1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. The Prætor attempts to carry out the wishes of deceased persons, and opposes the cunning of those who, by refusing to take under the will, obtain possession of the estate, or a portion of the same, on the ground of intestacy; in order to defraud legatees to whom something may be due under the will of the decedent, if the estate should not be obtained ab intestato; and he promises to grant an action against them. 1It makes little difference whether the party in question acquires the estate himself, or through someone else; for in whatever way he may be able to do so, if he does not acquire it under the will, he is in a position to be affected by the Edict of the Prætor. 2An heir is held to have omitted to take advantage of the benefits granted him by will, who, when he can order someone to enter upon the estate, declines to do so. 3But what if his slave, when ordered to enter upon the estate, after receiving the order should not obey it? The slave, however, can be compelled to do this, and therefore his master comes within the scope of the Edict. 4If, however, the master has not been informed by his slave of his appointment as heir, and he himself afterwards obtains possession of the estate on the ground of intestacy; he will not be liable under the Edict, unless he pretends ignorance of the facts. 5Ad Dig. 29,4,1,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 602, Note 6.Where the proposed case is, that the same party was, at the same time, appointed heir and substituted, and neglected to take advantage of his appointment; the question arises whether he comes within the scope of the Edict. I do not think that he does, as the testator who appointed him as substitute for himself granted him the privilege of rejection. 6Where anyone rejects an estate, he forfeits any rights to which he may be entitled under the will. 7Where children subject to the authority of their father immediately become heirs by his will, there is no reason why they cannot reject his estate. If, however, they subsequently interfere with it, they are considered to be heirs by virtue of the will, unless they refrain from taking under it, and claim possession of the property on the ground of intestacy; for, in this instance, they come within the terms of the Edict. 8Where an heir is appointed under a condition, and being able to comply with it, does not do so, when the condition is such that it depends upon the consent of the said heir, and he afterwards obtains possession of the estate on the ground of intestacy, he should be held liable under the Edict; for the reason that a conditional appointment of this kind should be considered as an absolute one. 9Ad Dig. 29,4,1,9Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 614, Note 4.When parties who have refused to take under the will obtain an estate on the ground of intestacy, we do not inquire whether they have acquired possession of the same as heirs-at-law or not, for by whatever title they may acquire possession of the estate, or a portion of it, they can be sued under the Edict, provided they do not acquire it on some other ground; for instance, where anyone rejects an estate and acquires it by means of a trust, and is placed in possession for the purpose of discharging the trust; or if you should state that be obtained possession in order to preserve a claim; as, in this instance, he cannot be compelled to answer in a suit brought by the legatees. Therefore, the Edict of the Prætor will apply whenever any one holds possession as an heir-at-law, or acquires the estate on the ground of intestacy, or holds it as a depredator, pretending that he has some title to possession on the ground of intestacy; for no matter in what way he may be pecuniarily benefited by obtaining the estate, he must pay the legacies. 10Security, however, must be furnished by the legatees, that in case the heir should be deprived of the estate by a better title the legacies shall be repaid to him; and even if the party may not have the estate in his possession, but has acted in bad faith to avoid being in possession, the result is that he will be held liable, just as if he had entered upon the estate. 11A person is considered to have acted in bad faith to avoid being in possession, who fraudulently transfers possession to someone else, in order that the legatees and others who have received anything under the will may be deprived of whatever was bequeathed to them. 12The question was asked whether anyone should not be held to have acted in bad faith who, in order to avoid being in possession, fraudulently relinquished it after having held it for some time; or whether he is also liable who did this maliciously to avoid obtaining possession in the first place. Labeo says that it seems to him that he who avoided obtaining possession in the first place is not less guilty than he who fraudulently relinquishes it, after having obtained it. This is one prevalent opinion. 13Where anyone fraudulently rejects an estate in order that it may descend to the heir-at-law, he will be liable to an action brought by the legatees.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book VII. Although he who relinquishes an estate in consideration of the payment of a sum of money may not be considered to have assumed the part of an heir, an action should, nevertheless, be granted against him, as in the case of a party who, having declined to take an estate under a will, obtains possession of it on the ground of intestacy, as the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript. For this reason he will be liable to be sued by the legatees and other beneficiaries of the estate. 1But should the action be brought against him in the beginning, and recourse then be had to the heir; or shall we change the order? The more equitable opinion seems to me to be that proceedings should first be instituted against the possessor of the estate, especially if the possession of the same is profitable to him.

3Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book III. If you receive money from a substitute in consideration of your relinquishing your claim to an estate, and he enters upon the same, it may be doubted whether an action should be granted to the legatees. I think that if the substitute should also relinquish his claim for the reason that the estate vests in him by law, and he obtains possession of it, both of you will be liable; and an action will be granted in favor of him to whom a legacy has been bequeathed, against whichever one of you he may elect to sue.

4Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. In case the heir should not receive any money, but refuses to take under the will, because he desires to confer a favor either on the substitute, or the heir-at-law, will there be ground for the application of the Edict? It would be intolerable for him to be able to prevent the execution of the will of the deceased; and therefore if it is clearly established that this was done for the purpose of injuring the legatees—even though no money was received but the act was prompted by excessive partiality—it must be said that there will be ground for an equitable action against the party who is in possession of the estate. 1It is very properly held that whenever anyone wishes to confer a favor upon another who will become the heir by his rejection of the estate, and he would not have rejected it unless he had intended to confer the favor, and especially if he did so for the purpose of preventing the execution of the will, it must, in this instance, be said that an action will lie against the possessor of the estate, with this distinction, however, that where money having been accepted, the heir rejected the estate, we can, under these circumstances, say that suit should be brought against him; but where he acted through partiality and for the purpose of defrauding those to whom something was bequeathed, the possessor of the estate should be sued in a prætorian action. 2Although the Prætor seems to refer to appointed heirs, still, this provision also extends to others; for instance, where there is a legatee who has been charged with a trust, and he causes the estate to be rejected through his fraudulent act, suit should be brought against him. 3Where anyone sells his right to an estate, he is held to remain in possession of the same, and not to have acted fraudulently in order to avoid being in possession.

5Marcellus, Digest, Book XII. A patron is held to be excused who rejects an appointment as heir, when he has been appointed heir by his freedman in a different way than he ought to have been. For if his slave should have been appointed sole heir to an estate, and on account of some accident was not able to enter upon it by order of his master, he can, with impunity, decline to accept the estate given him by the will.

6Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. For the reason that a party who is in possession of an estate on the ground of intestacy can be sued if he relinquishes his rights under the will, the question arose whether he can be compelled to make payment if he seems to have relinquished them in compliance with the wishes of the testator. For example, a man appointed a brother his heir, and then executed a codicil requesting his brother, if the estate should come to him by law, to discharge a trust in favor of certain individuals; and therefore it should be considered, he having renounced his rights under the will and obtained possession of the estate on the ground of intestacy, whether he will be liable to the legatees. Julianus states, in the Thirty-first Book of the Digest, that he can be compelled in the first place to pay the legacies, and afterwards, they having been settled, should anything be remaining from the three-fourths of the estate, he can be required to discharge the trust. If, however, the legacies exhaust three-fourths of the estate, then nothing shall be paid under the trust, for the heir-at-law must have the fourth undiminished. Hence the order was established by Julianus that the legacies should first be discharged, and the trusts paid out of the remainder, with the understanding that the fourth should remain intact. I think that the opinion of Julianus should be adopted, so that if the estate was rejected under the will, in order that it might be obtained ab intestato, the party ought by all means to be compelled to pay the legacies, for the reason that the testator who left him the trust to be discharged in case the succession was intestate did not authorize him to reject the estate under such circumstances. 1If, however, it is evident that the testator expressly authorized him to do this, he will not become liable under the Edict, because he availed himself of the privilege which the testator granted him. But if the testator did not under the will specifically grant him the privilege of rejecting the estate, the order prescribed by Julianus should be followed. 2But what shall we say where legacies are left by will, and trusts in case of intestacy, to the same person, and, in addition to this, trusts are left to other parties? Shall we follow the same order established by Julianus, or shall we subject all the trustees to contribution as if they were equal? The better opinion is to ascertain whether it makes much difference if the heir becomes liable under the Edict, or not; for if he does become liable, those are to be preferred to whom something was left by the will; but if he does not, as it was the wish of the testator to grant him the privilege of succeeding ab intestato, or because he was admitted for some other reason, which, in accordance with what we have above stated, is not in violation of the Edict, it must be said that all the trusts ought to contribute as if they had all been placed on the same footing. 3The Prætor does not promise to grant the action indiscriminately, but only where proper cause is shown; for if he should ascertain that the testator was the author of this arrangement, and himself had permitted the heir to succeed ab intestato, or if he should find that there was any other good reason for the rejection of the estate, he will not grant the legatees an action against him. 4Also if the Prætor should ascertain that the property belongs to another, he will not grant an action, provided no suspicion of collusion influences the decision of the Prætor. 5Where, however, the person who can be deprived of the estate has in his possession any portion of the same, and relinquishes possession of it without being guilty of fraud, the better opinion is that he ceases to be liable to be sued. 6What time then shall we consider, when investigating as to whether he is in possession or not? The time when issue was joined should be considered. 7It is evident that where anyone is in possession of the property of an unclaimed estate, and that the term of four years has elapsed, suit can undoubtedly be brought against him, under this Section of the Edict, both for the reason that he refused to take under the will and because he is in possession on the ground of intestacy, and, indeed, as he is rendered safe by prescription on account of the expiration of four years. 8Where a patron is appointed heir to the share of an estate to which he is entitled, and a co-heir is appointed with him, and he rejects the appointment for his share, because what is due to him has been already exhausted, and the co-heir also rejects his portion; and then the patron obtains possession of the entire estate ab intestato, by operation of law; Celsus says in the Sixteenth Book of the Digest that the same action should be granted against him which could have been brought against his co-heir Titius, and that it will be sufficient for the patron to have for himself the entire share to which he was legally entitled. This, however, is correct only where the co-heir is in collusion with the patron, for otherwise, the latter cannot be compelled to pay the legacies, as it is not forbidden for anyone to refuse an estate, if he does so without being guilty of fraud. 9The better opinion is, that this Edict also applies to the prætorian possession of an estate contrary to the provisions of the will, so that, where a party, by taking possession of the estate in opposition to the will, must pay the legacies to the children, and the parents, and if he should fail to obtain possession of the estate, and should acquire possession of it on the ground of intestacy, he can be compelled to pay whatever he would have paid if he had obtained possession of the estate in opposition to the will. 10Where freedom has been given to a slave on the condition of his paying ten aurei, and his rights under the will are relinquished by the heir, the slave will not be liberated unless the condition is complied with.

7Marcellus, Digest, Book XII. A certain man appointed Titius and Mævius his heirs, and bequeathed a hundred aurei to Titius, and both of them relinquished their rights under the will, and entered upon the estate as heirs-at-law. Titius cannot properly bring an action to recover his legacy. The same rule will apply where the testator bequeathed legacies to both the heirs.

8Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. Where a person becomes an heir under the condition of paying ten aurei, or under any other condition which consists of either giving or doing something, and the heir, having relinquished his rights under the will, obtains possession of the estate on the ground of intestacy, it should be considered whether or not relief should be granted to him for whose benefit the condition was imposed. The better opinion is that he is not entitled to relief, for he is not a legatee.

9Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLV. But if the parties still have time to comply with the condition, he will not be liable under this section of the Edict.

10Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. Where he who has relinquished his rights under the will is not alone, but together with another party has possession of the estate, Julianus very properly says, and his opinion is approved by Marcellus, that an equitable action should also be granted against him in favor of the legatees, for he ought not to object because the act of the appointed heir prejudices him, since he also profited by it. This, however, is correct where the person who relinquishes his rights under the will did not receive any money for doing so, for he will then be liable for the entire amount. 1Where legacies have been left to be discharged by appointed heirs in favor of substitutes, and the said appointed heirs as well as the substitutes have obtained possession of the estate on the ground of intestacy, after their rights under the will have been relinquished by them, the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that the appointed heirs can honorably refuse to pay the legacies bequeathed to the substitutes; for they may very properly refuse to pay any legacy or trust to a substitute who claims it, if he was free to enter upon the estate, and to obtain all the property belonging to it without demanding the discharge of the trust. 2Where there are two heirs, one of whom was appointed and the other substituted, and both of them having relinquished their rights under the will obtain possession of the estate ab intestato; the question arises whether both of them can be compelled to pay the legacies, and whether each one of them is obliged to pay those legacies, with which he was charged, or whether both of them should pay the legacies together. I think an action should be granted in favor of the legatees against each one of them, for the payment of all the legacies; but let us consider whether each one is obliged to pay the legacies with which he himself was charged, or also those with which the other heir was charged. Let us also suppose that the appointed heir alone was in possession of the estate: will he be liable to an action for the payment of the legacies with which he was charged, or will he be also responsible for those with which the substitute was charged? It must be held that he will only be liable for the legacies with which the substitute was charged in case the estate should come into the hands of the heirs appointed under the will, on account of the bad faith of the substitute, where no money was paid; for if the substitute received any money, he himself should be sued. Moreover, if the substitute alone is in possession of the estate, and the appointed heir should reject it in consideration of having received a sum of money, we say that he will be liable to his legatees, and the substitute to his own; but where no money has been paid, we will grant an action against the substitute. If, however, both parties are in possession, the better opinion is that each one will be liable to his respective legatees.

11Javolenus, Epistles, Book VII. Where the same property has been bequeathed to me to be delivered by both the appointed and the substituted heirs, and they, having relinquished their rights under the will, have possession of the estate by operation of law, the entire legacy is due to me from both of them; still, if I have obtained it from one, I cannot collect it from the other, hence I can proceed against whichever one of them I choose.

12Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. The question also arose in this case with respect to grants of freedom, whether it was proper that they should be conferred by both of the heirs, when the one appointed as well as the substitute were charged with their execution. The better opinion is that both those which were direct and those which were granted in trust become operative. 1It is established that the heir of anyone who relinquished his rights under a will in order to obtain possession of the estate on the ground of intestacy is liable in an action brought by the legatees to recover the entire amount; for the proceeding rather has reference to the recovery of the property than the penalty, and therefore the action is a perpetual one. This, however, will not be the case if the heir is sued on account of the bad faith of the deceased, for then an action can be brought against him for the property which came into his hands.

13Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. Even if the heir should not come into possession of the entire estate, or a large portion of the same on the ground of intestacy, but only of a very small part of that for which he was appointed, and also where he only holds a single article belonging to it, he will be liable under this Edict.

14The Same, Concerning Testaments; On the Edict of the Urban Prætor, Book II. Even though, properly speaking, a single article is not understood to be part of an estate.

15The Same, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. For this is not unjust, since the person suffers this inconvenience through his own fault,

16The Same, Concerning Testaments; On the Edict of the Urban Prætor, Book II. For since an estate can be claimed on the ground of hereditary right by a party, who is in possession of a single article belonging to it, it cannot be doubted that what we have stated is true.

17The Same, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. If anyone, having relinquished his rights under the will, should not be in possession of the entire estate, the legatees are excluded; for everyone should be free to reject even a profitable inheritance, even though in this way legacies and grants of freedom may be annulled. It has been provided, however, with reference to estates bequeathed in trust, that if the appointed heir should decline to accept the estate, he can be compelled to do so by order of the Prætor, and to surrender it to the beneficiaries of the trust; but this advantage is not enjoyed by those to whom separate articles have been bequeathed by way of trust, any more than it is by legatees.

18The Same, Concerning Testaments; On the Edict of the Urban Prætor, Book II. Where two appointed heirs, both having relinquished their rights under the will, obtain possession of an estate on the ground of intestacy, then, in accordance with the Prætorian Law, both will be considered as having entered upon the estate under the will, and an action will lie against each of them for his respective share. 1We should note that the benefit of the Lex Falcidia must be accorded to the heir against whom an action is granted in favor of the legatees by this section of the Edict.

19The Same, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. Moreover, where a patron has been appointed heir to the whole estate, and by renouncing his rights under the will obtains possession ab intestato, he should always be entitled to the benefit of the share which is due to him, and which he would have obtained if he had entered upon the estate by virtue of the will.

20Ulpianus, Disputations, Book IV. Where the same property was left to different persons, and both the appointed heir and the substitute were charged with its delivery, both of said legatees are not entitled to recovery, but only the one who received it from the appointed heir.

21Julianus, Digest, Book XXVII. If my son should be appointed heir by his mother, and I, having relinquished my testamentary rights, demand possession of the estate in the name of my said son, an action in favor of the legatees should be granted against me, just as if I myself had been appointed the heir, and, having relinquished my rights under the will, had obtained possession of the property of the estate on the ground of intestacy.

22The Same, Digest, Book XXXI. Where the following provision was inserted into a will: “Let Titius be my heir, and if Titius becomes my heir, let Mævius become my heir”; and Titius, having relinquished his testamentary rights, obtains possession of the estate as heir-at-law, the petition to recover the estate should not be granted against him in favor of Mævius for the share of the estate to which he would have been entitled, if Titius had not relinquished his hereditary rights. For, as the heir obtains possession of the estate when testamentary rights are relinquished, the legacies and grants of freedom must be taken into account, since otherwise they cannot be granted except by the heir. The Prætor, however, cannot intervene where an estate is disposed of in this way, for the testator is to blame for having bequeathed a part of it under such a condition, when he could have bequeathed it absolutely. 1Wherefore, if the following provision was inserted into a will: “Let Titius be my heir, and if any of the above-mentioned persons whom I have appointed becomes my heir, let Stichus be free and my heir”, and Titius having relinquished his rights under the will obtains possession of the estate, the Prætor cannot assure Stichus of his freedom, nor can he grant him an action for the recovery of the estate. 2Where anyone draws up a will as follows: “Let Titius be my heir, and if Titius should not become my heir, let Mævius be my heir, and if any of the heirs whom I have previously appointed becomes my heir, I bequeath a hundred aurei to Mævius, if he should not become my heir”. Titius relinquished his rights under the will and obtained possession of the estate by operation of law, and the question arises whether an action for the recovery of the estate should be granted to Mævius, in whose power it was to acquire it all by entering upon the same by virtue of the substitution. It was decided that Mævius would be entitled to the action, because nothing prevented him from having a good reason for not involving himself in the affairs of the estate.

23Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XLVI. Where a son, who is under the control of his father, and also a daughter were appointed heir, an emancipated brother, having been passed over, obtained possession of the estate in opposition to the will. By this means the heirs acquired the estate of their father on the ground of intestacy, and paid all the legacies. The daughter, however, did not divide her dowry with her brother, as she was held to be entitled to her share of the estate as an appointed heir.

24Paulus, On the Edict, Book LX. Where a ward relinquishes his testamentary rights through the fraudulent representations of his guardian, and obtains the estate as heir-at-law, actions to recover the legacies should be granted against the ward, but only to the extent that the estate had been acquired by him. But what if he had obtained possession of the estate along with another? 1Many authorities think that this rule should be observed only with reference to a youth who has arrived at puberty, and that he should only be liable for the share of the estate in his possession; even though the Prætor grants an action against him just as if he had entered upon the estate.

25Celsus, Digest, Book XVI. A man for whom his own slave was substituted ordered him to enter upon the estate. If he did this for the purpose of avoiding payment of the legacies, he shall pay them all, both for the reason that he is the heir, and because having relinquished his rights under the will he has possession of the estate by virtue of the substitution, with the exception of the portion reserved by the Falcidian Law.

26Papinianus, Questions, Book XVI. Julianus says that where a father ordered his daughter, who had been appointed a substitute for himself, to accept an estate; he will, by the terms of the Edict, be compelled to pay the legacies with which he was charged, since his daughter was substituted instead of her father, and the latter was not given the right of choice. Where, however, the different legacies amount to more than three-quarters of the estate, an account must be taken, in the first place, of those with which the daughter was charged, for fraud will be imputed to the father, if, having rejected the honor conferred upon him, he prefers the appointment of another as heir, on account of the benefit which may accrue to him therefrom. 1Julianus thinks that if a father who is substituted for his daughter enters upon an estate, he will not be guilty of bad faith, for no one is considered to have substituted a father for his daughter against the will of the parent, but in order that he might have the power of making his choice.

27The Same, Opinions, Book VI. Where a mother is substituted for her son under the age of puberty, there is ground for the application of the Edict, if, having relinquished her testamentary rights, she obtains possession of the estate of her son by operation of law. The same rule applies if she should be appointed the heir and also the substitute of her son. 1A brother is not considered to come within the terras of the Edict, so far as the legacies are concerned, who did not emancipate his son who had been substituted for a boy under the age of puberty by the will of his brother; but he will obtain possession of the property of the estate through him on the ground of intestacy. 2An action in favor of the legatees will be granted by the decree of the Prætor against a party who was not appointed testamentary heir, if he participated in a fraudulent agreement with the appointed heirs in order to obtain sole possession of the estate by operation of law.

28Marcianus, Trusts, Book IV. Where a master sells a slave whom he had appointed his heir, and who himself had been charged with a trust, and he does this before he orders him to enter upon the estate, he should discharge the trust, because by obtaining the price of the slave he also obtained the value of the estate. 1Where a party is appointed heir and is requested to deliver the estate, and having relinquished his testamentary rights, obtains possession of the estate by operation of law, there is no doubt that he can be compelled to surrender the estate, and also the legacies and other property left in trust, as well as execute any grants of freedom direct, as well as indirect. Where, however, he is charged to manumit slaves belonging to others, he should redeem them, and he to whom the estate was surrendered, as well as he who surrenders it, must both share the loss.

29Ulpianus, Trusts, Book V. Where anyone, having relinquished his rights under the will, obtains possession of an estate on the ground of intestacy, he must bestow freedom on the slaves, nor can this act of him who declines to take under the will injure them, as they become his freedmen.

30Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book III. Where an heir, having relinquished his rights under the will, obtains possession of the estate as a purchaser, or on account of a dowry, or by way of donation, or by any other title except that of heir or possessor, he will not be liable to an action brought by the legatees.