Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXIX5,
De senatus consulto Silaniano et Claudiano: quorum testamenta ne aperiantur
Liber vicesimus nonus
V.

De senatus consulto Silaniano et Claudiano: quorum testamenta ne aperiantur

(Concerning the Silanian and Claudian Decrees of the Senate by the Provisions of Which Wills Cannot Be Opened.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­ge­si­mo ad edic­tum. Cum ali­ter nul­la do­mus tu­ta es­se pos­sit, ni­si pe­ri­cu­lo ca­pi­tis sui cus­to­diam do­mi­nis tam ab do­mes­ti­cis quam ab ex­tra­neis prae­sta­re ser­vi co­gan­tur, id­eo se­na­tus con­sul­ta in­tro­duc­ta sunt de pu­bli­ca quaes­tio­ne a fa­mi­lia ne­ca­to­rum ha­ben­da. 1Do­mi­ni ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­tur qui ha­bet pro­prie­ta­tem, et­si usus fruc­tus alie­nus sit. 2Qui ser­vum bo­na fi­de pos­se­dit, do­mi­ni ap­pel­la­tio­ne non con­ti­ne­bi­tur, nec qui usum fruc­tum so­lum ha­buit. 3Ser­vus pig­no­ri da­tus, quod at­ti­net ad de­bi­to­ris ne­cem, per om­nia per­in­de ha­be­tur at­que si pig­no­ri da­tus non es­set. 4Ser­vi ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam hi con­ti­nen­tur, qui sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­ti sunt: nam me­dio tem­po­re he­redis sunt, nec quod con­di­cio ex­is­tens ef­fi­cit, ut de­si­nant es­se he­redis, fa­cit ne vi­dean­tur in­ter­im eius. idem­que erit di­cen­dum in sta­tu­li­be­ro. 5Sed in eo, cui fi­dei­com­mis­sa li­ber­tas pu­re de­be­tur, ex­stat re­scrip­tum di­vi Pii ad Iu­ven­tium Sa­binum, quo os­ten­di­tur non es­se fes­ti­nan­dum ad tor­men­ta eius, cui fi­dei­com­mis­sa li­ber­tas de­be­tur: et ma­gis est, ne pu­nia­tur ob hoc quod sub eo­dem tec­to fuit, ni­si par­ti­ceps sce­le­ris fue­rit. 6Do­mi­ni ap­pel­la­tio­ne et­iam pro par­te do­mi­num con­ti­ne­ri di­cen­dum est. 7Do­mi­ni ap­pel­la­tio­ne et fi­lius fa­mi­lias ce­te­ri­que li­be­ri, qui in po­tes­ta­te sunt, con­ti­nen­tur: se­na­tus con­sul­tum enim Si­la­nia­num non so­lum ad pa­tres fa­mi­lias, ve­rum ad li­be­ros quo­que per­ti­net. 8Quid de­in­de di­ce­mus, si li­be­ri non sint in po­tes­ta­te? Mar­cel­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum du­bi­tat: ego pu­to ple­nius ac­ci­pien­dum, ut et­iam ad eos li­be­ros per­ti­neat, qui in po­tes­ta­te non sunt. 9In eo, qui est in ad­op­tio­nem da­tus, non pu­ta­mus lo­cum ha­be­re se­na­tus con­sul­tum, quam­vis in ad­op­ta­to lo­cum ha­bet. 10Sed nec in alum­no oc­ci­so lo­cus est se­na­tus con­sul­to. 11De ma­tris ser­vis fi­lio fi­lia­ve oc­ci­sis quaes­tio non ha­be­bi­tur. 12Si pa­ter ab hos­ti­bus cap­tus sit, quaes­tio­nem de ser­vis ha­ben­dam et sup­pli­cium fi­lio oc­ci­so ele­gan­ter Scae­vo­la ait: quod et­iam post mor­tem pa­tris pro­bat, si an­te, quam suus ei he­res ex­is­tat, oc­ci­sus fue­rit. 13Idem Scae­vo­la ait con­stan­tius de­fen­den­dum he­rede in­sti­tu­to fi­lio de his quaes­tio­nem ha­ben­dam et sup­pli­cium, qui pu­re le­ga­ti vel ma­nu­mis­si sunt, an­te ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem fi­lio oc­ci­so: quam­vis enim, si vi­ve­ret, he­rede eo ex­is­ten­te ip­sius non es­sent fu­tu­ri, at­ta­men ubi de­ces­sit, qua ex­tinc­tum le­ga­tum et li­ber­tas est, se­na­tus con­sul­to fo­re lo­cum di­cit. 14Si pa­ter ne­ca­tus sit, an de ser­vis fi­lii quaes­tio ha­bea­tur, si for­te cas­tren­si pe­cu­lio ser­vos ha­buit? et ma­gis est quaes­tio­nem de ser­vis fi­lii ha­ben­dam sup­pli­cium­que su­men­dum, li­cet non sit in po­tes­ta­te fi­lius. 15Si vir aut uxor oc­ci­si es­se pro­po­nan­tur, de ser­vis eo­rum quaes­tio ha­be­tur, quam­quam ne­que vi­ri ser­vi pro­prie uxo­ris di­can­tur ne­que uxo­ris pro­prie vi­ri: sed quia com­mix­ta fa­mi­lia est et una do­mus est, ita vin­di­can­dum at­que in pro­priis ser­vis se­na­tus cen­suit. 16Sed ne­que uxo­re oc­ci­sa ne­que ma­ri­to de ser­vis so­ce­ri quaes­tio­nem ha­ben­dam se­na­tus cen­suit: Mar­cel­lus au­tem li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum et­iam in so­ce­ri ser­vis idem quod in ma­ri­ti rec­te di­xit. 17Oc­ci­so­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne eos con­ti­ne­ri La­beo scri­bit, qui per vim aut cae­dem sunt in­ter­fec­ti, ut pu­ta iu­gu­la­tum stran­gu­la­tum prae­ci­pi­ta­tum vel sa­xo vel fus­te vel la­pi­de per­cus­sum vel quo alio te­lo ne­ca­tum. 18Quod si quis pu­ta ve­ne­no vel et­iam quo alio quod clam ne­ca­re so­leat in­ter­emp­tus sit, ad hoc se­na­tus con­sul­tum vin­dic­ta mor­tis eius non per­ti­ne­bit: hoc id­cir­co, quia to­tiens pu­nien­di sunt ser­vi, quia au­xi­lium do­mi­no non tu­le­runt, quo­tiens po­tue­runt ei ad­ver­sus vim opem fer­re et non tu­le­runt: ce­te­rum quid po­tue­runt fa­ce­re ad­ver­sus eos, qui ve­ne­no vel quo alio mo­re in­si­dian­tur? 19Pla­ne si ve­ne­num per vim in­fu­sum sit, se­na­tus con­sul­tum lo­cum ha­bet. 20Ubi­cum­que igi­tur vis ad­hi­bi­ta est quae in­ter­eme­re so­let, ibi di­cen­dum est lo­cum se­na­tus con­sul­to fo­re. 21Quid er­go, si do­mi­nus ve­ne­no non per vim ne­ca­tus es­se pro­po­na­tur? im­pu­ni­tum erit fac­tum? nul­lo mo­do: li­cet enim ces­sat se­na­tus con­sul­tum Si­la­nia­num nec quaes­tio sup­pli­cium­que de his qui sub eo­dem tec­to fue­runt ha­bea­tur, ta­men si qui con­scii vel fac­to­res sce­le­ris fue­runt, hi de­mum sup­pli­cio ad­fi­ciun­tur: et ad­iri he­redi­tas ape­ri­ri­que ta­bu­lae et­iam an­te quaes­tio­nem ha­bi­tam pos­sunt. 22Si si­bi ma­nus quis in­tu­lit, se­na­tus con­sul­to qui­dem Si­la­nia­no lo­cus non est, sed mors eius vin­di­ca­tur, sci­li­cet ut, si in con­spec­tu ser­vo­rum hoc fe­cit po­tue­runt­que eum in se sae­vien­tem pro­hi­be­re, poe­na ad­fi­cian­tur, si ve­ro non po­tue­runt, li­be­ren­tur. 23Si quis non me­tu cri­mi­nis in­mi­nen­tis, sed tae­dio vi­tae vel in­pa­tien­tia do­lo­ris si­bi ma­nus in­tu­lit, eius tes­ta­men­tum ape­ri­ri et re­ci­ta­ri mor­tis ca­sus non im­pe­dit. 24Item il­lud scien­dum est, ni­si con­stet ali­quem es­se oc­ci­sum, non ha­be­ri de fa­mi­lia quaes­tio­nem: li­que­re igi­tur de­bet sce­le­re in­ter­emp­tum, ut se­na­tus con­sul­to lo­cus sit. 25Quaes­tio­nem au­tem sic ac­ci­pi­mus non tor­men­ta tan­tum, sed om­nem in­qui­si­tio­nem et de­fen­sio­nem mor­tis. 26Hoc au­tem se­na­tus con­sul­tum eos qui­dem, qui sub eo­dem tec­to fue­runt, om­ni­mo­do pu­nit, eos ve­ro, qui non sub eo­dem tec­to, sed in ea­dem re­gio­ne, non ali­ter, ni­si con­scii fuis­sent. 27‘Eo­dem’ au­tem ‘tec­to’ qua­li­ter ac­ci­pia­tur, vi­dea­mus, utrum in­tra eos­dem pa­rie­tes an et ul­tra in­tra ean­dem diae­tam vel cu­bicu­lum vel ean­dem do­mum vel eos­dem hor­tos vel to­tam vil­lam. et ait Sex­tus sic es­se sae­pe iu­di­ca­tum, ut qui­cum­que eo lo­ci fue­runt, un­de vo­cem ex­au­di­re po­tue­runt, hi pu­nian­tur, qua­si sub eo­dem tec­to fue­runt, li­cet alii va­li­dio­ris vo­cis, alii ex­iguio­ris sunt nec om­nes un­di­que ex­au­di­ri pos­sunt. 28Iux­ta hoc ta­men vi­de­tur et di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sis­se in haec ver­ba: ‘Ser­vi quo­tiens do­mi­nis suis au­xi­lium fer­re pos­sunt, non de­bent sa­lu­ti eo­rum suam an­te­po­ne­re: po­tuis­se au­tem an­cil­lam, quae in eo­dem con­cla­vi cum do­mi­na sua fue­rat, au­xi­lium rei fer­re, si non cor­po­re suo, at cer­te vo­ce plo­ran­tem, ut hi, qui in do­mo fue­rant aut vi­ci­ni au­di­rent, hoc ip­so ma­ni­fes­tum est, quod di­xit per­cus­so­rem si­bi mor­tem mi­na­tum, si pro­clamas­set. ul­ti­mum ita­que sup­pli­cium pa­ti de­bet vel hoc, ne ce­te­ri ser­vi cre­dant in pe­ri­cu­lo do­mi­no­rum si­bi quem­que con­su­le­re de­be­re.’ 29Hoc re­scrip­tum mul­ta con­ti­net: nam ei non par­cit, qui eo­dem con­cla­vi fuit: et ei, qui ti­muit mo­ri, non ignos­cit: et quod vel vo­ce opor­teat ser­vos do­mi­nis au­xi­lium fer­re, os­ten­dit. 30Si quis in vil­la agens oc­ci­sus sit, plus quam in­iquum est, si for­te dif­fu­sa la­te prae­dia ha­beat, de om­ni­bus qui in ea re­gio­ne fue­rint ser­vis et quaes­tio­nem ha­be­ri et sup­pli­cium su­mi: suf­fi­cit er­go eos, qui cum ip­so qui oc­ci­sus di­ci­tur fue­runt et qui su­spi­cio­ne cae­dis aut con­scien­tia at­tin­gi vi­de­bun­tur, de his quaes­tio­nem ha­be­ri. 31Cum do­mi­nus in iti­ne­re es­set oc­ci­sus, de his, qui una cum eo fue­runt cum oc­ci­de­re­tur vel, cum una fuis­sent, pro­fu­ge­runt, sup­pli­cium su­men­dum est. quod si cum do­mi­no ne­mo fuit cum oc­ci­de­re­tur, ces­sant is­ta se­na­tus con­sul­ta. 32Im­pu­bes ser­vus vel an­cil­la non­dum vi­ri­po­tens non in ea­dem cau­sa erunt: ae­tas enim ex­cu­sa­tio­nem me­re­tur. 33Im­pu­be­ri au­tem utrum in sup­pli­cio tan­tum par­ci­mus an ve­ro et­iam in quaes­tio­ne? et ma­gis est, ut de im­pu­be­re nec quaes­tio ha­bea­tur: et alias so­let hoc in usu ob­ser­va­ri, ut im­pu­be­res non tor­quean­tur: ter­re­ri tan­tum so­lent et ha­be­na et fe­ru­la vel cae­di. 34Ex­cu­san­tur au­tem ser­vi, qui au­xi­lium tu­le­runt si­ne do­lo ma­lo: nam si fin­xit se quis au­xi­lium fer­re vel di­cis gra­tia tu­lit, ni­hil hoc com­men­tum ei prod­erit. 35Tu­lis­se au­tem au­xi­lium non tan­tum is vi­de­tur qui ser­va­vit do­mi­num, hoc est qui po­tuit ita opem fer­re, ut sal­vus es­set do­mi­nus, ve­rum is quo­que, qui quid­quid po­tuit fe­cit, tam­et­si do­mi­nus in­ter­fec­tus est: vel­uti si quis cla­ma­vit, ut ad au­xi­lium con­ve­ni­re­tur, aut ter­ruit ad­gres­so­res at­que si quis tur­bam con­vo­ca­vit aut si cor­pus suum ob­ie­cit vel alias cor­po­re suo au­xi­lium tu­lit. 36Non ta­men sem­per qui cla­mo­re usus est, au­xi­lium tu­lis­se vi­de­tur: quid enim, si, cum pos­set ma­nu de­pel­le­re a do­mi­no pe­ri­cu­lum, il­le cla­mo­rem in­anem ele­git? plec­ten­dus uti­que erit. 37Quid si vul­ne­ra­ti sint ser­vi, cum pro­te­ge­rent do­mi­num? di­cen­dum est par­ci eis de­be­re, ni­si si aut ip­si si­bi vul­ne­ra is­ta fe­ce­runt da­ta ope­ra, ne pu­ni­ren­tur, aut ta­lia vul­ne­ra is­ti ac­ce­pe­runt, ut pos­sent ni­hi­lo mi­nus opem fer­re, si vo­luis­sent. 38Si do­mi­nus mor­ti­fe­re vul­ne­ra­tus su­per­vi­xe­rit nec de quo­quam ser­vo­rum suo­rum con­ques­tus sit, et­iam­si sub eo­dem tec­to fue­runt, ta­men par­cen­dum il­lis erit.

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXX. As no household can be safe unless slaves are compelled, under peril of their lives, to protect their masters, not only from persons belonging to his family, but also from strangers, certain decrees of the Senate were enacted with reference to putting to public torture all the slaves belonging to a household in case of the violent death of their master. 1A person is included in the appellation of master who possesses the ownership of the slaves, even though the usufruct of the same may belong to another. 2Where anyone is in possession of a slave in good faith, but who is, in fact, free, he is not included in the appellation of master; nor is he, either, who has only the usufruct of a slave. 3A slave given by way of pledge is, so far as the death of the debtor is concerned, in every respect considered as if he had not been pledged. 4Those also are included in the appellation of slaves, who are bequeathed under a certain condition; for in the meantime they belong to the heir, and as, when the condition is fulfilled they cease to belong to him, it follows that meanwhile they should not be held to constitute part of his property. The same rule must be said to apply to the case of a slave who is to be free under a certain condition. 5A Rescript of the Divine Pius to Jubentius Sabinus is extant which has reference to a slave whose unconditional freedom was due under the terms of a trust; from which it is evident that too much haste should not be employed in the torture of a slave who is entitled to his freedom under a trust, and the better opinion is that he should not be punished, for the reason that he lives under the same roof with the testator, unless he participated in the crime. 6It must be said that he who has only a share in the ownership of a slave is also included in the appellation of master. 7Sons under paternal control, and other children who are in the power of their father, are also included in the appellation of master; for the Silanian Decree of the Senate not only refers to the heads of families, but also to the children. 8But what shall we say if the children are not subject to the authority of their father? Marcellus, in the Twelfth Book of the Digest, expresses uncertainty on this point. I think that the most liberal construction should be given to the Decree of the Senate, so that it may also include children who are not under paternal control. 9We do not think that the Decree of the Senate is applicable to the case of a son who has been given in adoption, even though it may apply to an adoptive father. 10The Decree of the Senate does not apply where a youth who is being reared is killed. 11Torture shall not be inflicted upon the slaves of a mother, where a son or a daughter have been killed. 12Scævola very properly says that where a father has been captured by the enemy, and his son is killed, the slaves of the father should be put to the torture and punished. He approves of this also being done, even after the death of the father, if the son was killed before he became the proper heir. 13Scævola also says that it may uniformly be maintained, where a son has been appointed heir and is killed before entering upon the estate, that the slaves can be put to the torture and punished, even if they have been unconditionally bequeathed or manumitted. For although even if he had lived and had become the heir, the slaves would not belong to him, therefore when he died, as both the legacies and the grants of freedom will be extinguished, he holds there is ground for the application of the Decree of the Senate. 14If the father is killed, should torture be inflicted upon the slaves of the son, if they form part of the castrense peculium? The better opinion is that the slaves of the son should be put to the torture, and subjected to punishment, even though the son is not under the control of his father. 15In the case of murder of a man and his wife, torture should be inflicted upon their slaves, although, properly speaking, the slaves of the husband do not belong to the wife, nor her slaves to him, but, for the reason that the two sets of slaves are commingled, and there is but one household, the Senate decreed that punishment should be inflicted, just as if the slaves belonged equally to both of them. 16But where the wife or the husband was killed, the Senate did not decree that the slaves of the father-in-law should be put to the torture. Marcellus, however, very properly says, in the Twelfth Book of the Digest, that what has been determined with reference to the slaves of the husband also applies to those of a father-in-law. 17Labeo states that those are understood to be included in the term “killed” who have been put to death by violence, or murdered; for instance, by having their throats cut, by being strangled, or thrown down from some height, or struck with a stone or a club, or deprived of life by the use of any other kind of weapon. 18Where a man is killed, for instance, by poison, or by some other agency which it is customary to employ secretly, this Decree of the Senate will not apply to the avenging of his death; for the reason that slaves are punished whenever they do not assist their master against anyone who is guilty of violence towards him, when they are able to do so. But what could they effect against those who insidiously make use of poison or any other method of this kind? 19It is evident that the Decree of the Senate will be applicable where poison is forcibly administered. 20Therefore, whenever such force is employed as usually causes death, it must be held that there is ground for the application of the Decree of the Senate. 21But what if the master was killed by poison, and not by violence, will the deed go unpunished? By no means. For although the Silanian Decree of the Senate may not apply, nor torture and punishment be inflicted upon those who are under the same roof, still, any who knew of the crime or were participants in it must be subjected to punishment, and the estate can be entered upon, and the will opened, even before torture is inflicted. 22Where a person lays violent hands upon himself, there is indeed no ground for the application of the Decree of the Senate; still, his death should be avenged. For example, if he committed the act in the presence of his slaves, and they could have prevented it, they should be punished, but if they were unable to prevent it, they will be free from liability. 23Where anyone lays violent hands upon himself, not through remorse for some crime which he has committed, but through being weary of life, or unable to suffer pain, the manner of his death does not prevent his will from being opened and read. 24It should also be noted that, unless it is established that a man has been killed, his slaves ought not to be tortured. Hence, it must positively be ascertained that the party owed his death to crime, for the Decree of the Senate to be applicable. 25We, however, understand the term torture to mean not merely being put to the question, but every inquiry and defence that may be made in the investigation of the death of the master. 26Again, this Decree of the Senate punishes, without exception, all those slaves, “Who live under the same roof”; but such as are not under the same roof, but in the same neighborhood, shall not be punished, unless they have knowledge of the crime. 27Let us consider what must be understood by the term “under the same roof”; whether it means within the same walls, or outside, within the same enclosure, within the same apartment, or the same house, or the same garden, or the entire residence. Sextus says that it has often been decided that wherever slaves were if they could have heard the voice of their master, they shall be punished just as if they has been under the same roof; although some persons have louder voices than others, and all cannot be heard from the same place. 28With reference to this, it appears that the Divine Hadrian also stated the following in a Rescript: “Whenever slaves can afford assistance to their master, they should not prefer their own safety to his. Moreover, a female slave who is in the same room with her mistress can give her assistance, if not with her body, certainly by crying out, so that those who are in the house or the neighbors can hear her; and this is evident even if she should allege that the murderer threatened her with death if she cried out. She ought, therefore, to undergo capital punishment, to prevent other slaves from thinking that they should consult their own safety when their master is in danger.” 29This Rescript contains many provisions, for it does not spare anyone who is in the same room, and does not excuse a slave who fears death, and requires slaves to summon aid to their masters by crying out. 30Where a master is killed while on one of his estates in the country, it would be extremely unjust if all the slaves who are in that neighborhood should be subjected to torture and punishment, if the said estate is very large. It will then be sufficient for those to be put to the torture who were with him when he was said to have been killed, and who appeared to be liable to suspicion of having committed the murder, or of having knowledge of it. 31Where a master was murdered while on a journey, the slaves who were with him at the time he lost his life, or those who had been with him and took to flight, should be subjected to punishment. If, however, no one was with him at the time he was killed, these Decrees of the Senate do not apply. 32A male or a female slave who has not yet reached the age of puberty is not included in this category, for their age is deserving of excuse. 33Shall we grant a slave, who has not yet attained puberty, indulgence merely with reference to punishment, or does this also relate to torture? The better opinion is that torture should not be inflicted upon a slave under the age of puberty; and, besides, it is the custom ordinarily observed that minors shall not be put to the torture, but only be frightened, or be whipped with a rod, or a leather thong. 34Slaves are excused who have obtained aid without fraudulent intent; for if one should pretend to be of assistance, or should bring it merely for the sake of appearance, this will be of no advantage to him. 35A slave is considered to have rendered assistance to his master not only when he has preserved him from harm, that is to say, when he could have exerted his power to the extent of saving him, but also when, although he did all that he could, he was unable to prevent his master from being killed; for example, where he cried out for the purpose of obtaining aid, or frightened the persons who were attacking his master, or if he assembled a crowd of people, or interposed his body between them and his master, or afforded him protection in any other way by means of his body. 36A slave who cries out is not, however, always considered to have aided his master; for what, if when he could have averted the danger from him, he chose to cry out in vain? He should undoubtedly be punished. 37But what if the slaves should be wounded while they are protecting their master? It must be said that they should be excused unless they inflicted wounds upon themselves purposely in order to avoid being punished; or if they did not receive wounds sufficiently serious to prevent them from still assisting their master, if they had desired to do so. 38Where the master, being mortally wounded, survives for a certain time, without complaining of any of his slaves, even if they should be under the same roof with him, they must be spared.

2Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro quin­to de co­gni­tio­ni­bus. Di­vus Mar­cus Com­mo­dus Pi­so­ni re­scrip­sit in haec ver­ba: ‘Cum con­sti­te­rit apud te, Pi­so ca­ris­si­me, Iu­lium Do­na­tum, post­ea­quam con­ter­ri­tus ad­ven­tu la­tro­num pro­fu­ge­rat vil­lam suam, vul­ne­ra­tum es­se, mox tes­ta­men­to fac­to pur­gas­se of­fi­cium ser­vo­rum suo­rum, nec pie­tas pro ser­vis nec sol­li­ci­tu­do he­redis op­ti­ne­re de­bet, ut ad poe­nam vo­cen­tur, quos ab­sol­vit do­mi­nus ip­se’.

2Callistratus, Concerning Judicial Inquiries, Book V. The Divine Marcus Commodus stated in a Rescript to Piso the following: “Since it has been proved before you, my dear Piso, that Julius Donatus, after having been alarmed by the approach of robbers, took refuge in his country-house, and was wounded, and afterwards, having executed a will, manifested his affection for his slaves, neither his regard for them, nor the solicitude of the heir should allow punishment to be inflicted upon those whom the master himself has absolved”.

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­ge­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si quis in gra­vi va­le­tu­di­ne ad­fec­tus opem do­mi­no fer­re non po­tue­rit, sub­ve­nien­dum est ei. 1Si quis mo­riens di­xis­set a ser­vo vim mor­tis al­la­tam es­se si­bi, di­cen­dum est non es­se cre­den­dum do­mi­no, si mo­riens hoc di­xit, ni­si po­tue­rit et pro­ba­ri. 2Si ma­ri­tus uxo­rem noc­tu in­tra cu­bicu­lum se­cum cu­ban­tem ne­ca­ve­rit vel uxor ma­ri­tum, ser­vi poe­na se­na­tus con­sul­ti li­be­ra­bun­tur. sed si ex­au­dis­sent et opem non tu­lis­sent, plec­ten­di erunt, non tan­tum si pro­prii es­sent mu­lie­ris, sed et­iam si ma­ri­ti. 3Si ta­men ma­ri­tus in ad­ul­te­rio de­pre­hen­sam oc­ci­dat, quia ignos­ci­tur ei, di­cen­dum est non tan­tum ma­ri­ti, sed et­iam uxo­ris ser­vos li­be­ran­dos, si ius­tum do­lo­rem ex­se­quen­ti do­mi­no non re­sti­te­runt. 4Si cum om­nes do­mi­ni ad­gres­su­ram pa­te­ren­tur, uni ser­vus opem tu­lit, an sit ex­cu­san­dus, an ve­ro quia om­ni­bus non tu­lit plec­ten­dus? et ma­gis est, ut, si qui­dem om­ni­bus fer­re po­tuit, quam­vis qui­bus­dam tu­lit, sup­pli­cio ad­fi­cien­dum: si ve­ro si­mul om­ni­bus non po­tuit, ex­cu­san­dum, quia qui­bus­dam opem tu­le­rit. nam il­lud du­rum est di­ce­re, si, cum duo­bus au­xi­lium fer­re non pos­sit, ele­git al­te­ri es­se au­xi­lio, elec­tio­ne cri­men eum con­tra­xis­se. 5Qua­re et si ser­vus mu­lie­ris ma­ri­to do­mi­nae ma­gis au­xi­lio fuit quam do­mi­nae vel con­tra, di­cen­dum est ignos­ci ei de­be­re. 6Sub­ve­ni­tur eis, qui eo tem­po­re quo do­mi­nus do­mi­na­ve oc­ci­sa est clau­si ita fue­runt si­ne do­lo ma­lo, ut erum­pe­re suc­cur­ren­di cau­sa aut com­pre­hen­den­di eos, qui cae­dem fe­ce­rint, non po­tue­rint: nec in­ter­est, a quo clau­si con­ti­ne­bun­tur: sic ta­men, si non da­ta ope­ra vo­lue­rint se ita in­clu­di, ne opem fer­re pos­sint. clu­sos ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus et si sunt vinc­ti, si ta­men ita vinc­ti, ut om­ni­no rum­pe­re vin­cu­la et au­xi­lio es­se non po­tue­rint. 7Ignos­ci­tur et­iam his qui ae­ta­te de­fec­ti sunt. 8Sur­dus quo­que in­ter in­be­cil­los nu­me­ran­dus est aut in­ter eos qui sub eo­dem tec­to non sunt, quia ut il­li per spa­tium, ita hic per mor­bum ni­hil au­dit. 9Cae­cus quo­que ve­niam me­re­ri de­bet. 10Mu­tum si­mi­li mo­do ex­ci­pi­mus, sed ibi, ubi vo­cis tan­tum au­xi­lium su­per­fuit. 11Fu­rio­sos ex­ci­pi ne­qua­quam du­bium est. 12Si quis quem eo­rum ser­vum ser­vam­ve ex ea fa­mi­lia, qui eius fa­ci­no­ris no­xius erit, re­ce­pe­rit vel ce­la­ve­rit sciens do­lo ma­lo, in ea cau­sa est, ac si le­ge quae de si­ca­riis la­ta est fa­ci­no­ris no­xius fue­rit. 13Si ex sti­pu­la­tu ser­vus de­bea­tur et cae­dem do­mi­ni ar­gue­rit et pro hoc prae­mio li­ber es­se ius­sus sit, ex sti­pu­la­to ac­tio sti­pu­la­to­ri non da­tur: nam et si sup­pli­cio ad­fec­tus fuis­set, non da­re­tur. quod si sub eo­dem tec­to non fuit, ex sti­pu­la­tu ac­tio in aes­ti­ma­tio­ne ser­vi uti­lis erit cre­di­to­ri. 14Utrum au­tem is so­lus vi­dea­tur in­di­cas­se vel ar­guis­se, qui ad hoc pro­si­lit ul­tro, an et­iam is, qui, cum ac­cu­sa­re­tur ip­se, de­tor­sit in alium cri­men? et ma­gis est, ut il­le hoc prae­mio dig­nus sit, qui ul­tro ad ac­cu­sa­tio­nem pro­si­lit. 15Hi quo­que, qui non po­tue­runt alias ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re, ut pu­ta si hac le­ge dis­trac­tus erat quis, ne ma­nu­mit­te­re­tur, pot­erunt prop­ter hoc, quod in com­mu­ne uti­le est, ad li­ber­ta­tem per­ve­ni­re. 16De his quo­que ser­vis, qui tes­ta­men­to ma­nu­mis­si sunt, per­in­de at­que ser­vis sup­pli­cium su­men­dum est. 17De his, qui an­te­quam tes­ta­men­tum oc­ci­si oc­ci­sae­ve ape­ri­re­tur pro­fu­gis­sent post­ea­que aper­to tes­ta­men­to li­be­ri scrip­ti in­ve­ni­ren­tur, per­in­de ac si de ser­vis quaes­tio ha­ben­da sup­pli­cium­que su­men­dum est: nam est ae­quis­si­mum ul­tio­ni do­mi­no­rum non ob­sta­re in­dul­gen­tiam ip­so­rum, quam quis­que ple­nio­rem es­set ex­per­tus, eo gra­vio­rem sce­le­ri suo poe­nam me­re­bi­tur. 18Quod ad cau­sam tes­ta­men­ti per­ti­nens re­lic­tum erit ab eo qui oc­ci­sus es­se di­ce­tur, id ne quis sciens do­lo ma­lo ape­rien­dum re­ci­tan­dum de­scri­ben­dum­que cu­ret, edic­to ca­ve­tur, prius­quam de ea fa­mi­lia quaes­tio ex se­na­tus con­sul­to ha­bi­ta sup­pli­cium­que de no­xiis sump­tum fue­rit. 19Ape­ri­re au­tem hic il­le vi­de­tur qui na­tu­ra­li­ter ape­rit, si­ve sint sig­na­tae si­ve non sint le­ga­tae, sed tan­tum na­tu­ra­li­ter clau­sae. 20Ape­ri­re ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus pro­hi­bi­tos nos vel pa­lam pu­bli­ce vel se­cre­to: om­nis enim aper­tu­ra pro­hi­bi­ta est. 21Si quis igno­rans oc­ci­sum ape­rue­rit, non de­bet hoc edic­to te­ne­ri. 22Et si sciens, non ta­men do­lo ape­ruit, ae­que non te­ne­bi­tur, si for­te per im­pe­ritiam vel per rus­ti­ci­ta­tem igna­rus edic­ti prae­to­ris vel se­na­tus con­sul­ti ape­ruit. 23Si quis ta­bu­las qui­dem non ape­ruit na­tu­ra­li­ter, li­num au­tem in­ci­de­rit, ex­cu­sa­tus erit, quia do­lo ca­ret, qui ip­sas ta­bu­las non ape­ruit. 24Si au­tem non to­tum tes­ta­men­tum, sed pars eius aper­ta sit, di­cen­dum est in edic­tum in­ci­dis­se eum qui ape­ruit: par­vi enim re­fert, utrum to­tum an pars ape­ria­tur. 25Si quis co­di­cil­los ape­rue­rit, tes­ta­men­tum non ape­rue­rit, in edic­tum in­ci­dit: nam et co­di­cil­li ad cau­sam tes­ta­men­ti per­ti­nent. 26Item si­ve iu­re va­leat id quod aper­tum est si­ve non va­leat, at­ta­men edic­to lo­cus est. 27Ea­dem ser­van­tur et de his, quae ad cau­sam sub­sti­tu­tio­nis per­ti­nent, si pu­pil­lus pu­pil­la­ve oc­ci­sus oc­ci­sa­ve es­se di­ce­tur. 28Si alius ape­ruit, alius re­ci­ta­vit, alius de­scrip­se­rit, om­nes in edic­tum in­ci­dent, qui sin­gu­la eo­rum fe­ce­runt. 29Non tan­tum ex tes­ta­men­to, sed et­iam ab in­tes­ta­to he­redi­tas ad hoc edic­tum per­ti­net, ut ne quis ad­eat bo­no­rum­ve pos­ses­sio­nem pe­tat, an­te­quam quaes­tio de fa­mi­lia ha­bea­tur, ne he­res prop­ter com­pen­dium suum fa­mi­liae fa­ci­nus oc­cul­ta­ret. 30Ele­gan­ter Scae­vo­la ait, ut quis ad he­redem suum uti­les ac­tio­nes trans­mit­tat, si for­te an­te ad­itio­nem de­ces­sit, ex­plo­ra­tum es­se de­be­re id­cir­co eum non ad­ire, quod se­na­tus con­sul­to edic­to­que ter­rea­tur. 31Si con­di­cio­ni in­tra diem ex die mor­tis prae­sti­tu­tum pa­re­re ius­si igno­ran­tia non pa­rue­runt, si id­cir­co igno­ra­tum est, quia me­tu se­na­tus con­sul­ti ape­ri­ri ta­bu­lae non po­tue­runt, suc­cur­ri­tur eis ad im­plen­dam con­di­cio­nem. 32Si et aliud im­pe­d­imen­tum sit de non ad­eun­da he­redi­ta­te vel ape­rien­da­rum ta­bu­la­rum, sit et se­na­tus con­sul­ti, ni­hil prod­es­se im­pe­d­imen­tum se­na­tus con­sul­ti, si et aliud fuit: vel­uti si prae­gnas uxor oc­ci­si fuit vel et­iam pu­ta­ba­tur et prop­ter­ea ad­ire he­redi­ta­tem in­sti­tu­tus non po­tue­rit.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. Where a slave who was suffering from serious illness could not render his master assistance, he must be granted relief. 1If anyone while dying says that he was killed by his slave, it must be held that the master should not be believed, if he made this statement at the point of death, unless it can otherwise be proved. 2If a husband should kill his wife, or a wife should kill her husband at night, while they were together in their bedroom, the slaves will not be liable to punishment under the Decree of the Senate; but if they heard cries, and did not render assistance, they shall be punished, not only if they belong to the wife, but also if they belong to the husband. 3Where, however, a husband kills his wife caught in the act of adultery; for the reason that he himself is excused, it must be held that his slaves, as well as those of his wife, are free from liability, if they did not resist their master while seeking just reparation for a grievance. 4Where several masters, owning a slave in common, are attacked, and the slave only assists one of them, shall he be excused, or, indeed, shall he be punished for not assisting all of them? The better opinion is, that he should be subjected to punishment, if he could have assisted all of them, but only assisted one. If, however, he could not assist all at the same time, he must be excused, because he only afforded aid to one, for it would be harsh to claim that where a slave could not protect two of his masters, that he was guilty of crime for having chosen to protect but one of them. 5Wherefore, if a slave belonging to the wife should assist her husband rather than his mistress, or vice versa, it must be said that he ought to be excused. 6Those slaves must be excused who, at the time their master or mistress was killed, were shut up without bad faith on their part, so that they could not break out for the purpose of rendering assistance, or of seizing those who committed the murder. Nor does it make any difference by whom they were shut up, provided this was not done on purpose to prevent them from bringing aid. We understood the term “shut up” also to mean where they are bound, provided they have been bound in such a way that they cannot release themselves, and render assistance. 7Those also are excused who are incapacitated on account of age. 8A deaf slave also should be included among those who are infirm, or who do not live under the same roof; because as the latter cannot hear anything on account of the distance, so the former can hear nothing on account of his affliction. 9A blind slave also deserves to be excused. 10We must likewise except a dumb slave, but only where he could render aid by means of his voice. 11There is no doubt whatever that slaves who are insane should be excepted. 12Where anyone knowingly receives, or conceals through fraud a male or a female slave who belonged to the deceased, and who is liable to punishment on account of not having assisted him when the crime was committed, he is in the same position as if he had been guilty of the crime as prescribed by the law enacted with reference to assassins. 13Where a slave is due by reason of a stipulation, and discloses who committed the murder of his master, and on this account is directed to be free by way of reward, an action based on the stipulation shall not be granted to the stipulator, for it would not be granted if the slave had been subjected to punishment. Where, however, the slave did not live under the same roof with his master, an equitable action based on the stipulation will be granted to the creditor to recover the estimated value of the slave. 14But does this only apply to a slave who seems to have indicated or proved who committed the crime, if he did this voluntarily; or shall he also be included who, when he was accused, threw the responsibility of the crime upon another? The better opinion is, that he is entitled to the reward who voluntarily came forward with the accusation. 15Those slaves also, who otherwise would be unable to obtain their freedom, for instance, where they have been sold on condition that they will never be manumitted, can become free by an act of this kind, because it is conducive to the public welfare. 16Punishment must also be inflicted upon slaves who have been manumitted by will, just as upon other slaves. 17Torture and punishment must also be inflicted upon any slaves who, before the will of their murdered master or mistress has been opened, take to flight, and who afterwards, when the will is opened are found to have been left their freedom, just as upon other slaves. For it is perfectly just that the kindness of their masters should not stand in the way of their being avenged, and the more the slave has enjoyed their favor, the more serious punishment he deserves for his crime. 18It is provided by the Edict that where anything has been bequeathed by will by the person who is said to have been killed, no one who is aware of this shall open, read, or copy the will, before the slaves have been tortured and punishment is inflicted upon the guilty, in compliance with the Decree of the Senate; otherwise he will be guilty of bad faith. 19He is considered to have opened a will who opens it in the ordinary way, whether it is sealed, or not fastened with a cord, but merely closed. 20We must understand the term “to open”, to mean that we are forbidden to open the will in the presence of anyone, or publicly, or secretly; for every kind of opening is prohibited. 21Where anyone who did not know of the murder opens a will he should not be held liable under this Edict. 22And if he should be aware of the death of the testator, but does not open the will in bad faith, he will also not be liable, or if he does this through inexperience, or through rusticity is not aware of the existence of the Edict of the Prætor, or the Decree of the Senate. 23Where anyone does not open a will in the ordinary way, but cuts the cord with which it is tied, he will be excused, because he is not guilty of bad faith who does not open the will itself. 24Where, not the entire will, but only a portion of the same, is opened, it must be said that the person who opens it comes within the terms of the Edict, for it makes but little difference whether the entire will, or only a part of it, is opened. 25Where anyone opens a codicil, but does not open the will, he becomes liable under the Edict, because the codicil forms a part of the will. 26There is ground for the enforcement of the Edict whether the will that is opened is valid, or not. 27The same rule applies to those matters which relate to the substitution, where a male or a female minor is alleged to have been killed. 28When one person opens a will, and another reads it publicly, and a third copies it, all of those who did these things separately will be liable under the Edict. 29This Edict has reference not only to testamentary estates but also to intestate successions, in order to prevent anyone from entering upon the estate, or demanding prætorian possession of property belonging to the same, before torture has been inflicted upon the slaves, lest an heir might conceal the crime of his slaves for his own advantage. 30Scævola very properly says that anyone will transmit to his heir the right to bring prætorian actions if he should happen to die before entering upon the estate, and it should be ascertained that he did not do so because he feared to become liable under the Decree of the Senate and the Edict. 31If I should order a condition to be complied with between a certain day and the time of my death, and the heirs do not comply with it through ignorance, and, for the reason that such ignorance existed, the will could not be opened without incurring the penalty of the Decree of the Senate; relief should be granted to the heirs to enable them to fulfill the condition. 32Where any other impediment than fear of violating the Decree of the Senate exists to prevent entrance upon the estate or opening of the will, that arising from the Decree of the Senate, if there is any other, will be of no advantage to the heir; as, for instance, if the wife of the murdered man was pregnant, or was even supposed to be in that condition, and for this reason the appointed heir could not enter upon the estate.

4Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro sex­to re­spon­so­rum. Qui pos­tu­mos he­redes in­sti­tue­rat, non na­tis pos­tu­mis uxo­rem se­cun­do lo­co scrip­sit he­redem: cum a fa­mi­lia ne­ca­tus di­ce­re­tur, uxor diem suum ob­ie­rat: he­redes mu­lie­ris ac­tio­nes ex con­sti­tu­tio­ne si­bi da­ri pos­tu­la­bant. eos ita de­mum au­dien­dos es­se re­spon­di, si mu­lier, quam in ute­ro ni­hil ges­ta­re con­sta­bat, prop­ter se­na­tus con­sul­tum he­redi­ta­tem ad­ire no­luit: alio­quin prae­gna­te ea de­func­ta nul­lam in­iu­riae que­rel­lam in­ter­ve­nis­se.

4Papinianus, Opinions, Book VI. A man appointed his posthumous children his heirs, and, in case none should be born, substituted his wife, and he was said to have been killed by his slaves, and his wife died; the woman’s heirs petitioned that the estate should be given to them by virtue of the substitution. I gave it as my opinion that they should only be heard if the wife was proved not to have been pregnant, and declined to enter upon the estate on account of the Decree of the Senate. If, however, she should die while pregnant, no complaint could be made that any injury had been done to them.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­ge­si­mo ad edic­tum. Ne­ces­sa­rios he­redes pu­to edic­to com­pre­hen­di, si se mis­ceant he­redi­ta­ti. 1Nec bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nem pe­ti prae­tor per­mit­tit: et ego pu­to ad om­nes bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio­nes hoc edic­tum per­ti­ne­re. 2Non alias bo­na pu­bli­can­tur, quam si con­sta­bit es­se oc­ci­sum pa­trem fa­mi­lias et he­redem an­te quaes­tio­nem de fa­mi­lia ha­bi­tam sup­pli­cium­que sump­tum ad­is­se he­redi­ta­tem. 3Ubi quis in­cu­ria ne­ca­tus est vel me­di­ci in­si­diis, ad­iri qui­dem he­redi­tas pot­est, sed he­redi de­fen­sio mor­tis in­cum­bit.

5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. I think that necessary heirs are included in the Edict, if they interfere in the business of the estate. 1The Prætor does not permit the possession of the estate to be demanded under these circumstances; and I think that the Edict applies to all prætorian possession. 2Property belonging to an estate shall not be confiscated, unless it is established that the head of the household was killed, and that the heir entered upon the estate before the slaves were put to the question, and punished. 3Where anyone dies through neglect, or through the treachery of a physician, his estate can be entered upon; but the duty of avenging his death devolves upon the heir.

6Pau­lus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Et­si per­cus­sor cer­tus sit, ta­men ha­ben­da quaes­tio est, ut cae­dis man­da­tor in­ve­nia­tur: uti­que au­tem ip­se ma­xi­me quaes­tio­ni da­bi­tur, quam­vis et ce­te­ri pu­nian­tur. 1Quam­vis alias in ca­put do­mi­ni ser­vi non tor­quean­tur, rec­te ta­men fiet quaes­tio, et­iam­si he­redem ac­cu­sent, si­ve ex­tra­neus he­res si­ve ex suis sit. 2Si unus ex do­mi­nis non com­pa­reat, quae­ren­dum est de ca­su eius per ser­vos, quos com­mu­nes ha­bue­runt: ma­gis enim de sa­lu­te aut ul­tio­ne do­mi­ni non com­pa­ren­tis quam in ca­put prae­sen­tis tor­que­bun­tur. 3Si ap­pe­ti­tus sit nec oc­ci­sus do­mi­nus, ni­hil se­na­tus con­sul­to ca­ve­tur: ip­se enim in fa­mi­liam suam pot­est anim­ad­ver­te­re.

6Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLVI. Even if the murderer should be well known, torture must still be inflicted, in order that the instigator of the crime may be detected. Moreover, the murderer himself shall, by all means, be put to the question, and the other slaves also punished. 1Although slaves shall not be tortured except where their master is accused of a capital crime; still, torture can be properly inflicted even if the heir is accused, whether he be a foreign, or the proper heir. 2Where one of two masters does not appear, the slaves held in common shall be put to the question to ascertain what has happened to him; for they are tortured to ascertain something with reference to the fate of the master who does not appear, rather than to avenge his death, or to obtain information which may implicate the master who is present in a capital crime. 3Where a master has been attacked, but not killed, nothing is provided by the Decree of the Senate, for he himself can punish his own slave.

7Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad se­na­tus con­sul­tum Si­la­nia­num. Et in li­ber­tos ex­tra­or­di­na­rium au­xi­lium ha­be­bit.

7The Same, On the Silanian Decree of the Senate. And in this instance, he will enjoy an extraordinary privilege with reference to his freedman.

8Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo sex­to ad edic­tum. Se­na­tus con­sul­to Pi­so­nia­no ca­ve­tur, ut, si poe­nae ob­no­xius ser­vus venis­set, quan­do­que anim­ad­ver­sum in eum es­set, ut ven­di­tor pre­tium prae­sta­ret, ne emp­to­ri in­iu­riam fe­cis­se vi­dea­tur se­na­tus. 1Si fi­lius fa­mi­lias, qui in cas­tren­si pe­cu­lio tes­ta­tus est, oc­ci­sus sit, om­ni­mo­do id de­fen­den­dum est, ut, ex qui­bus ca­si­bus ad fis­cum pa­tris fa­mi­lias bo­na per­ti­nent, his ca­si­bus et hu­ius pe­cu­lium, po­tius quam ad he­redes, qui de­li­que­runt in ad­eun­do et si­mi­li­bus ul­ti­ve non sunt.

8The Same, On the Edict, Book XLIX. It is provided by the Pisonian Decree of the Senate that: “Where a slave is liable to some penalty and is about to be punished, the vendor shall refund the price paid for him to the purchaser;” which was enacted by the Senate to avoid any injury being done to the purchaser. 1Where a son under paternal control, who has made a testamentary disposition of his castrense peculium, is killed, it should undoubtedly be maintained that under these circumstances the estate of the deceased will belong to the Treasury, if his heirs have entered upon his estate, and did not avenge his death; just as in a similar instance, the estate of the head of a household will also be forfeited.

9Gaius li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Cum fis­co ca­du­ca bo­na de­func­ti ad­di­can­tur prop­ter in­ul­tam mor­tem, in eum le­ga­to­rum ac­tio da­tur: et li­ber­ta­tes ra­tae sunt eo­rum sci­li­cet, qui se­na­tus con­sul­to ex­ci­piun­tur.

9Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. When the property of a deceased person is confiscated by the Treasury because his death was unavenged, an action is granted against it in favor of the legatees, and all grants of freedom to slaves shall be perfected; that is to say, of such as are excepted from the provisions of the Decree of the Senate.

10Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad se­na­tus con­sul­tum Si­la­nia­num. Si ex­he­redatus fi­lius, an­te­quam ad­ire­tur pa­tris he­redi­tas, oc­ci­sus sit, ex even­tu in­spi­cie­tur, ut, si ad­ita fue­rit he­redi­tas, qua­si alie­ni fuis­se vi­dean­tur: si ve­ro ir­ri­tum tes­ta­men­tum fac­tum sit, quia ip­sius es­sent si vi­ve­ret, om­nia per­in­de agun­tur ac si do­mi­nus es­set. 1Sub di­vo Tra­ia­no con­sti­tu­tum est de his li­ber­tis, quos vi­vus ma­nu­mi­se­rat, quaes­tio­nem ha­be­ri.

10Paulus, On the Silanian Decree of the Senate. Where a disinherited son is killed before the estate of his father has been entered upon, consideration must be paid to what takes place, so that, if the estate is accepted, the slaves will not be held to belong to another; but if the will should become void, measures must be taken just as if the son had been their master, because they would have belonged to him if he had lived. 1It was established by a Constitution of the Divine Trajanus that freedmen whom the deceased had manumitted could be put to the question.

11Try­pho­ni­nus li­bro se­cun­do dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Idem­que erit et de his, qui ius anu­lo­rum pe­tie­rant.

11Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book II. The same rule will apply to those who have obtained the right to wear rings.

12Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad se­na­tus con­sul­tum Si­la­nia­num. Si ser­vus a tes­ta­to­re oc­ci­so le­ga­tus sit et prae­tor pro prae­mio sta­tue­rit li­be­rum eum es­se, di­cen­dum est non im­pe­di­ri li­ber­ta­tem.

12Paulus, On the Silanian Decree of the Senate. Where a slave has been bequeathed by a testator who was murdered, and the Prætor decides that he was entitled to his freedom by way of reward, it must be said that his freedom cannot be prevented.

13Ve­nu­leius Sa­tur­ni­nus li­bro se­cun­do de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. In co­gni­tio­ne aper­ti ad­ver­sus se­na­tus con­sul­tum tes­ta­men­ti eius, qui a fa­mi­lia sua oc­ci­sus di­ca­tur, quin­quen­nii tem­pus con­sti­tu­tum est se­na­tus con­sul­to Tau­ro et le­pi­do con­su­li­bus: quod ta­men ad ex­tra­neos per­ti­net. nam­que eos, qui par­ri­ci­dii poe­na te­ne­ri pos­sunt, sem­per ac­cu­sa­re per­mit­ti­tur eo­dem se­na­tus con­sul­to.

13Venuleius Saturninus, On Public Prosecutions, Book II. During the Consulate of Taurus and Lepidus, the term of five years was established by a Decree of the Senate for the institution of criminal proceedings, where the will of a man who was said to have been killed by his slaves had been opened contrary to the Decree of the Senate, which provision, however, only applies to strangers; for, by the same Decree of the Senate, those who are liable to punishment for parricide can always be accused without reference to lapse of time.

14Mae­cia­nus li­bro un­de­ci­mo de pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis. Ex­ci­piun­tur se­na­tus con­sul­to Si­la­nia­no im­pu­be­res ser­vi. Tre­bius au­tem Ger­ma­nus le­ga­tus et­iam de im­pu­be­re su­mi ius­sit sup­pli­cium et ta­men non si­ne ra­tio­ne: nam is puer nec mul­tum a pu­be­ri ae­ta­te ab­erat et ad pe­des do­mi­ni cu­bue­rat cum oc­ci­de­re­tur nec post­ea cae­dem eius pro­di­de­rat. ut enim opem fer­re eum non po­tuis­se con­sta­bat, ita si­len­tium prae­sti­tis­se et­iam post­ea cer­tum erat, et his dum­ta­xat im­pu­be­ri­bus se­na­tus con­sul­to par­ci cre­de­bat, qui tan­tum sub eo­dem tec­to fuis­sent: qui ve­ro mi­nis­tri vel par­ti­ci­pes cae­dis fuis­sent et eius ae­ta­tis, quam­quam non­dum pu­be­ris, ut rei in­tel­lec­tum ca­pe­re pos­sent, his non ma­gis in cae­de do­mi­ni quam in ul­la alia cau­sa par­ci opor­te­re.

14Marcianus, On Public Prosecutions, Book XI. Slaves who have not reached the age of puberty are excepted from the operation of the Silanian Decree of the Senate. The Deputy, Trebius Germanus, however, ordered punishment to be inflicted upon a slave under the age of puberty; and this was not without reason, because the boy was very little under that age, and was sleeping at the feet of his master at the time when he was killed, and did not afterwards disclose that he had been murdered. As it was proved that he was unable to have assisted him, it was also certain that he afterwards kept silent; and it was held that boys under the age of puberty could only be excused from liability under the Decree of the Senate, where they had merely been under the same roof with their master, but where such slaves had been the principals or accomplices in the crime, and were of such an age as to understand what they were doing (even though they may not have reached the age of puberty), they should not be excused from responsibility for the murder of their master any more than for anything else.

15Mar­cia­nus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de de­la­to­ri­bus. Si se­quens gra­dus ul­tus fue­rit ne­cem tes­ta­to­ris, an prio­re he­redi­tas ad il­lum trans­fe­ra­tur? et ait Pa­pi­nia­nus non es­se hoc: nam poe­na il­lius hu­ius prae­mium es­se non de­bet. 1Cum ex par­te he­redi in­sti­tu­to le­ga­tum quo­que erat et in ul­cis­cen­da mor­te ces­sa­ve­rat, di­vi Se­ve­rus et An­to­ni­nus re­scrip­se­runt tam he­redi­ta­tis por­tio­nem quam le­ga­tum ei au­fe­ren­dum. 2He­redi­bus au­tem, qui in ul­cis­cen­da mor­te de­func­ti ces­sa­ve­rant, tam tes­ta­men­to quam ab in­tes­ta­to au­fe­run­tur bo­na: for­te et si qua­si pa­tro­nus venit, quam­vis hi suo iu­re ad­mit­tan­tur.

15Marcianus, On Informers. Where substitutes avenge the death of the testator, shall the estate be transferred to them? Papinianus says that it should not, for the penalty of the first degree ought not to be the reward of the second. 1Where a legacy was bequeathed to an heir appointed to a portion of the estate, and he failed to avenge the death of the deceased, the Divine Severus and Antoninus stated in a Rescript that he should be deprived of the share of the estate which had been bequeathed to him. 2Estates bequeathed by will, as well as those derived from intestate succession, must be taken away from heirs who have been derelict in avenging the death of the deceased (even if they appear as patrons), although they may be entitled to the succession as direct heirs.

16Mar­cel­lus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Do­mi­no a fa­mi­lia oc­ci­so ser­vus com­mu­nis ne­cem eius de­te­xit: fa­vo­re li­ber­ta­tis li­ber qui­dem fie­ri de­bet, pre­tii au­tem par­tem si­bi con­tin­gen­tem so­cium con­se­qui opor­tet.

16Marcellus, Digest, Book XII. Where a master was killed by one of his slaves, and a slave who was owned in common by the deceased and another party detected the criminal, he should be liberated on account of the favor due to freedom, but the partner should be paid his share of the value of the slave.

17Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo re­gu­la­rum. Prius de se fa­mi­lia tor­quen­da est et, si con­fi­tea­tur, tunc in­ter­ro­ge­tur, quo man­dan­te fla­gi­tium ad­mis­sum sit.

17Modestinus, Rules, Book VIII. The slaves should first be put to the torture, and if they confess should then be interrogated, in order that it may be ascertained at whose instigation they committed the crime.

18Idem li­bro no­no re­gu­la­rum. Et in­of­fi­cio­so tes­ta­men­to que­ri idem et mor­tem vin­di­ca­re de­func­ti non pro­hi­be­tur, id­que Pau­lus re­spon­dit.

18The Same, Rules, Book IX. It is not forbidden to complain of an inofficious testament, and to avenge the death of the defunct at the same time. Paulus rendered this opinion.

19Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo pan­dec­ta­rum. Cum do­mi­nus oc­ci­di­tur, au­xi­lium ei fa­mi­lia fer­re de­bet et ar­mis et ma­nu et cla­mo­ri­bus et ob­iec­tu cor­po­ris: quod si, cum pos­set, non tu­le­rit, me­ri­to de ea sup­pli­cium su­mi­tur.

19The Same, Pandects, Book VIII. When a master is attacked, his slaves should attempt to assist him with arms, and with their hands, with cries, and with the interposition of their bodies. If anyone should not offer assistance when he is able to do so, he shall deservedly be subjected to punishment for this reason.

20Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. He­res, qui ve­ne­ni cau­sam per­se­qui­tur, res he­redi­ta­rias ur­guen­tes or­di­na­re sal­vis pro­ba­tio­num in­di­ciis non pro­hi­be­tur.

20Papinianus, Opinions, Book II. An heir, who is instituting a prosecution for poisoning, is not forbidden to transact urgent business relating to the estate, if he preserves all evidence and proofs of the crime.

21Idem li­bro sex­to re­spon­so­rum. Prop­ter ve­ne­ni quaes­tio­nem tem­pus pe­ten­dae pos­ses­sio­nis non pro­fer­tur, cum eo quo­que sus­pen­so cri­mi­ne rec­te pe­ta­tur. aliud se­na­tui pla­cuit, cum a fa­mi­lia do­mi­nus ne­ca­tus di­ci­tur, ser­vo­rum vi­de­li­cet cau­sa, quo­rum li­ber­ta­tem quaes­tio­nis ha­ben­dae gra­tia neg­le­gi ne­ces­se est. 1Nep­tis, quae pos­ses­sio­nem aviae pe­tie­rat, mor­tem eius in­ter­fec­tam sciens non de­fen­de­rat. fi­dei­com­mis­sum, quod avia ex alio tes­ta­men­to nep­ti de­buit, in re­sti­tuen­dis fis­co bo­nis non es­se de­du­cen­dum pla­cuit: do­lus enim he­redis pu­ni­tus est. si au­tem neg­le­gen­tia mu­lier emo­lu­men­tum bo­no­rum amis­e­rit, fi­dei­com­mis­sum es­se re­ti­nen­dum in­te­gra­to iu­re de­bi­ti ra­tio­nis est. 2Prae­si­dis in­iqui­ta­te reis il­la­tae cae­dis ab­so­lu­tis he­redi­bus, qui non de­func­to­rie de­bi­tum of­fi­cium im­ple­ve­rant, quam­vis non pro­vo­cas­sent, he­redi­ta­tem au­fer­ri non opor­te­re vi­sum est.

21The Same, Opinions, Book VI. The time for demanding the possession of the property of an estate shall not be delayed on account of any question arising out of the poisoning; and the claim may properly be made while the proof of the crime is still in abeyance. The Senate determined otherwise where a master was said to have been killed by his slaves, because as it was necessary that the freedom of said slaves should not be granted them at once, in order that they might be put to the torture. A granddaughter, who had demanded possession of the estate of her grandmother, being aware that she had been killed, did not avenge her death. It was held that a trust which the grandmother owed to her granddaughter, by virtue of the will of another, should not be deducted from the estate of the grandmother, when it was confiscated by the Treasury, for the bad faith of the heir must be punished. 1If, however, the woman had lost the benefit of the bequest through mere negligence, it is just that the trust should be deducted, the right of the obligation remaining unimpaired. 2Where persons guilty of murder have been discharged through the injustice of the Governor, it is held that the heirs should not be deprived of the estate if they have properly discharged their duty, even though they may not have appealed from the decision.

22Pau­lus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Gaius Se­ius cum lan­gues­ce­ret, ques­tus est se ve­ne­no oc­ci­di a ser­vo suo et sic ex­spi­ra­vit: cui he­res ex­sti­tit Lu­cia Ti­tia so­ror et mor­tem eius ex­se­qui neg­le­xit et ip­sa post an­num de­ci­mum de­ces­sit: ex­sti­tit qui bo­na nun­tia­ret Gaii Se­ii: quae­ro, an mor­te Ti­tiae ex­tinc­tum sit cri­men. Pau­lus re­spon­dit cau­sam, de qua quae­ri­tur, cum sit pe­cu­nia­ria, mor­te in­gra­tae he­redis ex­tinc­tam non vi­de­ri.

22Paulus, Opinions, Book XVI. Gaius Seius, while in a feeble condition, complained that he had been poisoned by his slaves, and then died. His sister, Lucia Titia, became his heir, and after his death neglected to prosecute his murderer. She herself died ten years afterwards, and someone gave notice that the estate of Gaius Titius was liable to forfeiture. I ask whether the criminal prosecution was extinguished by the death of Titia. Paulus answered that, in the case stated, it did not appear to be extinguished by the death of the ungrateful heir, as a pecuniary penalty was involved.

23Mae­cia­nus li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo fi­dei­com­mis­so­rum. Si an­te­quam pa­te­fie­ret tes­ta­to­rem oc­ci­sum, ta­bu­lae tes­ta­men­ti aper­tae es­sent, de­in­de in­no­tuis­set id ad­mis­sum es­se, cau­sa co­gni­ta pu­to com­pel­len­dum in­sti­tu­tum ad­ire he­redi­ta­tem, quam su­spec­tam di­ce­ret, et ex Tre­bel­lia­no se­na­tus con­sul­to re­sti­tue­re.

23Marcianus, Concerning Trusts, Book XIII. If a will should be opened before it was known that the testator had been killed, and then the crime should be ascertained to have been committed, I think that, where proper cause is shown, the appointed heir should be compelled to enter upon the estate which he declared was insolvent, and make restitution in accordance with the Trebellian Decree of the Senate.

24Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­qua­ge­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si quis qua­si su­spec­tam he­redi­ta­tem co­ac­tus ad­it, non te­ne­tur edic­to.

24Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. Where anyone is compelled to enter upon an estate which he has reason to suspect of being insolvent, he will not be liable under the Edict.

25Gaius li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Le­ge Cor­ne­lia ca­ve­tur de prae­mio ac­cu­sa­to­ris, qui re­qui­si­vit et re­nun­tia­vit eos ser­vos, qui ex ea fa­mi­lia an­te quaes­tio­nem fu­ge­rint, ut in sin­gu­los ser­vos quos con­vi­ce­rit quin­que au­reos ex bo­nis oc­ci­si aut, si in­de red­igi ea quan­ti­tas non pos­sit, ex pu­bli­co ac­ci­piat. quod prae­mium non in om­nes ser­vos, qui sub eo­dem tec­to lo­co­ve fue­rint, sed in eos so­los, qui cae­dem ad­mi­sis­sent, ac­cu­sa­to­ri tri­bui­tur. 1Prae­ter­ea ca­ve­tur, ut de his, qui an­te quaes­tio­nem ha­bi­tam fu­ge­rint, si aper­to tes­ta­men­to li­be­ri scrip­ti in­ve­nian­tur, le­ge de si­ca­riis iu­di­cium fiat ita, ut ex vin­cu­lis cau­sam di­cant et con­vic­ti per­in­de ac ser­vi pu­nian­tur et ei qui con­vi­ce­rit de­ni au­rei prae­mii no­mi­ne da­ren­tur ex bo­nis dam­na­ti. 2Ex hoc edic­to ac­tio pro­fi­cis­ci­tur con­tra eum, qui ad­ver­sus edic­tum prae­to­ris ta­bu­las tes­ta­men­ti ape­ruis­se di­ce­tur vel si quid aliud fe­cis­se di­ce­tur: nam ut ex su­pra dic­tis ap­pa­ret, plu­ra sunt, prop­ter quae poe­na edic­ti con­sti­tu­ta est. pa­lam est au­tem po­pu­la­rem ac­tio­nem es­se, cu­ius poe­na in cen­tum au­reos ex bo­nis dam­na­ti ex­ten­di­tur: et in­de par­tem di­mi­diam ei, cu­ius ope­ra con­vic­tus erit, prae­mii no­mi­ne se da­tu­rum prae­tor pol­li­ce­tur, par­tem in pu­bli­cum red­ac­tu­rum.

25Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. It is provided by the Cornelian Law with reference to the reward to which an accuser is entitled who seeks out and gives information of the whereabouts of slaves who have fled before torture was applied, that he shall receive five aurei out of the estate of the deceased for each slave that he convicts, or if this sum can not be obtained from that source, it shall be paid out of the Public Treasury. This reward shall not be given for the apprehension and conviction of every slave who was under the same roof and in the same place with the deceased, but only for those who are found guilty of the murder. 1It is also provided with reference to those slaves who fled before torture was applied, that if, after the will has been opened, it should be found that they were granted their freedom thereby, judgment shall be rendered in accordance with the law relating to assassins: so that they cannot defend themselves after having been imprisoned, and that if they are convicted, they shall be punished just like slaves, and ten aurei shall be taken out of the estate, by way of reward, and given to the party who convicted them. 2Proceedings are instituted under this Edict against a person who, contrary to the provisions of the Edict of the Prætor, is said to have opened the will, or to have committed some other act, in violation of them; for (as in evident from what has been previously stated) there are many things on account of which the penalty prescribed by the Edict can be imposed. It is clear that this action is a popular one, and its penalty is a hundred aurei to be taken from the property of the person who is convicted; and the Prætor promises that half of said sum shall be given by way of reward to him by whose efforts the criminal was found guilty, and the other half shall be turned into the Public Treasury.

26Scae­vo­la li­bro tri­ge­si­mo quar­to di­ges­to­rum. Fi­dei­com­mis­sum, quod ex tes­ta­men­to fra­tris pa­true­lis Gaius Se­ius Ti­tio de­be­bat, ab he­redi­bus Se­ii Ti­tius ac­ce­pit: quae­si­tum est, cum ne­cem Gaii Se­ii he­redes eius non vin­di­ca­ve­rint, an Ti­tius ni­hi­lo mi­nus eos he­redes ut in­dig­nos ac­cu­sa­re pos­sit ob id, quod ne­cem eius non vin­di­ca­ve­rint, nec ob­sit ei, quod ab is­dem fi­dei­com­mis­sum ex tes­ta­men­to fra­tris pa­true­lis con­se­cu­tus sit. re­spon­dit ni­hil pro­po­ni, cur ob­sta­ret.

26Scævola, Digest, Book XXXIV. Gaius Seius owed Titius property under a trust established by the will of his cousin, and Titius received it from the heirs of Seius. The question arose, as the heirs of Gaius Seius did not avenge his death, whether Titius could, nevertheless, accuse these heirs as being unworthy to obtain the estate, because they had not avenged his death; and whether the fact that he had received from them the trust to which he was entitled under the will of his cousin, the deceased, would not stand in his way. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, there was no reason that it should be considered an obstacle.

27Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo de iu­re fis­ci. Si de plu­ri­bus he­redi­bus qui­bus­dam in­vi­tis aut igno­ran­ti­bus aper­tum erit tes­ta­men­tum, non amit­tunt por­tio­nes suas qui cul­pa ca­rent.

27Callistratus, On the Rights of the Treasury, Book I. Where there are several heirs, and the will is opened against the consent of some of them, or without their knowledge, those who are free from blame will not lose their shares of the estate.