Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXV3,
De agnoscendis et alendis liberis vel parentibus vel patronis vel libertis
Liber vicesimus quintus
III.

De agnoscendis et alendis liberis vel parentibus vel patronis vel libertis

(Concerning the Recognition and Maintenance of Children, Parents, Patrons, and Freedmen.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. Se­na­tus con­sul­tum, quod fac­tum est de li­be­ris agnos­cen­dis, duas spe­cies com­plec­ti­tur, unam eo­rum qui agnos­cunt, aliam ea­rum quae fal­sum par­tum sub­iciunt. 1Per­mit­tit igi­tur mu­lie­ri pa­ren­ti­ve in cu­ius po­tes­ta­te est vel ei cui man­da­tum ab eis est, si se pu­tet prae­gna­tem, de­nun­tia­re in­tra dies tri­gin­ta post di­vor­tium con­nu­me­ran­dos ip­si ma­ri­to vel pa­ren­ti in cu­ius po­tes­ta­te est, aut do­mum de­nun­tia­re, si nul­lius eo­rum co­piam ha­beat. 2Do­mum ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus hos­pi­tium, si in ci­vi­ta­te ma­neat: quod si non sit, sed in vil­la vel in mu­ni­ci­pio, il­lic ubi la­rem ma­tri­mo­nio col­lo­ca­rent: 3De­nun­tia­re au­tem hoc tan­tum es­se mu­lie­rem ex eo prae­gnan­tem. non er­go hoc de­nun­tiat, ut mit­tat cus­to­des ma­ri­tus: suf­fi­cit enim mu­lie­ri hoc no­tum fa­ce­re, quod sit prae­gnas. ma­ri­ti est iam aut mit­te­re cus­to­des aut ei de­nun­tia­re, quod non sit ex se prae­gnas: hoc au­tem vel ip­si ma­ri­to vel alii no­mi­ne eius fa­ce­re per­mit­ti­tur. 4Poe­na au­tem ma­ri­ti ea est, ut, ni­si aut cus­to­des prae­mi­se­rit aut con­tra de­nun­tia­ve­rit non es­se ex se prae­gna­tem, co­ga­tur ma­ri­tus par­tum agnos­ce­re: et, si non agno­ve­rit, ex­tra or­di­nem co­er­ce­tur. de­be­bit igi­tur re­spon­de­re non es­se ex se prae­gna­tem aut no­mi­ne eius re­spon­de­ri: quod si fac­tum fue­rit, non alias ne­ces­se ha­be­bit agnos­ce­re, ni­si ve­re fi­lius fue­rit. 5Il­lud no­tan­dum est, quod de­nun­tia­tio a ma­ri­to non in­ci­pit, sed a mu­lie­re: 6Sed si ma­ri­tus ul­tro cus­to­des of­fe­rat et ea non ad­mit­tat, vel si non de­nun­tia­ve­rit mu­lier, aut si de­nun­tia­ve­rit qui­dem, cus­to­des au­tem ar­bi­trio iu­di­cis non ad­mi­se­rit, li­be­rum est ma­ri­to pa­ren­ti­ve eius par­tum non agnos­ce­re. 7Si mu­lier es­se se prae­gna­tem in­tra tri­gin­ta dies non de­nun­tia­ve­rit, post­ea de­nun­tians cau­sa co­gni­ta au­di­ri de­be­bit. 8Quin im­mo et si in to­tum omi­se­rit de­nun­tia­tio­nem, Iu­lia­nus ait ni­hil hoc no­ce­re ei quod edi­tur. 9Dies au­tem tri­gin­ta con­ti­nuos ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus ex die di­vor­tii, non uti­les. 10Ele­gan­ter au­tem apud Iu­lia­num li­bro no­no de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum quae­ri­tur, si in­tra dies tri­gin­ta mu­lier ma­ri­to non de­nun­tia­ve­rit et in­tra tri­gin­ta par­tum edi­de­rit, an se­na­tus con­sul­to lo­cus sit. et ait Plan­cia­num se­na­tus con­sul­tum ces­sa­re, quia de eo par­tu non vi­de­tur sen­ti­re, qui in­tra diem tri­ge­si­mum nas­ca­tur: quip­pe dies tri­gin­ta ad de­nun­tian­dum prae­sti­tuit se­na­tus. sed hanc rem non fa­ce­re prae­iu­di­cium par­tui ar­bi­tror. 11Quem­ad­mo­dum per con­tra­rium si ma­ri­tus uxo­re de­nun­tian­te cus­to­des mi­se­rit, nul­lum prae­iu­di­cium si­bi fa­cit. li­ce­bit igi­tur ei par­tum edi­tum ex se ne­ga­re nec ei no­ce­bit, quod ven­trem cus­to­die­rit: et ita Mar­cel­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit: ait enim, si­ve quis ne­get uxo­rem si­ve ex se prae­gna­tem, si­ne prae­iu­di­cio rec­te mit­tet cus­to­des, ma­xi­me si mis­su­rus id ip­sum prot­es­te­tur. 12Iu­lia­nus li­bro no­no de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit: quod se­na­tus con­sul­to com­pre­hen­sum est, si mu­lier vi­ro de­nun­tia­ve­rit se ex eo con­ce­pis­se et is cui de­nun­tia­tum erit cus­to­des ad ven­trem cus­to­dien­dum in­spi­cien­dum­que non mis­se­rit ne­que con­tes­ta­to di­xe­rit eam ex se prae­gna­tem non es­se, ut ei id quod edi­tum sit agnos­ce­re sit ne­ces­se, non eo per­ti­net, ut, si quis agnos­ce­re se fi­lium di­ce­ret, suum he­redem ha­be­ret, quam­vis ex alio con­cep­tus sit: quan­do­que enim, in­quit, coe­pit cau­sa agi, gran­de prae­iu­di­cium ad­fert pro fi­lio con­fes­sio pa­tris. 13Idem per con­tra­rium quo­que ait, si mu­lier di­vor­tio fac­to non fe­ce­rit ea, quae se­na­tus con­sul­to prae­ci­piun­tur, ut li­ceat pa­tri non agnos­ce­re, non eo per­ti­ne­re, ut fi­lius na­tus suum se di­ce­re non pos­sit, sed ad id tan­tum, ut ita pa­ter ale­re eum co­ga­tur, si con­sti­te­rit eum fi­lium es­se. 14Idem Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, si uxo­re de­nun­tian­te se prae­gna­tem ma­ri­tus non ne­ga­ve­rit, non uti­que suum il­li par­tum ef­fi­ci, co­gen­dum ta­men ale­re: ce­te­rum es­se sa­tis in­iu­rio­sum ait, si quis lon­go tem­po­re afue­rit et re­ver­sus uxo­rem prae­gna­tem in­ve­ne­rit et id­cir­co re­ie­ce­rit, si quid ex his, quae se­na­tus con­sul­to con­ti­nen­tur, omi­se­rit, suum he­redem ei nas­ci. 15Ex his ap­pa­ret, si­ve uxor omis­se­rit, quae eam ex se­na­tus con­sul­to ob­ser­va­re opor­tuit, ni­hil prae­iu­di­ca­re fi­lio, si fi­lius est, non tan­tum in iu­re sui, ve­rum ne in ali­men­tis qui­dem se­cun­dum di­vi Pii re­scrip­tum: si­ve ma­ri­tus neg­le­xe­rit fa­ce­re, quae ex se­na­tus con­sul­to de­bet, na­tum co­gi­tur om­ni­mo­do ale­re, ce­te­rum re­cu­sa­re pot­erit fi­lium. 16Pla­ne si de­nun­tian­te mu­lie­re ne­ga­ve­rit ex se es­se prae­gna­tem, tam­et­si cus­to­des non mi­se­rit, non evi­ta­bit, quo mi­nus quae­ra­tur, an ex eo mu­lier prae­gnas sit. quae cau­sa si fue­rit ac­ta apud iu­di­cem et pro­nun­tia­ve­rit, cum de hoc age­tur quod ex eo prae­gnas fue­rit nec ne, in ea cau­sa es­se, ut agnos­ci de­beat: si­ve fi­lius non fuit si­ve fuit, es­se suum

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. The Decree of the Senate enacted with reference to the recognition of children is in two parts, one of which has reference to the recognition of children by their parents, and the other to those who substitute spurious offspring. 1The Decree permits the woman herself, or her father under whose control she is, or anyone who is directed by either of them, in case she believes herself to be pregnant, to notify her husband, or her father under whose control she is, within thirty days after the divorce; or to leave the notice at his residence if there is no opportunity for personal service. 2We should understand the term “residence” to mean the lodging of the husband, if he lives in a city, but if he does not, but resides in a country house, or in a provincial town, the place where the parties have established their domicile during marriage. 3The wife should merely notify the husband that she is pregnant by him. She does not give this notice in order that her husband may send guards to watch her, for it is sufficient for her to inform him that she is pregnant. The husband should then either send persons to watch her, or should notify her that she is not pregnant by him; and it is permissible for this notification to be made by the husband himself, or by another party in his name. 4The penalty of the husband, if he does not send persons to watch, or does not notify the woman that she is not pregnant by him, is that he shall be compelled to recognize the child; and if he should not do so, to be punished with extraordinary severity. Therefore, he should answer the notice, or it should be answered in his name, that the woman is not pregnant by him. If this is done, it will not be necessary for him to recognize the child, unless it is really his own. 5It should be remembered that the notice does not proceed from the husband, but from the woman. 6If, however, the husband should offer guards to watch his wife, and she should not allow this; or if she does not give him notice of her condition; or if she should give him notice, but not consent to accept the guards appointed by the court, the husband or his father is at liberty to refuse to acknowledge the child. 7Where a woman does not give notice of her pregnancy within thirty days, but does so afterwards, she should be heard after proper cause is shown. 8If, however, she should entirely neglect to give the notice, Julianus says that this does not in any way prejudice the child. 9We should understand the thirty days subsequent to the divorce to be continuous, and not available days. 10In the Nineteenth Book of the Digest by Julianus, the following nice point is suggested. If the woman should not notify her husband of her condition within thirty days, but should be delivered of a child within that period, will the Decree of the Senate apply? He says that, in this instance, the Plautian Decree of the Senate will not be applicable, because it was not considered to have reference to a child who was born within thirty days, for the Senate appointed the thirty days for the notification of the pregnancy. I think, however, that this would not in any way prejudice the child. 11Just as, on the other hand, if the husband, after receiving notice from his wife, should send guards, this would not cause any prejudice to himself. He will, therefore, be permitted to deny that the child is his, nor will it prejudice him, because he placed a watch over the woman. This opinion is also stated by Marcellus in the Seventh Book of the Digest, for he says that if a party denies that a woman is his wife, or that she is pregnant by him, he can, without any prejudice to himself, very properly send persons to watch her, especially if he makes protest at the time that he does so. 12Julianus says in the Nineteenth Book of the Digest, that it is stated in the Decree of the Senate that if the woman should notify her husband that she had conceived by him, and he, after having been notified, should not send persons to watch or examine her, and does not declare in the presence of witnesses that she is not pregnant by him, he will be compelled to recognize the child when it is born; but it does not follow from this that if he says that the child is his, he must make it his heir if it was begotten by someone else. Still, he holds that when the case is heard in court, the admission of the father will establish a strong presumption in favor of the child. 13He also says that, on the other hand, where the woman, after a divorce has taken place, does not comply with what was prescribed by the Decree of the Senate, the father has the right not to acknowledge the child; and that it does not follow from this that, after the child is born, it cannot be declared to be his, but merely that the father will not be compelled to support it, if it should be proved to be his own offspring. 14Julianus also says that if a woman notifies her husband that she is pregnant, and he does not deny it, it must not be concluded from this that the child is his, although he can be compelled to support it. It would, however, be very unjust if, where a man has been absent for a long time, and having returned, finds his wife pregnant, and for this reason repudiates her, and he neglects to comply with any of the provisions of the Decree of the Senate, the child should be his heir. 15It is apparent from what has been said, that the child is in no way prejudiced, if the wife should fail to observe any of the provisions of the Decree of the Senate, when the child in fact belongs to her husband—and this not merely has reference to its rights, nor indeed to its maintenance, according to a Rescript of the Divine Pius; or if the husband has neglected to do what is prescribed by the Decree of the Senate, he can certainly be compelled to support the child, but he can repudiate it. 16It is clear that, if, after the woman has notified her husband, he should deny that she is pregnant by him, even though he may not send persons to watch her, he cannot prevent an examination being made to ascertain whether the woman is pregnant by him, or not. If this case is brought into court, and a decision be rendered on the point as to whether or not the woman is pregnant by her husband, the child must be recognized by the husband, whether it belongs to him, or not.

2Iu­lia­nus li­bro no­no de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. in om­ni­bus cau­sis (qua­re et fra­tri­bus con­san­gui­neus erit):

2Julianus, Digest, Book XIX. This applies to all cases, and therefore the child will be related by blood to its brothers.

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo quar­to ad edic­tum. si­ve con­tra pro­nun­tia­ve­rit, non fo­re suum, quam­vis suus fue­rit: pla­cet enim eius rei iu­di­cem ius fa­ce­re. et ita Mar­cel­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum pro­bat, eo­que iu­re uti­mur. 1Quia Plan­cia­num se­na­tus con­sul­tum ad eos par­tus per­ti­net qui post di­vor­tium edun­tur, aliud se­na­tus con­sul­tum tem­po­ri­bus di­vi Ha­d­ria­ni fac­tum est, ut, et­iam­si con­stan­te ma­tri­mo­nio par­tus sit edi­tus, de agnos­cen­do eo aga­tur. 2Quid er­go, si quis post mor­tem pa­tris nas­ca­tur avo su­per­sti­te, in cu­ius po­tes­ta­te re­ca­su­rus est, ut si ex fi­lio eius sus­cep­tus pro­be­tur? vi­den­dum quid di­ci de­beat. et cer­te pro­ban­dum est cum avo prae­iu­di­cium de par­tu agnos­cen­do si­mi­li­ter agen­dum. 3Quid si hoc ip­sum in quaes­tio­nem ve­niat, utrum in ma­tri­mo­nio an post­ea edi­tus sit? di­cen­dum est et su­per hoc ex se­na­tus con­sul­tis agen­dum. 4Et quid sit, si an uxor fue­rit dis­cep­te­tur? et Iu­lia­nus Sex­to Cae­ci­lio Afri­ca­no re­spon­dit lo­cum es­se prae­iu­di­cio. 5Il­lud te­nen­dum haec se­na­tus con­sul­ta post mor­tem pa­ren­tis ces­sa­re, si is su­per­sit, in cu­ius po­tes­ta­te re­ca­su­ri non sunt. quid er­go est? in pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis, quam fi­lius in­ten­dit, quae­re­tur, utrum ex eo na­tus sit cu­ius he­redi­ta­tem pe­tit an non. ad­eo hoc ve­rum est, ut Iu­lia­nus li­bro no­no de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scri­bat, si vi­vo pa­tre red­di­tum sit prae­iu­di­cium et an­te­quam sen­ten­tia fe­ra­tur, pa­ter de­ces­se­rit, trans­eun­dum ad Car­bo­nia­num edic­tum. 6Item haec se­na­tus con­sul­ta per­ti­nent ad eos, qui sui he­redes ad­gnas­can­tur: ce­te­rum si for­te non sint in po­tes­ta­tem re­ca­su­ri, ve­rius est se­na­tus con­sul­ta ces­sa­re.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIV. If, on the other hand, the judge should decide that the child does not belong to the husband, even though it is really his, it is settled that a decision of this kind is equivalent to law. This opinion Marcellus approves in the Seventh Book of the Digest, and we make use of it at the present time. 1For the reason that the Plautian Decree of the Senate has reference to children born after a divorce, another Decree of the Senate was enacted during the reign of the Divine Hadrian, which prescribed that children born during marriage must be recognized by their parents. 2But what if a child should be born after the death of its father, and during the lifetime of its grandfather, under whose control it would be placed, if it should be proved that the said child is the issue of the son of the grandfather? It should be considered what must be held in this instance. The opinion should be adopted that the question of its recognition should be left to its grandfather. 3But what if, in this case, the question should arise whether the child was born during marriage, or subsequently? It must be said that proceedings should be taken in accordance with the Decree of the Senate for the determination of this point. 4And what should be done if it was denied that the woman was the wife of the alleged husband? Julianus informed Sextus Cæcilius Africanus that there was ground for a preliminary inquiry. 5It must be held that these Decrees of the Senate are not applicable after the death of the father, if there is no relative under whose control the child can be placed. What claim to the estate could a child in this instance assert? Could he make such a claim, whether he was begotten by the person whose estate he demands, or not? What Julianus wrote in the Nineteenth Book of the Digest is true to the extent that, if proceedings for the recognition of the child had been begun during the lifetime of the father, and the latter should die before a decision was rendered, recourse must be had to the Carbonian Edict. 6These decrees of the Senate also have reference to children who are born their own heirs. The better opinion is, however, that they are not applicable where the child, whose recognition is in question, was not under the control of the party instituting the proceedings.

4Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do sen­ten­tia­rum. Ne­ca­re vi­de­tur non tan­tum is qui par­tum prae­fo­cat, sed et is qui ab­icit et qui ali­mo­nia de­ne­gat et is qui pu­bli­cis lo­cis mi­se­ri­cor­diae cau­sa ex­po­nit, quam ip­se non ha­bet.

4Paulus, Opinions, Book II. Not only he who smothers a child is hold to kill it, but also he who abandons it, or denies it food, as well as he who exposes it in a public place for the purpose of exciting pity, which he himself does not feel.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de of­fi­cio con­su­lis. Si quis a li­be­ris ali de­si­de­ret vel si li­be­ri, ut a pa­ren­te ex­hi­bean­tur, iu­dex de ea re co­gnos­cet. 1Sed utrum eos tan­tum li­be­ros qui sunt in po­tes­ta­te co­ga­tur quis ex­hi­be­re, an ve­ro et­iam em­an­ci­pa­tos vel ex alia cau­sa sui iu­ris con­sti­tu­tos, vi­den­dum est. et ma­gis pu­to, et­iam­si non sunt li­be­ri in po­tes­ta­te, alen­dos a pa­ren­ti­bus et vi­ce mu­tua ale­re pa­ren­tes de­be­re. 2Utrum au­tem tan­tum pa­trem avum­ve pa­ter­num proavum­ve pa­ter­ni avi pa­trem ce­te­ros­que vi­ri­lis se­xus pa­ren­tes ale­re co­ga­mur, an ve­ro et­iam ma­trem ce­te­ros­que pa­ren­tes et per il­lum se­xum con­tin­gen­tes co­ga­mur ale­re, vi­den­dum. et ma­gis est, ut utru­bi­que se iu­dex in­ter­po­nat, quo­run­dam ne­ces­si­ta­ti­bus fa­ci­lius suc­cur­su­rus, quo­run­dam ae­gri­tu­di­ni: et cum ex ae­qui­ta­te haec res de­scen­dat ca­ri­ta­te­que san­gui­nis, sin­gu­lo­rum de­si­de­ria per­pen­de­re iu­di­cem opor­tet. 3Idem in li­be­ris quo­que ex­hi­ben­dis a pa­ren­ti­bus di­cen­dum est. 4Er­go et ma­trem co­ge­mus prae­ser­tim vol­go quae­si­tos li­be­ros ale­re nec non ip­sos eam. 5Item di­vus Pius sig­ni­fi­cat, qua­si avus quo­que ma­ter­nus ale­re com­pel­la­tur. 6Idem re­scrip­sit, ut fi­liam suam pa­ter ex­hi­beat, si con­sti­te­rit apud iu­di­cium ius­te eam pro­crea­tam. 7Sed si fi­lius pos­sit se ex­hi­be­re, aes­ti­ma­re iu­di­ces de­bent, ne non de­beant ei ali­men­ta de­cer­ne­re. de­ni­que idem Pius ita re­scrip­sit: ‘Ad­iti a te com­pe­ten­tes iu­di­ces ali te a pa­tre tuo iu­be­bunt pro mo­do fa­cul­ta­tium eius, si mo­do, cum opi­fi­cem te es­se di­cas, in ea va­le­tu­di­ne es, ut ope­ris suf­fi­ce­re non pos­sis’. 8Si vel pa­rens ne­get fi­lium id­cir­co­que ale­re se non de­be­re con­ten­dat, vel fi­lius ne­get pa­ren­tem, sum­ma­tim iu­di­ces opor­tet su­per ea re co­gnos­ce­re. si con­sti­te­rit fi­lium vel pa­ren­tem es­se, tunc ali iu­be­bunt: ce­te­rum si non con­sti­te­rit, nec de­cer­nent ali­men­ta. 9Me­mi­nis­se au­tem opor­tet, et­si pro­nun­tia­ve­rint ali opor­te­re, at­ta­men eam rem prae­iu­di­cium non fa­ce­re ve­ri­ta­ti: nec enim hoc pro­nun­tia­tur fi­lium es­se, sed ali de­be­re: et ita di­vus Mar­cus re­scrip­sit. 10Si quis ex his ale­re de­trec­tet, pro mo­do fa­cul­ta­tium ali­men­ta con­sti­tuen­tur: quod si non prae­sten­tur, pig­no­ri­bus cap­tis et dis­trac­tis co­ge­tur sen­ten­tiae sa­tis­fa­ce­re. 11Idem iu­dex aes­ti­ma­re de­bet, num ha­beat ali­quid pa­rens vel an pa­ter quod me­ri­to fi­lios suos no­lit ale­re: Tre­ba­tio de­ni­que Ma­ri­no re­scrip­tum est me­ri­to pa­trem eum nol­le ale­re, quod eum de­tu­le­rat. 12Non tan­tum ali­men­ta, ve­rum et­iam ce­te­ra quo­que one­ra li­be­ro­rum pa­trem ab iu­di­ce co­gi prae­be­re re­scrip­tis con­ti­ne­tur. 13Si im­pu­bes sit fi­lius em­an­ci­pa­tus, pa­trem in­opem ale­re co­ge­tur: in­iquis­si­mum enim quis me­ri­to di­xe­rit pa­trem ege­re, cum fi­lius sit in fa­cul­ta­ti­bus. 14Si ma­ter ali­men­ta, quae fe­cit in fi­lium, a pa­tre re­pe­tat, cum mo­do eam au­dien­dam. ita di­vus Mar­cus re­scrip­sit An­to­niae mon­ta­nae in haec ver­ba: ‘Sed et quan­tum ti­bi ali­men­to­rum no­mi­ne, qui­bus ne­ces­sa­rio fi­liam tuam ex­hi­buis­ti, a pa­tre eius prae­sta­ri opor­teat, iu­di­ces aes­ti­ma­bunt, nec im­pe­tra­re de­bes ea, quae ex­igen­te ma­ter­no af­fec­tu in fi­liam tuam ero­ga­tu­ra es­ses, et­iam­si a pa­tre suo edu­ca­re­tur’. 15A mi­li­te quo­que fi­lio, qui in fa­cul­ta­ti­bus sit, ex­hi­ben­dos pa­ren­tes es­se pie­ta­tis ex­igit ra­tio. 16Pa­rens quam­vis ali a fi­lio ra­tio­ne na­tu­ra­li de­beat, ta­men aes alie­num eius non es­se co­gen­dum ex­sol­ve­re fi­lium re­scrip­tum est. 17Item re­scrip­tum est he­redes fi­lii ad ea prae­stan­da, quae vi­vus fi­lius ex of­fi­cio pie­ta­tis suae da­bit, in­vi­tos co­gi non opor­te­re, ni­si in sum­mam eges­ta­tem pa­ter de­duc­tus est. 18So­lent iu­di­ces co­gnos­ce­re et in­ter pa­tro­nos et li­ber­tos, si alen­dis his aga­tur: ita­que si ne­gent se es­se li­ber­tos, co­gnos­ce­re eos opor­te­bit: quod si li­ber­tos con­sti­te­rit, tunc de­mum de­cer­ne­re, ut alant: nec ta­men ali­men­to­rum de­cre­tum tol­let li­ber­to fa­cul­ta­tem, quo mi­nus prae­iu­di­cio cer­ta­re pos­sit, si li­ber­tum se ne­get. 19Ali­men­ta au­tem pro mo­do fa­cul­ta­tium erunt prae­ben­da, egen­ti­bus sci­li­cet pa­tro­nis: ce­te­rum si sit un­de se ex­hi­beant, ces­sa­bunt par­tes iu­di­cis. 20Utrum au­tem tan­tum pa­tro­ni alen­di sint an et­iam pa­tro­no­rum li­be­ri, trac­ta­ri pot­est. et pu­to cau­sa co­gni­ta iu­di­ces et li­be­ros quo­que pa­tro­no­rum alen­dos de­cer­ne­re, non qui­dem tam fa­ci­le ut pa­tro­nos, sed non­num­quam et ip­sos: nam et ob­se­quium non so­lum pa­tro­nis, ve­rum et­iam li­be­ris eo­rum de­be­re prae­sta­ri. 21Sed et li­ber­tus ma­ter­nus ale­re co­gi­tur. 22Si quis a li­ber­ti li­ber­to ali se de­si­de­ret vel ab eo, quem ex cau­sa fi­dei­com­mis­si ma­nu­mi­sit quem­que suis num­mis red­emit, non de­bet au­di­ri, ut et Mar­cel­lus scri­bit, exae­quat­que eum, qui mer­ce­des ex­igen­do ius li­ber­to­rum amis­it. 23Sed et pa­tro­ni fi­lium, qui ca­pi­tis ac­cu­sa­vit li­ber­tum pa­ter­num, ne­gat ex­hi­ben­dum. 24Sed et li­ber­ta co­gi­tur pa­tro­num ale­re. 25De ali­men­tis pa­tro­ni ar­bi­ter so­let da­ri ar­bi­tra­tu­rus, quan­tum sit in fa­cul­ta­ti­bus, ut per­in­de pos­sint ali­men­ta mo­de­ra­ri, quae tam­diu prae­sta­bun­tur, quam­diu li­ber­to su­per­sit, pa­tro­no de­sit. 26Pa­trem et ma­trem pa­tro­ni, cum pa­tro­nus et fi­lii eius mi­ni­me su­per­sint, ale­re egen­tes, ip­si si ido­nei fa­cul­ta­ti­bus sunt, co­gun­tur.

5Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. Where anyone asks support of his children, or where children can be supported by their father, a judge should take cognizance of the matter. 1Should a father be compelled to support only such children as are under his control, or should he support those who are already emancipated, or who, for any other reason, have become independent, is a question for consideration. I think the better opinion is that even where the children are not under paternal control, they must be supported by their parents, and that, on the other hand, their parents should also be supported by them. 2Let us see whether we are obliged to support only our fathers, our paternal grandfathers, our paternal great-grandfathers and other relatives of the male sex; or whether we are obliged to support our mothers, and our other ascendants in the maternal line. The better opinion is, that in every instance, the judge should interpose for the purpose of giving relief to the necessities of some and the infirmities of others; and since this obligation is derived from justice, and from the attachment due to blood, the judge should carefully weigh the claims of each of the parties. 3It must be said that the same rule applies to the maintenance of children by their parents. 4Therefore we compel a mother to support her illegitimate children, and them to support her. 5The Divine Pius also intimates that a maternal grandfather is obliged to support his grandchildren. 6He also stated in a Rescript that a father must support his daughter, if it should be proved in court that he had actually begotten her. 7Where a son can support himself, the court should decide not to compel maintenance to be furnished him. Hence the Emperor Pius stated in a Rescript: “The competent judges and before whom you will appear, must order that you shall be supported by your father in proportion to his means; provided that you allege that you are an artisan, and that by reason of ill health, you cannot maintain yourself by your own labor.” 8Where a father denies that a party asking for support is his son, and therefore contends that he should not furnish it; or where a son denies that an applicant for maintenance is his father, the judges must decide the case summarily, and if it is established that the petitioner is a son, or a father, they must then order him to be supported. If, however, this should not be proved, they shall not decide that maintenance shall be furnished. 9But it must be remembered that if the judges hold that support should be furnished, still, this does not prejudice the truth, for they do not decide that the party is a son, but merely that he should be supported. This the Divine Marcus also stated in a Rescript. 10If anyone should refuse to provide support, the judges must determine the amount to be furnished in proportion to his means, and if he still fails to provide it, he can be compelled to comply with the judgment by taking his property in execution and selling the same. 11The judge must also determine whether a relative or a father has any good reason for refusing to support his children. There is a rescript addressed to Trebatius Marinus which states that a father can properly refuse to support his son if the latter has informed against him. 12It is stated in certain rescripts that a father can be compelled by a judge not only to furnish provisions, but also all other necessaries to his children. 13Where a son has been emancipated before arriving at puberty, he can be compelled to support his father, if the latter is in poverty; for anyone would say with reason that it is most unjust for a father to remain in want, while his son was in prosperous circumstances. 14Where a mother who furnished provisions to her child, brings suit against its father, she should be heard under certain conditions; for the Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript addressed to Antonia Montana: “The judges will estimate how much shall be paid to you by the father of your daughter in proportion to the amount of necessary provisions which you have furnished her for her support; but you cannot obtain as much as you would have expended for your daughter through maternal affection, even if she had been driven away by her father.” 15Filial affection requires that parents should be supported by a son who is in the military service, provided he has the means to do so. 16It is stated in a rescript that, although a parent should, according to the dictates of nature, be supported by his son, still the latter ought not to be required to pay his debts. 17Ad Dig. 25,3,5,17Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 475, Note 13.There is also a rescript which states that the heirs of the son, if unwilling, are not compelled to furnish such assistance to their father that a son while living would provide him with through motives of filial duty, unless the father is in the greatest poverty. 18Judges are also accustomed to decide between patrons and freedmen, where the question of their maintenance arises. Therefore, if the patrons deny that the claimants are their freedmen, the judges must make inquiry, and if it is proved that they are their freedmen, then they must order them to be supported. The decree for support does not, however, prevent the freedman (if he denies that he is such) from contending for his rights against his patron. 19Support must be furnished by freedmen to their patrons who are in poverty in proportion to their means. If, however, the latter are able to support themselves, the authority of the judge need not be interposed. 20The question may be asked whether only patrons are to be supported, or whether their children must also be maintained. I think that, upon proper cause being shown, judges should decree that the children of patrons should also be supported, not indeed as readily as patrons, but sometimes; for freedmen should show reverence not only to their patrons but also to the children of the latter. 21The freedman of a woman is compelled to support her children. 22If anyone should desire to be supported by a freedman of his freedman, or by a slave whom he has manumitted by reason of a trust, or by one whom he has redeemed from slavery with his own money, he should not be heard. For, as Marcellus says, he should be compared with one who, by exacting a reward, loses thereby the rights he has in a freedman. 23If the son of his patron has accused the freedman of his father of a capital crime, he denies that the latter is required to support him. 24A freedwoman is also obliged to support her patron. 25An arbiter is usually appointed to decide with reference to the support of a patron, and he must ascertain the value of the resources of the freedman, in order that the amount of the maintenance may be determined, and this must be provided as long as the freedman is able to do so, and the patron requires it. 26Freedmen are compelled to furnish support for the father and mother of their patron, where the patron and his children are no longer living, if they are in need, and the freedmen have the means to do so.

6Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ma­nu­mis­sio­ni­bus. Ali­men­ta li­ber­to pe­ten­te non prae­stan­do pa­tro­nus amis­sio­ne li­ber­ta­tis cau­sa im­po­si­to­rum et he­redi­ta­tis li­ber­ti pu­nie­tur: non au­tem ne­ces­se ha­be­bit prae­sta­re, et­iam­si pot­est. 1Im­pe­ra­to­ris Com­mo­di con­sti­tu­tio ta­lis pro­fer­tur: ‘Cum pro­ba­tum sit con­tu­me­liis pa­tro­nos a li­ber­tis es­se vio­la­tos vel il­la­ta ma­nu atro­ci es­se pul­sa­tos aut et­iam pau­per­ta­te vel cor­po­ris va­le­tu­di­ne la­bo­ran­tes re­lic­tos, pri­mum eos in po­tes­ta­te pa­tro­no­rum red­igi et mi­nis­te­rium do­mi­nis prae­be­re co­gi: sin au­tem nec hoc mo­do ad­mo­nean­tur, vel a prae­si­de emp­to­ri ad­di­cen­tur et pre­tium pa­tro­nis tri­bue­tur’.

6Modestinus, Concerning Manumissions. The patron, by refusing to furnish support at the request of his freedman, forfeits the privileges imposed in his favor upon the latter on account of his manumission, and he is punished by the loss of the estate of the freedman; but he is not required to furnish support, even if he is able to do so. 1A Constitution of the Emperor Commodus contains the following: “Where it is proved that a patron has been rudely treated by his freedman, or severely beaten by him, or abandoned while in poverty or while suffering from bodily illness; he must first be brought again under the control of his patron, and compelled to render services to him as his master, and if he does not take warning by this proceeding, he shall be sold to a purchaser under the authority of a magistrate, and his price given to his patron”.

7Idem li­bro quin­to re­spon­so­rum. Si ne­get qui ma­ri­tus fuis­se di­ci­tur ma­tri­mo­nium es­se con­trac­tum eo, quod eam quae se uxo­rem fuis­se di­cit an­cil­lam es­se pro­ba­re pa­ra­tus sit, ali­men­ta qui­dem li­be­ris prae­sta­re in­ter­im com­pel­len­dum, sin au­tem con­sti­te­rit eam ser­vam fuis­se, ni­hil ei, qui pas­cen­dos cu­ra­vit, ex hoc prae­iu­di­cium ge­ne­ra­re re­spon­di.

7The Same, Opinions, Book V. If he who is alleged to have been the husband of a woman denies that the marriage was contracted, for the reason that he is ready to prove that she who claims to be his wife is a slave, he shall be compelled to support her children in the meantime; but if it should be established that she was a slave, he who was charged with their support will not be prejudiced on this account.

8Mar­cel­lus li­bro pri­mo ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Non quem­ad­mo­dum mas­cu­lo­rum li­be­ro­rum nos­tro­rum li­be­ri ad onus nos­trum per­ti­nent, ita et in fe­mi­nis est: nam ma­ni­fes­tum est id quod fi­lia pa­rit non avo, sed pa­tri suo es­se one­ri, ni­si pa­ter aut non sit su­per­stes aut egens est.

8Ad Dig. 25,3,8Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 475, Note 5.Marcellus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. The children of our male children are under our care, but this is not the case with those descended from females; for it is evident that a child whom a daughter brings forth is under the care of her father, and not of her grandfather, unless the father is not living, or is in want.

9Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de iu­re pa­tro­na­tus. In bo­nis su­per­sti­tum li­ber­to­rum nul­lum om­ni­no ius pa­tro­ni li­be­ri­ve pa­tro­no­rum ha­bent, ni­si si tam es­se in­fir­mos tam­que pau­pe­res prae­si­di­bus pro­ba­ve­rint, ut me­ri­to mens­truis ali­men­tis a li­ber­tis suis ad­iu­va­ri de­beant. id­que ius ita plu­ri­mis prin­ci­pum con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus ma­ni­fes­ta­tur.

9Paulus, On the Right of Patronage. Patrons and their children have no right to the property of their surviving freedmen, unless they prove to the court that they are so weak or poor that they should be assisted with monthly contributions of food by their freedmen. This rule has been established by many Imperial Constitutions.