Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XV4,
Quod iussu
Liber quintus decimus
IV.

Quod iussu

(Concerning the Action Based on the Authorization of the Father or the Master.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Me­ri­to ex ius­su do­mi­ni in so­li­dum ad­ver­sus eum iu­di­cium da­tur, nam quo­dam­mo­do cum eo con­tra­hi­tur qui iu­bet. 1Ius­sum au­tem ac­ci­pien­dum est, si­ve tes­ta­to quis si­ve per epis­tu­lam si­ve ver­bis aut per nun­tium si­ve spe­cia­li­ter in uno con­trac­tu ius­se­rit si­ve ge­ne­ra­li­ter: et id­eo et si sic con­tes­ta­tus sit: ‘quod vo­les cum Sti­cho ser­vo meo neg­otium ge­re pe­ri­cu­lo meo’, vi­de­tur ad om­nia ius­sis­se, ni­si cer­ta lex ali­quid pro­hi­bet. 2Sed ego quae­ro, an re­vo­ca­re hoc ius­sum an­te­quam cre­da­tur pos­sit: et pu­to pos­se, quem­ad­mo­dum si man­das­set et post­ea an­te con­trac­tum con­tra­ria vo­lun­ta­te man­da­tum re­vo­cas­set et me cer­tio­ras­set. 3Sed et si man­da­ve­rit pa­ter do­mi­nus­ve, vi­de­tur ius­sis­se. 4Sed et si ser­vi chi­ro­gra­pho sub­scrip­se­rit do­mi­nus, te­ne­tur quod ius­su. 5Quid er­go si fi­de­ius­se­rit pro ser­vo? ait Mar­cel­lus non te­ne­ri quod ius­su: qua­si ex­tra­neus enim in­ter­ve­nit: ne­que hoc di­cit id­eo, quod te­ne­tur ex cau­sa fi­de­ius­sio­nis, sed quia aliud est iu­be­re, aliud fi­de­iu­be­re: de­ni­que idem scri­bit, et­si in­uti­li­ter fi­de­ius­se­rit, ta­men eum non ob­li­ga­ri qua­si ius­se­rit, quae sen­ten­tia ve­rior est. 6Si ra­tum ha­bue­rit quis quod ser­vus eius ges­se­rit vel fi­lius, quod ius­su ac­tio in eos da­tur. 7Si pu­pil­lus do­mi­nus ius­se­rit, uti­que non te­ne­tur, ni­si tu­to­re auc­to­re ius­sit. 8Si ius­su fruc­tua­rii erit cum ser­vo con­trac­tum, item eius cui bo­na fi­de ser­vit, Mar­cel­lus pu­tat quod ius­su dan­dam in eos ac­tio­nem: quam sen­ten­tiam et ego pro­bo. 9Si cu­ra­to­re ad­ules­cen­tis vel fu­rio­si vel prod­igi iu­ben­te cum ser­vo con­trac­tum sit, pu­tat La­beo dan­dam quod ius­su ac­tio­nem in eos quo­rum ser­vus fue­rit: idem et in ve­ro pro­cu­ra­to­re. sed si pro­cu­ra­tor ve­rus non sit, in ip­sum po­tius dan­dam ac­tio­nem idem La­beo ait.

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX. An action is very properly granted against a master for the entire amount, on the ground that he has authorized a contract; for, to a certain extent, a contract is entered into with the party who ordered it to be made. 1Ad Dig. 15,4,1,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 482, Note 12.Authority must, however, be understood, whether anyone gives it in the presence of a witness, or by a letter, or verbally, or by a messenger, or whether the authority was given in a specified contract, or in general terms; and therefore, if a party made a statement as follows: “Transact what business you desire with my slave Stichus, at my risk,” he is held to have directed that everything be done, unless a special agreement prohibits something. 2I ask, however, whether he can revoke this sanction before a debt is incurred. I think that he can do so, just as if he had given a mandate, and afterwards, having changed his mind, before the contract had been made, he had revoked the mandate and notified me. 3Also, if a father or a master has given a mandate, he is held to have conferred authority. 4And, moreover, if a master has signed the written contract of the slave, he will be liable in the proceeding aforesaid. 5But what if he becomes surety for the slave? Marcellus says that he is not liable to this action, for he intervened as a stranger; and he does not say this for the reason that the master is liable on the ground of security, but because to give authority is one thing, and to become surety is another; and he further says that even though the security may be worthless, he will not be liable on account of having given authority; and this is the more correct opinion. 6If anyone should ratify a transaction made by his slave or his son, an action on this ground will be granted against him. 7Where a ward, who is the owner, grants authority, he is undoubtedly not liable, unless he did so with the consent of his guardian. 8Where a contract is entered into with a slave by authority of the usufructuary, or with that of a person whom he is serving in good faith as a slave; Marcellus thinks that this action should be granted against him, and I also approve this opinion. 9Ad Dig. 15,4,1,9Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 73, Note 13a.Where a contract is entered into with a slave by authority of the curator of a minor, or of an insane person, or of a spendthrift; Labeo thinks that the action should be granted against the party whose slave he was, and the same applies to a veritable agent. If, however, the latter is not a genuine agent, Labeo also says that the action should preferably be granted against the party himself.

2Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si tu­to­ris ius­su ser­vo pu­pil­li cre­di­tum sit, pu­to, si ex uti­li­ta­te pu­pil­li fue­rit cre­di­tum, in pu­pil­lum es­se dan­dam ac­tio­nem ‘quod ius­sit tu­tor’. 1Si ius­su do­mi­ni an­cil­lae vel ius­su pa­tris fi­liae cre­di­tum sit, dan­da est in eos quod ius­su ac­tio. 2Si ius­su meo cum alie­no ser­vo con­trac­tum fue­rit eum­que post­ea red­eme­ro, quod ius­su non te­ne­bor, ne ac­tio, quae ab in­itio in­uti­lis fue­rit, even­tu con­fir­me­tur.

2Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX. Where a loan is made to the slave of a ward, with the sanction of his guardian, if the loan was for the benefit of the ward, I think that an action on the ground of the guardian’s sanction should be granted against the ward. 1Where a loan is made by the authority of the master of a female slave, or by that of the father of a girl, an action on this ground should be granted against him. 2If a contract is made with a slave of another by my authority, and I afterwards purchase the slave, I will not be liable to this action; lest a proceeding which, in the beginning, was of no effect, be rendered valid by the occurrence.

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Do­mi­num, qui ius­sit sem­is­si­bus usu­ris ser­vo suo pe­cu­niam mu­tuam cre­di, hac­te­nus te­ne­ri qua­te­nus ius­sit: nec pig­no­ris ob­li­ga­tio­nem lo­cum ha­be­re in his prae­diis, quae ser­vus non ex vo­lun­ta­te do­mi­ni ob­li­ga­vit.

3Ulpianus, Opinions, Book II. A master who has directed money to be loaned to his slave at six per cent interest, is liable for the amount which he has authorized; and an obligation of pledge does not affect lands which a slave has encumbered without the consent of his master.

4Idem li­bro de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Si ius­su eius, qui ad­mi­nis­tra­tio­ni re­rum ci­vi­ta­tis prae­po­si­tus est, cum ser­vo ci­vi­ta­tis neg­otium con­trac­tum sit, Pom­po­nius scri­bit quod ius­su cum eo agi pos­se.

4The Same, On the Edict, Book X. If any business is transacted with a slave belonging to a city, by the authority of the official appointed for the management of its affairs, Pomponius says that an action on this ground can be brought against him.

5Pau­lus li­bro quar­to ad Plau­tium. Si do­mi­nus vel pa­ter pe­cu­niam mu­tuam ac­cep­tu­rus ius­se­rit ser­vo fi­lio­ve nu­me­ra­ri, nul­la quaes­tio est, quin ip­si con­di­ci pos­sit: im­mo hoc ca­su de ius­su ac­tio non com­pe­tit. 1Si unus ex ser­vi do­mi­nis ius­sit con­tra­hi cum eo, is so­lus te­ne­bi­tur: sed si duo ius­se­runt, cum quo­vis in so­li­dum agi pot­est, quia si­mi­les sunt duo­bus man­dan­ti­bus.

5Paulus, On Plautius, Book IV. If a master, or a father, being about to receive a loan of money, directs it to be paid to his slave or his son, there is no doubt that a personal suit for recovery can be brought against him, himself; and it is certain that, in this instance, the present action will not lie. 1Ad Dig. 15,4,5,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 407, Note 7.Where one of the masters of a slave directed a contract to be entered into with him, he alone will be liable; but if two directed this to be done, an action can be brought against either of them for the entire amount, because they resemble two parties who have given a mandate.