Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XVIII5,
De rescindenda venditione et quando licet ab emptione discedere
Liber octavus decimus
V.

De rescindenda venditione et quando licet ab emptione discedere

(Concerning the Rescinding of a Sale, and When It Is Permitted to Withdraw From a Purchase.)

1Pom­po­nius li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Cel­sus fi­lius pu­ta­bat, si ven­di­dis­set mi­hi fi­lius fa­mi­lias rem pe­cu­lia­rem, et­iam, si con­ve­niat ut ab­ea­tur ab ea ven­di­tio­ne, in­ter pa­trem et fi­lium et me con­ve­ni­re de­be­re, ne, si cum pa­tre so­lo pac­tus sim, fi­lius non pos­sit li­be­ra­ri et quae­ra­tur, utrum­ne ni­hil aga­tur ex ea pac­tio­ne an ve­ro ego qui­dem li­be­rer, fi­lius ma­neat ob­li­ga­tus, sic­uti, si pu­pil­lus si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te pa­cis­ca­tur, ip­se qui­dem li­be­ra­tur, non et­iam qui cum eo pac­tus est. nam quod Aris­to di­xit pos­se ita pa­cis­ci, ut unus ma­neat ob­li­ga­tus, non est ve­rum, quia pro una par­te con­tra­hen­tium ab­iri pac­to ab emp­tio­ne non pos­sit: et id­eo si ab una par­te re­no­va­tus sit con­trac­tus, di­ci­tur non va­le­re eius­mo­di pac­tio­nem. sed di­cen­dum est pa­tre pa­cis­cen­te et li­be­ra­to ad­ver­sa­rio fi­lium quo­que obi­ter li­be­ra­ri.

1Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XV. Celsus, the younger, was of the opinion that if a son under paternal control should sell me property which formed part of his peculium, even though an agreement was made that the sale should be annulled, it ought to be entered into between the father, the son, and myself; for if I made the agreement with the father alone, the son would not be released from liability; and it was asked whether such a contract would not be absolutely void, or whether, in fact, I would not be released and the son remain bound; as, for instance, in the case where a ward made a contract without the authority of his guardian, he himself would be released, but the party with whom he made the contract would not be. For what Aristo stated is not true, namely, that a contract could be entered into so that only one of the contracting parties would be liable, because one of them cannot annul an agreement for a sale; therefore, if the contract is renewed by one party, it is held that such an agreement is not valid. It must, however, be said that where a father makes a contract, and the other party is released from liability, the son will also be released at the same time.

2Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quar­to ad Sa­binum. Si quam rem a te emi, ean­dem rur­sus a te plu­ris mi­no­ris­ve eme­ro, dis­ces­si­mus a prio­re emp­tio­ne (pot­est enim, dum res in­te­gra est, con­ven­tio­ne nos­tra in­fec­ta fie­ri emp­tio) at­que ita con­sis­tit pos­te­rior emp­tio, qua­si nul­la prae­ces­se­rit. sed non pot­eri­mus ea­dem ra­tio­ne uti post pre­tium so­lu­tum emp­tio­ne re­pe­ti­ta, cum post pre­tium so­lu­tum in­fec­tam emp­tio­nem fa­ce­re non pos­su­mus.

2The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXIV. If, after I have purchased something from you, I again purchase it from you at a higher or a lower price, we are understood to have annulled the first sale; for the sale is still held to be incomplete by our agreement while matters remain unchanged, and thus the subsequent sale will stand, just as if no other had preceded it. But we cannot apply the same principle if the sale is renewed after the price was paid, because after it was paid we could not render the sale incomplete.

3Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. Emp­tio et ven­di­tio sic­ut con­sen­su con­tra­hi­tur, ita con­tra­rio con­sen­su resol­vi­tur, an­te­quam fue­rit res se­cu­ta: id­eo­que quae­si­tum est, si emp­tor fi­de­ius­so­rem ac­ce­pe­rit, vel ven­di­tor sti­pu­la­tus fue­rit, an nu­da vo­lun­ta­te resol­va­tur ob­li­ga­tio. Iu­lia­nus scrip­sit ex emp­to qui­dem agi non pos­se, quia bo­nae fi­dei iu­di­cio ex­cep­tio­nes pac­ti in­sunt: an au­tem fi­de­ius­so­ri uti­lis sit ex­cep­tio, vi­den­dum: et pu­to li­be­ra­to reo et fi­de­ius­so­rem li­be­ra­ri. item ven­di­to­rem ex sti­pu­la­tu agen­tem ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­ri opor­tet, idem­que iu­ris es­se, si emp­tor quo­que rem in sti­pu­la­tio­nem de­du­xe­rit.

3Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. Purchase and sale are contracted by common consent, and so they can also be rescinded by common consent before the transaction has been concluded. Therefore, the question arose as to whether the obligation could be rescinded by the mere will of the parties, if the purchaser has accepted a surety, or the vendor had entered into a stipulation. Julianus says that then, indeed, an action on sale would not lie, because exceptions based on the contract are included in a bona fide agreement. It should be considered, however, whether an exception would be available to release the surety. I am of the opinion that if the principal should be released, the surety will be also. The same rule applies where, if the vendor institutes proceedings on the ground of the stipulation, he can be barred by an exception. The law is also the same where the purchaser has included the delivery of the property in the stipulation.

4Li­bro oc­ta­vo di­ges­to­rum Iu­lia­ni Pau­lus no­tat. Si emp­tio con­trac­ta sit to­gae pu­ta aut lan­cis, et pac­tus sit ven­di­tor, ne al­ter­utrius emp­tio ma­neat, pu­to resol­vi ob­li­ga­tio­nem hu­ius rei no­mi­ne dum­ta­xat.

4Paulus, Notes on the Digest of Julianus, Book VIII. Where a contract was for the purchase of a toga, or a dish, and the vendor agreed that one of said articles should not be sold, I think that only the obligation with reference to said article is rescinded.

5Iu­lia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Cum emp­tor ven­di­to­ri vel emp­to­ri ven­di­tor ac­cep­tum fa­ciat, vo­lun­tas utrius­que os­ten­di­tur id agen­tis, ut a neg­otio dis­ce­da­tur et per­in­de ha­bea­tur, ac si con­ve­nis­set in­ter eos, ut ne­uter ab al­te­ro quic­quam pe­te­ret, sed ut evi­den­tius ap­pa­reat, ac­cep­ti­la­tio in hac cau­sa non sua na­tu­ra, sed po­tes­ta­te con­ven­tio­nis va­let. 1Emp­tio nu­da con­ven­tio­ne dis­sol­vi­tur, si res se­cu­ta non fue­rit. 2Mor­tuo au­tem ho­mi­ne per­in­de ha­ben­da est ven­di­to ac si tra­di­tus fuis­set, ut­po­te cum ven­di­tor li­be­re­tur et emp­to­ri ho­mo per­eat: qua­re ni­si ius­ta con­ven­tio in­ter­ve­ne­rit, ac­tio­nes ex emp­to et ven­di­to ma­ne­bunt.

5Julianus, Digest, Book XV. Ad Dig. 18,5,5 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 20, S. 50: Aufrechterhaltung einer Willenserklärung, wenn das geschlossene Geschäft zwar wegen eines juristischen Mangels ungiltig, indeß die Erfordernisse eines andern Geschäfts vorhanden sind.Where the purchaser released the vendor or the vendor released the purchaser from liability, it seems to be the intention of both parties that the transaction should be at an end; and the result is the same as if it had been agreed between them that neither should claim anything from the other. It is, in this case, however, more evident, that the release is not valid on account of its nature, but through the force of the agreement. 1A sale is annulled by the mere agreement of the parties, if the transaction has not been concluded. 2Where a slave that has been sold dies, the sale is held to be in the same condition as if he had been delivered; that is to say, the vendor is released from liability, and the loss of the slave must be borne by the purchaser. Wherefore, unless some other lawful agreement has been entered into, actions on purchase and sale will lie.

6Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Si con­ve­nit, ut res quae venit, si in­tra cer­tum tem­pus dis­pli­cuis­set, red­de­re­tur, ex emp­to ac­tio est, ut Sa­b­inus pu­tat, aut pro­xi­ma emp­ti in fac­tum da­tur.

6Paulus, On the Edict, Book II. If it was agreed between the parties that the property which was sold be returned within a certain time, if it did not suit, Sabinus thinks that an action on purchase will lie, or that one in factum, resembling an action on purchase, should be granted.

7Idem li­bro quin­to quaes­tio­num. Si id quod pu­re emi sub con­di­cio­ne rur­sus emam, ni­hil agi­tur pos­te­rio­re emp­tio­ne. 1Si pu­pil­li per­so­na in­ter­ve­nit, qui an­te si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te, de­in­de tu­to­re auc­to­re emit, quam­vis ven­di­tor iam ei ob­li­ga­tus fuit, ta­men quia pu­pil­lus non te­ne­ba­tur, re­no­va­ta ven­di­tio ef­fi­cit, ut in­vi­cem ob­li­ga­ti sint: quod si an­te tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­tas in­ter­ve­ne­rit, de­in­de si­ne tu­to­re auc­to­re emit, ni­hil ac­tum est pos­te­rio­re emp­tio­ne. idem pot­est quae­ri, si si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te pac­tus fue­rit, ut dis­ce­da­tur ab emp­tio­ne: an pro­in­de sit, at­que si ab in­itio si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te emis­set, ut sci­li­cet ip­se non te­n­ea­tur, sed agen­te eo re­ten­tio­nes com­pe­tant. sed nec il­lud si­ne ra­tio­ne di­ce­tur, quon­iam in­itio rec­te emp­tio sit con­trac­ta, vix bo­nae fi­dei con­ve­ni­re eo pac­to sta­ri, quod al­te­ri cap­tio­sum sit, et ma­xi­me, si ius­to er­ro­re sit de­cep­tus.

7The Same, Questions, Book V. If I purchase a second time, under a condition, something which I have already purchased absolutely, the subsequent purchase is void. 1Ad Dig. 18,5,7,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 321, Note 22.Where a ward personally makes a contract without the authority of his guardian, and afterwards makes a purchase with his consent, although the vendor is already bound by a contract with him, still, because the ward is not liable, the sale is renewed in order that they may be mutually bound. If the authority of the guardian was interposed in the first place, and afterwards the ward made a purchase without his authority, the second purchase is void. The question may also be raised if the purchase can be annulled, where an agreement was entered into by the ward without the authority of his guardian, since such an agreement has the same effect as if the ward had, in the first place, made the purchase without the authority of his guardian, and therefore he himself is not liable; but if he brings an action for the property, can the vendor retain it until it is paid for? It may reasonably be held, however, that since the purchase was properly contracted for in the beginning, it is hardly consistent with good faith that an agreement should be adhered to if, by means of it, the other party should be taken at a disadvantage; and this is especially the case if the latter was misled by a plausible error.

8Scae­vo­la li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Ti­tius Se­ii pro­cu­ra­tor de­func­to Se­io ab eo scrip­tus he­res, cum igno­ra­ret, fun­dum ven­den­te ser­vo he­redi­ta­rio, qua­si pro­cu­ra­tor sub­scrip­sit: quae­si­tum est, an co­gni­to eo, prius­quam emp­tio per­fi­ce­re­tur, a ven­di­tio­ne dis­ce­de­re pos­sit. re­spon­dit Ti­tium, si non ip­se ven­di­dit, non id­cir­co ac­tio­ni­bus ci­vi­li­bus te­ne­ri, quod ser­vo ven­den­te sub­scrip­se­rat, sed ser­vi no­mi­ne prae­to­ria ac­tio­ne te­ne­ri.

8Scævola, Opinions, Book II. Titius, the agent of Seius, was appointed the heir of the latter at his death, and Titius, not being aware that he was dead, sold a tract of land through a slave belonging to the estate, and signed his name as agent. The question arose whether the agent could have annulled the sale, if he had known of the death before the purchase was concluded? The answer was that if Titius himself had not sold the property, he would not be liable to a civil action, for the reason that he signed the contract of the slave who made the sale, but that he would be liable to a prætorian action in the name of said slave.

9Idem li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum. Fun­dus qui Lu­cii Ti­tii erat ob vec­ti­ga­le rei pu­bli­cae ven­iit: sed cum Lu­cius Ti­tius de­bi­tor pro­fes­sus es­set pa­ra­tum se es­se vec­ti­gal ex­sol­ve­re so­li­dum, cum mi­no­re venis­set fun­dus, quam de­bi­ta sum­ma es­set, prae­ses pro­vin­ciae re­sci­dit11Die Großausgabe liest re­scin­dit statt re­sci­dit. ven­di­tio­nem eum­que re­sti­tui ius­sit Lu­cio Ti­tio: quae­si­tum est, an post sen­ten­tiam prae­si­dis, an­te­quam re­sti­tue­re­tur, in bo­nis Lu­cii Ti­tii fun­dus emp­tus es­set. re­spon­dit non prius, quam emp­to­ri pre­tium es­set il­la­tum vel, si pre­tium non­dum es­set ab emp­to­re so­lu­tum, in vec­ti­gal sa­tis­fac­tum es­set.

9The Same, Digest, Book IV. A certain tract of land which belonged to Lucius Titius was sold on account of a public tax. Lucius Titius, having acknowledged that he was the debtor, said that he was ready to pay the whole of the tax; and, as the sale of the property was not sufficient to pay the entire amount, the Governor of the province rescinded the sale, and ordered the land to be restored to Lucius Titius. The question arose whether, after the decision of the Governor and before the land was restored, it was included in the property of Lucius Titius? The answer was that this was not the case before the price had been refunded to the purchaser, or if the price had not yet been paid by him before the claim for taxes was satisfied.

10Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum. Se­ius a Lu­cio Ti­tio emit fun­dum le­ge dic­ta, ut, si ad diem pe­cu­niam non sol­vis­set, res in­emp­ta fie­ret. Se­ius par­te pre­tii prae­sen­ti die so­lu­ta, de­func­to ven­di­to­re, fi­liis eius pu­pil­la­ris ae­ta­tis et ip­se tu­tor cum aliis da­tus, ne­que con­tu­to­ri­bus pre­tium se­cun­dum le­gem nu­me­ra­vit nec ra­tio­ni­bus tu­te­lae ret­tu­lit: quae­si­tum est, an ir­ri­ta emp­tio fac­ta es­set. re­spon­dit se­cun­dum ea quae pro­po­ne­ren­tur in­emp­tam vi­de­ri. 1Emp­tor prae­dio­rum cum su­spi­ca­re­tur Nu­me­riam et Sem­pro­niam con­tro­ver­siam mo­tu­ras, pac­tus est cum ven­di­to­re, ut ex pre­tio ali­qua sum­ma apud se ma­ne­ret, do­nec emp­to­ri fi­de­ius­sor da­re­tur a ven­di­to­re: post­ea ven­di­tor eam le­gem in­se­ruit, ut, si ex die pe­cu­nia om­nis so­lu­ta non es­set et ven­di­tor ea prae­dia venis­se nol­let, in­ven­di­ta es­sent: in­ter­ea de ad­ver­sa­riis al­te­ram mu­lie­rem ven­di­tor su­pe­ra­vit, cum al­te­ra trans­egit, ita ut si­ne ul­la quaes­tio­ne emp­tor prae­dia pos­si­de­ret: quae­si­tum est, cum ne­que fi­de­ius­sor da­tus est nec om­nis pe­cu­nia se­cun­dum le­gem suis die­bus so­lu­ta sit, an prae­dia in­ven­di­ta sint. re­spon­dit, si con­ve­nis­set, ut non prius pe­cu­nia sol­ve­re­tur quam fi­de­ius­sor ven­di­ti cau­sa da­re­tur, nec id fac­tum es­set, cum per emp­to­rem non sta­ret quo mi­nus fie­ret, non pos­se pos­te­rio­rem le­gis par­tem ex­er­ce­ri.

10The Same, Digest, Book VII. Seius bought a tract of land from Lucius Titius under the condition that the property would remain unsold if payment was not made by a certain time. Seius, having paid a portion of the price at once, and the vendor having died, he was appointed guardian of the minor children of Titius, along with others, but did not pay the remainder of the price to his fellow-guardians, in compliance with the contract, and did not place the amount among the assets of the guardianship. The question arose whether the purchase was void. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, the sale was held to be of no effect. 1The purchaser of certain lands, suspecting that Numeria and Sempronia would raise a controversy with reference to the sale of the same, agreed with the vendor that a certain portion of the price should remain in his hands until a surety should be furnished him by the vendor. The vendor afterwards inserted the following provision into the contract, namely: “That if all the money was not paid by a certain time, and the vendor did not wish the lands to be sold, they would remain unsold.” In the meantime, the vendor gained his case against one of his female adversaries, and made a compromise with the other, so that the purchaser might obtain possession of the lands without any dispute. The question arose, as no surety was furnished, and the entire sum of money was not paid at the appointed time in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether the land remained unsold? The answer was that if the agreement had been that the money should not be paid before a surety had been furnished on account of the sale, and nothing had been done by the purchaser to prevent the execution of the contract, the latter portion of the same could not be enforced.