De transactionibus
(Concerning Compromises.)
1 Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo ad edictum. Qui transigit, quasi de re dubia et lite incerta neque finita transigit. qui vero paciscitur, donationis causa rem certam et indubitatam liberalitate remittit.
1 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book L. When a man makes a compromise with reference to something which is in doubt, and the issue of the trial is uncertain, the compromise is not brought to a termination; but he who makes an agreement surrenders by way of donation through liberality, something which is certain and undisputed.
2 Idem libro septuagensimo quarto ad edictum. Transactum accipere quis potest non solum, si Aquiliana stipulatio fuerit subiecta, sed et si pactum conventum fuerit factum.
2 The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXIV. Anyone can accept a compromise, not only where the Aquilian stipulation is inserted, but also where an agreement is entered into.
3 Scaevola libro primo digestorum. Imperatores Antoninus et Verus ita rescripserunt: ‘Privatis pactionibus non dubium est non laedi ius ceterorum. quare transactione, quae inter heredem et matrem defuncti facta est, neque testamentum rescissum videri posse neque manumissis vel legatariis actiones suae ademptae. quare quidquid ex testamento petunt, scriptum heredem convenire debent: qui in transactione hereditatis aut cavit sibi pro oneribus hereditatis, aut si non cavit, non debet neglegentiam suam ad alienam iniuriam referre.’ 1Cum transactio propter fideicommissum facta esset et postea codicilli reperti sunt: quaero, an quanto minus ex transactione consecuta mater defuncti fuerit quam pro parte sua est, id ex fideicommissi causa consequi debeat. respondit debere. 2Debitor, cuius pignus creditor distraxit, cum Maevio, qui se legitimum creditoris heredem esse iactabat, minimo transegit: postea testamento prolato Septicium heredem esse apparuit. quaesitum est, si agat pigneraticia debitor cum Septicio, an is uti possit exceptione transactionis factae cum Maevio, qui heres eo tempore non fuerit: possitque Septicius pecuniam, quae Maevio ut heredi a debitore numerata est, condictione repetere, quasi sub praetextu hereditatis acceptam. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non posse, quia neque cum eo ipse transegit nec negotium Septicii Maevius gerens accepit.
3 Scævola, Digest, Book I. The Emperors Antoninus and Verus stated in a Rescript, “That there is no doubt that private agreements which have been entered into do not prejudice the rights of others”; therefore, where a compromise has been made between the heir and the mother of the deceased, the will cannot be held to be rescinded by it, nor are manumitted slaves or legatees deprived of their rights of action thereby. Hence, when they bring suit for anything under the will, they must sue the heir mentioned therein; who, when he compromised matters connected with the estate, whether he provided for himself with reference to the burdens attached to it, or whether he did not do so, he has no right to permit his own negligence to injure others. 1When a compromise is entered into with regard to a trust, and afterwards codicils are found; I ask, if the mother of the deceased has received less through the compromise than her share, ought she to receive what is lacking by virtue of the trust? The answer was that she ought. 2A debtor whose pledge had been sold by his creditor compromised for a smaller sum with Mævius, who claimed to be the heir of the lawful creditor, and afterwards the will of the creditor having been produced, it appeared that Septicius was the heir. The question then arose whether, if the debtor brought suit against Septicius for the property pledged, he could make use of an exception on the ground of the compromise made with Mævius, who was not the legal heir at that time; and can Septicius have a right to recover the money which was paid by the debtor to Mævius as the heir, on the ground that it was received by him under the pretext of inheritance? The answer was that this could not be done, according to the facts stated, for the reason that Septicius did not himself make a compromise with him, nor was Mævius, when he accepted it, acting as the agent of Septicius.
4 Ulpianus libro quadragensimo sexto ad Sabinum. Aquiliana stipulatio omnimodo omnes praecedentes obligationes novat et peremit ipsaque peremitur per acceptilationem: et hoc iure utimur. ideoque etiam legata sub condicione relicta in stipulationem Aquilianam deducuntur.
4 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLVI. The Aquilian stipulation absolutely changes and annuls all preceding obligations, and is itself annulled by a release; and this is now our practice. Therefore, even bequests which are made conditionally come under the Aquilian stipulation.
5 Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Cum Aquiliana stipulatio interponitur, quae ex consensu redditur, lites, de quibus non est cogitatum, in suo statu retinentur. liberalitatem enim captiosam interpretatio prudentium fregit.
5 Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. When the Aquilian stipulation is made use of, the consent of the contracting parties is implied, and any actions which they had not yet thought of remain in their former condition; for the interpretation of persons learned in the law is opposed to all captious liberality.
6 Gaius libro septimo decimo ad edictum provinciale. De his controversiis, quae ex testamento proficiscuntur, neque transigi neque exquiri veritas aliter potest quam inspectis cognitisque verbis testamenti.
6 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XVII. In controversies arising out of a will no compromise can take place, nor can the truth of the facts be inquired into, unless an examination and interpretation of the words of the will is made.
7 Ulpianus libro septimo disputationum. Et post rem iudicatam transactio valet, si vel appellatio intercesserit vel appellare potueris. 1Si fideiussor conventus et condemnatus fuisset, mox reus transegisset cum eo, cui erat fideiussor condemnatus: an transactio valeat quaeritur: et puto valere, quasi omni causa et adversus reum et adversus fideiussorem dissoluta. si tamen ipse fideiussor condemnatus transegit, etsi transactio non peremit rem iudicatam, tamen eo quod datum est relevari rem iudicatam oportet. 2Usque adeo autem quod datum est etiamsi non proficit ad transactionem, extenuat tamen rem iudicatam, ut inde sit et dictum et rescriptum circa alimentorum transactionem citra praetoris auctoritatem factam, ut quod datum est proficiat ad alimenta: ita ut, si quid amplius ex causa alimentorum deberi potest, id praestetur, quod autem datum est, imputetur.
7 Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VII. A compromise is valid even after judgment has been rendered, if an appeal has been, or can be taken. 1Where a surety was sued, and judgment rendered against him, and afterwards the principal made a compromise with the party who obtained the judgment against the surety; the question arises, was the compromise valid? I am of the opinion that it was, and that every cause of action against both principal and surety was removed. If, however, the surety himself made the compromise after he lost his case, while the judgment was not annulled by the compromise, still, it should be considered as settled, so far as anything which was paid is concerned. 2It is so true, however, that what was paid in this case even though it does not dispose of the compromise still diminished the amount of the judgment, that it may be held, and it is, in fact, contained in a rescript in a case where a compromise was entered into without permission of the Prætor, that what had been paid should be applied to the furnishing of maintenance, and whatever, in addition, was due on account of maintenance must be provided, but what had already been paid should be credited.
8 Idem libro quinto de omnibus tribunalibus. Cum hi, quibus alimenta relicta erant, facile transigerent contenti modico praesenti: divus Marcus oratione in senatu recitata effecit, ne aliter alimentorum transactio rata esset, quam si auctore praetore facta. solet igitur praetor intervenire et inter consentientes arbitrari, an transactio vel quae admitti debeat. 1Eiusdem praetoris notio ob transactionem erit, sive habitatio sive vestiarium sive de praediis alimentum legabitur. 2Haec oratio pertinet ad alimenta, quae testamento vel codicillis fuerint relicta sive ad testamentum factis sive ab intestato. idem erit dicendum et si mortis causa donata fuerint relicta vel ab eo, cui mortis causa donata sunt, relicta. sed et si condicionis implendae gratia relicta sunt, adhuc idem dicemus. plane de alimentis, quae non mortis causa donata sunt, licebit et sine praetore auctore transigi. 3Sive igitur in menses singulos sive in dies sive in annos fuerint relicta, oratio locum habet. sed et si non fuerint perpetuo relicta, sed usque ad annos certos, idem est. 4Si integra quantitas alicui fuerit legata, ut ex usuris eius se alat et mortis tempore pecunias restituat: non cessabit oratio, licet non in annos singulos videatur id relictum. 5Sed et si sit certa quantitas relicta Titio vel res ita, ut inde alimenta Seio praestentur: magis est ut transigere Titius possit, nec enim transactione Titii minuuntur alimenta Seii. idemque est et si per fideicommissum alimenta ad hoc legatario fuerint relicta. 6Eam transactionem oratio improbat, quae idcirco fit, ut quis repraesentatam pecuniam consumat. quid ergo si quis citra praetoris auctoritatem transegerit, ut quod per singulos annos erat ei relictum, consequeretur per singulos menses? aut quid si, quod per singulos menses ei relictum erat, consequeretur per singulos dies? quid deinde si, quod consummato anno ut acciperet, initio anni consequatur? et puto eam transactionem valere, quia meliorem condicionem suam alimentarius tali transactione facit: noluit enim oratio alimenta per transactionem intercipi. 7Nihil autem interest, utrum libertini sint quibus alimenta relicta sunt an ingenui, satis locupletes an minus. 8Vult igitur oratio apud praetorem de istis quaeri: in primis de causa transactionis, dein de modo, tertio de persona transigentium. 9In causa hoc erit requirendum, quae causa sit transigendi: sine causa enim neminem transigentem audiet praetor. causae fere huiusmodi solent allegari: si alibi domicilium heres, alibi alimentarius habeat: aut si destinet domicilium transferre [ed. maior alteruter] <ed. minor alter> eorum: aut si causa aliqua urgueat praesentis pecuniae: aut si a pluribus ei alimenta relicta sint et minutatim singulos convenire difficile ei sit: aut si qua alia causa fuit, ut plures solent incidere, quae praetori suadeant transactionem admittere. 10Modus quoque pecuniae, quae in transactionem venit, aestimandus est: ut puta quantitas transactionis. nam etiam ex modo fides transactionis aestimabitur. modus autem pro aetate eius, qui transigit, arbitrandus est et valetudine: nam alias cum puero, alias cum iuvene, alias cum sene transigi palam est: constat enim alimenta cum vita finiri. 11Sed et personarum contemplatio habenda est, hoc est, cuius vitae sint hi, quibus alimenta relicta sunt: utrum frugi vitae hi sint, qui alias sufficere sibi possint, an sequioris, qui de alimentis pendeant. in persona eius, a quo alimenta relicta sunt, haec erunt specienda: in quibus sunt facultatibus, cuius propositi, cuius opinionis. tunc enim apparebit, numquid circumvenire velit eum, cum quo transigit. 12Qui transigit de alimentis, non videbitur neque de habitatione neque de vestiario transegisse, cum divus Marcus specialiter etiam de istis transigi voluerit. 13Sed et si quis de alimentis transegerit, non habebit necesse etiam de habitatione vel ceteris invitus transigere: poterit igitur vel de omnibus simul vel de quibusdam facere transactionem. 14De calciario quoque arbitrio praetoris transigendum est. 15Si uni pluribusve fundus ad alimenta fuerit relictus velintque eum distrahere: necesse est praetorem de distractione eius et transactione arbitrari. sed si pluribus fundus ad alimenta fuerit relictus et hi inter se transigant: sine praetoris auctoritate facta transactio rata esse non debet. idem est et si ager fuerit in alimenta obligatus: nam nec pignus ad hoc datum inconsulto praetore poterit liberari. 16Arbitratu praetoris vel de universis alimentis vel de parte eorum transigi oportere plus quam manifestum est. 17Si praetor aditus citra causae cognitionem transigi permiserit, transactio nullius erit momenti: praetori enim ea res quaerenda commissa est, non neglegenda nec donanda. sed et si non de omnibus inquisierit, quae oratio mandat, hoc est de causa de modo de personis transigentium, dicendum est, quamvis de quibusdam quaesierit, transactionem esse irritam. 18Sed nec mandare ex hac causa iurisdictionem vel praeses provinciae vel praetor poterit. 19Transactiones alimentorum etiam apud procuratorem Caesaris fieri possunt: scilicet si a fisco petantur alimenta. secundum quae et apud praefectos aerarii transigi poterit. 20Si cum lis quidem esset de alimentis, transactum autem de lite fuisset: transactio valere inconsulto praetore non potest, ne circumveniatur oratio. fingi enim lites poterunt, ut transactio etiam citra praetoris fiat auctoritatem. 21Si eidem alimenta et praeterea legatum praesenti die datum sit, et transactum fuerit citra praetoris auctoritatem: id quod datum est imputabitur prius in legatum quod praesenti die datum est, superfluum in alimentariam causam. 22Si quis de alimentis transegerit sine praetoris auctoritate, id quod datum est in praeterita alimenta cedet. nec interest tantum in quantitate sit debita, quantum datum est, an minus, an plus: nam et si minus sit, adhuc tamen id quod in solutum datum est in praeterita alimenta imputabitur. sane si is, qui de alimentis transegit, locupletior factus sit ea solutione: in quod factus sit locupletior aequissimum erit in eum dari repetitionem: nec enim debet ex alieno damno esse locuples. 23Si in annos singulos certa quantitas alicui fuerit relicta homini honestioris loci veluti salarium annuum vel usus fructus, transactio et sine praetore fieri poterit: ceterum si usus fructus modicus alimentorum vice sit relictus, dico transactionem citra praetorem factam nullius esse momenti. 24Si cui non nummus ad alimenta, sed frumentum atque oleum et cetera, quae ad victum necessaria sunt, fuerint relicta: non poterit de his transigere, sive annua sive menstrua ei relinquantur. si tamen ita sine praetore transegerit, ut in vicem eorum nummum quotannis vel quotmensibus acciperet et neque diem neque modum permutavit, sed tantum genus: vel ex contrario si pactus fuerit, ut in generibus alimenta acciperet, quae in nummis ei relicta fuissent: vel si vinum pro oleo vel oleum pro vino vel quid aliud commutavit: vel locum permutavit, ut quae erant ei Romae alimenta relicta, in municipio vel in provincia acciperet vel contra: vel personam commutavit, ut quod a pluribus erat accepturus, ab uno acciperet: vel alium pro alio debitorem acceperit: haec omnia habent disceptationem praetoris et pro utilitate alimentarii recipienda sunt. 25Si ad habitationem certa quantitas sit annua relicta et ita sit transactum sine praetore, ut habitatio praestetur, valet transactio, quia fructus habitationis praestatur, licet ruinae vel incendio subiecta transactio est. per contrarium quoque si pro habitatione, quae erat relicta, placuerit certam quantitatem praestari, transactio rata est et citra praetorem.
8 The Same, On all Tribunals, Book V. When those to whom provision for maintenance has been left, were ready to make a compromise, and were satisfied with a moderate sum to be paid to them at once; the Divine Marcus stated in an Address delivered in the Senate: “That no compromise with reference to maintenance should stand, unless it was made under the authority of the Prætor.” Therefore the Prætor is accustomed to intervene and decide between the contracting parties whether the compromise is one which should be admitted. 1Whether provision for a house, or for clothing, or for maintenance dependent on real-estate is bequeathed, the inquiry of the same Prætor with reference to the compromise must be held. 2The above-mentioned Address relates to provision for maintenance left either by will or codicil, whether it was added to the will, or the party died intestate. The same rule is applicable where the provision was made by a donation mortis causa or where a charge was imposed upon anyone. Where bequests are made for the purpose of fulfilling a condition, we say that the rule is the same. It is evident that a compromise can be entered into without the authority of the Prætor when provision for maintenance is not made mortis causa. 3The Address applies to sums to be paid monthly or daily or annually, and the same rule is applicable where they are not left for life, but only for a certain term of years. 4Where a certain sum is bequeathed to anyone in order that he may support himself with the interest of the same and restore the entire amount at the time of his death; the Address will still apply, although the amount cannot be held to be paid annually. 5Where, however, a certain sum of money, or a certain amount of property is left to Titius, in order to provide for the support of Seius, the better opinion is that Titius can compromise; for by this act of Titius the maintenance of Seius is not diminished. The same rule applies where property was left to the legatee under a trust in order to provide for maintenance. 6The Address forbids a compromise which is made in such a way that anyone can spend at once the amount which is given him. What would be the case then, if a party made a compromise without the authority of the Prætor, to the effect that whatever was payable to him annually by the bequest, he should receive each month? Or what should be done if he received every day what had been left to him to be paid every month? Or how would it be if what he had a right to receive at the end of a year, should be received by him at the beginning? I am of the opinion that an arrangement of this kind is valid, because the party to be supported improves his condition by such a transaction; and that the Address of the Emperor did not intend that the maintenance of persons should be cut off by a compromise. 7It makes no difference whether the parties for whom provision for maintenance is made are freedmen, or freeborn, rich, or poor. 8The Address also directs inquiry to be made before the Prætor with reference to the following matters; in the first place, concerning the cause of the compromise; second, concerning its terms; third, concerning the personal characters of the parties to the transaction. 9With reference to the cause, it must be ascertained what reason exists for making the compromise for the Prætor will hear no one who desires to make a compromise without sufficient cause. The reasons which are usually alleged are the following, namely: where the heir and the party to be supported reside in different places; or where either of them intends to change his residence; or where there is some urgent reason for a sum of money to be paid at the time; or where provision for maintenance has been charged upon several heirs, and it is difficult for them to distribute small sums of money among different persons; or where any other reason exists among those which usually arise, and which may induce the Prætor to sanction the compromise. 10The amount of money involved in the transaction must also be considered, for the good faith of the parties is to be determined in this way. The amount must also be estimated according to the age and condition of health of the person who is making the compromise, as it is clear that it must vary in the cases of a boy, a young man, or one who is old; and it is evident that a provision for maintenance will end with the life of the party for whose benefit it was made. 11The character of the persons must also be taken into consideration; that is to say, what are the habits of life of those for whom provision is made, whether they are frugal and have sufficient for their maintenance from other sources; or whether they are of an inferior class, who will be compelled to depend entirely upon the provision made for them. With regard to the person who is charged with furnishing maintenance, these things must be investigated namely, what his means are, as well as his intentions and his opinions, for it will then be apparent whether he desires to ever reach the party with whom he makes the compromise or not. 12A compromise made with respect to maintenance, does not apply to lodging or clothing; as the Divine Marcus ordered that special arrangements should be made with reference to these matters. 13Where, however, anyone makes a compromise with respect to maintenance, it will not be considered necessary for him, against his will, to make any arrangement concerning lodgings, or other matters; he can, therefore, enter into an agreement with reference to all things at once, or only concerning a few. 14A compromise with respect to a provision for shoes must also be made under the authority of the Prætor. 15Where real-estate charged with maintenance has been left to one or several persons, and they desire to alienate it, it is necessary for the Prætor to decide concerning both the alienation and the compromise. Where real-estate charged with maintenance is left to several persons, and these make a compromise among themselves without the consent of the Prætor, the compromise should not be sustained. The same rule applies where land is given as security for maintenance, for, where a pledge is given for this purpose, it cannot be released without the authority of the Prætor. 16It is perfectly manifest that the consent of the Prætor is necessary where a compromise is made for the entire amount of the maintenance, or only for a portion of the same. 17If, when application is made to the Prætor, he permits a compromise to be made without an investigation of the case, the transaction will be void; for the matter is referred to the Prætor to be examined, and not to be neglected, or given up. If, however, he does not make inquiry about everything which he is directed to do by the Address; that is to say, about the cause, the amount, and the character of the parties to the transaction, it must be held that even though he investigates some matters, the compromise is void. 18Neither the Governor of the province, nor the Prætor can delegate his jurisdiction in a matter of this kind. 19Compromises with respect to maintenance can also be made in the presence of the Imperial Procurator; for example, where maintenance is claimed from the Treasury, and hence this can be done in the presence of the Prefect of the Treasury. 20Where an action is pending with reference to provision for maintenance, and a compromise is made, it will not be valid without the authority of the Prætor; as otherwise the Address of the Emperor might be evaded; for pretended suits could be brought, in order that a compromise might be arranged without the consent of the Prætor. 21Where provision for maintenance is left to anyone, and in addition to this a legacy which is to be paid immediately, and a compromise is made without the authority of the Prætor; whatever may be paid is first credited on the legacy which was made payable without delay, and the remainder on the provision for maintenance. 22Where anyone makes a compromise with reference to maintenance, without the authority of the Prætor, whatever is paid will be applied to the settlement of what is due on the maintenance; for it makes no difference how much the arrears were, or whether they were more or less than the amount paid; for if they are less, still the payment must be credited on the arrears of the provision for maintenance. And it is clear that if he who made the compromise with respect to maintenance, became more wealthy by the payment, it will be perfectly just that the other party should have an action to recover the amount by which he became more wealthy, for no one ought to profit by the loss of another. 23Where a certain sum to be paid annually, as, for instance, an annual pension or an usufruct has been left by anyone to a man of superior rank, a compromise can be made without the authority of the Prætor. But, if a moderate usufruct has been left, instead of a provision for maintenance, I say that a compromise made without the authority of the Prætor is of no force or effect. 24Where provision has been made for the maintenance of a person, not in money but in grain, oil, and other articles which are necessary for subsistence, a compromise cannot be arranged with respect to them, whether the payments are to be made to him annually, or monthly. Where, however, the compromise made without the Prætor’s authority was, that he should, instead of the articles, receive a certain sum of money payable either annually, or monthly, and neither the date nor the amount was changed, but only the nature of the article; or if, on the other hand, he agreed to receive subsistence in kind, which had been left to him in money; as where he changed wine for oil, or oil for wine, or anything else of this description; or changed the place so as to receive the provision left to him at Rome, in some town, or in some province, or vice versa; or if he changed the person, so as to receive from one what he should have received from several; or accepts one debtor instead of another; all these things must be submitted to the decision of the Prætor, and be determined for the benefit of the party entitled to maintenance. 25Where a certain sum, payable annually for lodging, has been left, any transaction which is entered into for the furnishing of lodging without the authority of the Prætor is valid; since the party obtains the benefit of the lodging, although the compromise may afford a lodging liable to demolition, or fire. On the other hand also, if he agrees that a stated sum shall be paid him instead of the lodging which was bequeathed, the transaction is valid, even without the Prætor’s authority.
9 Idem libro primo opinionum. Qui cum tutoribus suis de sola portione administratae tutelae suae egerat et transegerat, adversus eosdem tutores ex persona fratris sui, cui heres extiterat, agens praescriptione factae transactionis non summovetur. 1Transactio quaecumque fit, de his tantum, de quibus inter convenientes placuit, interposita creditur. 2Qui per fallaciam coheredis ignorans universa, quae in vero erant, instrumentum transactionis sine Aquiliana stipulatione interposuit, non tam paciscitur quam decipitur. 3Ei qui, nondum certus ad se querellam contra patris testamentum pertinere, de aliis causis cum adversariis pacto transegit, tantum in his interpositum pactum nocebit, de quibus inter eos actum esse probatur. his tantum transactio obest, quamvis maior annis viginti quinque eam interposuit, de quibus actum probatur. nam ea, quorum actiones competere ei postea conpertum est, iniquum est peremi pacto. id de quo cogitatum non docetur.
9 The Same, Opinions, Book I. A party brought an action against his guardians with reference to his share of the estate administered under their guardianship, and compromised the case. If, having become an heir of his brother, he brought suit against the same guardians as his brothers’ representative, he will not be barred by their pleading the compromise which was effected. 1Where a compromise of any description is made, it is considered to be restricted to those matters concerning which the parties have agreed among themselves. 2Where a party, being ignorant of all the existing conditions of the case through the deceit of his co-heir, executed an instrument of compromise without the Aquilian stipulation, he is held rather to have been deceived than to have made an agreement. 3Where a son who is not yet informed that he has a right to bring an action to set aside the will of his father, compromises other matters with his adversaries by an agreement; the agreement which he entered into will only prejudice him with reference to such things as it is proved that they were intended to do, even though one party who made the compromise was over twenty-five years of age; for, as far as relates to anything ascertained afterwards for which he was entitled to bring an action, it would be unjust to hold that the transaction extinguished rights which had not yet been considered.
10 Idem libro primo responsorum. De re filiorum, quos in potestate non habuit, transigentem patrem minime eis subesse placet.
10 The Same, Opinions, Book I. It is settled that where a father makes a compromise with reference to the rights of sons who are not under his control, they are not prejudiced by it.
11 Idem libro quarto ad edictum. Post rem iudicatam etiam si provocatio non est interposita, tamen si negetur iudicatum esse vel ignorari potest an iudicatum sit: quia adhuc lis obesse possit, transactio fieri potest.
11 The Same, On the Edict, Book IV. After judgment has been rendered, even if no appeal is taken, still, where the fact that judgment has been rendered is denied, or it is possible for the party to be ignorant whether the judgment was rendered or not; then, as a trial may still take place, a compromise can be effected.
12 Celsus libro tertio digestorum. Non est ferendus qui generaliter in his, quae testamento ei relicta sunt, transegerit, si postea causetur de eo solo se cogitasse, quod prima parte testamenti ac non etiam quod posteriore legatum sit. si tamen postea codicilli proferuntur, non improbe mihi dicturus videtur de eo dumtaxat se cogitasse, quod illarum tabularum, quas tunc noverat, scriptura contineretur.
12 Celsus, Digest, Book III. It should not be tolerated that a party may make a compromise with reference to legacies left to him in general terms by will, and afterwards claim that his object was not to compromise except with reference to what was left him in the first part of the will, and not with reference to what was left him in the last part. But where codicils are produced, I think that he could not improperly say to me that he only was thinking about what was contained in those pages of the will of which he knew at the time of the transaction.
13 Aemilius Macer libro primo ad legem vicensimam hereditatium. Nulli procuratorum principis inconsulto principe transigere licet.
13 Æmilius Macer, On the Five Per Cent Law Respecting Inheritances, Book I. It is not lawful for an Imperial Procurator to make a compromise without the authority of the Emperor.
14 Scaevola libro secundo responsorum. Controversia inter legitimum et scriptum heredem orta est eaque transactione facta certa lege finita est: quaero creditores quem convenire possunt? respondit, si idem creditores essent, qui transactionem fecissent, id observandum de aere alieno, quod inter eos convenisset: si alii creditores essent, propter incertum successionis pro parte hereditatis, quam uterque in transactione expresserit, utilibus actionibus conveniendus est.
14 Scævola, Opinions, Book II. A controversy arose between an heir-at-law and a testamentary heir, and a compromise having been made, the matter was settled under certain conditions. I desire to know against whom the creditors can bring an action. The answer was that if the creditors were the same who made the compromise, whether others were present or not, on account of the uncertainty of the succession, an action should be brought against each one of the heirs for the share of the estate which each obtained by virtue of the compromise.
15 Paulus libro primo sententiarum. Pacto convento Aquiliana quidem stipulatio subici solet: sed consultius est huic poenalem quoque stipulationem subiungere, quia rescisso forte pacto poena ex stipulatu peti potest.
15 Paulus, Sentences, Book I. It is customary for the Aquilian stipulation to be inserted in every contract, but it is more prudent to add to it a penal stipulation, because if the contract is rescinded, suit can be brought for the penalty under the stipulation.
16 Hermogenianus libro primo iuris epitomarum. Qui fidem licitae transactionis rupit, non exceptione tantum summovebitur, sed et poenam, quam, si contra placitum fecerit rato manente pacto, stipulanti recte promiserat, praestare cogetur.
16 Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. He who breaks faith in a lawful compromise is not only barred by an exception, but also can be forced to pay the penalty which he has promised in proper form to pay to the stipulator if he violated the contract.
17 Papinianus libro secundo quaestionum. Venditor hereditatis emptori mandatis actionibus cum debitore hereditario, qui ignorabat venditam esse hereditatem, transegit: si emptor hereditatis hoc debitum ab eo exigere velit, exceptio transacti negotii debitori propter ignorantiam suam accommodanda est. idem respondendum est et in eo, qui fideicommissam recepit hereditatem, si heres cum ignorante debitore transegit.
17 Papinianus, Questions, Book II. The vendor of an estate having assigned his rights to the purchaser, made a compromise with a debtor to the estate who did not know that it had been sold. The purchaser of the estate should take measures to collect the debt, and an exception on the ground of business transacted is granted the debtor because of his ignorance. The same rule applies to the case of a man who received an estate by virtue of a trust, if the heir makes a compromise with a debtor who is not aware that this has been done.