos­sit, non id­eo ta­men ac­tio fi­lii dif­fer­tur: quia tunc is­dem die­bus fi­lio sol­vi do­tem re­spon­sum est, cum pa­tri pro par­te he­res ex­sti­tit et ad prae­cep­tio­nem do­tis so­lu­to ma­tri­mo­nio, post­quam he­res ex­sti­tit, ad­mis­sus est. 4Si for­te per er­ro­rem cau­tio de­fen­sio­nis omis­sa sit ex cau­sa fi­dei­com­mis­si fi­lius do­tem ac­ce­pe­rit, ut in­de­bi­tum fi­dei­com­mis­sum non re­pe­te­re­tur: cau­tio­nes enim prae­stan­dae ne­ces­si­tas so­lu­tio­nem mo­ra­tur, non in­de­bi­tum fa­cit quod fuit de­bi­tum: sed non erit in­iquum he­redi sub­ve­ni­ri. 5Quid er­go si pa­tris he­res sol­ven­do non sit? non­ne ius­te mu­lie­ri da­bi­tur ad­ver­sus vi­rum uti­lis ac­tio do­tis? cui dos perire non de­bet, quia non in­ter­po­suit per er­ro­rem he­res cau­tio­nem.

7Papinianus, Questions, Book XVIII. A father bequeathed to his disinherited son the dowry which he had received from his daughter-in-law. If the heir of the father should file an exception on the ground of bad faith, he will not be compelled to pay the legacy, unless security is given him that he will be indemnified in case the marriage is dissolved. 1But if, before the legacy has been paid to the son, the woman should recover her dowry, the son will in vain bring an action to recover the legacy. 2If, however, the Falcidian Law is applicable to the legacy of the dowry against the disinherited son, and the woman should have ratified the payment, she will be granted a dotal equitable action, based on the amount of the legacy which the heir retained. But if she should not ratify it, the heir must be defended against her by the husband, who promised that he would do so, but if the latter should alone be compelled to undertake the defence, an action on the judgment for the amount claimed under the Falcidian Law will be granted against the heir, if security is not furnished. 3But if the wife should obtain a divorce from the son before the legacy is paid, although she cannot yet secure her dowry, the action of the son will, nevertheless, not be deferred for that reason; because when it was decided that the dowry should be paid to him at that time, it was also held that this should not be done unless he became the heir to a portion of his father’s estate, and that, after the marriage was dissolved, and he had accepted the estate, would have been admitted to receive the dowry before distribution. 4If security for the defence of the heir should have been neglected through mistake, and the son should receive the dowry under a trust, the trust cannot be claimed again as not having been due; for the necessity of furnishing security causes delay, and does not render that not due, which actually was due. Hence it will not be inequitable to grant relief to the heir. 5But what if the heir of the father was not solvent? Could not a prætorian dotal action legally be granted to the woman against her husband; for her dowry should not be lost merely because the heir failed to give security through mistake?

8Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo re­spon­so­rum. Vir uxo­ri, quae do­tem in man­ci­piis ha­be­bat, pe­cu­niam pro do­te le­ga­ve­rat: vi­vo vi­ro man­ci­piis mor­tuis uxor post vi­rum vi­ta de­ces­sit. ad he­redem eius ac­tio le­ga­ti rec­te trans­mit­ti­tur, quon­iam ma­ri­ti vo­lun­tas ser­van­da est.

8The Same, Opinions, Book VII. A man bequeathed a sum of money, in lieu of her dowry, to his wife, who had brought him her dowry in slaves. The slaves having died during the lifetime of the husband, his wife died after he did. The right of action to recover the legacy will pass by law to her heir, as the will of the husband must be executed.

9Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo re­spon­so­rum. ‘Uxo­ri meae fun­dum Cor­ne­lia­num et quae nup­tu­ra op­tu­lit aes­ti­ma­ta in spe­cie­bus re­sti­tui vo­lo’. re­spon­di non aes­ti­ma­tum prae­dium in do­tem da­tum ex­cep­tum non vi­de­ri, sed uni­ver­sa do­te prae­le­ga­ta re­rum aes­ti­ma­ta­rum pre­tium non re­lic­tum, ve­rum ip­sas res, qua­les in­ve­ni­ren­tur.

9The Same, Opinions, Book VIII. “I desire that the Cornelian Estate, and whatever property my wife brought me at the time of her marriage, and which was appraised, be returned to her in kind.” I held that the said tract of land which had formed part of the dowry, but had not been appraised, did not appear to have been excepted, but that the entire dowry had been bequeathed, and that not the value of the appraised property, but the property itself had been left in the condition in which it might be found.

10Scae­vo­la li­bro oc­ta­vo quaes­tio­num. Si Se­iae pro do­te cen­tum fun­dus le­ga­tus sit idem­que Mae­vio: quod Mae­vio Fal­ci­dia au­fert, pro eo qua­si con­cur­sus non fue­rit, mu­lier plus vin­di­cet, quia am­plius sit in do­te mu­lie­ris.

10Scævola, Questions, Book VIII. If a tract of land of the value of a hundred aurei should be left to Seia, in lieu of her dowry, and the same should be devised to Mævius, the woman can recover, in addition, the amount which the Falcidian Law will take from Mævius, because they are not, so to speak, joint legatees of the same, as there is more included in the dowry of the woman than in the remainder of the land.

11Pau­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo re­spon­so­rum. Se­ia cum nu­be­ret Lu­cio Ti­tio, de­dit do­tis no­mi­ne cen­tum au­reos et ad­hi­buit Quin­tum Mu­cium, qui ni­hil nu­me­ra­vit, sed do­tem sti­pu­la­tus est, si mor­te mu­lie­ris so­lu­tum fue­rit ma­tri­mo­nium. Se­ia mo­riens tes­ta­men­to suo ita ca­vit: ‘Lu­cio Ti­tio ma­ri­to meo, cui ma­xi­mas gra­tias ago, da­ri vo­lo su­per do­tem, quam ei de­di, tot au­reos’. quae­ro, cum in­sti­tuit Lu­cium Ti­tium con­ve­ni­re Quin­tus Mu­cius ex sti­pu­la­tu ac­tio­ne, an re­pel­le­re eum ma­ri­tus pos­sit ex ver­bis tes­ta­men­ti. re­spon­dit, si Quin­tus Mu­cius man­dan­te Se­ia non do­na­tio­nis cau­sa sti­pu­la­tus est, he­redi­bus mu­lie­ris eum te­ne­ri et id­eo Quin­tum Mu­cium ex­cep­tio­ne re­pel­len­dum es­se. quod si do­na­tio­nis cau­sa Se­ia sti­pu­la­ri per­mis­sis­set, vi­de­ri eum in eum ca­sum, qui mor­te mu­lie­ris ex­sti­tit mor­tis cau­sa sti­pu­la­tum: et id­eo fi­dei eius com­mit­ti po­tuis­se in eum ca­sum di­cen­dum fo­re.

11Ad Dig. 33,4,11Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 658, Note 3.Paulus, Opinions, Book VII. Seia, when she married Lucius Titius, gave him a hundred aurei by way of dowry, and called in Quintus Mucius, who did not pay anything, but stipulated for the return of the dowry, if the marriage should be dissolved by the death of the wife. Seia, at the time of her death, provided as follows by her will: “I wish the sum of so many aurei to be given to my husband, Lucius Titius, to whom I am under many obligations, in addition to what I have given him as my dowry.” I ask, if when Quintus Mucius instituted proceedings against Lucius Titius by an action founded on the stipulation, could the husband defeat him by setting out the terms of the will? The answer was that, if Quintus Mucius made the stipulation under the direction of Seia, and not for the purpose of making a donation, he will be liable to the heirs of the woman, and therefore Quintus Mucius will be barred by an exception. If, however, Seia permitted him to make the stipulation as a donation, he will be in the same position as one who had stipulated mortis causa, and therefore it must be said that in this instance he could have been charged with the execution of the trust.

12Scae­vo­la li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Qui do­tem in pe­cu­nia nu­me­ra­ta et aes­ti­ma­tis re­bus ac­ce­pe­rat, uxo­ri ita le­ga­vit: ‘Se­iae uxo­ri meae, si om­nes res, quae ta­bu­lis do­ta­li­bus con­ti­nean­tur, he­redi meo ex­hi­bue­rit et tra­di­de­rit, sum­mam do­tis, quam mi­hi pro ea pa­ter eius in­tu­lit, da­ri vo­lo: hoc am­plius de­na­rios de­cem’. quae­si­tum est, cum res in do­tem da­tae plu­res ip­so usu fi­ni­tae es­sent nec mo­rien­te ma­ri­to fue­rant, an qua­si sub im­pos­si­bi­li con­di­cio­ne le­ga­tum da­tum de­bea­tur. re­spon­di vi­de­ri con­di­cio­ni pa­ri­tum, si quod ex re­bus in do­tem da­tis su­per­erat, in po­tes­ta­tem he­redis per­ve­nit.

12Scævola, Opinions, Book III. Where a husband who had received a dowry from his wife in money, and other property which had been appraised, made a bequest to her as follows: “If my wife, Seia, should be able to show to my heir all the property contained in her dotal contract, and pay to him the amount which her father gave me for her, by way of dowry, I wish ten denarii over and above this sum to be paid to her.” As there was considerable property belonging to the dowry which was worn out by use and which did not exist at the time of the death of the husband, the question arose whether the legacy should be paid under an apparently impossible condition. I answered that the condition would seem to have been complied with, if what remained of the property given as dowry had come into the hands of the heir.

13La­beo li­bro pri­mo pi­tha­no­rum a Pau­lo epi­to­ma­to­rum. Paulus: si fi­lius fa­mi­lias, uxo­rem cum ha­be­ret, do­tem ab ea ac­ce­pe­rat, de­in­de pa­ter fa­mi­lias fac­tus do­tem ei ut so­let le­ga­vit: quam­vis pa­tri he­res non erit, ta­men id le­ga­tum de­be­bi­tur.

13Labeo, Abridgment of Probabilities by Paulus, Book I. Paulus: If a son under paternal control, who had a wife from whom he had received a dowry, should afterwards become the head of a household, and, as is customary, bequeath the dowry to her, the legacy will still be due, even though he did not become the heir of his father.

14Scae­vo­la li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Theo­pom­pus tes­ta­men­to fac­to duas fi­lias et fi­lium ae­quis par­ti­bus in­sti­tuit he­redes et co­di­cil­lis ita ca­vit: ‘τὴν θυγατέρα μου Κρισπίναν, ἣν ηὐχόμην ἐκδοῦναι, ᾧ ἂν οἱ φίλοι μου καὶ οἱ συγγενεῖς δοκιμάσωσι, προνοήσει ἐκδοθῆναι Πολλιανὸς εἰδώς μου τὴν γνώμην ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις, ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ τὴν ἀδελφὴν αὐτῆς ἐξέδωκα’. Pol­lia­nus a ma­ri­to puel­lae iu­ra­tus scrip­sit vo­luis­se pa­trem ean­dem quan­ti­ta­tem in do­tem ac­ci­pe­re et­iam mi­no­rem fi­liam, quam ma­ior ac­ce­pis­set. quae­ro, an ean­dem sum­mam do­tis no­mi­ne co­he­redes ex­tra par­tem he­redi­ta­tis mi­no­ri fi­liae prae­sta­re de­beant. re­spon­dit eum cu­ius no­tio est aes­ti­ma­tu­rum, ut ea­dem quan­ti­tas ex com­mu­ni prae­ci­pua mi­no­ri fi­liae do­tis no­mi­ne de­tur.

14Scævola, Digest, Book XV. Theopompus, having made a will, appointed his two daughters and his son equal heirs to his estate, and inserted the following provision in a codicil: “I wish my daughter, Crispina, to be married to someone of whom my friends and relatives will approve; and Pollianus, who knows my intentions, will provide for her dowry, in proportion to the equal shares of my estate which I have left to her and her sister.” Pollianus, having been sworn at the instance of the husband of the girl, stated that her father had intended the young daughter to receive as much, by way of dowry, as the elder one. I ask whether the co-heirs will be required to give the same sum to the younger daughter, over and above her share of the estate. The answer was that the magistrate, who had jurisdiction of the case, should decide that the same amount, after having been taken from the bulk of the estate, shall be given to the younger daughter, by way of dowry.

15Gaius li­bro se­cun­do de le­ga­tis ad edic­tum prae­to­ris. Li­cet pla­ceat pig­ne­ra­tas res vel in pu­bli­cum ob­li­ga­tas he­redem, qui da­re ius­sus est, li­be­ra­re de­be­re, ta­men si is qui ta­les res in do­tem ac­ce­pit do­tem prae­le­ga­ve­rit, non co­ge­tur he­res li­be­ra­re eas, ni­si aliud spe­cia­li­ter tes­ta­tor di­xe­rit.

15Gaius, Concerning Legacies under the Prætorian Edict, Book II. Although it is established that property which the heir is ordered to deliver, and which has been pledged or publicly hypothecated, must be released, still, where a husband has received property of this kind by way of dowry, and bequeaths it, his heir will not be compelled to release it, unless the testator specially desired this to be done.

16Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad Vi­tel­lium. Qui do­tem a ma­tre uxo­ris ac­ce­pe­rat et sti­pu­lan­ti ei pro­mi­se­rat, tes­ta­men­to uxo­ri do­tem le­ga­vit. cum quae­si­tum es­set, an uxor do­tis sum­mam con­se­qui pos­set, re­spon­dit Scae­vo­la non vi­de­ri da­ri uxo­ri, quod ne­ces­se sit ma­tri red­di. alias sic re­spon­dit non vi­de­ri, ni­si ma­ni­fes­te uxor do­cuis­set eam tes­tan­tis vo­lun­ta­tem fuis­se, ut one­ra­re he­redes du­pli­ci prae­sta­tio­ne do­tis vel­let.

16Ad Dig. 33,4,16Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 658, Note 3.Paulus, On Vitellius, Book II. A certain man received a dowry from the mother of his wife, and, after having entered into a stipulation with her, left the dowry to his wife by his will. The question having arisen whether the wife could recover the amount of the dowry, Scævola was of the opinion that it did not seem to be necessary to return to the mother what had been given to the wife; or in other words, he held that unless the wife could clearly prove that this was the wish of the testator, it did not appear that he intended to burden the heirs with a double payment of the dowry.

17Scae­vo­la li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Uxo­ri ita le­ga­vit: ‘uxor mea quid­quid ei com­pa­ra­vi et quod mi­hi de­dit e me­dio si­bi su­mat’: quae­ro, an dos prae­le­ga­ta vi­dea­tur. re­spon­dit ver­bis quae pro­po­ne­ren­tur vi­de­ri et de do­te le­ga­ta lo­qui, ni­si aliud tes­ta­to­rem vo­luis­se pro­ba­re­tur. 1‘Ti­tiae uxo­ri meae, quan­ta pe­cu­nia ad me in­ve sti­pu­la­tio­nem do­tis eius no­mi­ne per­ve­nit, quae dos est do­ta­li­bus duo­bus con­sig­na­tis in­stru­men­tis cen­tum au­reo­rum’. quae­si­tum est, an utram­que sum­mam con­se­qui pos­sit. re­spon­dit ni­hil pro­po­ni, cur non pos­sit.

17Scævola, Opinions, Book III. A man made a bequest to his wife as follows: “Let my wife take from the bulk of my estate whatever I have obtained for her use, and what she has given to me.” I ask whether it should be held that a preferred legacy of her dowry had been bequeathed. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, the legacy of the dowry should also be understood to be meant, unless it was proved that the intention of the testator was otherwise. 1“I give to my wife Titia, the money which came into my hands as her dowry, or has been stipulated for as such, which is evidenced by two dotal instruments, duly sealed, and amounts to the sum of a hundred aurei.” The question arose whether the woman can recover both sums. The answer was that there seems to be no reason why she cannot do so.