Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts
Dig. II1,
De iurisdictione
Liber secundus
I.

De iurisdictione

(Concerning jurisdiction.)

1 Ulpianus libro primo regularum. Ius dicentis officium latissimum est: nam et bonorum possessionem dare potest et in possessionem mittere, pupillis non habentibus tutores constituere, iudices litigantibus dare.

1 Ulpianus, Rules, Book I. The duties of him who has the right of dispensing justice are very extensive; for he can grant the possession of estates, place the parties in possession, appoint guardians for minors who have none, and designate judges for litigants.

2 Iavolenus libro sexto ex Cassio. Cui iurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus iurisdictio explicari non potuit.

2 Javolenus, On Cassius, Book VI. He to whom legal jurisdiction is given is also held to be invested with all the powers necessary for its exercise.

3 Ulpianus libro secundo de officio quaestoris. Imperium aut merum aut mixtum est. merum est imperium habere gladii potestatem ad animadvertendum facinorosos homines, quod etiam potestas appellatur. mixtum est imperium, cui etiam iurisdictio inest, quod in danda bonorum possessione consistit. iurisdictio est etiam iudicis dandi licentia.

3 Ulpianus, On the Duties of Quæstor, Book II. Official authority is either simple or mixed. Simple authority invests the magistrate with the right of inflicting the death penalty upon persons who are violators of the law, which is also designated “power”. Mixed authority, which embraces legal jurisdiction, consists of the right of granting possession of property. Jurisdiction includes the power of appointing a judge.

4 Idem libro primo ad edictum. Iubere caveri praetoria stipulatione et in possessionem mittere imperii magis est quam iurisdictionis.

4 The Same, On the Edict, Book I. The right to order a bond to be executed by a prætorian stipulation, and to place a party in possession, rather belong to authority than to jurisdiction.

5 Iulianus libro primo digestorum. More maiorum ita comparatum est, ut is demum iurisdictionem mandare possit, qui eam suo iure, non alieno beneficio habet:

5 Julianus, Digest, Book I. It was established by the custom of our ancestors that he only can delegate jurisdiction who possesses it in his own right, and not through delegation by another.

6 Paulus libro secundo ad edictum. et quia nec principaliter ei iurisdictio data est nec ipsa lex defert, sed confirmat mandatam iurisdictionem. ideoque si is, qui mandavit iurisdictionem, decesserit, antequam res ab eo, cui mandata est iurisdictio, geri coeperit, solvi mandatum Labeo ait, sicut in reliquis causis.

6 Paulus, On the Edict, Book II. And this is because jurisdiction is not given to him in the first place, and has not been conferred upon him by law, which only confirms that which has already been delegated; and therefore, if anyone who has delegated his jurisdiction should die before the business over which jurisdiction has been delegated to him had begun to be transacted; Labeo says that the delegated authority is abrogated, just as it is in other cases.

7 Ulpianus libro tertio ad edictum. Si quis id, quod iurisdictionis perpetuae causa, non quod prout res incidit, in albo vel in charta vel in alia materia propositum erit, dolo malo corruperit: datur in eum quingentorum aureorum iudicium, quod populare est. 1Servi quoque et filii familias verbis edicti continentur: sed et utrumque sexum praetor complexus est. 2Quod si dum proponitur vel ante propositionem quis corruperit, edicti quidem verba cessabunt, Pomponius autem ait sententiam edicti porrigendam esse ad haec. 3In servos autem, si non defenduntur a dominis, et eos qui inopia laborant corpus torquendum est. 4Doli mali autem ideo in verbis edicti fit mentio, quod, si per imperitiam vel rusticitatem vel ab ipso praetore iussus vel casu aliquis fecerit, non tenetur. 5Hoc vero edicto tenetur et qui tollit, quamvis non corruperit: item et qui suis manibus facit et qui alii mandat. sed si alius sine dolo malo fecit, alius dolo malo mandavit, qui mandavit tenebitur: si uterque dolo malo fecerit, ambo tenebuntur: nam et si plures fecerint vel corruperint vel mandaverint, omnes tenebuntur:

7 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. “If a person maliciously destroys a notice which has been entered in the register of an official, or written on papyrus, or any other substance, and which has reference to the general jurisdiction of the said official and not to any special matter; judgment should be rendered against him for fifty aurei, and anyone may bring suit for the same.” 1Slaves and sons of families also are affected by the terms of this edict; and the Prætor includes both sexes. 2If anyone should cause this damage before the notice has been published or while it is being published, the words of the Edict will be without effect; but Pomponius holds that the principle of the Edict is applicable to such a case. 3If the offence has been committed by slaves who are not defended by their masters, or by persons who are in poverty, corporeal punishment shall be inflicted. 4Malice is mentioned in the words of the Edict, because if anyone should commit such an act through ignorance or stupidity, or by the order of the Prætor himself, or through accident, he will not be liable. 5He who removes the document, even though he may not destroy it, is also liable under this Edict which includes both him who performs the act himself and him who orders another to perform it; but if anyone performs it without malice by the direction of another who was actuated by malice, the latter will be liable; and if both of them act maliciously both will be liable; and if several persons commit the act, whether they destroy documents, or order this to be done, all will be liable.

8 Gaius libro primo ad edictum provinciale. adeo quidem, ut non sufficiat unum eorum poenam luere.

8 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. And this applies to such an extent that it will not be sufficient for only one of them to pay the penalty.

9 Paulus libro tertio ad edictum. Si familia alicuius album corruperit, non similiter hic edicitur ut in furto, ne in reliquos actio detur, si tantum dominus, cum defendere voluit, unius nomine praestiterit, quantum liber praestaret: fortasse quia hic et contempta maiestas praetoris vindicatur et plura facta intelleguntur: quemadmodum cum plures servi iniuriam fecerunt vel damnum dederunt, quia plura facta sunt, non ut in furto unum. Octavenus hic quoque domino succurrendum ait: sed hoc potest dici, si dolo malo curaverint, ut ab alio album corrumperetur, quia tunc unum consilium sit, non plura facta. idem Pomponius libro decimo notat.

9 Paulus, On the Edict, Book III. If the entire body of slaves belonging to anyone should deface a register, the Edict does not treat this offence as it would a case of theft, where the master who wishes to defend the action pays as much in the name of one slave as a freeman would be compelled to pay, for then no action will lie against the others; the reason for which is perhaps that, in this instance, the offended dignity of the Prætor must be vindicated, and several acts are understood to have been committed; in the same manner as when several slaves have perpetrated a wrong, or have caused damage, because several acts have taken place, and not merely one, as in the case of theft. Octavenus says that in this instance relief ought to be granted to the master, but this can only be maintained where the slave maliciously brings it about that the register shall be destroyed by another, because then there is only one conspiracy, and not several acts. Pomponius states the same thing in the Tenth Book.

10 Ulpianus libro tertio ad edictum. Qui iurisdictioni praeest, neque sibi ius dicere debet neque uxori vel liberis suis neque libertis vel ceteris, quos secum habet.

10 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. He who presides over the administration of justice ought not to render judgment in his own case, or in that of his wife or children, or of his freedmen, or of any others whom he has with him.

11 Gaius libro primo ad edictum provinciale. Si idem cum eodem pluribus actionibus agat, quarum singularum quantitas intra iurisdictionem iudicantis sit, coacervatio vero omnium excedat modum iurisdictionis eius: apud eum agi posse Sabino Cassio Proculo placuit: quae sententia rescripto imperatoris Antonini confirmata est. 1Sed et si mutuae sunt actiones et alter minorem quantitatem, alter maiorem petat, apud eundem iudicem agendum est ei qui quantitatem minorem petit, ne in potestate calumniosa adversarii mei sit, an apud eum litigare possim. 2Si una actio communis sit plurium personarum, veluti familiae [ed. maior herciscundae] <ed. minor erciscundae>, communi dividundo, finium regundorum, utrum singulae partes spectandae sunt circa iurisdictionem eius qui cognoscit, quod Ofilio et Proculo placet, quia unusquisque de parte sua litigat: an potius tota res, quia et tota res in iudicium venit et vel uni adiudicari potest, quod Cassio et Pegaso placet: et sane eorum sententia probabilis est.

11 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. Where one person brings several actions against another and the amounts of the different claims demanded therein, if taken separately, are within the jurisdiction of the judge, but the entire sum exceeds it, it was the opinion of Sabinus, Cassius, and Proculus that the actions could be tried before him; and this opinion was confirmed by a Rescript of the Emperor Antoninus. 1Where, however, the rights of actions are reciprocal in their character, and one party claims an amount under the limit, and another one over it, he who claims the smaller sum can proceed before the same judge; so that it may not be in the power of my adversary, if he wishes to annoy me, to prevent me from trying the case before the same judge. 2Where an action is brought by a number of persons at the same time, as for instance for the partition of an estate, the division of common property, or the establishment of boundaries, should we in • order to ascertain the jurisdiction of the judge who has cognizance of the case, consider the value of the separate shares, which is the opinion of Ofilius and Proculus for the reason that each party is bringing suit for his own share; or should the entire value of the property rather be considered because the whole of it is in court and may perhaps be adjudged to one person? This is the opinion of both Cassius and Pegasus, and in fact it seems the more reasonable one.

12 Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Magistratibus municipalibus supplicium a servo sumere non licet, modica autem castigatio eis non est deneganda.

12 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Municipal magistrates have no authority to inflict severe punishment upon a slave; the right of moderate castigation cannot, however, be denied them.

13 Idem libro quinquagensimo primo ad Sabinum. Eum qui iudicare iubet magistratum esse oportet. 1Magistratus autem vel is qui in potestate aliqua sit, ut puta proconsul vel praetor vel alii qui provincias regunt, iudicare iubere eo die, quo privati futuri essent, non possunt.

13 The Same, On Sabinus, Book LI. He who orders anyone to act as judge must be a magistrate. 1A magistrate, or he who is invested with any authority, (as for instance, a Proconsul, a Prætor, or any other official who governs a province) cannot appoint a judge on the day on which he becomes a private person.

14 Idem libro trigensimo nono ad edictum. Est receptum eoque iure utimur, ut si quis maior vel aequalis subiciat se iurisdictioni alterius, possit ei et adversus eum ius dici.

14 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. It is an accepted rule which we make use of in law, that if anyone of higher, or of equal rank, submits himself to the jurisdiction of another, the latter can administer justice for and against him.

15 Idem libro secundo de omnibus tribunalibus. Si per errorem alius pro alio praetor fuerit aditus, nihil valebit quod actum est. nec enim ferendus est qui dicat consensisse eos in praesidem, cum, ut Iulianus scribit, non consentiant qui errent: quid enim tam contrarium consensui est quam error, qui imperitiam detegit?

15 The Same, On All Tribunals, Book II. If, through error, anyone appears before one Prætor while intending to appear before another, none of the proceedings which have been instituted will be valid, for no one is permitted to say that they agreed upon the judge; since, as Julianus stated, those who are in error do not agree. For what is so contrary to agreement as error, which always reveals ignorance?

16 Idem libro tertio de omnibus tribunalibus. Solet praetor iurisdictionem mandare: et aut omnem mandat aut speciem unam: et is cui mandata iurisdictio est fungetur vice eius qui mandavit, non sua.

16 The Same, On All Tribunals, Book III. The Prætor is accustomed to delegate his jurisdiction, and either delegate all or a portion of the same; while he to whom the right of dispensing justice has been delegated, exercises it in the name of him who appointed him, and not in his own.

17 Idem libro primo opinionum. Praetor sicut universam iurisdictionem mandare alii potest, ita et in personas certas vel de una specie potest, maxime cum iustam causam susceptae ante magistratum advocationis alterius partis habuerat.

17 The Same, Opinions, Book I. As the Prætor can delegate his entire jurisdiction to one person, he can also delegate it to several, or he can do this with reference to a particular case; and especially where he has a good reason, for example, because he appeared as the advocate of one of the parties before becoming a magistrate.

18 Africanus libro septimo quaestionum. Si convenerit, ut alius praetor, quam cuius iurisdictio esset, ius diceret et priusquam adiretur mutata voluntas fuerit, procul dubio nemo compelletur eiusmodi conventioni stare.

18 Africanus, Questions, Book VII. If it is agreed upon by the parties that another Prætor than the one who had jurisdiction of the case should hear it, and before applying to him one of them should change his mind, there is no doubt that he cannot be compelled to abide by an agreement of this kind.

19 Ulpianus libro sexto fideicommissorum. Cum quaedam puella apud competentem iudicem litem susceperat, deinde condemnata erat, posteaque ad viri matrimonium alii iurisdictioni subiecti pervenerat, quaerebatur, an prioris iudicis sententia exsequi possit. dixi posse, quia ante fuerat sententia dicta: sed et si post susceptam cognitionem ante sententiam hoc eveniet, idem putarem, sententiaque a priore iudice recte fertur. quod generaliter et in omnibus huiuscemodi casibus observandum est. 1Quotiens de quantitate ad iurisdictionem pertinente quaeritur, semper quantum petatur quaerendum est, non quantum debeatur.

19 Ulpianus, Trusts, Book VI. In a case where an unmarried woman had undertaken a defence before a competent judge and was defeated, and afterwards married a man who was subject to a different jurisdiction, the question arose whether the judgment of the former court could be executed? I have said that it could, because judgment had been rendered before her marriage; but if this had occurred after the judge had taken cognizance of the case, and before judgment, I hold the same opinion, namely that the decision of the first judge was properly rendered. This rule should be observed generally in all cases of this description. 1When the amount is made the subject of inquiry with reference to jurisdiction, the sum claimed must always be considered, and not that which is due.

20 Paulus libro primo ad edictum. Extra territorium ius dicenti impune non paretur. idem est, et si supra iurisdictionem suam velit ius dicere.

20 Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. A judge who administers justice beyond his jurisdiction may be disobeyed with impunity. The same rule applies if he wishes to dispense justice where the amount is beyond his jurisdiction.