De eo per quem factum erit quominus quis in iudicio sistat
(Concerning one who prevents a person from appearing in court.)
1 Ulpianus libro septimo ad edictum. Aequissimum putavit praetor dolum eius coercere, qui impedit aliquem iudicio sisti. 1Fecisse autem dolo malo non tantum is putatur, qui suis manibus vel per suos [ed. maior retinuerit] <ed. minor retinuit>, verum qui alios quoque rogavit ut eum detinerent vel abducerent, ne iudicio sistat, sive scientes sive ignorantes quid esset quod comminisceretur. 2Dolum autem malum sic accipimus, ut si quis venienti ad iudicium aliquid pronuntiaverit triste, propter quod is necesse habuerit ad iudicium non venire, teneatur ex hoc edicto: quamvis quidam putent sibi eum imputare, qui credulus fuit. 3Si reus dolo actoris non steterit, non habebit reus adversus eum actionem ex hoc edicto, cum contentus esse possit exceptione, si ex stipulatu conveniatur de poena, quod ad iudicium non venerit. aliter atque si ab alio sit impeditus: nam actionem propositam adversus eum exercebit. 4Si plures dolo fecerint, omnes tenentur: sed si unus praestiterit poenam, ceteri liberantur, cum nihil intersit. 5Servi nomine ex hac causa noxali iudicio agendum omnes consentiunt. 6Et heredi datur, sed non ultra annum. adversus heredem autem hactenus puto dandam actionem, ut ex dolo defuncti heres non lucretur.
1 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book VII. The Prætor has considered it most just to punish the malice of one who prevents the appearance of another in court. 1He not only is held to be guilty of malice who detains a party either with his own hands, or through the agency of those in his service, but also he who requests others to detain him or abduct him to prevent his appearing in court, whether they knew, or were ignorant of what he intended to do. 2Where any person communicates evil tidings to another on his way to court by means of which he prevents him from appearing, we consider it to be malicious, and he is liable under the Edict; although some authorities are of the opinion that the party who was so credulous would only have himself to blame. 3Where a defendant is prevented from appearing through the malice of the plaintiff, he will not have a right of action against the latter under this Edict, since he must be contented with an exception in case he should be sued for the penalty of his bond because he did not appear in court, but the case is different if he was prevented by another, for then he could bring an action against him. 4Where several persons have acted fraudulently, all are liable; but if one of them pays the penalty, the others are released from liability, as the plaintiff has no further interest in the matter. 5All authorities are of the opinion that in an instance of this kind, where a slave is concerned, a noxal action must be brought. 6The right of action passes to the heir, but not for a longer time than a year; and I think that an action will lie against the heir only to the extent of preventing him from profiting by the fraud of the deceased.
2 Paulus libro sexto ad edictum. Si actoris servus domino sciente et cum possit non prohibente dolo fecerit, quo minus in iudicio sistam, Ofilius dandam mihi exceptionem adversus dominum ait, ne ex dolo servi dominus lucretur. si vero sine voluntate domini servus hoc fecerit, Sabinus noxale iudicium dandum ait nec factum servi domino obesse debere nisi hactenus, ut ipso careat: quando ipse nihil deliquit.
2 Paulus, On the Edict, Book VI. Where the slave of the plaintiff, with the knowledge of his master, commits a fraud to hinder me from appearing in court, and his master does not prevent him when he could do so, Ofilius says that an exception should be granted against his master to prevent him from profiting by the fraud of the slave. But if, in fact, the slave committed the act without the consent of his master; Sabinus says that a noxal action will lie, and that the act of the slave ought not to prejudice his master, except to the extent that he shall lose him when he himself has committed no wrong.
3 Iulianus libro secundo digestorum. Ex hoc edicto adversus eum, qui dolo fecit, quo minus quis in iudicium vocatus sistat, in factum actio competit quanti actoris interfuit eum sisti. in quo iudicio deducitur si quid amiserit actor ob eam rem: veluti si reus tempore dominium rei interim sibi adquirat aut actione liberatus fuerit. 1Plane si is, qui dolo fecerit, quo minus in iudicio sistatur, solvendo non fuerit, aequum erit adversus ipsum reum restitutoriam actionem competere, ne propter dolum alienum reus lucrum faciat et actor damno adficiatur. 2Si et stipulator dolo Titii et promissor dolo Maevi impeditus fuerit, quo minus in iudicio sistatur: uterque adversus eum, cuius dolo impeditus fuerit, actione in factum experietur. 3Si et stipulator dolo promissoris et promissor dolo stipulatoris impeditus fuerit quo minus ad iudicium veniret: neutri eorum praetor succurrere debebit, ab utraque parte dolo compensando. 4Si a fideiussore quinquaginta stipulatus fuero, si in iudicium reus non venerit, petiturus a reo centum, et dolo malo Sempronii factum fuerit, ne in iudicium reus veniat: centum a Sempronio consequar. tanti enim mea interfuisse videtur, quia, si venisset in iudicium, actio mihi centum adversus reum vel adversus heredem eius competebat, licet fideiussor minorem summam mihi promiserit.
3 Julianus, Digest, Book II. An action will lie under this Edict against a party who, by means of fraud, prevented anyone from appearing in court, for a sum equal to the interest the plaintiff had in his appearance. In a suit of this kind it is ascertained if the plaintiff lost anything on account of this; as, for example, whether the defendant obtained ownership of the property in question by lapse of time, or was freed from liability to be sued. 1It is evident that if the party who acted maliciously to prevent the other from appearing in court is not solvent, it will be just to grant a restitutory action against the defendant, lest he may profit and the plaintiff suffer loss on account of the fraud of another. 2If the stipulator has been prevented from appearing in court through the fraudulent act of Titius, and the promisor has been prevented by that of Mævius; each of them has a right of action in factum against the party by whose fraudulent act he was prevented. 3If both the stipulator and the promisor were each prevented from appearing in court by the fraudulent act of the other, the Prætor shall come to the relief of neither of them, for the fraud committed by each is mutually set off. 4If I stipulate with a surety for fifty aurei in case the defendant should not appear, and I am suing the defendant for a hundred aurei, and, through the wrongful act of Sempronius, the defendant fails to appear in court, I can recover a hundred aurei from Sempronius, for that amount seems to have been my interest in the matter; because if the party had appeared I would have had an action against him for a hundred aurei, or one against his heir for the same amount, although the surety had bound himself to me for a smaller sum.