Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XVII2,
Pro socio
Liber septimus decimus
II.

Pro socio

(Concerning the Action on Partnership.)

1Pau­lus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. So­cie­tas co­iri pot­est vel in per­pe­tuum, id est dum vi­vunt, vel ad tem­pus vel ex tem­po­re vel sub con­di­cio­ne. 1In so­cie­ta­te om­nium bo­no­rum om­nes res quae co­eun­tium sunt con­ti­nuo com­mu­ni­can­tur,

1Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXII. A partnership can be formed either perpetually, that is, to say during the life of the parties, or for a certain time, or to begin at a certain time, or under some condition. 1Ad Dig. 17,2,1,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 171, Note 2.In the formation of a general partnership, the entire property of the partners immediately belongs to them all in common.

2Gaius li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. quia, li­cet spe­cia­li­ter tra­di­tio non in­ter­ve­niat, ta­ci­ta ta­men cre­di­tur in­ter­ve­ni­re.

2Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book X. Because, although delivery does not actually take place, still, it is tacitly presumed to do so.

3Pau­lus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Ea ve­ro, quae in no­mi­ni­bus erunt, ma­nent in suo sta­tu: sed ac­tio­nes in­vi­cem prae­sta­re de­bent. 1Cum spe­cia­li­ter om­nium bo­no­rum so­cie­tas co­ita est, tunc et he­redi­tas et le­ga­tum et quod do­na­tum est aut qua­qua ra­tio­ne ad­quisi­tum com­mu­nio­ni ad­quire­tur. 2De il­lo quae­ri­tur, si ita sit co­ita so­cie­tas, ut, si qua ius­ta he­redi­tas al­ter­utri ob­ve­ne­rit, com­mu­nis sit, quae sit ius­ta he­redi­tas, utrum quae iu­re le­gi­ti­mo ob­ve­nit an et­iam ea quae tes­ta­men­to? et pro­ba­bi­lius est ad le­gi­ti­mam he­redi­ta­tem tan­tum hoc per­ti­ne­re. 3So­cie­tas si do­lo ma­lo aut frau­dan­di cau­sa co­ita sit, ip­so iu­re nul­lius mo­men­ti est, quia fi­des bo­na con­tra­ria est frau­di et do­lo.

3Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXII. The existing debts remain in the same condition, but the rights of action should be reciprocally assigned. 1When a general partnership has been expressly entered into, estates, legacies, donations, and property acquired in any way whatsoever, are acquired in common. 2The question arises, when a lawful estate falls to any of the partners to be held in common, what is meant by the term “lawful estate”? Must this be understood to be one that descends to a party by law, or one which is bequeathed by will? It is more probable that it only refers to an estate which descends by law. 3Where a partnership is contracted fraudulently, or for the purpose of committing fraud, it is void by operation of law, because good faith is opposed to fraud and deceit.

4Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro ter­tio re­gu­la­rum. So­cie­ta­tem co­ire et re et ver­bis et per nun­tium pos­se nos du­bium non est. 1Dis­so­cia­mur re­nun­tia­tio­ne mor­te ca­pi­tis mi­nutio­ne et eges­ta­te.

4Modestinus, Rules, Book III. There is no doubt that a partnership can be formed by delivery of the property, verbally, and by means of a messenger. 1Partnerships are dissolved by renunciation, by death, by the forfeiture of civil rights, and by poverty.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. So­cie­ta­tes con­tra­hun­tur si­ve uni­ver­so­rum bo­no­rum si­ve neg­otia­tio­nis ali­cu­ius si­ve vec­ti­ga­lis si­ve et­iam rei unius. 1So­cie­tas au­tem co­iri pot­est et va­let et­iam in­ter eos, qui non sunt ae­quis fa­cul­ta­ti­bus, cum ple­rum­que pau­pe­rior ope­ra sup­pleat, quan­tum ei per com­pa­ra­tio­nem pa­tri­mo­nii de­est. do­na­tio­nis cau­sa so­cie­tas rec­te non con­tra­hi­tur.

5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXI. Ad Dig. 17,2,5 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 405, Note 5.Partnerships are formed either generally, where all the property is held in common, or specially, for some particular kind of business, for the collection of taxes, or even for a single transaction. 1Moreover, a valid partnership can be formed by parties who have not the same means; since frequently one who is less wealthy, makes up by his labor what he lacks in property. A partnership cannot legally be contracted for the purpose of making a donation.

6Pom­po­nius li­bro no­no ad Sa­binum. Si so­cie­ta­tem me­cum co­ie­ris ea con­di­cio­ne, ut par­tes so­cie­ta­tis con­sti­tue­res, ad bo­ni vi­ri ar­bi­trium ea res red­igen­da est: et con­ve­niens est vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­trio, ut non uti­que ex ae­quis par­ti­bus so­cii si­mus, vel­uti si al­ter plus ope­rae in­du­striae pe­cu­niae in so­cie­ta­tem col­la­tu­rus sit.

6Ad Dig. 17,2,6ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 109, S. 427, 430: Vervollständigung absichtlich unvollständiger Vereinbarung. Arbitrium boni viri. Taxation des Geschäftsantheils eines ausgetretenen Gesellschafters.Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book IX. If you form a partnership with me with the understanding that you are to have control of the shares of the partnership, this control should be such as would be exercised by a good citizen, and should be according to the judgment of one, as we may not be equal partners; for instance, where one of us has placed more labor, industry, or capital in the partnership.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Co­iri so­cie­ta­tem et sim­pli­ci­ter li­cet: et si non fue­rit di­stinc­tum, vi­de­tur co­ita es­se uni­ver­so­rum quae ex quaes­tu ve­niunt, hoc est si quod lu­crum ex emp­tio­ne ven­di­tio­ne, lo­ca­tio­ne con­duc­tio­ne de­scen­dit.

7Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. It is lawful to contract a simple partnership, and then, if no other provision is made, it is held to be one including everything acquired by gain, that is to say, where any profit is obtained from purchase, sale, leasing, and hiring.

8Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Quaes­tus enim in­tel­le­gi­tur, qui ex ope­ra cu­ius de­scen­dit.

8Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. Profit is understood to be whatever is derived from the industry of each of the partners.

9Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Nec ad­ie­cit Sa­b­inus he­redi­ta­tem vel le­ga­tum vel do­na­tio­nes mor­tis cau­sa si­ve non mor­tis cau­sa, for­tas­sis haec id­eo, quia non si­ne cau­sa ob­ve­niunt, sed ob me­ri­tum ali­quod ac­ce­dunt.

9Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Sabinus does not add that such a partnership should include an inheritance, a legacy, a donation mortis causa, or non mortis causa, and this is perhaps for the reason that these things do not come without a cause, but are granted on account of merit.

10Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Et quia ple­rum­que vel a pa­ren­te vel a li­ber­to qua­si de­bi­tum no­bis he­redi­tas ob­ve­nit:

10Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. And for the reason that very often an inheritance passes to us as a debt from a parent or from a freedman.

11Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. et ita de he­redi­ta­te le­ga­to do­na­tio­ne Quin­tus Mu­cius scri­bit.

11Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Quintus Mucius renders the same opinion with reference to inheritances, legacies, and donations.

12Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Sed nec aes alie­num, ni­si quod ex quaes­tu pen­de­bit, ve­niet in ra­tio­nem so­cie­ta­tis.

12Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. A debt due to a partner is not included in the capital of the partnership, unless it is derived from the profit obtained by one of the partners.

13Idem li­bro tri­ge­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Sed et si ad­icia­tur, ut et quaes­tus et lu­cri so­cii sint, ve­rum est non ad aliud lu­crum, quam quod ex quaes­tu venit, hanc quo­que ad­iec­tio­nem per­ti­ne­re.

13The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXII. If it is stated in the articles of partnership that the gains and profits shall be in common, it is clear that this is to be understood only to apply to such profits as come from the efforts of the partners.

14Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Si con­ve­ne­rit in­ter so­cios, ne in­tra cer­tum tem­pus com­mu­nis res di­vi­da­tur, non vi­de­tur con­ve­nis­se, ne so­cie­ta­te ab­ea­tur. quid ta­men si hoc con­ve­nit, ne ab­ea­tur, an va­leat? ele­gan­ter Pom­po­nius scrip­sit frus­tra hoc con­ve­ni­re: nam et si non con­ve­nit, si ta­men in­tem­pes­ti­ve re­nun­tie­tur so­cie­ta­ti, es­se pro so­cio ac­tio­nem. sed et si con­ve­nit, ne in­tra cer­tum tem­pus so­cie­ta­te ab­ea­tur, et an­te tem­pus re­nun­tie­tur, pot­est ra­tio­nem ha­be­re re­nun­tia­tio. nec te­ne­bi­tur pro so­cio qui id­eo re­nun­tia­vit, quia con­di­cio quae­dam, qua so­cie­tas erat co­ita, ei non prae­sta­tur: aut quid si ita in­iu­rio­sus et dam­no­sus so­cius sit, ut non ex­pe­diat eum pa­ti?

14Ad Dig. 17,2,14ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 87, S. 264: Auflösung der Societät durch Erklärung des Austritts eines Socius aus genügendem Grunde.Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. If it is agreed by the partners that the property in common shall not be divided until a certain period has elapsed, they are not held to have agreed not to withdraw from the partnership before that time has passed. What would be the effect, however, if an agreement was made not to withdraw? Would it be valid? Pomponius very properly states that such an agreement would be void, for if it were not made, and one of the partners should withdraw at an inopportune time, an action on partnership will lie against him; and even if an agreement is made not to withdraw from the partnership within a certain period, and a partner should withdraw before it had elapsed, his withdrawal would be valid; nor would he be liable in an action on partnership who withdrew on the ground that the condition was not fulfilled under which the partnership was formed, or that his partner had caused him so much injury and loss that it was not advantageous for him to endure it;

15Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Vel quod ea re frui non li­ceat, cu­ius gra­tia neg­otia­tio sus­cep­ta sit?

15Ad Dig. 17,2,15Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 307, Note 3.Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIII. Or because it was not possible for him to enjoy the property on account of which the business of the partnership was undertaken.

16Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Idem­que erit di­cen­dum, si so­cius re­nun­tia­ve­rit so­cie­ta­ti, qui rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa diu et in­vi­tus sit afu­tu­rus: quam­vis non­num­quam ei ob­ici pos­sit, quia po­tuit et per alium so­cie­ta­tem ad­mi­nis­tra­re vel so­cio com­mit­te­re: sed hoc non alias, ni­si val­de sit ido­neus so­cius aut fa­ci­lis afu­tu­ro et­iam per alium so­cie­ta­tis ad­mi­nis­tra­tio. 1Qui igi­tur pa­cis­ci­tur ne di­vi­dat, ni­si ali­qua ius­ta ra­tio in­ter­ce­dat, nec ven­de­re pot­erit, ne alia ra­tio­ne ef­fi­ciat, ut di­vi­da­tur. sed sa­ne pot­est di­ci ven­di­tio­nem qui­dem non im­pe­di­ri, sed ex­cep­tio­nem ad­ver­sus emp­to­rem lo­cum ha­be­re, si an­te di­vi­dat, quam di­vi­de­ret is qui ven­di­dit.

16Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. The same rule applies where a partner withdraws from the partnership because he, even against his will, is obliged to be absent for a considerable time in the public service; although sometimes he can be opposed, since he may be able to conduct the transactions of the partnership through another person, or charge his partner with it; still, this cannot be done unless his partner is especially qualified for the business, or another can be easily obtained for the management of the partnership, by the partner who is obliged to be absent. 1Therefore, where it is agreed that the partnership property is not to be divided, unless some good reason arises, it cannot be sold, or disposed of in any other way so that a division may be made. And, in fact, it may be said that a sale is not absolutely forbidden, but an exception can be filed against the purchaser if he divides the property before the vendor had a right to do so.

17Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Sed et so­cius qui alie­na­ve­rit con­tra pac­tio­nem ac­ci­pit com­mit­tit et te­ne­tur so­cie­ta­tis aut com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do iu­di­cio. 1Si ab­sen­ti re­nun­tia­ta so­cie­tas sit, quo­ad is scie­rit, quod is ad­quisi­vit qui re­nun­tia­vit in com­mu­ne red­igi, de­tri­men­tum au­tem so­lius eius es­se qui re­nun­tia­ve­rit: sed quod ab­sens ad­quisiit, ad so­lum eum per­ti­ne­re, de­tri­men­tum ab eo fac­tum com­mu­ne es­se. 2In so­cie­ta­te au­tem co­eun­da ni­hil at­ti­net de re­nun­tia­tio­ne ca­ve­re, quia ip­so iu­re so­cie­ta­tis in­tem­pes­ti­va re­nun­tia­tio in aes­ti­ma­tio­nem venit.

17Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. A partner who alienates property under such circumstances violates the agreement relative thereto, and is liable to an action on partnership, or for the division of property held in common. 1Ad Dig. 17,2,17,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 306, Note 10; Bd. II, § 307, Note 3.If a partnership is dissolved in the absence of a partner, the ownership remains in common until the latter ascertains what he who withdrew from the partnership has acquired, for any loss should be borne by him alone who withdrew; but what the absent partner may have acquired belongs exclusively to him, and any loss resulting therefrom must be apportioned in common. 2In the formation of a partnership, nothing is gained by the partner giving security not to withdraw; because an inopportune withdrawal causes liability for damages by operation of law, in an action on partnership.

18Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Si ser­vus so­cie­ta­tem co­ie­rit, non suf­fi­ciet, si iu­bea­tur a do­mi­no ser­vus ab­ire a so­cie­ta­te, sed so­cio re­nun­tian­dum est.

18Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIII. Where a slave forms a partnership, it will not be sufficient for him to be ordered by his master to withdraw from it, but his partner must be notified of his renunciation of the same.

19Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Qui ad­mit­ti­tur so­cius, ei tan­tum so­cius est qui ad­mi­sit, et rec­te: cum enim so­cie­tas con­sen­su con­tra­ha­tur, so­cius mi­hi es­se non pot­est quem ego so­cium es­se no­lui. quid er­go si so­cius meus eum ad­mi­sit? ei so­li so­cius est.

19Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Where anyone is admitted into a partnership he alone is his partner who admitted him. This is perfectly proper, for, since a partnership is formed by consent, he cannot be my partner whom I am unwilling should be such. What would be the case, however, if my partner should admit him? He would be his partner alone;

20Idem li­bro tri­ge­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. (nam so­cii mei so­cius meus so­cius non est)

20The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXI. For the partner of my partner is not mine.

21Idem li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. et quid­quid fue­rit de so­cie­ta­te nos­tra con­se­cu­tus, cum il­lo qui eum ad­sump­sit com­mu­ni­ca­bit, nos cum eo non com­mu­ni­ca­bi­mus. sed fac­tum eius prae­sta­bi­tur so­cie­ta­ti, id est aget so­cius et so­cie­ta­ti prae­sta­bit quod fue­rit con­se­cu­tus.

21The Same, On Sabinus, Book XX. And whatever such a partner may obtain from our partnership he will share with the one who admitted him; for we will not hold our share in common with him, and he who admitted him will be responsible for him to the partnership; that is to say, the said partner will have a right of action against him, and will pay to the partnership whatever he recovers.

22Gaius li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Ex con­tra­rio fac­tum quo­que so­cio­rum de­bet ei prae­sta­re sic­uti suum, quia ip­se ad­ver­sus eos ha­bet ac­tio­nem. item cer­tum est ni­hil ve­ta­re prius in­ter eum qui ad­mi­se­rit et eum qui ad­mis­sus fue­rit so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio agi, quam agi in­ci­piat in­ter ce­te­ros et eum qui ad­mi­se­rit.

22Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book X. On the other hand, he who has admitted him will be responsible to him for the acts of the other partners as well as for his own, because he himself has a right of action against them. It is also certain that there is nothing to prevent proceedings in an action on partnership from being instituted between the partner who admitted him and him who was admitted, before this is done between the other partners and the one who admitted him.

23Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. De il­lo Pom­po­nius du­bi­tat, utrum ac­tio­nem eum man­da­re so­ciis suf­fi­cit, ut, si fa­ce­re il­le non pos­sit, ni­hil ul­tra so­ciis prae­stet, an ve­ro in­dem­nes eos prae­sta­re de­beat. et pu­to om­ni­mo­do eum te­ne­ri eius no­mi­ne, quem ip­se so­lus ad­mi­sit, quia dif­fi­ci­le est ne­ga­re cul­pa ip­sius ad­mis­sum. 1Idem quae­rit, an com­mo­dum, quod prop­ter ad­mis­sum so­cium ac­ces­sit, com­pen­sa­ri cum dam­no, quod cul­pa prae­buit, de­beat, et ait com­pen­san­dum. quod non est ve­rum, nam et Mar­cel­lus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum scri­bit, si ser­vus unius ex so­ciis so­cie­ta­ti a do­mi­no prae­po­si­tus neg­le­gen­ter ver­sa­tus sit, do­mi­num so­cie­ta­ti qui prae­po­sue­rit prae­sta­tu­rum nec com­pen­san­dum com­mo­dum, quod per ser­vum so­cie­ta­ti ac­ces­sit, cum dam­no: et ita di­vum Mar­cum pro­nun­tias­se, nec pos­se di­ci so­cio: ‘abs­ti­ne com­mo­do, quod per ser­vum ac­ces­sit, si dam­num pe­tis.’

23Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Pomponius is in doubt as to whether it will be sufficient for the said partner to assign to his associates the right of action which he has against the newcomer, in case of loss, if the latter should not prove to be solvent, or whether he should fully indemnify them. I think that he who admitted the new partner will be liable to indemnify them entirely, because it would be difficult to deny that he was to blame for doing so. 1Ad Dig. 17,2,23,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 258, Note 4.He also asks whether any profits which may have accrued on account of the admission of the said partner can be set off against a loss which was caused by his negligence? He answered that they should be set off, which is not correct; for Marcellus states, in the Sixth Book of the Digest, that, if the slave of one of several partners having been placed in charge of the affairs of the partnership by his master, conducts them in a negligent manner, he who placed him in charge must make good the loss to the partnership; nor can any profits which may have accrued to the partnership through the slave be set off against the loss. He also says that the Divine Marcus decided that one partner could not say to another: “Relinquish the profits which have accrued through your slave, if you desire to be indemnified for the loss.”

24Idem li­bro tri­ge­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Pla­ne si am­bo so­cii ser­vum al­te­rius prae­po­sue­rint, non te­ne­bi­tur do­mi­nus eius no­mi­ne, ni­si dum­ta­xat de pe­cu­lio: com­mu­ne enim pe­ri­cu­lum es­se opor­tet, cum am­bo eum prae­po­na­mus.

24The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXI. It is evident that if two partners place the slave of one of them in charge of the business of the partnership, the master of said slave will not be responsible except to the extent of the peculium; for both of them should be liable to the same risk, as they both appointed him.

25Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Non ob eam rem mi­nus ad pe­ri­cu­lum so­cii per­ti­net quod neg­le­gen­tia eius per­is­set, quod in ple­ris­que aliis in­du­stria eius so­cie­tas auc­ta fuis­set: et hoc ex ap­pel­la­tio­ne im­pe­ra­tor pro­nun­tia­vit.

25Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. A partner is none the less liable for any loss suffered by his fellow-partners on account of his negligence; even though the value of the partnership property may have been increased in many other ways by his industry. The Emperor Antoninus rendered this decision in a case brought before him on appeal.

26Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Et id­eo si so­cius quae­dam neg­le­gen­ter in so­cie­ta­te egis­set, in ple­ris­que au­tem so­cie­ta­tem au­xis­set, non com­pen­sa­tur com­pen­dium cum neg­le­gen­tia, ut Mar­cel­lus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum scribsit.

26Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXI. And, therefore, if a partner transacts business relating to the partnership in a negligent manner, but in many respects benefits the partnership pecuniarily, the profit will not be set off against the negligence; as Marcellus stated in the Sixth Book of the Digest.

27Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Om­ne aes alie­num, quod ma­nen­te so­cie­ta­te con­trac­tum est, de com­mu­ni sol­ven­dum est, li­cet post­ea­quam so­cie­tas dis­trac­ta est so­lu­tum sit. igi­tur et si sub con­di­cio­ne pro­mi­se­rat et dis­trac­ta so­cie­ta­te con­di­cio ex­sti­tit, ex com­mu­ni sol­ven­dum est: id­eo­que si in­ter­im so­cie­tas dir­ima­tur, cau­tio­nes in­ter­po­nen­dae sunt.

27Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. All debts contracted during the existence of the partnership must be paid out of the common fund, even though payment was not made until after the partnership has been dissolved. Therefore, if a partner entered into a contract under a condition, and the condition took place after the partnership had been dissolved, the indebtedness must be discharged out of the common property. Hence, if the partnership is dissolved in the meantime, security should be furnished to one another by the partners.

28Idem li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si so­cii su­mus et unus ex die pe­cu­niam de­beat et di­vi­da­tur so­cie­tas, non de­bet hoc de­du­ce­re so­cius quem­ad­mo­dum prae­sens pu­re de­bet, sed om­nes di­vi­de­re et ca­ve­re, cum dies ve­ne­rit, de­fen­su iri so­cium.

28The Same, On the Edict, Book LX. If we are partners, and one of us owes a sum of money payable within a certain time, and the partnership is dissolved; the partner cannot deduct this sum as if it was due at that time, but it must be divided among all the partners, who should give security to defend their other partner when the day of payment arrives.

29Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Si non fue­rint par­tes so­cie­ta­ti ad­iec­tae, ae­quas eas es­se con­stat. si ve­ro plac­ue­rit, ut quis duas par­tes vel tres ha­beat, alius unam, an va­leat? pla­cet va­le­re, si mo­do ali­quid plus con­tu­lit so­cie­ta­ti vel pe­cu­niae vel ope­rae vel cu­ius­cum­que al­te­rius rei cau­sa. 1Ita co­iri so­cie­ta­tem pos­se, ut nul­lam par­tem dam­ni al­ter sen­tiat, lu­crum ve­ro com­mu­ne sit, Cas­sius pu­tat: quod ita de­mum va­le­bit, ut et Sa­b­inus scri­bit, si tan­ti sit ope­ra, quan­ti dam­num est: ple­rum­que enim tan­ta est in­du­stria so­cii, ut plus so­cie­ta­ti con­fe­rat quam pe­cu­nia, item si so­lus na­vi­get, si so­lus per­egri­ne­tur, pe­ri­cu­la sub­eat so­lus. 2Aris­to re­fert Cas­sium re­spon­dis­se so­cie­ta­tem ta­lem co­iri non pos­se, ut al­ter lu­crum tan­tum, al­ter dam­num sen­ti­ret, et hanc so­cie­ta­tem leo­ni­nam so­li­tum ap­pel­la­re: et nos con­sen­ti­mus ta­lem so­cie­ta­tem nul­lam es­se, ut al­ter lu­crum sen­ti­ret, al­ter ve­ro nul­lum lu­crum, sed dam­num sen­ti­ret: in­iquis­si­mum enim ge­nus so­cie­ta­tis est, ex qua quis dam­num, non et­iam lu­crum spec­tet.

29Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXX. Ad Dig. 17,2,29 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 405, Note 16; Bd. II, § 406, Note 13.Where the apportionment of shares is not mentioned in the formation of the partnership, it is held that they are equal. If, however, it should be agreed upon that one should have two shares, or three, and another, one, will this be valid? It is established that it will be, provided that the parties have furnished more money or labor to the partnership, or where any other good reason whatsoever exists. 1Cassius holds that a partnership can be formed in such a way that, while one of the partners will not be liable for any loss, the profit will be common to all. This, however, will only be valid (as Sabinus says) where the value of the services of the partner will be equal to the loss; for it frequently happens that the industry of one partner is of greater advantage to the partnership than the capital invested. The same rule applies if one partner alone makes a voyage by sea or land, as only he is exposed to danger. 2Aristo states that Cassius was of the opinion that a partnership could not be formed in such a way that one partner would take the profit and the other assume the loss, and a partnership of this description is usually called a “leonine” one. We, also, think that a partnership of this kind is void, where one of the partners takes the profit, and the other does not receive any gain at all, but sustains the loss; a partnership is extremely unjust where one partner suffers the loss, and receives no benefit whatever from it.

30Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Mu­cius li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo scri­bit non pos­se so­cie­ta­tem co­iri, ut aliam dam­ni, aliam lu­cri par­tem so­cius fe­rat: Ser­vius in no­ta­tis Mu­cii ait nec pos­se so­cie­ta­tem ita con­tra­hi, ne­que enim lu­crum in­tel­le­gi­tur ni­si om­ni dam­no de­duc­to ne­que dam­num ni­si om­ni lu­cro de­duc­to: sed pot­est co­iri so­cie­tas ita, ut eius lu­cri, quod re­li­quum in so­cie­ta­te sit om­ni dam­no de­duc­to, pars alia fe­ra­tur, et eius dam­ni, quod si­mi­li­ter re­lin­qua­tur, pars alia ca­pia­tur.

30Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. Mucius states in the Fourteenth Book, that a partnership cannot be formed in such a way that one partner will suffer a certain part of the loss, and another receive a different share of the profit. Servius says in his Notes on Mucius, that such a partnership cannot legally be formed, for that only is understood to be profit which remains after all loss has been deducted, nor does loss exist unless all the profit has been previously deducted. A partnership can, however, be formed in such a way that different amounts of the profits remaining in the funds of the partnership, after all loss has been deducted, can be paid to the partners; and, in like manner, where loss has been sustained, different shares of it may be apportioned among the several partners.

31Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Ut sit pro so­cio ac­tio, so­cie­ta­tem in­ter­ce­de­re opor­tet: nec enim suf­fi­cit rem es­se com­mu­nem, ni­si so­cie­tas in­ter­ce­dit. com­mu­ni­ter au­tem res agi pot­est et­iam ci­tra so­cie­ta­tem, ut pu­ta cum non af­fec­tio­ne so­cie­ta­tis in­ci­di­mus in com­mu­nio­nem, ut eve­nit in re duo­bus le­ga­ta, item si a duo­bus si­mul emp­ta res sit, aut si he­redi­tas vel do­na­tio com­mu­ni­ter no­bis ob­ve­nit, aut si a duo­bus se­pa­ra­tim emi­mus par­tes eo­rum non so­cii fu­tu­ri.

31Ad Dig. 17,2,31ROHGE, Bd. 13 (1874), Nr. 102, S. 311: Wesen der Societät. Geschäftsunternehmung auf gemeinschaftlichen Gewinn und Verlust. Beiderseitiges Leisten.Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. In order for an action on partnership to be brought, the partnership must intervene in the proceedings, for it is not sufficient for the property to be in common, unless the partnership appears as a party to the suit, for an action can be brought in common even outside the partnership; as, for instance, where we happen to own property together without the intention of forming a partnership, which occurs where property is bequeathed to two parties, and also where an article is bought by two persons at the same time; or where an estate or donation passes, or is given to us in common, or where we purchase separately the shares of two joint-owners, without the intention of becoming partners:

32Idem li­bro se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Nam cum trac­ta­tu ha­bi­to so­cie­tas co­ita est, pro so­cio ac­tio est, cum si­ne trac­ta­tu in re ip­sa et neg­otio, com­mu­ni­ter ges­tum vi­de­tur,

32The Same, On the Edict, Book II. For when a partnership is formed by express agreement, an action on partnership will lie; but where there is no agreement, an action can be brought with reference to the property itself, and the business is held to have been transacted in common.

33Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. ut in con­duc­tio­ni­bus pu­bli­co­rum, item in emp­tio­ni­bus: nam qui no­lunt in­ter se con­ten­de­re, so­lent per nun­tium rem eme­re in com­mu­ne, quod a so­cie­ta­te lon­ge re­mo­tum est. et id­eo so­cie­ta­te si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te co­ita pu­pil­lus non te­ne­tur, at­ta­men com­mu­ni­ter ges­to te­ne­tur.

33The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXI. As in the case of farmers of the revenue, as well as where there are several purchasers; for where they are unwilling to contend with one another, they are accustomed to purchase the property in common by means of messengers, and this is very different from a partnership. Therefore, where a ward enters into a partnership without the authority of the guardian, he will still be liable to an action on the ground of business transacted in common.

34Gaius li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Qui­bus ca­si­bus si quid for­te unus in eam rem im­pen­de­rit si­ve fruc­tus mer­ce­des­ve unus per­ce­pe­rit vel de­te­rio­rem fe­ce­rit rem, non so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio lo­cus est, sed in­ter co­he­redes qui­dem fa­mi­liae her­cis­cen­dae iu­di­cio agi­tur, in­ter ce­te­ros com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do. in­ter eos quo­que, qui­bus he­redi­ta­rio iu­re com­mu­nis res est, pos­se et com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do agi.

34Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XX. In those instances where one party happens to have expended money on the common property, or collected the crops or profits of the same, or has diminished its value, there is no ground for an action on partnership; but among co-heirs an action for partnership of the estate will lie, and among others an action for the division of property owned in common. An action for the division of property held in common can also be brought between those to whom it belongs by hereditary right.

35Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­ge­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Ne­mo pot­est so­cie­ta­tem he­rede suo sic pa­re­re, ut ip­se he­res so­cius sit: in he­redem au­tem so­cii pro­po­ni­tur ac­tio, ut bo­nam fi­dem prae­stet

35Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. No one can enter into a partnership in such a way that his heir may become a partner therein. An action, however, can be brought against the heir of a partner to compel him to fulfill the obligation of the deceased;

36Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. et ac­ti et­iam cul­pam, quam is prae­sta­ret in cu­ius lo­cum suc­ces­sit, li­cet so­cius non sit.

36Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. And he must also make good the effects of any negligence of the party of whom he is the lawful successor, even though he himself may not be a partner.

37Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Pla­ne si hi, qui so­ciis he­redes ex­sti­te­rint, ani­mum in­ie­rint so­cie­ta­tis in ea he­redi­ta­te, no­vo con­sen­su quod post­ea ges­se­rint ef­fi­ci­tur ut in pro so­cio ac­tio­nem de­du­ca­tur.

37Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIII. It is clear that, if the heirs of partners have the intention of forming a partnership in the estate by new consent, whatever they afterwards do will furnish ground for an action on partnership.

38Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Pro so­cio ar­bi­ter pro­spi­ce­re de­bet cau­tio­ni­bus in fu­tu­ro dam­no vel lu­cro pen­den­te ex ea so­cie­ta­te. quod Sa­b­inus in om­ni­bus bo­nae fi­dei iu­di­ciis ex­is­ti­ma­vit, si­ve ge­ne­ra­lia sunt (vel­uti pro so­cio, neg­otio­rum ges­to­rum, tu­te­lae) si­ve spe­cia­lia (vel­uti man­da­ti, com­mo­da­ti, de­po­si­ti). 1Si te­cum so­cie­tas mi­hi sit et res ex so­cie­ta­te com­mu­nes, quam im­pen­sam in eas fe­ce­ro quos­ve fruc­tus ex his re­bus ce­pe­ris, vel pro so­cio vel com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do me con­se­cu­tu­rum et al­te­ra ac­tio­ne al­te­ram tol­li Pro­cu­lus ait.

38Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. Ad Dig. 17,2,38 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 89, Note 13.The arbiter in an action on partnership should see that security is given for future loss or gain during the existence of the partnership. Sabinus thinks that this should be done in all bona fide cases, whether they are in general terms, for example, such as arise from partnership, or from voluntary agency, or from guardianship; or whether they are of a special character, as, for instance, where they are based on mandate, on loan for use, or on deposit. 1If you and I have formed a partnership, and the property derived from it is held in common, Proculus says that I can recover any expense I may have incurred on account of said property, and any profit you may have obtained from the same, by an action on partnership, or by one for the division of common property; and that one of these actions puts an end to the other.

39Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Si fun­dus mi­hi te­cum com­mu­nis sit et in eum mor­tuum in­tu­le­ris, agam te­cum pro so­cio.

39Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIII. Where you and I own a field in common, and you bury a dead body therein, I can bring an action on partnership against you.

40Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. He­res so­cii quam­vis so­cius non est, ta­men ea, quae per de­func­tum in­choa­ta sunt per he­redem ex­pli­ca­ri de­bent: in qui­bus do­lus eius ad­mit­ti pot­est.

40The Same, On Sabinus, Book XVII. The heir of a partner, although he is not a partner, should nevertheless finish what has been left incomplete by the deceased; and, in this instance, any bad faith of which he may be guilty can be taken into consideration.

41Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si quis a so­cio poe­nam sti­pu­la­tus sit, pro so­cio non aget, si tan­tun­dem in poe­nam sit, quan­tum eius in­ter­fuit.

41Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XX. Where one partner has entered into a stipulation with another with reference to a penalty, he cannot bring an action on partnership if the amount of the penalty was only equal to that of his interest.

42Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo quin­to ad Sa­binum. Quod si ex sti­pu­la­tu eam con­se­cu­tus sit, post­ea pro so­cio agen­do hoc mi­nus ac­ci­piet poe­na ei in sor­tem im­pu­ta­ta.

42The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLV. If, however, he has obtained the penalty of the stipulation after the action on partnership has been brought, he will be entitled to that much less, as the penalty will be charged against him to the principal.

43Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Si ac­tum sit com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do, non tol­li­tur pro so­cio ac­tio, quon­iam pro so­cio et no­mi­num ra­tio­nem ha­bet et ad­iu­di­ca­tio­nem non ad­mit­tit. sed si post­ea pro so­cio aga­tur, hoc mi­nus ex ea ac­tio­ne con­se­qui­tur, quam ex pri­ma ac­tio­ne con­se­cu­tus est.

43Ad Dig. 17,2,43ROHGE, Bd. 14 (1875), Nr. 78, S. 237: Theilungsklage. Gelegenheitsgesellschaft.The Same, On the Edict, Book XXVIII. Where suit has been brought for the division of property held in common, the right of action on partnership is not extinguished, for the latter has reference to the partnership and the obligations thereby contracted, and does not admit of adjudication; but if, an action on partnership is afterwards brought, less will be recovered by it than by the former one.

44Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Si mar­ga­ri­ta ti­bi ven­den­da de­de­ro, ut, si ea de­cem ven­di­dis­ses, red­de­res mi­hi de­cem, si plu­ris, quod ex­ce­dit tu ha­be­res, mi­hi vi­de­tur, si ani­mo con­tra­hen­dae so­cie­ta­tis id ac­tum sit, pro so­cio es­se ac­tio­nem, si mi­nus, prae­scrip­tis ver­bis.

44Ad Dig. 17,2,44ROHGE, Bd. 13 (1874), Nr. 102, S. 311: Wesen der Societät. Geschäftsunternehmung auf gemeinschaftlichen Gewinn und Verlust. Beiderseitiges Leisten.The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXI. If I should give you pearls to be sold, with the understanding that if you dispose of them for ten aurei you must pay me ten, but if you sell them for more, you can have the surplus; it seems to me that if this was done with the intention of forming a partnership, an action on partnership will lie, otherwise, one on a verbal contract can be brought.

45Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Rei com­mu­nis no­mi­ne cum so­cio fur­ti agi pot­est, si per fal­la­ciam do­lo­ve ma­lo amo­vit vel rem com­mu­nem ce­lan­di ani­mo con­trec­tet: sed et pro so­cio ac­tio­ne ob­stric­tus est, nec al­te­ra ac­tio al­te­ram tol­let. idem­que in om­ni­bus bo­nae fi­dei iu­di­ciis di­cen­dum est.

45The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXX. An action for theft on account of common property can be brought against a partner where, either through fraud or malicious intent, he has removed said property or disposed of it for the purpose of concealment, but he will also be liable to the action on partnership, for one action does not destroy the other. The same rule is applicable to all bona fide actions.

46Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Idem est et in co­lo­no et in eo qui neg­otia ge­rit et qui man­da­tum nos­trum ex­se­qui­tur et in tu­to­re.

46Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. The same rule also applies to a tenant, and to a party who is transacting the business of another, as well as to one who is executing a mandate of ours, and to a guardian.

47Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Sed si ex cau­sa fur­ti­va con­di­xe­ro, ces­sa­bit pro so­cio ac­tio, ni­si si plu­ris mea in­ter­sit. 1Si dam­num in re com­mu­ni so­cius de­dit, Aqui­lia te­ne­ri eum et Cel­sus et Iu­lia­nus et Pom­po­nius scri­bunt:

47Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. If I bring suit for the recovery of stolen property, the right of action on partnership is extinguished, unless I have still further interest in the matter. 1Where a partner has caused damage to property held in common, Celsus, Julianus, and Pomponius say that he will be liable under the Lex Aquilia;

48Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. sed ni­hi­lo mi­nus et pro so­cio te­ne­tur,

48Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. But he will, nevertheless, also be liable to an action on partnership,

49Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. si hoc fac­to so­cie­ta­tem lae­sit, si ver­bi gra­tia neg­otia­to­rem ser­vum vul­ne­ra­ve­rit vel oc­ci­dit.

49Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXI. If he has injured the partnership by his act; as, for example, if he has wounded or killed a slave belonging to it and who transacted its business.

50Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Sed ac­tio­ne pro so­cio con­se­qui­tur, ut al­te­ra ac­tio­ne con­ten­tus es­se de­beat, quia utra­que ac­tio ad rei per­se­cu­tio­nem re­spi­cit, non ut fur­ti ad poe­nam dum­ta­xat.

50Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. The result of bringing the action on partnership is that the partner must be satisfied with one or the other of the two proceedings; because both have in view the recovery of the property, and not, as in an action for theft, merely the collection of the penalty.

51Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Me­ri­to au­tem ad­iec­tum est ita de­mum fur­ti ac­tio­nem es­se, si per fal­la­ciam et do­lo ma­lo amo­vit, quia cum si­ne do­lo ma­lo fe­cit, fur­ti non te­ne­tur: et sa­ne ple­rum­que cre­den­dum est eum, qui par­tis do­mi­nus est, iu­re po­tius suo re uti quam fur­ti con­si­lium in­ire. 1Et id­eo vi­de­bi­mus, an Fa­bia te­n­ea­tur. et ra­tio qui­dem fa­cit, ne te­n­ea­tur, ve­rum si pla­gium fe­cit vel sup­pres­sit, Fa­bia te­ne­ri.

51Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III. It is also very properly added: “That an action for theft will only lie if the partner removed the property fraudulently, and with malicious intent,” because if he did so without malicious intent he would not be liable to an action for theft. And, indeed, it is generally held that a party who owns a share of the property would prefer to lawfully enjoy the same, rather than to form an intention to steal it. 1Therefore, let us see whether he will be liable under the Lex Fabia; and, although reason suggests that he should not be held responsible, still, if he has kidnapped the slave, or concealed him, he will be liable under the Lex Fabia.

52Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Cum duo­bus vi­ci­nis fun­dus con­iunc­tus ve­na­lis es­set, al­ter ex his pe­tit ab al­te­ro, ut eum fun­dum eme­ret, ita ut ea pars, quae suo fun­do iunc­ta es­set, si­bi ce­de­re­tur: mox ip­se eum fun­dum igno­ran­te vi­ci­no emit: quae­ri­tur, an ali­quam ac­tio­nem cum eo vi­ci­nus ha­beat. Iu­lia­nus scrip­sit im­pli­ci­tam es­se fac­ti quaes­tio­nem: nam si hoc so­lum ac­tum est, ut fun­dum Lu­cii Ti­tii vi­ci­nus eme­ret et me­cum com­mu­ni­ca­ret, ad­ver­sus me qui emi nul­lam ac­tio­nem vi­ci­no com­pe­te­re: si ve­ro id ac­tum est, ut qua­si com­mu­ne neg­otium ge­re­re­tur. so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio te­ne­bor, ut ti­bi de­duc­ta par­te quam man­da­ve­ram re­li­quas par­tes prae­stem. 1Venit au­tem in hoc iu­di­cium pro so­cio bo­na fi­des. 2Utrum er­go tan­tum do­lum an et­iam cul­pam prae­sta­re so­cium opor­teat, quae­ri­tur. et Cel­sus li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum ita scrip­sit: so­cios in­ter se do­lum et cul­pam prae­sta­re opor­tet. si in co­eun­da so­cie­ta­te, in­quit, ar­tem ope­ram­ve pol­li­ci­tus est al­ter, vel­uti cum pe­cus in com­mu­ne pas­cen­dum aut agrum po­li­to­ri da­mus in com­mu­ne quae­ren­dis fruc­ti­bus, nimi­rum ibi et­iam cul­pa prae­stan­da est: pre­tium enim ope­rae ar­tis est ve­la­men­tum. quod si rei com­mu­ni so­cius no­cuit, ma­gis ad­mit­tit cul­pam quo­que venire. 3Dam­na quae im­pru­den­ti­bus ac­ci­dunt, hoc est dam­na fa­ta­lia, so­cii non co­gen­tur prae­sta­re: id­eo­que si pe­cus aes­ti­ma­tum da­tum sit et id la­tro­ci­nio aut in­cen­dio per­ie­rit, com­mu­ne dam­num est, si ni­hil do­lo aut cul­pa ac­ci­de­rit eius, qui aes­ti­ma­tum pe­cus ac­ce­pe­rit: quod si a fu­ri­bus sub­rep­tum sit, pro­prium eius de­tri­men­tum est, quia cus­to­diam prae­sta­re de­buit, qui aes­ti­ma­tum ac­ce­pit. haec ve­ra sunt, et pro so­cio erit ac­tio, si mo­do so­cie­ta­tis con­tra­hen­dae cau­sa pas­cen­da da­ta sunt quam­vis aes­ti­ma­ta. 4Qui­dam sa­ga­riam neg­otia­tio­nem co­ie­runt: al­ter ex his ad mer­ces com­pa­ran­das pro­fec­tus in la­tro­nes in­ci­dit suam­que pe­cu­niam per­di­dit, ser­vi eius vul­ne­ra­ti sunt res­que pro­prias per­di­dit. di­cit Iu­lia­nus dam­num es­se com­mu­ne id­eo­que ac­tio­ne pro so­cio dam­ni par­tem di­mi­diam ad­gnos­ce­re de­be­re tam pe­cu­niae quam re­rum ce­te­ra­rum, quas se­cum non tu­lis­set so­cius ni­si ad mer­ces com­mu­ni no­mi­ne com­pa­ran­das pro­fi­cis­ce­re­tur. sed et si quid in me­di­cos im­pen­sum est, pro par­te so­cium agnos­ce­re de­be­re rec­tis­si­me Iu­lia­nus pro­bat. pro­in­de et si nau­fra­gio quid per­iit, cum non alias mer­ces quam na­vi so­le­rent ad­ve­hi, dam­num am­bo sen­tient: nam sic­uti lu­crum, ita dam­num quo­que com­mu­ne es­se opor­tet, quod non cul­pa so­cii con­tin­git. 5Cum duo erant ar­gen­ta­rii so­cii, al­ter eo­rum ali­quid se­pa­ra­tim quae­sie­rat et lu­cri sen­se­rat: quae­re­ba­tur, an com­mu­ne es­se lu­crum opor­te­ret. et im­pe­ra­tor Se­ve­rus Fla­vio Fe­li­ci in haec ver­ba re­scrip­sit: ‘et­iam­si ma­xi­me ar­gen­ta­riae so­cie­tas in­ita est, quod quis­que ta­men so­cius non ex ar­gen­ta­ria cau­sa quae­siit, id ad com­mu­nio­nem non per­ti­ne­re ex­plo­ra­ti iu­ris est’. 6Pa­pi­nia­nus quo­que li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum ait: si fra­tres pa­ren­tium in­di­vi­sas he­redi­ta­tes id­eo re­ti­nue­runt, ut emo­lu­men­tum ac dam­num in his com­mu­ne sen­ti­rent, quod ali­un­de quae­sie­rint in com­mu­ne non red­ige­tur. 7Item ex fac­to con­sul­tum re­spon­dis­se se ait li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum: in­ter Fla­vium vic­to­rem et bel­lic­um Asia­num plac­ue­rat, ut lo­cis emp­tis pe­cu­nia vic­to­ris mo­nu­men­ta fie­rent ope­ra et pe­ri­tia Asia­ni, qui­bus dis­trac­tis pe­cu­niam vic­tor cum cer­ta quan­ti­ta­te re­ci­pe­ret, su­per­fluum Asia­nus ac­ci­pe­ret, qui ope­ram in so­cie­ta­tem con­tu­lit: erit pro so­cio ac­tio. 8Idem Pa­pi­nia­nus eo­dem li­bro ait, si in­ter fra­tres vo­lun­ta­rium con­sor­tium in­itum fue­rit, et sti­pen­dia ce­te­ra­que sa­la­ria in com­mu­ne red­igi iu­di­cio so­cie­ta­tis, quam­vis fi­lius em­an­ci­pa­tus haec non co­ga­tur con­fer­re fra­tri, in­quit, in po­tes­ta­te ma­nen­ti, quia et si in po­tes­ta­te ma­ne­ret, prae­ci­pua ea ha­be­ret. 9Idem re­spon­dit so­cie­ta­tem non pos­se ul­tra mor­tem por­ri­gi, et id­eo nec li­ber­ta­tem de su­pre­mis iu­di­ciis con­strin­ge­re quis pot­erit vel co­gna­tum ul­te­rio­rem pro­xi­mio­ri­bus prae­fer­re. 10Idem re­spon­dit: so­cius, qui ces­san­tis ces­san­tium­ve por­tio­nes in­su­lae re­sti­tue­rit, quam­vis aut sor­tem cum cer­tis usu­ris in­tra quat­tuor men­ses, post­quam opus re­fec­tum erit, re­ci­pe­re pot­est ex­igen­do­que pri­vi­le­gio ute­tur aut de­in­ceps pro­priam rem ha­be­bit, pot­est ta­men pro so­cio age­re ad hoc, ut con­se­qua­tur quod sua in­ter­erat. fin­ge enim mal­le eum ma­gis suum con­se­qui quam do­mi­nium in­su­lae. ora­tio enim di­vi Mar­ci id­cir­co quat­tuor men­si­bus fi­nit cer­tas usu­ras, quia post quat­tuor do­mi­nium de­dit. 11Si qui so­cie­ta­tem ad emen­dum co­ie­rint, de­in­de res al­te­rius do­lo vel cul­pa emp­ta non sit, pro so­cio es­se ac­tio­nem con­stat. pla­ne si con­di­cio sit ad­iec­ta ‘si in­tra il­lum diem veniret’, et dies si­ne cul­pa so­cii prae­ter­ie­rit, ces­sa­bit ac­tio pro so­cio. 12Item si in com­mu­nem ri­vum re­fi­cien­dum in­pen­sa fac­ta sit, pro so­cio es­se ac­tio­nem ad re­ci­pe­ran­dum sump­tum Cas­sius scrip­sit. 13Item Me­la scri­bit, si vi­ci­ni se­mi­pe­des in­ter se con­tu­le­runt, ut ibi cra­ti­cium pa­rie­tem in­ter se ae­di­fi­ca­rent ad one­ra utrius­que sus­ti­nen­da, de­in­de ae­di­fi­ca­to pa­rie­te al­ter in eum in­mit­ti non pa­tia­tur, pro so­cio agen­dum. idem­que et si aream in com­mu­ne eme­rint, ne lu­mi­ni­bus suis of­fi­ce­re­tur, et al­te­ri tra­di­ta sit nec prae­stet al­te­ri quod con­ve­nit, pro so­cio ac­tio­nem es­se. 14Si plu­res sint in­ter eos­dem so­cie­ta­tes co­itae, ad om­nes so­cie­ta­tes suf­fi­ce­re hoc unum iu­di­cium con­stat. 15Si quis ex so­ciis prop­ter so­cie­ta­tem pro­fec­tus sit, vel­uti ad mer­ces emen­das, eos dum­ta­xat sump­tuum so­cie­ta­ti im­pu­ta­bit qui in eam rem im­pen­si sunt: via­ti­ca igi­tur et me­ri­to­rio­rum et sta­bu­lo­rum, iu­men­to­rum car­ru­lo­rum vec­tu­ras vel sui vel sar­ci­na­rum sua­rum gra­tia vel mer­cium rec­te im­pu­ta­bit. 16So­cium uni­ver­sa in so­cie­ta­tem con­fer­re de­bet Ne­ra­tius ait, si om­nium bo­no­rum so­cius sit: et id­eo si­ve ob in­iu­riam si­bi fac­tam vel ex le­ge Aqui­lia, si­ve ip­sius si­ve fi­lii cor­po­ri no­ci­tum sit, con­fer­re de­be­re re­spon­dit. 17Ibi­dem ait so­cium om­nium bo­no­rum non co­gi con­fer­re, quae ex pro­hi­bi­tis cau­sis ad­quisie­rit. 18Per con­tra­rium quo­que apud ve­te­res trac­ta­tur, an so­cius om­nium bo­no­rum, si quid ob in­iu­ria­rum ac­tio­nem dam­na­tus prae­sti­te­rit, ex com­mu­ni con­se­qua­tur ut prae­stet. et Ati­li­ci­nus Sa­b­inus Cas­sius re­spon­de­runt, si in­iu­ria iu­di­cis dam­na­tus sit, con­se­cu­tu­rum, si ob ma­le­fi­cium suum, ip­sum tan­tum dam­num sen­ti­re de­be­re. cui con­gruit, quod Ser­vium re­spon­dis­se Au­fi­dius re­fert, si so­cii bo­no­rum fue­rint, de­in­de unus, cum ad iu­di­cium non ad­es­set, dam­na­tus sit, non de­be­re eum de com­mu­ni id con­se­qui, si ve­ro prae­sens in­iu­riam iu­di­cis pas­sus sit, de com­mu­ni sar­cien­dum.

52The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXI. Ad Dig. 17,2,52 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 13 (1874), Nr. 102, S. 311: Wesen der Societät. Geschäftsunternehmung auf gemeinschaftlichen Gewinn und Verlust. Beiderseitiges Leisten.Where a tract of land adjoining two others is to be sold, and one of the parties asks another to purchase it so that he can transfer to him that part which joins his own premises, and soon after he himself purchases the tract, his said neighbor not being aware of the transaction; the question arises whether the neighbor has any right of action against him. Julianus stated that this involved a perplexing question of fact, for if the intention was that the neighbor should buy the land of Lucius Titius, and convey it to me, the neighbor would have no right of action against me who made the purchase; but if the intention had really been that a purchase of common property was to be made, I would be liable to an action on partnership to compel me to transfer to you the remainder of the land after having deducted that portion which I directed you to buy. 1Good faith is an important element in this action on partnership. 2The question arises whether a partner is only liable for fraud, or whether he is also liable for negligence? Celsus states in the Seventh Book of the Digest, that partners are responsible to one another for negligence as well as fraud. And he says that, if, in forming a partnership, one of them promised to furnish his skill and labor, as, for instance, where a flock held in common is to be pastured; or we give a field to a party to be improved, and from which the crops are to be gathered in common; in this case he will surely be liable for negligence, for the consideration is the value of his labor and skill. Where a partner damages the common property, it is held that he is also liable for negligence. 3Partners are not responsible for unforseen accidents, that is to say, for those that are unavoidable. Therefore, if a flock, after having been appraised, is delivered to a partner and it is lost through an attack by robbers, or by fire, the loss must be borne in common, if no fraud or negligence attaches to the party who received the said flock after it had been appraised. Where, however, it was stolen by thieves, the loss must be sustained by the party to whom it was entrusted, because he who received the flock after its valuation was obliged to take care of it. These opinions are correct, and an action on partnership will lie, provided that the flock, even though it had been appraised, was delivered to be pastured with the intention of forming a partnership. 4Two parties formed a partnership in the business of manufacturing soldiers’ cloaks. One of them, having undertaken a journey for the purpose of purchasing materials, fell among thieves, and his money was taken, his slaves were wounded, and he lost his private property. Julianus says that the loss must be borne in common, and that, therefore, the partner will be entitled to an action on partnership for half of the loss not only of the money, but also of the other property which the partner did not take with him, unless he made the journey for the purpose of purchasing merchandise on account of the partnership. Julianus very properly holds that if any expense was incurred for physicians the other partner is liable for his share. Hence, if property is lost by shipwreck, and merchandise was involved which it is not customary to transport by vessel, both parties must sustain the loss; for it, as well as the profits must be divided in common when it does not occur through the negligence of a partner. 5Where two bankers are partners, and one of them profits by a transaction separately, and appropriates the gain therefrom, the question arises whether the gain should be divided? The Emperor Severus gave the following reply in a Rescript to Flavius Felix: “Where a partnership to carry on a banking business has been expressly formed for that purpose, any profit which a partner obtains in any way not connected with said banking business, has been determined by law not to belong to the partnership.” 6Papinianus also says in the Third Book of Opinions: “Where brothers retain undivided the estates of their parents, in order to share among themselves the profits and losses of the same, any acquisitions which they obtain from any other source do not belong to the common fund.” 7He likewise states in the Third Book of Opinions that, having been consulted with reference to certain facts, he gave the following opinion: “An agreement was made between Flavius Victor and Vellicus Asianus that land having been purchased with the money of Victor, certain buildings should be erected by the labor and skill of Asianus, and, after the said buildings were sold, Victor should receive the money which he had invested and a certain sum besides, and Asianus, who had contributed his labor to the partnership, should be entitled to the remainder.” In this instance an action on partnership will lie. 8Papinianus also states in the same Book that where a voluntary partnership was formed between two brothers, the salaries and other compensations should be brought into the common fund of the partnership; although a son who is emancipated would not be compelled to give what he obtained in this way to his brother who remained under the control of his father, because, he says, even if he should remain under paternal control, these things would still be his private property. 9He also gave it as his opinion that a partnership could not last beyond the death of the partners; and therefore that anyone could not be deprived of the power of testamentary disposition, or of transferring his estate to a more distant cognate than others who were more nearly related. 10Papinianus also gave it as his opinion that, where a partner repaired certain parts of a building belonging to the partnership which was falling into ruin, or had become dilapidated, that he could, as a privileged creditor, either recover the principal expended together with the interest within four months after the work had been completed, or he could acquire said building as his own after that time, and that he had a right, nevertheless, to bring an action on partnership for the recovery of his interest; for example, if he preferred to obtain what belonged to him rather than the ownership of the property. An Address of the Divine Marcus fixed the term of four months for the interest to cease, because, after that time, the partner would acquire the ownership. 11Where persons form a partnership in order to purchase something, and afterwards the property is not purchased on account of the fraud or negligence of one of them, it is established that an action on partnership will lie. It is clear that if this condition is added, namely, “If the property is sold within a certain time,” and the period elapses without the partner being guilty of negligence, the action on partnership can not be brought. 12Cassius stated that the action on partnership is also available for the recovery of expenses incurred by one of the partners in repairing a water-course owned in common. 13Ad Dig. 17,2,52,13ROHGE, Bd. 12 (1874), Nr. 90, S. 274: Actio pro socio eines Gesellschafters wegen einer von ihm bewirkten Bezahlung eines Gesellschaftsschuld nach Auflösung der Gesellschaft.Mela also says that where two neighbors each contributed half a foot of land for the purpose of constructing a party-wall together, which was intended to support buildings belonging to each of them, and after said wall was built, one of them would not permit the other to use its support, an action on partnership would lie. The same authority held that, where two parties purchased a vacant lot to avoid their light being shut off, and it was delivered to one of them who would not allow the other to have what was agreed upon, an action on partnership can be brought. 14Where several partnerships are formed by the same persons, it is established that one judgment will be sufficient to decide all controversies which may arise with reference to them. 15Where one partner makes a journey connected with the business of the partnership, as for instance, for the purchase of merchandise, he will only be reimbursed for the expenses incurred by him on account of the partnership. He can, therefore, properly charge reasonable travelling expenses he incurred for hotel accommodations, for beasts of burden and the hire of vehicles, as well as for the transport of himself and his bales of goods, including the price of the same. 16Neratius says that where anyone is a general partner, he should place all his property in the partnership fund; and therefore he gives it as his opinion that the partnership will be responsible, under the Aquilian law, for any injury inflicted upon himself, or where any personal wrong has been inflicted upon him or his son. 17He also says that a partner, who has entered into a general partnership, is not required to bring into the common fund anything which he has acquired by unlawful means. 18On the other hand, it is also discussed by the ancient authorities whether a general partner who had had judgment rendered against him in an action for injury committed, could, by means of legal proceedings, compel the partnership to make good the judgment? Atilicinus, Sabinus, and Cassius answered that if he had been unjustly condemned, he would be entitled to recourse of this kind; but if the said injury resulted from some illegal act of his own, he himself alone must sustain the loss; which agrees with what Aufidius states was the opinion of Servius, that is, where there were two general partners, and one of them had judgment rendered against him for not appearing in court, he could not recover the amount of the judgment out of the partnership property; but if he, while present, suffered an unjust decision, he must be reimbursed from the partnership fund.

53Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Quod au­tem ex fur­to vel ex alio ma­le­fi­cio quae­si­tum est, in so­cie­ta­tem non opor­te­re con­fer­ri pa­lam est, quia de­lic­to­rum tur­pis at­que foe­da com­mu­nio est. pla­ne si in me­dium col­la­ta sit, com­mu­ne erit lu­crum.

53The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXX. It is clear that the proceeds of a theft or of any other breach of the law should not be placed in the partnership property, because a partnership in crime is base and dishonorable. Still, it is evident that if property obtained in this way becomes a part of the common fund, the gain must be divided:

54Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Quod enim ex ma­le­fi­cio con­tu­le­rit so­cius, non ali­ter re­ci­pe­re de­bet, quam si dam­na­tus sit.

54Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIII. For the reason that where a partner places the proceeds of a crime in the partnership fund, he cannot recover it, except where he is compelled to surrender it by a judicial decision.

55Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Si igi­tur ex hoc con­ven­tus fue­rit qui ma­le­fi­cium ad­mi­sit, id quod con­tu­lit aut so­lum aut cum poe­na au­fe­ret: so­lum au­fe­ret, si mi­hi pro­po­nas in­scien­te so­cio eum in so­cie­ta­tis ra­tio­nem hoc con­tu­lis­se: quod si scien­te, et­iam poe­nam so­cium agnos­ce­re opor­tet: ae­quum est enim, ut cu­ius par­ti­ci­pa­vit lu­crum par­ti­ci­pet et dam­num.

55Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Therefore, if a party who committed an illegal act is sued, he can either surrender only what he misappropriated, or he can do this with a penalty. He can give up the property, which was taken, alone, in case the other partner was ignorant that he had placed it with that of the partnership. If, however, he was aware of the fact, he, also, will be liable to the penalty, for it is but just that he who participated in the profit should also share the loss.

56Pau­lus li­bro sex­to ad Sa­binum. Nec quic­quam in­ter­est, utrum ma­nen­te so­cie­ta­te prae­sti­te­rit ob fur­tum an dis­so­lu­ta ea. idem­que est in om­ni­bus tur­pi­bus ac­tio­ni­bus, vel­uti in­iu­ria­rum, vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum, ser­vi cor­rup­ti et si­mi­li­bus, et in om­ni­bus poe­nis pe­cu­nia­riis quae ex pu­bli­cis iu­di­ciis ac­ci­dunt.

56Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VI. Nor does it make any difference whether the partner is compelled to surrender the property obtained by theft while the partnership is still in existence, or after it has been dissolved. The same rule applies to all actions which arise from dishonorable conduct, as, for instance, those based on injury, robbery with violence, the corruption of slaves, and others of this kind, as well as to all pecuniary penalties imposed in prosecutions for crime.

57Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad Sa­binum. Nec prae­ter­mit­ten­dum es­se Pom­po­nius ait ita de­mum hoc es­se ve­rum, si ho­nes­tae et li­ci­tae rei so­cie­tas co­ita sit: ce­te­rum si ma­le­fi­cii so­cie­tas co­ita sit, con­stat nul­lam es­se so­cie­ta­tem. ge­ne­ra­li­ter enim tra­di­tur re­rum in­ho­nes­ta­rum nul­lam es­se so­cie­ta­tem.

57Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Pomponius says the fact must not be lost sight of that these rules only apply where a partnership has been formed for an honorable and lawful purpose; for if it has been formed in order to break the law, it will be void, as it is generally held that there can be no partnership in matters which are dishonorable.

58Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Si id quod quis in so­cie­ta­tem con­tu­lit ex­stinc­tum sit, vi­den­dum, an pro so­cio age­re pos­sit. trac­ta­tum ita est apud Cel­sum li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum ad epis­tu­lam Cor­ne­lii Fe­li­cis: cum tres equos ha­be­res et ego unum, so­cie­ta­tem co­imus, ut ac­cep­to equo meo qua­dri­gam ven­de­res et ex pre­tio quar­tam mi­hi red­de­res. si igi­tur an­te ven­di­tio­nem equus meus mor­tuus sit, non pu­ta­re se Cel­sus ait so­cie­ta­tem ma­ne­re nec ex pre­tio equo­rum tuo­rum par­tem de­be­ri: non enim ha­ben­dae qua­dri­gae, sed ven­den­dae co­itam so­cie­ta­tem. ce­te­rum si id ac­tum di­ca­tur, ut qua­dri­ga fie­ret ea­que com­mu­ni­ca­re­tur tu­que in ea tres par­tes ha­be­res, ego quar­tam, non du­bie ad­huc so­cii su­mus. 1Item Cel­sus trac­tat, si pe­cu­niam con­tu­lis­se­mus ad mer­cem emen­dam et mea pe­cu­nia per­is­set, cui per­ie­rit ea. et ait, si post col­la­tio­nem eve­nit, ut pe­cu­nia per­iret, quod non fie­ret, ni­si so­cie­tas co­ita es­set, utri­que perire, ut pu­ta si pe­cu­nia, cum per­egre por­ta­re­tur ad mer­cem emen­dam, per­iit: si ve­ro an­te col­la­tio­nem, post­ea­quam eam de­sti­nas­ses, tunc per­ie­rit, ni­hil eo no­mi­ne con­se­que­ris, in­quit, quia non so­cie­ta­ti per­iit. 2Si fi­lius fa­mi­lias so­cie­ta­tem co­ie­rit, de­in­de em­an­ci­pa­tus a pa­tre fue­rit, apud Iu­lia­num quae­ri­tur, an ea­dem so­cie­tas du­ret an ve­ro alia sit, si for­te post em­an­ci­pa­tio­nem in so­cie­ta­tem du­ra­tum est. Iu­lia­nus scribsit li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum ean­dem so­cie­ta­tem du­ra­re, in­itium enim in his con­trac­ti­bus in­spi­cien­dum: dua­bus au­tem ac­tio­ni­bus agen­dum es­se, una ad­ver­sus pa­trem, al­te­ra ad­ver­sus fi­lium: cum pa­tre de eo, cu­ius dies an­te em­an­ci­pa­tio­nem ces­sit, nam eius tem­po­ris, quo post em­an­ci­pa­tio­nem so­cie­tas du­ra­vit, ni­hil prae­sta­re pa­trem opor­tet: cum fi­lio au­tem de utro­que tem­po­re, id est de to­ta so­cie­ta­te, nam et si quid, in­quit, so­cius fi­lii post em­an­ci­pa­tio­nem fi­lii do­lo fe­ce­rit, eius non pa­tri, sed fi­lio ac­tio dan­da est. 3Si ser­vus meus so­cie­ta­tem cum Ti­tio co­ie­rit et alie­na­tus in ea­dem per­man­se­rit, pot­est di­ci alie­na­tio­ne ser­vi et prio­rem so­cie­ta­tem fi­ni­tam et ex in­te­gro al­te­ram in­choa­tam, at­que id­eo et mi­hi et emp­to­ri ac­tio­nem pro so­cio com­pe­te­re, item tam ad­ver­sus me quam ad­ver­sus emp­to­rem ex his cau­sis quae an­te alie­na­tio­nem in­ci­de­runt dan­dam ac­tio­nem, ex re­li­quis ad­ver­sus emp­to­rem so­lum.

58The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXI. Ad Dig. 17,2,58 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 406, Note 4.It should be considered whether an action on partnership can be brought where the property which one of the partners brought into the common fund has been lost. This point was discussed by Celsus in the Seventh Book of the Digest, with reference to a letter of Cornelius Felix as follows: “You have three horses, and I have one; we form a partnership with the understanding that you will take my horse, sell the four horse team and pay me one-fourth of the proceeds.” Therefore, if my horse dies before the sale is concluded, Celsus says that he does not think that the partnership will continue to exist, and that no portion of the value of your horses is due, for the partnership was not entered into to form a team of four horses, but to sell one. But if the intention of the parties was stated to be the formation of a four horse team, and the holding of the same in common, and that you should be entitled to a three fourths interest, and I to a one fourth interest in the same, there is no doubt that we are partners to that extent. 1Ad Dig. 17,2,58,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 406, Note 4.Celsus also discusses the point, where we have contributed money for the purchase of merchandise, and my money has been lost, at whose risk would this be? He says that if the money was lost after it had been placed in the partnership fund, which would not have taken place unless the partnership had been formed, both parties must bear the loss; just as in the case where money is lost which was being taken to some distant place for the purchase of goods. If, however, the money was lost before it had been placed in the common fund, but after you had destined it for that purpose, he says that you can recover nothing on that ground, because it did not belong to the partnership when it was lost. 2Where a son under paternal control enters into a partnership, and is afterwards emancipated by his father, the question is asked by Julianus whether the same partnership continues to exist? Julianus states in the Fourteenth Book of the Digest, that the partnership does continue to exist, for the reason that in contracts of this kind the beginning of the transaction must be considered. There is ground, however, for two actions, one against the father, and the other against the son. The one against the father should be brought for what he ceased to be liable for on the day before the emancipation, for he is not liable for the time the partnership existed after the emancipation; the one against the son, however, includes both periods, that is to say, the entire time embraced by the partnership; for he says that if the partner of the son was guilty of any fraudulent act after the emancipation of the latter, an action on that ground should be granted to the son and not to the father. 3If my slave form a partnership with Titius, and it continues after the alienation of the slave, it can be said that the first partnership was terminated by the alienation of the slave and that an entirely new one began, and, therefore, that an action on partnership will lie both in my favor and in that of the purchaser of the slave. An action should also be granted against me as well as against the said purchaser, for any causes which arose before the alienation of said slave; but with reference to anything which took place afterwards, an action should be granted against the purchaser alone.

59Pom­po­nius li­bro duo­de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Ad­eo mor­te so­cii sol­vi­tur so­cie­tas, ut nec ab in­itio pa­cis­ci pos­si­mus, ut he­res et­iam suc­ce­dat so­cie­ta­ti. haec ita in pri­va­tis so­cie­ta­ti­bus ait: in so­cie­ta­te vec­ti­ga­lium ni­hi­lo mi­nus ma­net so­cie­tas et post mor­tem ali­cu­ius, sed ita de­mum, si pars de­func­ti ad per­so­nam he­redis eius ad­scrip­ta sit, ut he­redi quo­que con­fer­ri opor­teat: quod ip­sum ex cau­sa aes­ti­man­dum est. quid enim, si is mor­tuus sit, prop­ter cu­ius ope­ram ma­xi­me so­cie­tas co­ita sit aut si­ne quo so­cie­tas ad­mi­nis­tra­ri non pos­sit? 1Quod in alea aut ad­ul­te­rio per­di­de­rit so­cius, ex me­dio non est la­tu­rus: si quid ve­ro do­lo nos­tro so­cius dam­ni ce­pe­rit, a no­bis re­pe­tet.

59Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XII. To such an extent is a partnership dissolved by death, that we cannot even admit that an heir may succeed to the partnership. Sabinus states that this applies to private partnerships, but in such as have for their object the collection of taxes, the partnership, nevertheless, continues to exist after the death of a partner; but only provided that the share of the deceased has been transferred to the heir, so that the other partner also must divide with the heir, and this also depends upon circumstances; for what if he on account of whose services the partnership was especially formed, or without whom its affairs could not be managed, should die? 1What a partner loses by gambling, or as the result of adultery, cannot be charged to the partnership property, but if a partner has lost anything on account of our fraudulent acts he can recover it from us.

60Idem li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. So­cium, qui in eo, quod ex so­cie­ta­te lu­cri fa­ce­ret, red­den­do mo­ram ad­hi­buit, cum ea pe­cu­nia ip­se usus sit, usu­ras quo­que eum prae­sta­re de­be­re La­beo ait, sed non qua­si usu­ras, sed quod so­cii in­ter­sit mo­ram eum non ad­hi­buis­se: sed si aut usus ea pe­cu­nia non sit aut mo­ram non fe­ce­rit, con­tra es­se: item post mor­tem so­cii nul­lam ta­lem aes­ti­ma­tio­nem ex fac­to he­redis fa­cien­dam, quia mor­te so­cii dir­ima­tur so­cie­tas. 1So­cius cum re­sis­te­ret com­mu­ni­bus ser­vis ve­na­li­bus ad fu­gam erum­pen­ti­bus, vul­ne­ra­tus est: im­pen­sam, quam in cu­ran­do se fe­ce­rit, non con­se­cu­tu­rum pro so­cio ac­tio­ne La­beo ait, quia id non in so­cie­ta­tem, quam­vis prop­ter so­cie­ta­tem in­pen­sum sit, sic­uti si prop­ter so­cie­ta­tem eum he­redem quis in­sti­tue­re de­sis­set aut le­ga­tum prae­ter­mis­sis­set aut pa­tri­mo­nium suum neg­le­gen­tius ad­mi­nis­tras­set: nam nec com­pen­dium, quod prop­ter so­cie­ta­tem ei con­ti­gis­set, veniret in me­dium, vel­uti si prop­ter so­cie­ta­tem he­res fuis­set in­sti­tu­tus aut quid ei do­na­tum es­set.

60The Same, On Sabinus, Book XIII. Labeo says that a partner who fails to report to the partnership the profit which he has obtained, or one who uses the money for his own benefit, must pay interest on it, not as ordinary interest, but by way of indemnity for what his partner has suffered by reason of his default. If, however, he did not make use of the money, or was not in default, the contrary rule applies. Moreover, after the death of a partner, no estimate of damages can be made on account of any act of his heir, because the partnership was dissolved by the death of the partner. 1A partner, while attempting to prevent slaves, who formed part of the stock of the partnership from escaping, was wounded; Labeo says that the expense which he incurred for medical services, in consequence, cannot be recovered by an action on partnership, because it was not actually caused by the partnership business, although it was done on account of it; just as if where someone had avoided appointing a party an heir, or had passed him by in bequeathing a legacy, or had managed his property more negligently on account of a partnership, for any gain which he himself had obtained on account of the partnership he would not be obliged to place in the common fund; as, for example, if he had been appointed an heir on account of the partnership, or anything had been given to him for this reason.

61Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Se­cun­dum Iu­lia­num ta­men et quod me­di­cis pro se da­tum est re­ci­pe­re pot­est, quod ve­rum est.

61Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXI. According to Julianus, however, he can recover what he paid out for himself for medical services in a case of this kind; and this is true.

62Pom­po­nius li­bro ter­tio de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Si Ti­tius cum quo mi­hi so­cie­tas erat de­ces­se­rit ego­que cum pu­ta­rem Ti­tii he­redi­ta­tem ad Se­ium per­ti­ne­re, com­mu­ni­ter cum eo res ven­di­de­rim et par­tem pe­cu­niae ex ven­di­tio­ne red­ac­tae ego, par­tem Se­ius abs­tu­le­rit, te, qui re ve­ra Ti­tio he­res es, par­tem ad me red­ac­tae pe­cu­niae so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio non con­se­cu­tu­rum Ne­ra­tio et Aris­to­ni pla­ce­bat, quia meae dum­ta­xat par­tis pre­tia per­ce­pis­sem, ne­que in­ter­es­se, utrum per se par­tes meas ven­di­dis­sem an com­mu­ni­ter cum eo, qui re­li­quas par­tes ad se per­ti­ne­re di­ce­ret. alio­quin even­tu­rum, ut et­iam, si duo so­cii rem ven­di­de­rint, unus­quis­que quod ad se per­ve­ne­rit par­tem al­te­ri so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio prae­sta­re de­beat. sed nec te ex par­te, quam he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne for­te a Se­io con­se­cu­tu­rus sis, quic­quam mi­hi prae­sta­re de­be­re, quia quod ad Se­ium per­ve­ne­rit, tua­rum par­tium pre­tium sit nec ad me ha­ben­tem meum quic­quam ex eo red­ire de­beat.

62Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XIII. If Titius, with whom I have formed a partnership should die, and I am of the opinion that his estate belongs to Seius, and I sell the common property and take half of the proceeds of the sale, and Seius takes the other half; you, who are in reality the heir of Titius, cannot recover from me, in an action on partnership, the money which I have paid out; as was held by Neratius and Aristo, because I have only received the value of my share. Nor does it make any difference whether I dispose of my share separately, or together with that which the other party alleges is his. Otherwise, the result would be that, even if two partners should sell the property of the partnership, either one of them would be liable to the other in an action on partnership for half of whatever had come into his hands. But you would not be obliged to make good to me in a suit for the estate anything that you might have obtained from Seius, because what came into his possession was the price of your share, and nothing could be recovered from him by me, since I have already obtained what was mine.

63Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad edic­tum. Ve­rum est quod Sa­b­ino vi­de­tur, et­iam­si non uni­ver­so­rum bo­no­rum so­cii sunt, sed unius rei, at­ta­men in id quod fa­ce­re pos­sunt quod­ve do­lo ma­lo fe­ce­rint quo mi­nus pos­sint, con­dem­na­ri opor­te­re. hoc enim sum­mam ra­tio­nem ha­bet, cum so­cie­tas ius quo­dam­mo­do fra­ter­ni­ta­tis in se ha­beat. 1Vi­den­dum est, an et fi­de­ius­so­ri so­cii id prae­sta­ri de­beat an ve­ro per­so­na­le be­ne­fi­cium sit, quod ma­gis ve­rum est. sed si hic fi­de­ius­sor qua­si de­fen­sor so­cii iu­di­cium sus­ce­pe­rit, prod­erit si­bi: nam­que Iu­lia­nus li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scribsit de­fen­so­rem so­cii in id quod so­cius fa­ce­re pot­est con­dem­na­ri opor­te­re. idem­que et in pa­tro­ni de­fen­so­re ac­ci­pe­re de­be­re ait: et uti­que idem erit in uni­ver­sis, qui in id quod fa­ce­re pos­sunt con­ve­niun­tur. 2Pa­tri au­tem vel do­mi­no so­cii, si ius­su eo­rum so­cie­tas con­trac­ta sit, non es­se hanc ex­cep­tio­nem dan­dam, quia nec he­redi so­cii ce­te­ris­que suc­ces­so­ri­bus hoc prae­sta­bi­tur: quia nec ce­te­ro­rum he­redi­bus suc­ces­so­ri­bus­ve, quos in id quod fa­ce­re pos­sunt con­ve­ni­mus, idem prae­sta­tur. 3Id quod fa­ce­re so­cius pot­est quem­ad­mo­dum aes­ti­man­dum sit? et pla­cuit non de­be­re de­du­ci aes alie­num quod de­be­tur a so­cio: ita et Mar­cel­lus li­bro sep­ti­mo di­ges­to­rum scribsit, ni­si for­te, in­quit, ex ip­sa so­cie­ta­te de­bea­tur. 4Item vi­den­dum, an cau­tio ve­niat in hoc iu­di­cium eius quod fa­ce­re so­cius non pos­sit, sci­li­cet nu­da pro­mis­sio: quod ma­gis di­cen­dum ar­bi­tror. 5Si, cum tres so­cii es­sent, ege­rit cum uno ex so­ciis so­cius et par­tem suam in­te­gram sit con­se­cu­tus, de­in­de alius so­cius cum eo­dem agat et par­tem con­se­qui in­te­gram non pot­erit, quia fa­ce­re so­li­dum non pot­est, an hic qui mi­nus con­se­cu­tus est cum eo age­re pos­sit qui so­li­dum ac­ce­pit ad com­mu­ni­can­das par­tes in­ter eos, id est exae­quan­das, qua­si in­iquum sit ex ea­dem so­cie­ta­te alium plus, alium mi­nus con­se­qui? sed ma­gis est, ut pro so­cio ac­tio­ne con­se­qui pos­sit, ut utrius­que por­tio exae­que­tur: quae sen­ten­tia ha­bet ae­qui­ta­tem. 6Tem­pus au­tem spec­ta­mus quan­tum fa­ce­re so­cius pos­sit rei iu­di­can­dae. 7Hoc quo­que fa­ce­re quis pos­se vi­de­tur quod do­lo fe­cit quo mi­nus pos­sit: nec enim ae­quum est do­lum suum quem­quam rele­va­re. quod et in ce­te­ris, qui in id quod fa­ce­re pos­sunt con­ve­niun­tur, ac­ci­pien­dum est. si ta­men non do­lo, sed cul­pa sua fa­ce­re pos­se de­siit, di­cen­dum est con­dem­na­ri eum non de­be­re. 8In he­redem quo­que so­cii pro so­cio ac­tio com­pe­tit, quam­vis he­res so­cius non sit: li­cet enim so­cius non sit, at­ta­men emo­lu­men­ti suc­ces­sor est. et cir­ca so­cie­ta­tes vec­ti­ga­lium ce­te­ro­rum­que idem ob­ser­va­mus, ut he­res so­cius non sit ni­si fue­rit ad­sci­tus, ve­rum­ta­men om­ne emo­lu­men­tum so­cie­ta­tis ad eum per­ti­neat, si­mi­li mo­do et dam­num ad­gnos­cat quod con­tin­git, si­ve ad­huc vi­vo so­cio vec­ti­ga­lis si­ve post­ea: quod non si­mi­li­ter in vo­lun­ta­ria so­cie­ta­te ob­ser­va­tur. 9Si ser­vo com­mu­ni le­ga­tum si­ne li­ber­ta­te unus ex do­mi­nis re­li­quit, hoc ad so­lum so­cium per­ti­net: an ta­men pro so­cio iu­di­cio com­mu­ni­ca­ri de­beat cum he­rede so­cii, quae­ri­tur. et ait Iu­lia­nus Sex­tum Pom­po­nium re­fer­re Sa­binum re­spon­den­tem non com­mu­ni­ca­ri, et pos­se hanc sen­ten­tiam de­fen­di Iu­lia­nus ait: non enim prop­ter com­mu­nio­nem hoc ad­quisi­tum est, sed ob suam par­tem, nec opor­tet id com­mu­ni­ca­ri, quod quis non prop­ter so­cie­ta­tem, sed prop­ter suam par­tem ad­quisie­rit. 10So­cie­tas sol­vi­tur ex per­so­nis, ex re­bus, ex vo­lun­ta­te, ex ac­tio­ne. id­eo­que si­ve ho­mi­nes si­ve res si­ve vo­lun­tas si­ve ac­tio in­ter­ie­rit, dis­tra­hi vi­de­tur so­cie­tas. in­ter­eunt au­tem ho­mi­nes qui­dem ma­xi­ma aut me­dia ca­pi­tis de­mi­nutio­ne aut mor­te: res ve­ro, cum aut nul­lae re­lin­quan­tur aut con­di­cio­nem mu­ta­ve­rint, ne­que enim eius rei quae iam nul­la sit quis­quam so­cius est ne­que eius quae con­se­cra­ta pu­bli­ca­ta­ve sit. vo­lun­ta­te dis­tra­hi­tur so­cie­tas re­nun­tia­tio­ne.

63Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXI. Ad Dig. 17,2,63 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 267, Note 8.The opinion of Sabinus is correct, namely, that if the parties are not general partners, but only associated for a particular purpose, or where they have acted in bad faith to avoid responsibility, they can still have judgment rendered against them to the extent of their resources. This is perfectly reasonable, as a partnership in some respects resembles a fraternity. 1It should be considered whether only the surety of a partner should be indemnified, or is this, indeed, a personal advantage to all? I think the latter to be the better opinion; if, however, the surety should undertake to defend the action of the partner, he can profit by it; for Julianus says, in the Fourteenth Book of the Digest, that the defender of the partner can only have judgment rendered against him to the extent of the resources of said partner. And he adds that the same rule applies to one who acts as a defender of a patron. This rule is also generally applicable to all those who are sued to the amount of the means which they possess. 2This exception, however, should not be granted to the father or master of a partner, if the partnership was contracted by the direction of either; because it will not be granted to the heir and other successors of the partner, for the reason that we do not accord the same privilege to heirs or successors not to have judgment rendered against them beyond the extent of their resources. 3But how can an estimate of the financial resources of a partner be made? It has been established that the indebtedness of the partner should not be deducted; and this Marcellus stated in the Seventh Book of the Digest; unless, as he says, the debts had been contracted with reference to the partnership itself. 4It must also be considered whether the partner should, in a case of this kind, furnish security for what he cannot pay, that is to say, make a bare promise to do so. I think that this is the better opinion. 5If, where there are three partners, one of them should bring an action against one of the others, and recover his entire share, and then another should bring an action against the remaining partner, but is unable to recover his entire share because the said partner is not solvent; the question arises whether he who failed to obtain all that he was entitled to, can bring an action against the one who received the entire amount of his share, for the purpose of making a division, that is to say, of placing all the shares upon the same footing, since it is unjust that one should obtain more and the others less from the same partnership? This opinion is founded upon equity. 6In order to determine whether a partner is able to pay the amount which he owes, we must take into account the time when the judgment was rendered. 7Anyone is held to be able to make payment who has committed a fraudulent act in order to avoid doing so, for it is not just for anyone to profit by his own fraud. This should be understood to apply to all those against whom suit is brought to the extent of their resources. If, however, a party is unable to make payment, not on account of fraud, but because of his own negligence, it must be held that judgment should not be rendered against him. 8An action on partnership can also be brought against the heir of the partner, even though he may not be a partner, for even if he is not one, he is, nevertheless, the successor to the profits of the partnership. We observe the same rule with reference to partnerships for the collection of taxes and others of the same kind, namely that the heir is not a partner unless he has been admitted to the partnership; still, all the profits of the partnership belong to him, to the same extent that he is responsible for the losses which may occur either during the lifetime of the partnership in the collection of taxes, or afterwards. This rule is not applicable in the case of voluntary partnerships. 9If one of two masters bequeaths a legacy, without his freedom, to a slave held in common, this legacy belongs entirely to the surviving partner. Nevertheless, the question arises whether he can bring an action on partnership, for the division of the legacy, against the heir of the deceased partner? Julianus says that Sextus Pomponius states that the opinion of Sabinus is that the legacy cannot be divided. Julianus says, that there are good grounds for this opinion, for what has been acquired has not been done by reason of the partnership, but on account of the share of the partnership in the slave. It is not necessary for a division to be made of what a partner does not acquire through the partnership, but by means of his own property. 10A partnership is terminated by the non-existence of those who compose it; by loss of its property; by the will of the partners; and by legal proceedings. A partnership, therefore, is held to be dissolved when either the persons composing it, the property belonging to it, the agreement of the partners, or judicial proceedings relating to it, come to an end. The partners cease to exist, through the alteration of civil rights either in its greatest, intermediate, or least degree, or by death. The property is held to be lost where none remains, or its condition is changed; for no one can be a partner in property which is no longer in existence, nor in such as has been consecrated for religious purposes, or forfeited to the State. A partnership is terminated by the will of the parties, by withdrawal.

64Cal­lis­tra­tus li­bro pri­mo quaes­tio­num. Ita­que cum se­pa­ra­tim so­cii age­re coe­pe­rint et unus­quis­que eo­rum si­bi neg­otie­tur, si­ne du­bio ius so­cie­ta­tis dis­sol­vi­tur.

64Callistratus, Questions, Book I. Hence, if partners begin to act separately, and each one of them transacts business on his own account, there is no doubt that the partnership is dissolved.

65Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Ac­tio­ne dis­tra­hi­tur, cum aut sti­pu­la­tio­ne aut iu­di­cio mu­ta­ta sit cau­sa so­cie­ta­tis. Pro­cu­lus enim ait hoc ip­so quod iu­di­cium id­eo dic­ta­tum est, ut so­cie­tas dis­tra­ha­tur, re­nun­tia­tam so­cie­ta­tem, si­ve to­to­rum bo­no­rum si­ve unius rei so­cie­tas co­ita sit. 1Item bo­nis a cre­di­to­ri­bus ven­di­tis unius so­cii dis­tra­hi so­cie­ta­tem La­beo ait. 2Si in rem cer­tam emen­dam con­du­cen­dam­ve co­ita sit so­cie­tas, tunc et­iam post ali­cu­ius mor­tem quid­quid lu­cri de­tri­men­ti­ve fac­tum sit, com­mu­ne es­se La­beo ait. 3Di­xi­mus dis­sen­su sol­vi so­cie­ta­tem: hoc ita est, si om­nes dis­sen­tiunt. quid er­go, si unus re­nun­tiet? Cas­sius scrip­sit eum qui re­nun­tia­ve­rit so­cie­ta­ti a se qui­dem li­be­ra­re so­cios suos, se au­tem ab il­lis non li­be­ra­re. quod uti­que ob­ser­van­dum est, si do­lo ma­lo re­nun­tia­tio fac­ta sit, vel­uti si, cum om­nium bo­no­rum so­cie­ta­tem in­is­se­mus, de­in­de cum ob­ve­nis­set uni he­redi­tas, prop­ter hoc re­nun­tia­vit: id­eo­que si qui­dem dam­num at­tu­le­rit he­redi­tas, hoc ad eum qui re­nun­tia­vit per­ti­ne­bit, com­mo­dum au­tem com­mu­ni­ca­re co­ge­tur ac­tio­ne pro so­cio. quod si quid post re­nun­tia­tio­nem ad­quisie­rit, non erit com­mu­ni­can­dum, quia nec do­lus ad­mis­sus est in eo. 4Item si so­cie­ta­tem in­ea­mus ad ali­quam rem emen­dam, de­in­de so­lus vo­lue­ris eam eme­re id­eo­que re­nun­tia­ve­ris so­cie­ta­ti, ut so­lus eme­res, te­ne­be­ris quan­ti in­ter­est mea: sed si id­eo re­nun­tia­ve­ris, quia emp­tio ti­bi dis­pli­ce­bat, non te­ne­be­ris, quam­vis ego eme­ro, quia hic nul­la fraus est: ea­que et Iu­lia­no pla­cent. 5La­beo au­tem pos­te­rio­rum li­bris scribsit, si re­nun­tia­ve­rit so­cie­ta­ti unus ex so­ciis eo tem­po­re, quo in­ter­fuit so­cii non dir­imi so­cie­ta­tem, com­mit­te­re eum in pro so­cio ac­tio­ne: nam si emi­mus man­ci­pia in­ita so­cie­ta­te, de­in­de re­nun­ties mi­hi eo tem­po­re, quo ven­de­re man­ci­pia non ex­pe­dit, hoc ca­su, quia de­te­rio­rem cau­sam meam fa­cis, te­ne­ri te pro so­cio iu­di­cio. Pro­cu­lus hoc ita ve­rum es­se ait, si so­cie­ta­tis non in­ter­sit dir­imi so­cie­ta­tem: sem­per enim non id, quod pri­va­tim in­ter­est unius ex so­ciis, ser­va­ri so­let, sed quod so­cie­ta­ti ex­pe­dit. haec ita ac­ci­pien­da sunt, si ni­hil de hoc in co­eun­da so­cie­ta­te con­ve­nit. 6Item qui so­cie­ta­tem in tem­pus co­it, eam an­te tem­pus re­nun­tian­do so­cium a se, non se a so­cio li­be­rat: ita­que si quid com­pen­dii post­ea fac­tum erit, eius par­tem non fert, at si dis­pen­dium, ae­que prae­sta­bit por­tio­nem: ni­si re­nun­tia­tio ex ne­ces­si­ta­te qua­dam fac­ta sit. quod si tem­pus fi­ni­tum est, li­be­rum est re­ce­de­re, quia si­ne do­lo ma­lo id fiat. 7Re­nun­tia­re so­cie­ta­ti et­iam per alios pos­su­mus: et id­eo dic­tum est pro­cu­ra­to­rem quo­que pos­se re­nun­tia­re so­cie­ta­ti. sed utrum de eo dic­tum sit, cui om­nium bo­no­rum ad­mi­nis­tra­tio con­ces­sa est, an de eo, cui hoc ip­sum no­mi­na­tim man­da­tum est, vi­dea­mus, an ve­ro per utrum­que rec­te re­nun­tie­tur? quod est ve­rius, ni­si si pro­hi­bue­rit eum do­mi­nus spe­cia­li­ter re­nun­tia­re. 8Item scrip­tum est pos­se pro­cu­ra­to­ri quo­que meo so­cium meum re­nun­tia­re. quod Ser­vius apud Al­fe­num ita no­tat: es­se in po­tes­ta­te do­mi­ni, cum pro­cu­ra­to­ri eius re­nun­tia­tum est, an ve­lit ra­tam ha­be­re re­nun­tia­tio­nem. igi­tur is cu­ius pro­cu­ra­to­ri re­nun­tia­tum est li­be­ra­tus es­se vi­de­bi­tur: an au­tem ip­se quo­que qui re­nun­tia­vit pro­cu­ra­to­ri li­be­re­tur, in po­tes­ta­te eius erit, quem­ad­mo­dum di­xi­mus in eo, qui so­cio re­nun­tiat. 9Mor­te unius so­cie­tas dis­sol­vi­tur, et­si con­sen­su om­nium co­ita sit, plu­res ve­ro su­per­sint, ni­si in co­eun­da so­cie­ta­te ali­ter con­ve­ne­rit. nec he­res so­cii suc­ce­dit: sed quod ex re com­mu­ni post­ea quae­si­tum est, item do­lus et cul­pa in eo quod ex an­te ges­to pen­det tam ab he­rede quam he­redi prae­stan­dum est. 10Item si ali­cu­ius rei so­cie­tas sit et fi­nis neg­otio im­po­si­tus, fi­ni­tur so­cie­tas: quod si in­te­gris om­ni­bus ma­nen­ti­bus al­ter de­ces­se­rit, de­in­de tunc se­qua­tur res, de qua so­cie­ta­tem co­ie­runt, tunc ea­dem di­stinc­tio­ne ute­mur, qua in man­da­to, ut si qui­dem igno­ta fue­rit mors al­te­rius, va­leat so­cie­tas, si no­ta, non va­leat. 11So­cie­tas quem­ad­mo­dum ad he­redes so­cii non trans­it, ita nec ad ad­ro­ga­to­rem, ne alio­quin in­vi­tus quis so­cius ef­fi­cia­tur cui non vult. ip­se au­tem ad­ro­ga­tus so­cius per­ma­net: nam et si fi­lius fa­mi­lias em­an­ci­pa­tus fue­rit, per­ma­ne­bit so­cius. 12Pu­bli­ca­tio­ne quo­que dis­tra­hi so­cie­ta­tem di­xi­mus. quod vi­de­tur spec­ta­re ad uni­ver­so­rum bo­no­rum pu­bli­ca­tio­nem, si so­cii bo­na pu­bli­cen­tur: nam cum in eius lo­cum alius suc­ce­dat, pro mor­tuo ha­be­tur. 13Si post dis­trac­tam so­cie­ta­tem ali­quid in rem com­mu­nem im­pen­de­rit so­cius, ac­tio­ne pro so­cio id non con­se­qui­tur, quia non est ve­rum pro so­cio com­mu­ni­ter­ve id ges­tum es­se. sed com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do iu­di­cio hu­ius quo­que rei ra­tio ha­be­bi­tur: nam et­si dis­trac­ta es­set so­cie­tas, ni­hi­lo mi­nus di­vi­sio re­rum su­per­est. 14Si com­mu­nis pe­cu­nia pe­nes ali­quem so­cio­rum sit et ali­cu­ius so­cio­rum quid ab­sit, cum eo so­lo agen­dum, pe­nes quem ea pe­cu­nia sit: qua de­duc­ta de re­li­quo, quod cui­que de­bea­tur, om­nes age­re pos­sunt. 15Non­num­quam ne­ces­sa­rium est et ma­nen­te so­cie­ta­te agi pro so­cio, vel­uti cum so­cie­tas vec­ti­ga­lium cau­sa co­ita est prop­ter­que va­rios con­trac­tus ne­utri ex­pe­diat re­ce­de­re a so­cie­ta­te nec re­fer­tur in me­dium quod ad al­te­rum per­ve­ne­rit. 16Si unus ex so­ciis ma­ri­tus sit et dis­tra­ha­tur so­cie­tas ma­nen­te ma­tri­mo­nio, do­tem ma­ri­tus prae­ci­pe­re de­bet, quia apud eum es­se de­bet qui one­ra sus­ti­net: quod si iam dis­so­lu­to ma­tri­mo­nio so­cie­tas dis­tra­ha­tur, ea­dem die re­ci­pien­da est dos, qua et sol­vi de­bet.

65Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXII. Ad Dig. 17,2,65 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 405, Note 5.It is terminated by legal proceedings when the purpose for which it was formed is changed, either by stipulation or judicial decision; for Proculus says that a partnership is dissolved whether it be general or special, whenever legal steps are taken for the purpose of putting an end to it. 1Labeo says that a partnership is dissolved where the property of one of the partners is sold by his creditors. 2Labeo also says that if the partnership was formed for the purpose of purchasing or leasing something, that then, any profits which may have accrued, or any loss which may have taken place, must be divided in common after the death of one of the partners. 3We have stated that a partnership can be dissolved by the dissent of the parties, that is, if all of them are of one mind in this respect. But, what if only one of them should withdraw? Cassius stated that he who retires from the partnership releases his partners from responsibility, so far as he himself is concerned, but does not release himself from liability to them. This rule, however, should only be observed where the withdrawal is made from fraudulent motives; as, for instance, if we form a general partnership, and afterwards an inheritance passes to one of the partners and he retires on this account; if the inheritance should be productive of any loss, this must be borne by the partner who withdrew from the partnership, but he can be compelled by an action on partnership to share with the others any profits arising from the same. If he should acquire any property after his withdrawal, it will not be shared with the other partners, because fraud has not been committed with reference to it. 4Moreover, if we form a partnership for the purchase of certain property and afterwards you wish to purchase it yourself, and for this reason you withdraw from the partnership, you will be liable to the extent of my interest in said property. But if you withdraw because the purchase was displeasing to you, you will not be liable even if I purchase it; because in this instance no fraud exists. These opinions were also held by Julianus. 5Labeo also stated in his work on recent cases, that if one partner should withdraw from the partnership at a time when it was the interest of the other for it not to be dissolved; he will be liable to the action on partnership; for if we form a partnership for the purchase of slaves, and, after doing so, you withdraw from the association at a time which is not favorable for the sale of the slave, in this case, you will be liable to an action on partnership, because you have rendered my position worse. Proculus holds this opinion to be correct only where it is the interest of the partnership not to be terminated; for greater consideration is usually shown to what is beneficial to the partnership, than for the private advantage of one of the partners. These rules are only applicable where nothing has been agreed upon with reference to these matters, when the partnership was formed. 6Ad Dig. 17,2,65,6ROHGE, Bd. 11 (1874), Nr. 87, S. 264: Auflösung der Societät durch Erklärung des Austritts eines Socius aus genügendem Grunde.Where a partnership has been formed for a certain time, one of the partners, by withdrawal from it before the time has elapsed, releases his partner from liability to himself, but he does not release himself from liability to his partner. Hence, if any profit is obtained after his withdrawal, he will not be entitled to any share of it; but if any expenses have been incurred, he must also pay his share, unless his withdrawal took place on account of some necessity. When, however, the time has elapsed, either party is free to withdraw, because this can be done without fraudulent intent. 7We can also withdraw from a partnership by the agency of others, and therefore it is held that an agent can also withdraw in behalf of his principal. Let us consider, however, whether what has been stated on this point applies to him to whom the general management of the partnership property has been entrusted, or to him to whom special directions on this subject have been given; or can the withdrawal legally be made in either instance? The latter is the more correct opinion, unless the principal expressly forbade the agent to withdraw. 8Ad Dig. 17,2,65,8Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 306, Note 10.It is also settled that my partner can give notice of his withdrawal to my agent. Servius says in a note on Alfenus that it is in the power of the principal, when notice of withdrawal is given to his agent, to ratify or reject it at his pleasure; therefore, he will be held to be released from liability to whose agent notice of withdrawal was given; but he, also, who gave notice to the agent of his withdrawal, will be released if he so desires; as we have stated with reference to one partner who personally notifies the other of his withdrawal. 9Ad Dig. 17,2,65,9Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 408, Note 12.A partnership is dissolved by the death of one of the partners, even though it was formed with the consent of all, and several survive, unless some other arrangement was made when the partnership was formed; nor can the heir of a partner succeed to the partnership, but he can share in the profits of it afterwards. Moreover, any loss resulting from fraud or negligence in transacting the business before the death of the partner, must be made good to the heir, as well as by him. 10Moreover, a partnership formed for any special purpose is terminated when the business for which it was entered into is finished. If, however, one of the partners should die, while the affairs of the partnership were still unchanged, and the reason for the formation of the partnership should only appear after his death, we must then make the same distinction as in the case of a mandate; namely, that if the death of one of the partners was unknown to the other, the partnership will continue to exist; but if it was known, it will be dissolved. 11Just as the partnership does not pass to the heirs of a partner, so also it does not pass to an arrogator; lest, otherwise, a partner might become associated with persons against his will. The party who was arrogated will, however, remain in the partnership, for even if a son under paternal control should be emancipated, he will still continue to be a partner. 12We have stated that a partnership can also be dissolved by the confiscation of property, which is held to relate to the forfeiture of all the property of a partner to the State, for the latter is considered as dead when another partner succeeds him. 13If any expense should be incurred with reference to the partnership property, after the partnership has been dissolved, a partner cannot recover said expense in an action on partnership, because it is not true that this was done in behalf of the other partner, or on account of the partnership interest; but, in an action for the division of property held in common, account must be taken of this expense, for although the partnership may have been dissolved, the division of the property nevertheless remains. 14Ad Dig. 17,2,65,14Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 407, Note 4.Where money belonging to a partnership is in the hands of one of the partners, and the capital of one of the latter is, to a certain extent, diminished; suit should only be brought against the partner who has possession of the money; and, after what is due to him has been deducted, all of them can bring suit for the balance which is due to each one. 15Ad Dig. 17,2,65,15ROHGE, Bd. 12 (1874), Nr. 90, S. 274: Actio pro socio eines Gesellschafters wegen einer von ihm bewirkten Bezahlung eines Gesellschaftsschuld nach Auflösung der Gesellschaft.It is sometimes necessary to bring an action on partnership while the partnership is still in existence; as, for instance, where the latter was formed for the purpose of collecting taxes; if on account of various contracts it is to the advantage of neither partner to withdraw from the partnership, and one of them fails to place what he has collected in the common fund. 16Where one of the partners is married, and the partnership is dissolved during the marriage, the said married partner can take the dowry of his wife out of the partnership property, in preference to any other claim; because it should be in the hands of him who sustains the burdens of marriage. If, however, the partnership is dissolved after the marriage has ceased to exist, he should receive the dowry on the very day when it should be paid.

66Gaius li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Quod si eo tem­po­re quo di­vi­di­tur so­cie­tas in ea cau­sa dos sit, ut cer­tum sit eam vel par­tem eius red­di non opor­te­re, di­vi­de­re eam in­ter so­cios iu­dex de­bet.

66Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book X. If at the time when the partnership property is divided, circumstances exist which make it certain that the dowry, or even a portion of the same, should not be given up; the judge should order it to be divided among the partners.

67Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Si unus ex so­ciis rem com­mu­nem ven­di­de­rit con­sen­su so­cio­rum, pre­tium di­vi­di de­bet ita, ut ei ca­vea­tur in­dem­nem eum fu­tu­rum. quod si iam dam­num pas­sus est, hoc ei prae­sta­bi­tur. sed si pre­tium com­mu­ni­ca­tum sit si­ne cau­tio­ne et ali­quid prae­sti­te­rit is qui ven­di­dit, an, si non om­nes so­cii sol­ven­do sint, quod a qui­bus­dam ser­va­ri non pot­est a ce­te­ris de­beat fer­re? sed Pro­cu­lus pu­tat hoc ad ce­te­ro­rum onus per­ti­ne­re quod ab ali­qui­bus ser­va­ri non pot­est, ra­tio­ne­que de­fen­di pos­se, quon­iam, so­cie­tas cum con­tra­hi­tur, tam lu­cri quam dam­ni com­mu­nio in­itur. 1Si unus ex so­ciis, qui non to­to­rum bo­no­rum so­cii erant, com­mu­nem pe­cu­niam fae­ne­ra­ve­rit usu­ras­que per­ce­pe­rit, ita de­mum usu­ras par­ti­ri de­bet, si so­cie­ta­tis no­mi­ne fae­ne­ra­ve­rit: nam si suo no­mi­ne, quon­iam sor­tis pe­ri­cu­lum ad eum per­ti­nue­rit, usu­ras ip­sum re­ti­ne­re opor­tet. 2Si quid unus ex so­ciis ne­ces­sa­rio de suo im­pen­dit in com­mu­ni neg­otio: iu­di­cio so­cie­ta­tis ser­va­bit et usu­ras, si for­te mu­tua­tus sub usu­ris de­dit: sed et si suam pe­cu­niam de­dit, non si­ne cau­sa di­ce­tur, quod usu­ras quo­que per­ci­pe­re de­beat, quas pos­sit ha­be­re, si alii mu­tuum de­dis­set. 3Non alias so­cius in id quod fa­ce­re pot­est con­dem­na­tur, quam si con­fi­te­tur se so­cium fuis­se.

67Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXII. Where one of the partners sells the property of the partnership with the consent of the others, the price ought to be divided, and security furnished to indemnify him for the future; and if the said partner has already suffered any loss, it must be made good to him. If, however, the purchase-money is divided without any security being given, and the partner who made the sale was compelled to pay something on account of it; can he recover from some of the partners what he has not been able to collect from the others, where all of them are not solvent? Proculus thinks that this burden should be sustained by the others, if it cannot be collected from some of them; and that this can be defended on the ground that when the partnership was formed, a community of profit as well as loss was established. 1Where one of several partners, who did not belong to a general partnership, lent money which belonged to all of them, and collected the interest, he should only divide the interest if he lent the money in the name of the partnership; for if he did this in his own name, since he ran the risk of losing the principal, he is entitled to retain the interest. 2Where a partner incurs some necessary expense with reference to the business of the partnership, he can bring an action on partnership for the interest, if he should have borrowed the money at interest. But where he used his own money for this purpose, it is held, and not without reason, that he has a right to claim the same amount of interest which he could have collected if he had lent the money to anyone else. 3Judgment cannot be rendered against a partner to the extent of his resources, unless he acknowledged that he is a partner.

68Gaius li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Ne­mo ex so­ciis plus par­te sua pot­est alie­na­re, et­si to­to­rum bo­no­rum so­cii sint. 1Il­lud quae­ri­tur, utrum is de­mum fa­ce­re vi­de­tur quo mi­nus fa­ce­re pos­sit, qui ero­gat bo­na sua in frau­dem fu­tu­rae ac­tio­nis, an et qui oc­ca­sio­ne ad­quiren­di non uti­tur. sed ve­rius est de eo sen­ti­re pro­con­su­lem, qui ero­gat bo­na sua, id­que ex in­ter­dic­tis col­li­ge­re pos­su­mus, in qui­bus ita est: ‘quod do­lo fe­cis­ti, ut de­si­ne­res pos­si­de­re.’

68Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book X. No partner, even though the partnership is a general one, can alienate a larger amount than that which composes his share. 1The question arises whether a party is held to have committed an act to avoid making payment of the amount for which he is responsible, who disposes of his property fraudulently to avoid a future suit, or who does not make use of an opportunity for profit on this account? The better opinion is that, in this instance, the Proconsul had in mind a party who had disposed of his property, and this we can infer from the interdicts in which the sentence, “Because you have committed fraud in order to avoid being in possession,” is inserted.

69Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Cum so­cie­tas ad emen­dum co­ire­tur et con­ve­ni­ret, ut unus re­li­quis nun­di­nas id est epu­las prae­sta­ret eos­que a neg­otio di­mit­te­ret, si eas eis non sol­ve­rit, et pro so­cio et ex ven­di­to cum eo agen­dum est.

69Ad Dig. 17,2,69Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 405, Note 15.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXII. When a partnership is formed for the purpose of making purchases, and it is agreed upon that one of the partners shall furnish the others with provisions, and shall leave the transaction of the business to them, if he does not provide them with supplies, an action on partnership, as well as one on sale, can be brought against him.

70Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ter­tio ad edic­tum. Nul­la so­cie­ta­tis in ae­ter­num co­itio est.

70Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. A perpetual partnership cannot be formed.

71Idem li­bro ter­tio epi­to­ma­rum Al­fe­ni di­ges­to­rum. Duo so­cie­ta­tem co­ie­runt, ut gram­ma­ti­cam do­ce­rent et quod ex eo ar­ti­fi­cio quaes­tus fe­cis­sent, com­mu­ne eo­rum es­set: de ea re quae vo­lue­runt fie­ri in pac­to con­ven­to so­cie­ta­tis pro­scrip­se­runt, de­in­de in­ter se his ver­bis sti­pu­la­ti sunt: ‘haec, quae su­pra scrip­ta sunt, ea ita da­ri fie­ri ne­que ad­ver­sus ea fie­ri? si ea ita da­ta fac­ta non erunt, tum vi­gin­ti mi­lia da­ri?’ quae­si­tum est, an, si quid con­tra fac­tum es­set, so­cie­ta­tis ac­tio­ne agi pos­set. re­spon­dit, si qui­dem pac­to con­ven­to in­ter eos de so­cie­ta­te fac­to ita sti­pu­la­ti es­sent, ‘haec ita da­ri fie­ri spon­des?’, fu­tu­rum fuis­se, ut, si no­va­tio­nis cau­sa id fe­cis­sent, pro so­cio agi non pos­sit, sed to­ta res in sti­pu­la­tio­nem trans­la­ta vi­de­re­tur. sed quon­iam non ita es­sent sti­pu­la­ti ‘ea ita da­ri fie­ri spon­des?’ sed ‘si ea ita fac­ta non es­sent, de­cem da­ri?’ non vi­de­ri si­bi rem in sti­pu­la­tio­nem per­ve­nis­se, sed dum­ta­xat poe­nam (non enim utrius­que rei pro­mis­so­rem ob­li­ga­ri, ut ea da­ret fa­ce­ret et, si non fe­cis­set, poe­nam suf­fer­ret) et id­eo so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio agi pos­se. 1Duo col­li­ber­ti so­cie­ta­tem co­ie­runt lu­cri quaes­tus com­pen­dii, post­ea unus ex his a pa­tro­no he­res in­sti­tu­tus est, al­te­ri le­ga­tum da­tum est. ne­utrum ho­rum in me­dium re­fer­re de­be­re re­spon­dit.

71The Same, Epitomes of the Digest of Alfenus, Book III. Two persons formed a partnership to teach grammar, and to share among themselves any profits that might be obtained from this profession. After having agreed in the articles of partnership on what they wished to be done, they then stipulated with one another as follows: “Whatever is written above must be carried out, and cannot be opposed, and if the said provisions are not complied with, then twenty thousand sesterces shall be paid.” The inquiry arose whether if any of these provisions was violated, an action on partnership could be brought? The answer was that if, after their agreement had been made with reference to the partnership, they had stipulated as follows: “Do you promise that these provisions shall be observed as herein set forth?” The result would be that if the parties had done this for the purpose of changing their contract, an action on partnership would not lie, but the whole matter would be considered to have become a stipulation. But if they had not stipulated in these terms, “Do you promise that these provisions shall be observed as herein set forth?” but, as follows, “If these provisions are not observed, then ten aurei shall be paid;” it was held by him that the matter had not become a stipulation, but only what related to the penalty had been altered, because the party promising had not bound himself to do both things, that is, he would make payment and also perform the agreement, and that if he did not do so he would suffer the penalty; and therefore an action on partnership would be available. 1Two fellow freedmen formed a partnership for the purpose of sharing all “gains, profits, and emoluments,” and afterwards one of them, having been appointed an heir by his patron, a legacy was left to the other. The answer was that neither of them was obliged to place what he received in the partnership fund.

72Gaius li­bro se­cun­do cot­ti­dia­na­rum re­rum. So­cius so­cio et­iam cul­pae no­mi­ne te­ne­tur, id est de­si­diae at­que neg­le­gen­tiae. cul­pa au­tem non ad ex­ac­tis­si­mam di­li­gen­tiam di­ri­gen­da est: suf­fi­cit et­enim ta­lem di­li­gen­tiam com­mu­ni­bus re­bus ad­hi­be­re, qua­lem suis re­bus ad­hi­be­re so­let, quia qui pa­rum di­li­gen­tem si­bi so­cium ad­quirit, de se que­ri de­bet.

72Gaius, Diurnal, or Golden Matters, Book II. One partner is liable to another on the ground of negligence, that is to say of failure to act and lack of diligence. Negligence in this instance, however, is not understood to mean want of the most exact diligence, for it is sufficient for him to employ the same diligence in the partnership affairs as he is accustomed to do in his own; because where anyone takes a partner who displays very little diligence he has only himself to blame.

73Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Ma­xi­mi­no re­spon­dit, si so­cie­ta­tem uni­ver­sa­rum for­tu­na­rum co­ie­rint, id est ea­rum quo­que re­rum, quae post­ea cui­que ad­quiren­tur, he­redi­ta­tem cui­vis eo­rum de­la­tam in com­mu­ne red­igen­dam. idem ma­xi­mae re­spon­dit, si so­cie­ta­tem uni­ver­sa­rum for­tu­na­rum ita co­ie­rint, ut quid­quid ero­ge­tur vel quae­re­re­tur com­mu­nis lu­cri at­que im­pen­dii es­set, ea quo­que, quae in ho­no­rem al­te­rius li­be­ro­rum ero­ga­ta sunt, utris­que in­pu­tan­da.

73Ulpianus, Opinions, in Answer to Maximin, Book I. Where persons form a partnership of their entire property, that is to say of whatever property either one may subsequently acquire, an estate which falls to either of them must be placed in the common fund. He also stated to Maximin that, where persons form a partnership of their entire property in such a way that whatever is expended or gained shall be to the common profit or expense; any sums which may be expended for the children of either must be charged to both.

74Pau­lus li­bro se­xa­ge­si­mo se­cun­do ad edic­tum. Si quis so­cie­ta­tem con­tra­xe­rit, quod emit ip­sius fit, non com­mu­ne: sed so­cie­ta­tis iu­di­cio co­gi­tur rem com­mu­ni­ca­re.

74Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXII. Where anyone has formed a partnership, and makes a purchase, it belongs to him individually, and not to the common fund, but he can be compelled by an action on partnership to make it common property.

75Cel­sus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Si co­ita sit so­cie­tas ex his par­ti­bus, quas Ti­tius ar­bi­tra­tus fue­rit, si Ti­tius an­te­quam ar­bi­tra­re­tur de­ces­se­rit, ni­hil agi­tur: nam id ip­sum ac­tum est, ne ali­ter so­cie­tas sit, quam ut Ti­tius ar­bi­tra­tus sit.

75Celsus, Digest, Book XV. Where a partnership has been formed with the understanding that Titius shall have the regulation of the shares, and Titius dies before he renders a decision, the partnership is void; because the intention was that no other partnership should exist than that which is subject to the decision of Titius.

76Pro­cu­lus li­bro quin­to epis­tu­la­rum. So­cie­ta­tem me­cum co­is­ti ea con­di­cio­ne, ut Ner­va ami­cus com­mu­nis par­tes so­cie­ta­tis con­sti­tue­ret: Ner­va con­sti­tuit, ut tu ex trien­te so­cius es­ses, ego ex bes­se: quae­ris, utrum ra­tum id iu­re so­cie­ta­tis sit an ni­hi­lo mi­nus ex ae­quis par­ti­bus so­cii si­mus. ex­is­ti­mo au­tem me­lius te quae­si­tu­rum fuis­se, utrum ex his par­ti­bus so­cii es­se­mus quas is con­sti­tuis­set, an ex his quas vi­rum bo­num con­sti­tue­re opor­tuis­set. ar­bi­tro­rum enim ge­ne­ra sunt duo, unum eius­mo­di, ut si­ve ae­quum sit si­ve in­iquum, pa­re­re de­bea­mus (quod ob­ser­va­tur, cum ex com­pro­mis­so ad ar­bi­trum itum est), al­te­rum eius­mo­di, ut ad bo­ni vi­ri ar­bi­trium red­igi de­beat, et­si no­mi­na­tim per­so­na sit com­pre­hen­sa, cu­ius ar­bi­tra­tu fiat.

76Ad Dig. 17,2,76ROHGE, Bd. 3 (1872), S. 173: Unterschied zwischen Schiedsspruch und arbitrium boni viri bezüglich der Anfechtbarkeit.ROHGE, Bd. 4 (1872), S. 429: Unterschied zwischen Schiedsspruch und arbitrium boni viri bezüglich der Anfechtbarkeit.ROHGE, Bd. 18 (1876), Nr. 91, S. 345: Arbitrium merum, boni viri. Anfechtung propter magnam improbitatem.Proculus, Epistles, Book V. You formed a partnership with me under the condition that Nerva, our common friend, should decide with reference to the shares thereof; and Nerva decided that you should be a partner to the extent of one-third, and I to the extent of two-thirds of the capital. You ask whether this should be ratified in accordance with the rights of the partnership, or whether we are equal partners, nevertheless? I think that it would have been better for you to have made the inquiry whether we were partners to the extent of the shares which he had established, or whether to the extent of those which would have been apportioned by a good citizen; for there are two kinds of arbiters, one whose award we should obey whether it be just or unjust, which rule must be observed when recourse is had to arbitration by common consent of the parties. There is another kind, whose award must be compared with that which would be rendered by a good citizen, although the party who is to give it has been expressly selected;

77Pau­lus li­bro quar­to quaes­tio­num. (vel­uti cum le­ge lo­ca­tio­nis com­pre­hen­sum est, ut opus ar­bi­trio lo­ca­to­ris fiat):

77Ad Dig. 17,2,77ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 109, S. 427, 430: Vervollständigung absichtlich unvollständiger Vereinbarung. Arbitrium boni viri. Taxation des Geschäftsantheils eines ausgetretenen Gesellschafters.Paulus, Questions, Book IV. For instance, when the intention of a lease is involved, and the decision of the lessor is required.

78Pro­cu­lus li­bro quin­to epis­tu­la­rum. in pro­pos­i­ta au­tem quaes­tio­ne ar­bi­trium vi­ri bo­ni ex­is­ti­mo se­quen­dum es­se, eo ma­gis quod iu­di­cium pro so­cio bo­nae fi­dei est.

78Proculus, Epistles, Book V. I think that, in the case stated, the judgment of a good citizen should be followed, and all the more so, because a decision in an action on partnership is one where good faith is concerned.

79Pau­lus li­bro quar­to quaes­tio­num. Un­de si Ner­vae ar­bi­trium ita pra­vum est, ut ma­ni­fes­ta in­iqui­tas eius ap­pa­reat, cor­ri­gi pot­est per iu­di­cium bo­nae fi­dei.

79Ad Dig. 17,2,79ROHGE, Bd. 3 (1872), S. 173: Unterschied zwischen Schiedsspruch und arbitrium boni viri bezüglich der Anfechtbarkeit.ROHGE, Bd. 4 (1872), S. 429: Unterschied zwischen Schiedsspruch und arbitrium boni viri bezüglich der Anfechtbarkeit.Paulus, Questions, Book IV. Wherefore, if the award of Nerva is so improper that its manifest injustice is apparent, it can be corrected by a judgment on the ground of good faith.

80Pro­cu­lus li­bro quin­to epis­tu­la­rum. Quid enim si Ner­va con­sti­tuis­set, ut al­ter ex mil­le­si­ma par­te, al­ter ex duo mil­le­si­mis par­ti­bus so­cius es­set? il­lud pot­est con­ve­niens es­se vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­trio, ut non uti­que ex ae­quis par­ti­bus so­cii si­mus, vel­uti si al­ter plus ope­rae in­du­striae gra­tiae pe­cu­niae in so­cie­ta­tem col­la­tu­rus erat.

80Ad Dig. 17,2,80ROHGE, Bd. 3 (1872), S. 173: Anspruch eines Socius auf nicht bedungene Vergütung für geleistete Arbeiten.Proculus, Epistles, Book V. What would be the result if Nerva decided that one party should be a partner to the extent of one thousand shares, and the other to the extent of two thousand shares? The decision of a good citizen could not fail to be that we are not partners to the same extent; for example, just as if one of us should bring into the partnership more labor, skill, credit, and money than the other.

81Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro no­no quaes­tio­num. Si so­cius pro fi­lia do­tem pro­mi­sit et prius quam sol­ve­ret he­rede ea re­lic­ta de­ces­sit: quae post­ea cum ma­ri­to de ex­igen­da do­te egit, ac­cep­to li­be­ra­ta est. quae­si­tum est, an, si pro so­cio age­ret, do­tis quan­ti­ta­tem prae­ci­pe­re de­be­ret, si for­te con­ve­nis­set in­ter so­cios, ut de com­mu­ni dos con­sti­tue­re­tur. di­xi pac­tum non es­se in­iquum, uti­que si non de al­te­rius tan­tum fi­lia con­ve­nit: nam si com­mu­ne hoc pac­tum fuit, non in­ter­es­se, quod al­ter so­lus fi­liam ha­buit. ce­te­rum si nu­me­ra­tam do­tem pa­ter de­func­ta in ma­tri­mo­nio fi­lia re­ci­pe­ras­set, red­di pe­cu­niam so­cie­ta­ti de­buis­se, pac­tum ex ae­qui­ta­te sic no­bis in­ter­pre­tan­ti­bus. quod si sal­va so­cie­ta­te di­vor­tio ma­tri­mo­nium so­lu­tum fo­ret, cum sua cau­sa do­tem re­ci­pe­ra­ri, sci­li­cet ut ea vel alii ma­ri­to da­ri pos­sit. nec, si prior ma­ri­tus fa­ce­re non pos­set, de­nuo de so­cie­ta­te con­sti­tuen­dam do­tem, ni­si si no­mi­na­tim ita con­ve­nis­set. ve­rum in pro­pos­i­to lar­gi­ter in­ter­es­se vi­de­ba­tur, dos nu­me­ra­ta es­set an ve­ro pro­mis­sa: nam si fi­lia da­tam do­tem, post­ea­quam pa­tri he­res ex­sti­tit, iu­re suo re­ce­pis­set, non es­se re­fe­ren­dam pe­cu­niam so­cie­ta­ti, quam mu­lier ha­bi­tu­ra fuit, et­si alius he­res ex­sti­tis­set: quod si ac­cep­to a ma­ri­to li­be­ra­ta es­set, ne­qua­quam im­pu­ta­ri pos­se so­cie­ta­ti non so­lu­tam pe­cu­niam.

81Papinianus, Questions, Book IX. Where a partner promised a dowry in behalf of his daughter, and, before he paid it, died, having left her his heir, and she afterwards brought an action against her husband for her dowry; she was released by a receipt from her husband. The question arose whether, if she brought an action on partnership, she ought to receive the amount of the dowry as a preferred claim, if it had been agreed between the partners that the dowry should be taken out of the common fund? I say that the contract was not an unjust one, provided that the girl had not made it merely with reference to one of the partners; for, if the agreement was reciprocal, it did not make any difference if only one of the partners had a daughter. Moreover, if the father should recover the dowry which he had given after the death of his daughter during marriage, the money ought to be returned to the partnership, for we should interpret the contract equitably in this way. If, however, the marriage should be dissolved by a divorce during the existence of the partnership, the dowry would be recovered with its accessories, so that it could again be given to another husband. But if the first husband was not able to restore the dowry, another could not be taken from the funds of the partnership, unless this had been expressly agreed upon. In the example proposed, however, it seems to be most probable that the dowry was actually paid, or at least promised. For if the daughter had received the dowry by operation of law, after she became the heir of her father, the money ought not to be placed in the partnership fund, because she would be entitled to it, even if there should be another heir. But, if she was released by a receipt from her husband, money should not be credited to the partnership which had not been paid.

82Idem li­bro ter­tio re­spon­so­rum. Iu­re so­cie­ta­tis per so­cium ae­re alie­no so­cius non ob­li­ga­tur, ni­si in com­mu­nem ar­cam pe­cu­niae ver­sae sunt.

82Ad Dig. 17,2,82ROHGE, Bd. 7 (1873), S. 433: Eine nützliche Verwendung für eine Gesellschaft ist dadurch allein, daß eine Sache zu Gesellschaftszwecken verwendet worden, noch nicht entstanden. Es muß der Gesellschafter ersichtlich für die Gesellschaft gehandelt haben.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 483, Note 15.The Same, Opinions, Book III. One partner is not bound for the debts contracted by another, according to the law of partnership, unless the money was deposited in the common chest.

83Pau­lus li­bro pri­mo ma­nua­lium. Il­lud quae­ren­dum est, ar­bor quae in con­fi­nio na­ta est, item la­pis qui per utrum­que fun­dum ex­ten­di­tur an, cum suc­ci­sa ar­bor vel la­pis ex­emp­tus eius sit cu­ius fun­dus, pro ea quo­que par­te sin­gu­lo­rum es­se de­beat, pro qua par­te in fun­do fue­rat? an qua ra­tio­ne dua­bus mas­sis duo­rum do­mi­no­rum fla­tis to­ta mas­sa com­mu­nis est, ita ar­bor hoc ip­so, quo se­pa­ra­tur a so­lo pro­priam­que sub­stan­tiam in unum cor­pus red­ac­tam ac­ci­pit, mul­to ma­gis pro in­di­vi­so com­mu­nis fit, quam mas­sa? sed na­tu­ra­li con­ve­nit ra­tio­ni et post­ea tan­tam par­tem utrum­que ha­be­re tam in la­pi­de quam in ar­bo­re, quan­tam et in ter­ra ha­be­bat.

83Ad Dig. 17,2,83Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 142, Note 4.Paulus, Manuals, Book I. The question arose whether, where a tree which grows on the boundary line, or a stone which extends on each side of the line of two contiguous tracts of land, will belong proportionately to the owner of each tract; or, if the tree is cut down, or the stone removed, it will remain undivided; as occurs where two masses of metal belonging to two owners are melted together the entire mass becomes the common property of both; and thus, in this instance where a tree is separated from the soil, there is all the more reason for considering it to belong to both owners, than is the case with a mass of metal; since it only forms one body composed of the same substance. It is in accordance with natural reason, however, that, after the separation of the stone or the tree, each of the two owners should have the same share of the same to which he was entitled while it remained in the earth.

84La­beo li­bro sex­to pos­te­rio­rum a Ia­vo­le­no epi­to­ma­to­rum. Quo­tiens ius­su ali­cu­ius vel cum fi­lio eius vel cum ex­tra­neo so­cie­tas co­itur, di­rec­to cum il­lius per­so­na agi pos­se, cu­ius per­so­na in con­tra­hen­da so­cie­ta­te spec­ta­ta sit.

84Labeo, Abridgments by Javolenus, Book VI. Whenever a partnership is formed by the direction of anyone, either with the son of the latter or with another person, a direct action can be brought against the one who was in view when the partnership was formed.