1Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book V. It is established that an appointment made under a condition which is impossible, or through mistake, is not void.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book VI. Where it was stated in a will: “Let a certain slave, if he should be mine”; or, “If he should be mine at the time I die, be my heir”, the question arises how should the term “mine” be understood. If the testator should alienate the usufruct in the slave, the latter will, nevertheless, belong to him; but the question is whether the condition of the appointment would fail if he alienated a portion of his ownership in said slave. The better opinion is, that the condition would not fail, unless it appeared by the clearest evidence that the intention of the testator, when he inserted the words relative to the condition, was that the entire ownership of the slave should remain in him, for then, if any part in him was alienated, the condition would not be fulfilled. 1Where, however, there are two slaves who are appointed heirs in the following words: “If the first and second slaves mentioned should belong to me at the time of my death, let them be free and my heirs”, and one of them should be alienated, Celsus very properly holds that the language should be understood to mean the same as if the testator had appointed the slaves his heirs separately, and under the same condition.

3Paulus, On Sabinus, Book I. If I am appointed an heir under the condition: “If I pay ten aurei”, and the party to whom I am ordered to pay the money refuses to accept it, the condition is held to have been complied with.

4Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. If certain heirs should be appointed as follows: “If they remain partners in my property until they reach the age of sixteen years, let them be my heirs”, Marcellus says that an appointment made in language of this kind is void. Julianus, however, holds that such an appointment is valid, since the partnership can be formed for some future purpose, before the estate is entered upon. This is correct. 1Ad Dig. 28,7,4,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 554, Note 8.Julianus also says, where anyone appoints an heir under the condition: “If he does not alienate a certain slave belonging to the estate”, that the condition is fulfilled when the heir furnishes his coheir with security. However, where only one heir is mentioned, he is held to have been appointed under an impossible condition, which opinion is correct.

5Paulus, On Sabinus, Book II. Where several conditions together are imposed upon an heir, all of them must be complied with, for the reason that they are considered as one; where, however, they are imposed separately, each must be complied with by itself.

6Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book IX. Where an heir has been appointed under the condition: “If he should erect a monument to the testator within three days after his death”, and the monument cannot be completed in three days, it must be said that the condition vanished, as being impossible.

7Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book V. If anyone should appoint heirs under the condition: “If they give security to one another to pay the legacies left by the will”, it is established that they are released from complying with the condition, because it was made in violation of the laws which forbid certain persons to receive legacies; although, even if security should be furnished, the heirs would be protected by an exception in an action at law.

8Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. Whatever is left by a testator under the condition of taking an oath is disapproved by the Prætor. For he takes care that no one who accepts any property under the condition of taking an oath, or by omitting to comply with the condition, shall lose the estate, or a legacy, or that he shall be compelled shamefully to take an oath on condition of receiving what was bequeathed to him. The Prætor, therefore, sees that anyone to whom property was left under the condition of taking an oath, can acquire it just as those do upon whom no condition of being sworn is imposed, and in this case he acts very properly, as there are some men who, through their contempt for religion, are always ready to take an oath, and there are others who are timid, even to superstition, on account of their fear of Divinity; hence the Prætor most wisely interposes his authority, in order that neither the latter nor the former may either acquire or lose what was left to them in this manner. For he who wishes, by the influence of religion, to restrain those to whom he left property under the condition of taking an oath, would not be able to accomplish his purpose unless they did so; for the parties complying with the condition would be admitted to the succession, or if they failed to comply with it, they would be excluded on account of non-fulfillment of the condition. 1This Edict also relates to legacies, and not merely to the appointment of heirs. 2With reference to trusts, it is also necessary for those who have jurisdiction over a trust to obey the Edict of the Prætor; for the reason that trusts are discharged in the same manner as legacies. 3In the case of donations mortis causa, it must be said that there is ground for the application of the Edict; if, for instance, anyone should provide that the party must surrender whatever he received, unless he swears that he will perform some act. Therefore, it will be necessary for the bond to be given up. 4Where anyone has been appointed under the condition of taking an oath, as well as under some other condition, it must be considered whether he can be released from the performance of the condition. The better opinion is, that he should be released from the condition of the oath, although he may be obliged to comply with the other condition. 5But where an heir has been appointed under the condition of taking an oath, or of the payment of ten thousand aurei, that is to say, that he is required either to pay the money or be sworn, it must be considered whether he should not be released from one condition because he can be secure by complying with the other. The better opinion is, that he should be released from the first condition, lest, by some means, he may be compelled to take the oath. 6Whenever an heir is ordered by the testator, “To give something, or to perform some act”, which is not dishonorable, he will not be entitled to an action unless he gives or does what he was ordered to swear to do. 7When an heir was appointed on the condition that he would swear to manumit Stichus, and Stichus died, or was manumitted during the lifetime of the testator, the condition will not be held to have been violated; although it is true that the heir would have been compelled to manumit the slave if he had lived. The same rule applies where an heir was appointed as follows: “Let Titius be my heir, in order that he may manumit Stichus”; or, “I bequeath a hundred aurei to Titius, in order that he may manumit Stichus”. For if Stichus should die, no one can say that the heir will be barred from receiving the legacy, for he is not considered to have failed to comply with the condition, when he was unable to do so, and the will of the testator must be executed if this can be done. 8It is not necessary to appear before the Prætor for the purpose of being released from this oath, for where a release is once given by the Prætor it is good for all time; and a release is not obligatory in each individual instance. Therefore, it is held that a release is granted from the day on which the legacy was payable, even though the appointed heir was ignorant of the fact. Hence, it is very properly held in the case of the heir of a legatee, that if the legatee should die after the day appointed for the payment of the legacy, his heir must make use of the action de legato, just as if the legacy had been left unconditionally to the party whom he succeeded as heir.

9Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLV. A release is also given from conditions which are opposed to good morals, for instance, “If he should not ransom his father from the enemy”; or “If he should not furnish support to his parents or his patron”.

10Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VIII. An appointment like the following: “If I appoint Seius my heir by a codicil, let him be my heir”, is not void, so far as the appointed heir is concerned, except where that heir is a son; for this is a conditional appointment, and the estate is not held to be bequeathed by a codicil, which is forbidden by law, but it is a conditional appointment made by will. Hence, if the testator should say: “Let him be my heir whose name I shall insert in a codicil”, it must be held, for the same reason, that the appointment will be valid, there being no law preventing it. 1If we make an appointment as follows: “Let So-and-So be my heir, if I have appointed him heir by a codicil”, the appointment will be valid, even with reference to a son who is under paternal control, because a condition is not imposed every time that the past or present is referred to; for example: “If the King of the Parthians should be living”; “If a ship should be in port.”

11Julianus, Digest, Book XXIX. Where a party makes an appointment by will, as follows: “Let my son be my heir, if he adopts Titius, and if he does not adopt him, let him be disinherited”; and if the son is ready to adopt him, but Titius is unwilling to be arrogated, the son will become the heir, just as if the condition had been fulfilled.

12Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book III. The following words: “Let Publius Mævius be my heir if he is willing”, establish a condition with reference to the necessary heir, so that he will not become the heir if he is unwilling; for these words are fruitlessly added with reference to a voluntary heir, for even if they had not been added, the appointee would not become the heir against his will.

13Ad Dig. 28,7,13Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 643, Note 2.Julianus, Digest, Book XXX. Where anyone receives an estate or a legacy under the condition, “If he should pay ten aurei”, neither the estate nor the legacy can be acquired by him, unless, after having fulfilled the condition, he, either as heir or legatee, complies with the legal formalities by means of which an estate or a legacy is ordinarily obtained.

14Marcianus, Institutes, Book IV. When conditions are prescribed in violation of the Edicts of the Emperors, or against the laws, or contrary to whatever obtains the force of law, or which are opposed to good morals, or imply derision, or are such as the Prætors would not approve of, they are held not to have been written, and the estate or the legacy will pass to the heir or legatee, just as if the condition had not been prescribed.

15Papinianus, Questions, Book XVI. Where a son under paternal control is appointed an heir, under a condition which is one that the Senate or the Emperor does not tolerate, it invalidates the will of the father, just as if the condition could not be complied with by the son; for where any acts injuriously affect our piety, reputation, or self-respect, and, generally speaking, are contrary to good morals, it is held that we are unable to perform them.

16Marcianus, Institutes, Book IV. Julianus states that the following appointment is void, namely: “If Titius should be my heir, let Seius be my heir; if Seius should be my heir, let Titius be my heir”, as the condition cannot take place.

17Florentinus, Institutes, Book X. Where several appointments of heirs to the same share of an estate have been made under different conditions, the condition which is first performed will confer priority on the appointment.

18Marcianus, Institutes, Book VII. Where a slave was granted his freedom absolutely, and an heir was appointed under a condition, and it was provided that if the latter should not be the heir he would be entitled to a legacy, the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that the conditions seemed to have been repeated in the legacy. 1With a view to this, Papinianus stated that where a grandmother appointed her grandson heir to a portion of her estate, under the condition that he should be emancipated, and afterwards, by a codicil, bequeathed to him whatever she had not left him as an heir, the condition of the emancipation was also held to have been repeated in the legacy; although in bequeathing the legacy, she made no substitution, any more than she did in leaving him a share of her estate.

19The Same, Institutes, Book VIII. Where it was set forth in a will: “Let Titius be my heir, and if Titius should be my heir let Mævius be my heir”, if Titius should accept the estate, which was suspected of being insolvent, Mævius can voluntarily accept it, and retain a fourth of the same.

20Labeo, Epitomes of the Last Works of Javolenus, Book II. Ad Dig. 28,7,20 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 554, Note 8.A woman who was indebted to her husband for money promised to him by way of dowry, appointed him her heir, “Under the condition that he would not claim or exact the money which she had promised as dowry”. I think that if the husband should notify the other heirs that he is not unwilling to give a release for what was due to him by way of dowry, he will immediately become the heir. If, however, he should be appointed heir under such a condition, I hold that he will, nevertheless, forthwith become the heir, because performance of the condition is impossible, and any such condition must be considered as not having been imposed. 1If anyone should be ordered to manumit a slave belonging to an estate, and to become the heir, even though he should manumit him, and perform an act which is void, he will, nevertheless, become the heir; for while it is true that he manumitted the slave, the freedom granted to the latter after the estate was entered upon will become valid in accordance with the wish of the testator. 2If anyone should appoint you an heir under the condition that you appoint him one, or bequeath something to him, it makes no difference in what degree he has been appointed an heir by you, or what has been left to him, provided you can prove that you have done this in any degree whatsoever.

21Celsus, Digest, Book XVI. A slave belonging to another can be appointed an heir, “When he shall become free”; but a slave belonging to the testator cannot be appointed in this manner.

22Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVIII. Because reason suggests that he who can bestow freedom should himself grant it, either at the present time, or after a certain period, or under some condition, and he has not the power to appoint a slave his heir in case he should obtain his liberty in any other way whatsoever.

23Marcellus, Digest, Book XII. “Let whichever of my brothers, who shall marry our cousin, be my heir to three-fourths of my estate, and let the one who does not marry her be my heir to one-fourth of the same.” The said cousin either marries another, or does not wish to marry anyone. The brother who marries the cousin will be entitled to three-fourths of the estate, and the remaining fourth will belong to the other. If, however, neither of them marries the girl, not because they were unwilling to do so, but because she refused to be married, both of them will be admitted to equal shares of the estate; for generally, the condition: “If he should marry a wife; if he should pay a sum of money; if he should perform some act”; must be understood to mean that it is not his fault if he does not marry the woman, pay the money, or perform the act.

24Papinianus, Opinions, Book VI. “Let the one of my brothers who marries his cousin Titia be the heir to two-thirds of my estate, and the one who does not marry her be the heir to the remaining third of the same.” If the cousin should die during the lifetime of the testator, both of the brothers will be entitled to equal shares of his estate, because it is true that they were appointed heirs, but were entitled to different shares in case the marriage took place.

25Modestinus, Rules, Book IX. Where a slave is appointed an heir under a certain condition, he cannot comply with the condition without the order of his master.

26Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book II. If a minor should be appointed an heir under some condition, he can comply with the condition, even without the authority of his guardian. The same rule applies where a legacy has been bequeathed to him under some condition, because when the condition has been fulfilled, he is in the same position as if the estate or the legacy had been left to him unconditionally.

27Modestinus, Opinions, Book VIII. A certain man appointed an heir by his will under the condition: “If he throws my remains into the sea”. As the heir did not comply with the condition, the question arose whether he should be excluded from the succession to the estate. Modestinus answered: “The heir should rather be praised than censured, who did not throw the remains of the testator into the sea, in accordance with the will of the latter, but gave them up to burial in memory of the duty due to humanity”. It must first be considered whether a man who imposes a condition of this kind is of sound mind, and, therefore, if this suspicion is not removed by convincing evidence, the heir-at-law cannot in any way dispute the right to the estate with the heir who was appointed. 1A testator, by a codicil, imposed a condition upon his heir whom he had appointed absolutely by his will, I ask whether it is necessary for him to comply with it. Modestinus answers: “An estate can neither be granted, nor taken away by a codicil”. The testator, however, is understood, in this instance, to have had in his mind the exclusion of the heir from the succession in case of his failure to comply with the condition.

28Ad Dig. 28,7,28Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 627, Note 6.Papinianus, Questions, Book XIII. If a son should be appointed an heir under a condition, and grandchildren by him are substituted; as it is not sufficient for a son to be appointed an heir under any kind of a condition whatsoever, the will is only held to be valid where the fulfillment of the condition is in the power of the son. Let us therefore consider whether it makes any difference what condition was imposed, whether it was one that could not be carried out if the son should die, as, for instance, “If my son should go to Alexandria, let him be my heir”, and he dies at Rome; or if it is one which can be fulfilled at the last moment of his life, for example, “If he should pay ten aurei to Titius, let my son be my heir”, for this condition can be performed by another party in the name of the son. The first kind of a condition above mentioned admits the grandsons to the succession during the lifetime of the father, who, if he should have no substitute, becomes the lawful heir of his father when he dies. This is established by what is stated by Servius, for he relates that a certain person had been appointed an heir under the condition, “If he should ascend to the Capitol, and even if he should not do so, a legacy shall be given to him”, and the heir died before he ascended to the Capitol. With reference to this, Servius gave the opinion that the condition failed through the death of the heir, and therefore at the time of his death he began to be entitled to the legacy. The other kind of a condition, however, does not admit grandsons to the succession during the lifetime of the son, who, if they should not be substituted, would be the heirs of their intestate grandfather; for the son would not be held to have stood in their way, as after the death of the father, his will becomes of no effect; just as if the son having been disinherited, the grandsons had been appointed heirs at the time that the son died.