Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XXII3,
De probationibus et praesumptionibus
Liber vicesimus secundus
III.

De probationibus et praesumptionibus

(Concerning Proofs and Presumptions.)

1Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num. Quo­tiens quae­re­re­tur, ge­nus vel gen­tem quis ha­be­ret nec ne, eum pro­ba­re opor­tet.

1Papinianus, Questions, Book III. Whenever a question is raised with reference to the family or race of any person, he must prove whether he belongs to it or not.

2Pau­lus li­bro se­xa­ge­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Ei in­cum­bit pro­ba­tio qui di­cit, non qui ne­gat.

2Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIX. Proof is incumbent upon the party who affirms a fact, not upon him who denies it.

3Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro no­no re­spon­so­rum. Cum ta­ci­tum fi­dei­com­mis­sum ab eo da­tur, qui tam in pri­mo quam in se­cun­do tes­ta­men­to pro ea­dem par­te vel post­ea pro ma­io­re he­res scri­bi­tur, pro­ba­tio mu­ta­tae vo­lun­ta­tis ei de­bet in­cum­be­re qui con­ve­ni­tur, cum se­cre­ti sus­cep­ti ra­tio ple­rum­que do­mi­nis re­rum per­sua­deat eos ita he­redes scri­be­re, quo­rum fi­dem ele­ge­runt.

3Papinianus, Opinions, Book IX. Where an implied trust is charged upon a party who is appointed heir for an equal or a larger share of the estate, by both a first and a second will, the proof of changed intention on the part of the testator devolves upon him against whom suit is brought; for often a motive of secrecy induces owners of property to appoint persons heirs in whose good faith they have confidence.

4Pau­lus li­bro sex­to re­spon­so­rum. Re­spon­dit emp­to­rem pro­ba­re de­be­re, eum ser­vum de quo quae­ri­tur an­te­quam eme­ret fu­gis­se.

4Paulus, Opinions, Book VI. The purchaser must prove that the slave in question had taken to flight before he purchased him.

5Idem li­bro no­no re­spon­so­rum. Ab ea par­te, quae di­cit ad­ver­sa­rium suum ab ali­quo iu­re pro­hi­bi­tum es­se spe­cia­li­ter le­ge vel con­sti­tu­tio­ne, id pro­ba­ri opor­te­re. 1Idem re­spon­dit, si quis ne­gat em­an­ci­pa­tio­nem rec­te fac­tam, pro­ba­tio­nem ip­sum prae­sta­re de­be­re.

5The Same, Opinions, Book IX. Where anyone alleges that his adversary is deprived of some right by a particular law or constitution, he must prove it. 1Paulus also holds that where anyone denies that emancipation has been legally accomplished, he must furnish proof of his statement.

6Scae­vo­la li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Pa­tro­num ma­ni­fes­te do­ce­re de­be­re li­ber­tum in frau­dem suam ali­quid de­dis­se, ut par­tem eius quod in frau­dem da­tum es­set, pos­set avo­ca­re.

6Scævola, Opinions, Book II. A patron must clearly show that his freedman has given something for the purpose of cheating him, in order to be able to revoke a portion of what has been fraudulently bestowed.

7Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do sen­ten­tia­rum. Cum pro­ba­tio prio­ris fu­gae de­fi­cit, ser­vi quaes­tio­ni cre­den­dum est: in se enim in­ter­ro­ga­ri, non pro do­mi­no aut in do­mi­num vi­de­tur.

7Paulus, Sentences, Book II. Where evidence of former flight is lacking, a slave shall be believed, if put to the torture, for he is held to be interrogated in his own behalf, and not for or against his master.

8Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo ad Plau­tium. Si fi­lius in po­tes­ta­te pa­tris es­se ne­get, prae­tor co­gnos­cit, ut prior do­ceat fi­lius, quia et pro pie­ta­te quam pa­tri de­bet prae­sta­re hoc sta­tuen­dum est et quia se li­be­rum es­se quo­dam­mo­do con­ten­dit: id­eo enim et qui ad li­ber­ta­tem pro­cla­mat, prior do­ce­re iu­be­tur.

8The Same, On Plautius, Book XVIII. If a son under the control of his father denies the fact, the Prætor must direct the son to first prove his allegation, and this rule has been established on account of the affection which he ought to manifest for his father, and because the son practically alleges that he is free. Hence anyone who asserts his right to freedom is in the first place, ordered to prove it.

9Cel­sus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Si pac­tum fac­tum sit, in quo he­redis men­tio non fiat, quae­ri­tur, an id ac­tum sit, ut ip­sius dum­ta­xat per­so­na eo sta­tue­re­tur. sed quam­vis ve­rum est, quod qui ex­ci­pit pro­ba­re de­beat quod ex­ci­pi­tur, at­ta­men de ip­so dum­ta­xat ac non de he­rede eius quo­que con­ve­nis­se pe­ti­tor, non qui ex­ci­pit pro­ba­re de­bet, quia ple­rum­que tam he­redi­bus nos­tris quam no­bis­met ip­sis ca­ve­mus.

9Celsus, Digest, Book I. Where an agreement is made in which there is no mention of an heir, the question arises whether this has been done in order that only the person of the party himself may be considered. But although it may be true that he who makes use of an exception must establish good ground for doing so; still, the plaintiff, and not he who pleaded the exception, must prove that the agreement merely had reference to himself, and did not include his heir, because in such cases, we generally provide for our heirs as well as for ourselves.

10Mar­cel­lus li­bro ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Cen­sus et mo­nu­men­ta pu­bli­ca po­tio­ra tes­ti­bus es­se se­na­tus cen­suit.

10Marcellus, Digest, Book III. The Senate decreed that the registers of the Censor and the public records are better evidence than that of witnesses.

11Cel­sus li­bro un­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Non est ne­ces­se pu­pil­lo pro­ba­re fi­de­ius­so­res pro tu­to­re da­tos, cum ac­ci­pie­ban­tur, ido­neos non fuis­se: nam pro­ba­tio ex­igen­da est ab his, quo­rum of­fi­cii fuit pro­vi­de­re, ut pu­pil­lo ca­ve­re­tur.

11Ad Dig. 22,3,11ROHGE, Bd. 6 (1872), S. 216: Beweislast bei einem Anspruche gegen den Mandatar wegen Verabsäumung der vertragsmäßigen Diligenz. Rechenschaftspflicht des Mandatars.Celsus, Digest, Book XI. A ward is not compelled to prove that the sureties furnished by his guardian were not solvent when they were accepted, for proof of this must be required of those whose duty it was to watch over the ward, and provide security for him.

12Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Quin­gen­ta tes­ta­men­to ti­bi le­ga­ta sunt: idem scrip­tum est in co­di­cil­lis post­ea scrip­tis: re­fert, du­pli­ca­re le­ga­tum vo­lue­rit an re­pe­te­re et ob­li­tus se in tes­ta­men­to le­gas­se id fe­ce­rit: ab utro er­go pro­ba­tio eius rei ex­igen­da est? pri­ma fron­te ae­quius vi­de­tur, ut pe­ti­tor pro­bet quod in­ten­dit: sed nimi­rum pro­ba­tio­nes quae­dam a reo ex­igun­tur: nam si cre­di­tum pe­tam, il­le re­spon­deat so­lu­tam es­se pe­cu­niam, ip­se hoc pro­ba­re co­gen­dus est. et hic igi­tur cum pe­ti­tor duas scrip­tu­ras os­ten­dit, he­res pos­te­rio­rem in­anem es­se, ip­se he­res id ad­pro­ba­re iu­di­ci de­bet.

12Ad Dig. 22,3,12ROHGE, Bd. 22 (1878), Nr. 66, S. 300: Beweis fortdauernder Bereicherung.The Same, Digest, Book XVII. Fifty aurei were bequeathed to you by will, and the same legacy was included in codicils which were subsequently executed. It is important to ascertain whether the testator intended to double the legacy, or merely to repeatedly mention it, or did so, having forgotten that he had already made the bequest in his will. From which party then must proof of the intention of the testator be exacted? At first sight, it would appear more just that the plaintiff should prove what he claims, but there is no doubt that proof is sometimes required of the defendant; for if I bring suit for a claim and the defendant answers that the money has been paid, he himself is required to establish this. Therefore, in the present instance, if the plaintiff exhibits two instruments, and the heir alleges that the last one is void, the latter must prove this in court.

13Idem li­bro tri­ge­si­mo di­ges­to­rum. Cum de ae­ta­te ho­mi­nis quae­re­re­tur, Cae­sar nos­ter in haec ver­ba re­scrip­sit: ‘Et du­rum et in­iquum est, cum de sta­tu ae­ta­tis ali­cu­ius quae­re­re­tur et di­ver­sae pro­fes­sio­nes pro­fe­run­tur, ea po­tis­si­mum sta­re, quae no­cet: sed cau­sa co­gni­ta ve­ri­ta­tem ex­cu­ti opor­tet et ex eo po­tis­si­mum an­nos com­pu­ta­ri, ex quo prae­ci­puam fi­dem in ea re con­sta­re cre­di­bi­lius vi­de­tur’.

13The Same, Digest, Book XXX. Where an inquiry was made with reference to the age of a man, our Emperor issued the following Rescript: “It is both hard and unjust, when a question arises with reference to a party’s age, and different statements are made, that one should be accepted which is prejudicial; but in the trial of a case the truth should be considered, and his age should be computed according to the document which seems to be most credible, and to deserve the greatest confidence in the investigation of the matter.”

14Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de of­fi­cio con­su­lis. Cir­ca eum, qui se ex li­ber­ti­ni­ta­te in­ge­nuum di­cat, re­fe­ren­dum est, quis ac­to­ris par­ti­bus fun­ga­tur. et si qui­dem in pos­ses­sio­nem li­ber­ti­ni­ta­tis fuit, si­ne du­bio ip­sum opor­te­bit in­ge­nui­ta­tis cau­sam age­re do­ce­re­que se in­ge­nuum es­se: sin ve­ro in pos­ses­sio­ne in­ge­nui­ta­tis sit et li­ber­ti­nus es­se di­ca­tur, sci­li­cet eius qui ei con­tro­ver­siam mo­vet, hoc pro­ba­re de­bet qui eum di­cit li­ber­tum suum: quid enim in­ter­est, ser­vum suum quis an li­ber­tum con­ten­dat? si quis au­tem fi­du­cia in­ge­nui­ta­tis suae ul­tro in se sus­ci­piat pro­ba­tio­nes ad hoc, ut sen­ten­tiam fe­rat pro in­ge­nui­ta­te fa­cien­tem, hoc est, in­ge­nuum se es­se ut pro­nun­tie­tur, an ob­tem­pe­ra­re ei de­beat, trac­ta­ri pot­est. et non ab re es­se opi­nor mo­rem ei ge­ri pro­ban­di se in­ge­nuum et sen­ten­tiam se­cun­dum se dan­dam, cum nul­la cap­tio in­ter­ce­dat iu­ris.

14Ulpianus, On the Office of the Consul, Book II. Inquiries should be made with reference to a person who, having passed as a freedman, now alleges that he is freeborn and desires to proceed as plaintiff. If, indeed, he occupies the position of a freedman, there is no doubt that he must bring an action to have himself declared freeborn, and establish that this is the case. But if he enjoys the reputation of having been born free, and he is alleged to be a freedman (of course by him who is responsible for the controversy), he who says that he is his freedman must prove it. For what difference does it make whether anyone asserts that he is his slave or his freedman? Where, however, a party has sufficient confidence in his claim of freedom of birth as voluntarily to undertake to produce proofs of it for the purpose of obtaining a decision declaring him freeborn (that is to say that he was born free as he alleges), it may be asked whether he should be permitted to do so. I am of the opinion that this should be done, and that he should have an opportunity to prove that he is freeborn, and have a decision rendered in his favor, as no one can be taken at a disadvantage by such a judgment.

15Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Qui­dam qua­si ex Se­ia sus­cep­tus a Gaio Se­io, cum Gaius fra­tres ha­be­ret, he­redi­ta­tem Gaii in­va­sit et fra­tri­bus eius­dem qua­si ex man­da­tu de­func­ti fi­dei­com­mis­sa sol­vit, cau­tio­nem ac­ce­pit: qui post­ea co­gni­to, quod fi­lius fra­tris eo­rum non fuis­set, quae­re­bant, an cum eo de he­redi­ta­te fra­tris pos­sint, prop­ter emis­sam ma­num ab eis qua­si fi­lio, age­re. Mo­des­ti­nus re­spon­dit cau­tio­ne ex­so­lu­ti fi­dei­com­mis­si sta­tum eius, qui pro­ba­ri pot­est a fra­tri­bus de­func­ti fi­lius mor­tui non es­se, mi­ni­me con­fir­ma­tum es­se: sed hoc ip­sum a fra­tri­bus pro­ba­ri de­bet.

15Modestinus, Opinions, Book XII. A certain man, asserting that he was the son of Seia and Gaius, seized the estate of Gaius, although the latter had brothers, and discharged certain trusts in favor of these brothers, as if by the direction of the deceased, and took a receipt. They, having afterwards ascertained that the alleged son was not their brother, asked whether they could bring an action against him to recover the estate, on account of the receipt which they had given him as the son of the deceased. Modestinus answered that the position of the party to whom the receipt had been given in discharge of the trust, and who could be proved by the brothers of the deceased not to be his son, was not in the slightest degree established by this fact, but that proof must be submitted by the brothers.

16Te­ren­tius Cle­mens li­bro ter­tio ad le­gem Iu­liam et Pa­piam. Et­iam ma­tris pro­fes­sio fi­lio­rum re­ci­pi­tur: sed et avi re­ci­pien­da est.

16Terentius Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III. The statement of a mother as to the birth of her children, as well as that of a grandfather, must be accepted.

17Cel­sus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum. Cum de le­ge Fal­ci­dia quae­ri­tur, he­redis pro­ba­tio est lo­cum ha­be­re le­gem Fal­ci­diam: quod dum pro­ba­re non pot­est, me­ri­to con­dem­na­bi­tur.

17Celsus, Digest, Book VI. When a question is raised with reference to the Lex Falcidia, the heir must prove that this law is applicable, because if he cannot do so, judgment will properly be rendered against him.

18Ul­pia­nus li­bro sex­to dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Quo­tiens ope­rae qua­si a li­ber­to pe­tun­tur, pro­ba­tio­nes ab eo qui se pa­tro­num di­cit ex­igun­tur: et id­eo Iu­lia­nus scrip­sit, li­cet in prae­iu­di­cio pos­ses­sor pa­tro­nus es­se vi­de­tur, ve­rum par­ti­bus ac­to­ris non li­ber­tum fun­gi de­be­re, sed eum qui se pa­tro­num es­se con­ten­dit. 1Qui do­lo di­cit fac­tum ali­quid, li­cet in ex­cep­tio­ne, do­ce­re do­lum ad­mis­sum de­bet. 2In­ter­ro­ga­tio­nis fac­tae pro­ba­tio­nem ac­to­ri im­po­ni de­be­re, id est ei, qui in iu­re in­ter­ro­ga­tum di­xit re­spon­dis­se se so­lum he­redem es­se. vel si ta­cuis­se di­ca­tur in­ter­ro­ga­tus, ae­que tan­tun­dem erit di­cen­dum im­po­si­tam in­pro­ba­tio­nem non ei qui ex­ce­pit se non re­spon­dis­se, sed ac­to­ri.

18Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VI. Whenever services are demanded of a freedman, proof of his right to do so is required from the party who alleges that he is his patron; therefore Julianus holds that, although in a matter which is in controversy the patron is held to be entitled to possession, he who is said to be the freedman should not take the part of plaintiff, but he who asserts that he is the patron should do so. 1Ad Dig. 22,3,18,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 265, Note 17.Where anyone alleges that some fraudulent act has been committed, he must prove the fraud, even though he may have made this statement in an exception. 2The plaintiff should be compelled to prove the truth of an interrogatory which is made, that is, where it is alleged that a party who was interrogated in court answered that he was the sole heir; or if, having been interrogated, he is said to have remained silent, the same rule must be held to apply; and the blame must be placed not upon him who stated in his exception that he did not answer, but upon the plaintiff.

19Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. In ex­cep­tio­ni­bus di­cen­dum est reum par­ti­bus ac­to­ris fun­gi opor­te­re ip­sum­que ex­cep­tio­nem vel­ut in­ten­tio­nem im­ple­re: ut pu­ta si pac­ti con­ven­ti ex­cep­tio­ne uta­tur, do­ce­re de­bet pac­tum con­ven­tum fac­tum es­se. 1Cum quis pro­mi­sis­set iu­di­cio se sis­ti et rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa afuis­se di­cat et ob id non ste­tis­se, vel do­lo ma­lo ad­ver­sa­rii fac­tum quo mi­nus sis­te­re­tur, vel va­le­tu­di­nem si­bi im­pe­d­imen­to fuis­se vel tem­pes­ta­tem, pro­ba­re eum id opor­tet. 2Sed et si pro­cu­ra­to­ria quis ex­cep­tio­ne uta­tur, eo quod non li­cuis­set ad­ver­sa­rio da­re vel fie­ri pro­cu­ra­to­rem, pro­ba­re id opor­tet ob­icien­tem ex­cep­tio­nem. 3Idem erit di­cen­dum et si ea pe­cu­nia pe­ta­tur, quae pen­sa­ta di­ci­tur. 4Hoc am­plius, si iu­di­ca­tae rei vel iu­ris­iu­ran­di con­di­cio de­la­ta di­ca­tur de eo quod nunc pe­ti­tur, si­ve in alea ges­tum es­se con­ten­da­tur, eum im­ple­re pro­ba­tio­nes opor­tet.

19The Same, Disputations, Book VII. It must be said, with reference to exceptions, that the defendant is required to perform the part of plaintiff, and he himself prove his exception, just as the plaintiff must prove his claim; for instance, where he pleads an exception on the ground of a contract entered into, he must show that the contract was actually made. 1Where anyone who promised to appear in court alleges as a reason for not doing so that he has been absent on public business, or that some malicious act of his adversary prevented him from appearing, or his health, or a storm hindered him, he must prove it. 2Where a party makes use of an exception on the ground that the appointment of the attorney of his adversary is not valid, because his adversary could not appoint, or be appointed an attorney, he must prove the truth of the exception which he has interposed. 3The same rule will apply where suit is brought for a sum of money which is alleged to have been paid. 4Again, where an exception is pleaded on the ground of a decision rendered; or because an oath is said to have been tendered with reference to the property for which suit now is brought, or because the matter in controversy has reference to a game of chance, the party who filed the exception must prove all these allegations.

20Iu­lia­nus li­bro qua­dra­ge­si­mo ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Si quis li­be­rum ho­mi­nem vi ra­pue­rit, in vin­cu­lis ha­bue­rit, is in­dig­nis­si­me com­mo­dum pos­ses­so­ris con­se­que­re­tur, quia pro­ba­ri non pot­erit ho­mi­nem eo tem­po­re quo pri­mum lis or­di­na­re­tur in li­ber­ta­te fuis­se.

20Julianus, Digest, Book XLIII. Where anyone seizes a freeman by force, and keeps him in chains, he is most unworthy of the advantages enjoyed by a possessor, because it cannot be proved that, at the time that proceedings were first instituted, the man was free.

21Mar­cia­nus li­bro sex­to in­sti­tu­tio­num. Ve­rius es­se ex­is­ti­mo ip­sum qui agit, id est le­ga­ta­rium, pro­ba­re opor­te­re scis­se alie­nam rem vel ob­li­ga­tam le­ga­re de­func­tum, non he­redem pro­ba­re opor­te­re igno­ras­se alie­nam vel ob­li­ga­tam, quia sem­per ne­ces­si­tas pro­ban­di in­cum­bit il­li qui agit.

21Marcianus, Institutes, Book VI. I think that the better opinion is that he who brings the action, that is to say the legatee, must prove that the testator knew that the property bequeathed belonged, or was encumbered to another, and that the heir is not required to prove that it belonged to someone else, or was encumbered, because the necessity of proving his allegations always rests upon the plaintiff.

22Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Eum, qui vo­lun­ta­tem mu­ta­tam di­cit, pro­ba­re hoc de­be­re.

22Ulpianus, Opinions, Book I. He who says that he has changed his mind must prove it.

23Mar­cia­nus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad for­mu­lam hy­po­the­ca­riam. An­te om­nia pro­ban­dum est, quod in­ter agen­tem et de­bi­to­rem con­ve­nit, ut pig­no­ri hy­po­the­cae­ve sit: sed et si hoc pro­bet ac­tor, il­lud quo­que im­ple­re de­bet rem per­ti­ne­re ad de­bi­to­rem eo tem­po­re quo con­ve­nit de pig­no­re, aut cu­ius vo­lun­ta­te hy­po­the­ca da­ta sit.

23Marcianus, On the Hypothecary Formula. It must be proved, before everything else, that it was agreed between the plaintiff and the debtor, that the property should be pledged or hypothecated. After the plaintiff has proved this, he must also establish the fact that the property belonged to the debtor at the time the pledge was agreed upon, or that the hypothecation was made with his consent.

24Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro quar­to re­gu­la­rum. Si chi­ro­gra­phum can­cel­la­tum fue­rit, li­cet prae­sump­tio­ne de­bi­tor li­be­ra­tus es­se vi­de­tur, in eam ta­men quan­ti­ta­tem, quam ma­ni­fes­tis pro­ba­tio­ni­bus cre­di­tor si­bi ad­huc de­be­ri os­ten­de­rit, rec­te de­bi­tor con­ve­ni­tur.

24Modestinus, Rules, Book IV. Where a promissory note has been cancelled, although the presumption is that the debtor has been released, still, he can lawfully be sued for the amount which the creditor can show by manifest evidence is still due to him.

25Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num. Cum de in­de­bi­to quae­ri­tur, quis pro­ba­re de­bet non fuis­se de­bi­tum? res ita tem­pe­ran­da est, ut, si qui­dem is, qui ac­ce­pis­se di­ci­tur rem vel pe­cu­niam in­de­bi­tam, hoc ne­ga­ve­rit et ip­se qui de­dit le­gi­ti­mis pro­ba­tio­ni­bus so­lu­tio­nem ad­pro­ba­ve­rit, si­ne ul­la di­stinc­tio­ne ip­sum, qui ne­ga­vit se­se pe­cu­niam ac­ce­pis­se, si vult au­di­ri, com­pel­len­dum es­se ad pro­ba­tio­nes prae­stan­das, quod pe­cu­niam de­bi­tam ac­ce­pit: per et­enim ab­sur­dum est eum, qui ab in­itio ne­ga­vit pe­cu­niam sus­ce­pis­se, post­quam fue­rit con­vic­tus eam ac­ce­pis­se, pro­ba­tio­nem non de­bi­ti ab ad­ver­sa­rio ex­ige­re. sin ve­ro ab in­itio con­fi­tea­tur qui­dem sus­ce­pis­se pe­cu­nias, di­cat au­tem non in­de­bi­tas ei fuis­se so­lu­tas, prae­sump­tio­nem vi­de­li­cet pro eo es­se qui ac­ce­pit ne­mo du­bi­tat: qui enim sol­vit num­quam ita re­su­pi­nus est, ut fa­ci­le suas pe­cu­nias iac­tet et in­de­bi­tas ef­fun­dat, et ma­xi­me si ip­se qui in­de­bi­tas de­dis­se di­cit ho­mo di­li­gens est et stu­dio­sus pa­ter fa­mi­lias, cu­ius per­so­nam in­cre­di­bi­le est in ali­quo fa­ci­le er­ras­se. et id­eo eum, qui di­cit in­de­bi­tas sol­vis­se, com­pel­li ad pro­ba­tio­nes, quod per do­lum ac­ci­pien­tis vel ali­quam ius­tam igno­ran­tiae cau­sam in­de­bi­tum ab eo so­lu­tum, et ni­si hoc os­ten­de­rit, nul­lam eum re­pe­ti­tio­nem ha­be­re. 1Sin au­tem is qui in­de­bi­tum que­ri­tur vel pu­pil­lus vel mi­nor sit vel mu­lier vel for­te vir qui­dem per­fec­tae ae­ta­tis, sed mi­les vel agri cul­tor et fo­ren­sium re­rum ex­pers vel alias sim­pli­ci­ta­te gau­dens et de­si­dia de­di­tus: tunc eum qui ac­ce­pit pe­cu­nias os­ten­de­re be­ne eas ac­ce­pis­se et de­bi­tas ei fuis­se so­lu­tas et, si non os­ten­de­rit, eas red­hi­be­re. 2Sed haec ita, si to­tam sum­mam in­de­bi­tam fuis­se so­lu­tam is qui de­dit con­ten­dat. sin au­tem pro par­te que­ri­tur, quod pars pe­cu­niae so­lu­tae de­bi­ta non est, vel quod ab in­itio qui­dem de­bi­tum fuit, sed vel dis­so­lu­to de­bi­to post­ea igna­rus ite­rum sol­vit vel ex­cep­tio­ne tu­tus er­ro­re eius pe­cu­nias de­pen­dit: ip­sum om­ni­mo­do hoc os­ten­de­re, quod vel plus de­bi­to per­sol­vit vel iam so­lu­tam pe­cu­niam per er­ro­rem re­pe­ti­ta so­lu­tio­ne de­pen­dit vel tu­tus ex­cep­tio­ne suam ne­sciens pro­ie­cit pe­cu­niam, se­cun­dum ge­ne­ra­lem re­gu­lam, quae eos, qui op­po­nen­das es­se ex­cep­tio­nes ad­fir­mant vel sol­vis­se de­bi­ta con­ten­dunt, haec os­ten­de­re ex­igit. 3In om­ni­bus au­tem vi­sio­ni­bus quas prae­po­sui­mus li­cen­tia con­ce­den­da est ei, cui onus pro­ba­tio­nis in­cum­bit, ad­ver­sa­rio suo rei ve­ri­ta­te ius­iu­ran­dum fer­re, prius ip­so pro ca­lum­nia iu­ran­te, ut iu­dex iu­ra­men­ti fi­dem se­cu­tus ita suam sen­ten­tiam pos­sit for­ma­re, iu­re re­fe­ren­dae re­li­gio­nis ei ser­van­do. 4Sed haec, ubi de so­lu­tio­ne in­de­bi­ti quaes­tio est. sin au­tem cau­tio in­de­bi­te ex­po­si­ta es­se di­ca­tur et in­dis­cre­te lo­qui­tur, tunc eum, in quem cau­tio ex­po­si­ta est, com­pel­li de­bi­tum es­se os­ten­de­re, quod in cau­tio­nem de­du­xit, ni­si ip­se spe­cia­li­ter qui cau­tio­nem ex­po­suit cau­sas ex­pla­na­vit, pro qui­bus ean­dem con­scrip­sit: tunc enim sta­re eum opor­tet suae con­fes­sio­ni, ni­si evi­den­tis­si­mis pro­ba­tio­ni­bus in scrip­tis ha­bi­tis os­ten­de­re pa­ra­tus sit se­se haec in­de­bi­te pro­mis­sis­se.

25Ad Dig. 22,3,25ROHGE, Bd. 21 (1877), Nr. 84, S. 261: Folgen leichtsinnigen Leugnens.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 426, Note 10-25.Paulus, Questions, Book III. Ad Dig. 22,3,25 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 23 (1878), Nr. 107, S. 319: Begründung der cond. indeb. Beweis des Irrthums und dessen Entschuldbarkeit.Where a question arises with reference to money which is not due, who must prove this? The matter should be adjusted so that if he who is said to have received the property denies that the money is not owing, and he who paid it proves its payment by competent evidence, then he who denies absolutely that he received the money, if he wishes to be heard, must be compelled to furnish proof that the money was lawfully due to him; for it would be absurd if he who, in the beginning, denied that he had received the money, and afterwards was shown to have received it, should require proof from his adversary that it was not owing to him. If, however, in the first place, the plaintiff should acknowledge that he had received the money, but should assert that it was due to him, the presumption undoubtedly will lie in favor of the party who received it, for he who pays is never so negligent as to throw away his money without hesitation, and pay it when it is not due; and especially is this the case where the party who alleges that he paid what was not due is the diligent and careful head of a household, for it is incredible that a person of this kind should be so easily deceived. Therefore he who alleges that he has paid money which was not due will be required to produce evidence that the said money was paid through the fraud of the party who received it, or on account of some just cause of ignorance, and unless he shows this he will have no right to recover it. 1Where, however, he who complains of the payment of money which was not due is a ward, a minor, or a woman, or, indeed, a man of full age but a soldier, or a cultivator of the soil and inexperienced in public business, or fond of a simple life and given to idleness; then he who receives the money must show that he actually did so, and that it was due and payable to him, and if he fails to do this he must refund it. 2This only applies where the party who paid the money contends that the entire sum was not due. Where, however, he complains of the payment of only a portion, on the ground that only a part of the money paid was not due; or that it was due in the beginning, but the debt was afterwards discharged, and he ignorantly paid it a second time; or that, being protected by an exception, he paid the money through mistake; he, himself, must, by all means, establish that he either paid more than was due, or that he paid money a second time through mistake, or that, being protected by an exception, he ignorantly paid the money; in accordance with the general rule which requires those to furnish proof who state that they have exceptions to offer, or who allege that they have paid the debt. 3In all the instances which we have suggested, permission should be granted to him upon whom rests the burden of proof to tender the oath to his adversary, with reference to the truth of the matter, before tendering him the oath pro calumnia; so that the judge may regulate his decision according to the confidence which he has in the oath of the plaintiff, the right to the defendant to tender the oath back to his adversary being reserved. 4Ad Dig. 22,3,25,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 318, Note 4; Bd. II, § 412b, Note 2.This point relates to the payment of money which is not due. Where, however, a written promise to pay is said to have been made for money which is not due, and the terms of the instrument are indefinite, then the party in whose favor the note was executed will be compelled to prove that the sum mentioned in it is due to him, unless he who made the note has explicitly stated his reasons for doing so; for then he must abide by his admission, unless he is ready to show by conclusive documentary evidence that he made the promise to pay money which he did not owe.

26Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro vi­ce­si­mo quaes­tio­num. Pro­cu­la mag­nae quan­ti­ta­tis fi­dei­com­mis­sum a fra­tre si­bi de­bi­tum post mor­tem eius in ra­tio­ne cum he­redi­bus com­pen­sa­re vel­let, ex di­ver­so au­tem al­le­ga­re­tur num­quam id a fra­tre quam­diu vi­xit de­si­de­ra­tum, cum va­riis ex cau­sis sae­pe ra­tio­ni fra­tris pe­cu­nias ra­tio Pro­cu­lae sol­vis­set: di­vus Com­mo­dus cum su­per eo neg­otio co­gnos­ce­ret, non ad­mi­sit com­pen­sa­tio­nem, qua­si ta­ci­te fra­tri fi­dei­com­mis­sum fuis­set re­mis­sum.

26Papinianus, Questions, Book XX. Procula, to whom a large sum of money was due from her brother under the terms of a trust, wished to set off this sum proportionately against his heirs after his death; and in opposition to this it was alleged that she had never demanded the money of her brother during his lifetime, but that she herself had paid him certain sums of money for various reasons growing out of accounts which they had with one another. The Divine Commodus, in deciding the case, did not admit the set-off, but held that she had tacitly released her brother from the execution of the trust.

27Scae­vo­la li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ter­tio di­ges­to­rum. Qui tes­ta­men­tum fa­cie­bat ei qui us­que ad cer­tum mo­dum ca­pe­re po­tue­rat le­ga­vit li­ci­tam quan­ti­ta­tem, de­in­de ita lo­cu­tus est: ‘Ti­tio cen­tum do le­go, quae mi­hi per­tu­lit: quae id­eo ei non ca­vi, quod om­nem for­tu­nam et sub­stan­tiam, si quam a ma­tre sus­ce­pe­rat in si­nu meo ha­bui si­ne ul­la cau­tio­ne. item ei­dem Ti­tio red­di et sol­vi vo­lo de sub­stan­tia mea cen­tum quin­qua­gin­ta, quae ego ex red­iti­bus prae­dio­rum eius (quo­rum ip­se fruc­tum per­ce­pi et dis­tra­xi), item de ca­len­da­rio (si qua a ma­tre re­ce­pe­rat Ti­tius) in rem meam con­ver­ti’. quae­ro, an Ti­tius ea ex­ige­re pot­est. re­spon­dit, si Ti­tius su­pra scrip­ta ex ra­tio­ne sua ad tes­ta­to­rem per­ve­nis­se pro­ba­re po­tue­rit, ex­igi: vi­de­tur enim eo, quod il­le plus ca­pe­re non pot­erat, in frau­dem le­gis haec in tes­ta­men­to ad­ie­cis­se.

27Scævola, Digest, Book XXXIII. A man made a will, and bequeathed a lawful share of his estate to one who was only entitled to receive a certain amount, and he then provided as follows: “I give and bequeath one hundred aurei to Titius, which he has placed in my hands, but of which I have not given him any written evidence, because I have held all the fortune and property which he received from his mother in my possession without any note. Moreover, I desire that there should be delivered and paid to Titius a hundred and fifty aurei out of my estate, which I have received as the rent of land, being the proceeds of crops harvested and sold, as well as any sums shown on my books to have been received by Titius from his mother, and which I have appropriated to my own use.” I ask whether Titius can collect this money. The answer was that if Titius can prove that the property had come into the hands of the testator in accordance with the above-mentioned statement, he can do so; for it is held that in a case where a party is not entitled to receive more than a certain amount by a legacy, such provisions are added to a will in violation of law.

28La­beo li­bro sep­ti­mo pi­tha­non a Pau­lo epi­to­ma­to­rum. Si ar­bi­ter anim­ad­ver­te­re de­beat, an ope­ris fac­ti me­mo­ria ex­stet, hoc ei quae­ren­dum est, an ali­quis me­mi­ne­rit id opus fac­tum es­se. Paulus: im­mo cum in ar­bi­trio quae­ri­tur, me­mo­ria fac­ti ope­ris ex­stet nec ne, non hoc quae­ri­tur, num ali­quis me­mi­ne­rit, quo die aut quo con­su­le fac­tum sit, sed num hoc ali­quo mo­do pro­ba­ri pos­sit, quan­do id opus fac­tum sit: et hoc ita, quod Grae­ce di­ci so­let ἐν πλάτει. enim pot­est hoc me­mo­ria non te­ne­ri: in­tra an­num pu­ta fac­tum, cum in­ter­im ne­mo sit eo­rum, qui me­mi­ne­rit, qui­bus con­su­li­bus id vi­de­rit, sed cum om­nium haec est opi­nio nec au­dis­se nec vi­dis­se, cum id opus fie­ret, ne­que ex eis au­dis­se, qui vi­dis­sent aut au­dis­sent: et hoc in­fi­ni­te si­mi­li­ter su­sum ver­sum ac­ci­det, cum me­mo­ria ope­ris fac­ti non ex­sta­ret.

28Ad Dig. 22,3,28Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 113, Note 9.Labeo, Epitomes of Probabilities, by Paulus, Book VII. Where it is the duty of an arbiter to decide a case, should he inquire whether a memorandum of the labor performed exists, or whether anyone remembers that the labor has been performed? Paulus says that when inquiry is made in a case of arbitration, as to whether a memorandum of the labor performed is in existence or not, it ought not to be asked whether anyone remembers the time, or under what consul the work was done, but whether it can be proved in any way whatsoever when it was done. And this should be accomplished, as the Greeks are accustomed to state, in a general way, for it cannot be retained in the memory that the work has been done; for example, within a certain year, since, in the meantime, no one will probably remember under what consuls it was performed. But where the opinion of all persons is that they did not hear of the work being done, or see it, or learn of it from any who might have seen it, or heard of it, and, no matter how far back one may go, no memorandum of the work performed can be found; this will be sufficient.

29Scae­vo­la li­bro no­no di­ges­to­rum. Im­pe­ra­to­res An­to­ni­nus et Ve­rus Au­gus­ti Clau­dio Apol­li­na­ri11Die Großausgabe liest Apo­li­na­ri statt Apol­li­na­ri. re­scrip­se­runt in haec ver­ba: ‘Pro­ba­tio­nes quae de fi­liis dan­tur, non in so­la ad­fir­ma­tio­ne tes­tium con­sis­tunt, sed et epis­tu­las, quae uxo­ri­bus mis­sae al­le­ga­ren­tur, si de fi­de ea­rum con­stet, non­nul­lam vi­cem in­stru­men­to­rum op­ti­ne­re de­cre­tum est’. 1Mu­lier gra­vi­da re­pu­dia­ta, fi­lium eni­xa, ab­sen­te ma­ri­to ut spu­rium in ac­tis pro­fes­sa est. quae­si­tum est an is in po­tes­ta­te pa­tris sit et ma­tre in­tes­ta­ta mor­tua ius­su eius he­redi­ta­tem ma­tris ad­ire pos­sit nec ob­sit pro­fes­sio a ma­tre ira­ta fac­ta. re­spon­dit ve­ri­ta­ti lo­cum su­per­fo­re.

29Scævola, Digest, Book IX. The Emperors Antoninus and Verus stated in a Rescript to Claudius Apollinaris the following, namely: “It is decreed that proofs given with reference to children shall not consist of the mere statements of witnesses, but also of letters which are alleged to have been sent to wives, if their authenticity is established, and they can be introduced as documentary evidence.” 1A wife, who had been repudiated while pregnant, brought forth a son during the absence of her husband; and, in the course of the proceedings instituted in consequence, confessed that the child was illegitimate. The inquiry arose whether the son was under the control of his father, and if when his mother died intestate, he could enter upon her estate by order of his father, or whether the confession made by his angry mother would prejudice his rights. The answer was that, in cases of this kind an opportunity always existed for ascertaining the truth.