Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XIV4,
De tributoria actione
Liber quartus decimus
IV.

De tributoria actione

(Concerning the Tributorian Action.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Hu­ius quo­que edic­ti non mi­ni­ma uti­li­tas est, ut do­mi­nus, qui alio­quin in ser­vi con­trac­ti­bus pri­vi­le­gium ha­bet (quip­pe cum de pe­cu­lio dum­ta­xat te­n­ea­tur, cu­ius pe­cu­lii aes­ti­ma­tio de­duc­to quod do­mi­no de­be­tur fit), ta­men, si scie­rit ser­vum pe­cu­lia­ri mer­ce neg­otia­ri, vel­ut ex­tra­neus cre­di­tor ex hoc edic­to in tri­bu­tum vo­ca­tur. 1Li­cet mer­cis ap­pel­la­tio an­gus­tior sit, ut ne­que ad ser­vos ful­lo­nes vel sar­ci­na­to­res vel tex­to­res vel ve­na­li­cia­rios per­ti­neat, ta­men Pe­dius li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo scri­bit ad om­nes neg­otia­tio­nes por­ri­gen­dum edic­tum. 2Pe­cu­lia­rem au­tem mer­cem non sic uti pe­cu­lium ac­ci­pi­mus, quip­pe pe­cu­lium de­duc­to quod de­be­tur ac­ci­pi­tur, merx pe­cu­lia­ris, et­iam­si ni­hil sit in pe­cu­lio, do­mi­num tri­bu­to­ria ob­li­gat, ita de­mum si scien­te eo neg­otia­bi­tur. 3Scien­tiam hic eam ac­ci­pi­mus, quae ha­bet et vo­lun­ta­tem, sed ut ego pu­to, non vo­lun­ta­tem, sed pa­tien­tiam: non enim vel­le de­bet do­mi­nus, sed non nol­le. si igi­tur scit et non pro­tes­ta­tur et con­tra di­cit, te­ne­bi­tur ac­tio­ne tri­bu­to­ria. 4Po­tes­ta­tis ver­bum ad om­nem se­xum, item ad om­nes, qui sunt alie­no iu­ri sub­iec­ti, por­ri­gen­dum erit. 5Non so­lum ad ser­vos per­ti­ne­bit tri­bu­to­ria ac­tio, ve­rum ad eos quo­que, qui no­bis bo­na fi­de ser­viunt, si­ve li­be­ri si­ve ser­vi alie­ni sunt, vel in qui­bus usum fruc­tum ha­be­mus,

1Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX. The advantage of this Edict is far from being of trifling importance, as a master, who, otherwise, enjoys a privilege in the case of contracts made by a slave (since he is liable only for the amount of the peculium, the estimate of which is made after what is due to the master has been deducted), is, nevertheless, called upon by this Edict to contribute like any other creditor, if he was aware that the slave was transacting business with property belonging to the peculium. 1Although the term “merchandise” is one of limited signification, and does not apply to slaves who are fullers, tailors, weavers, or dealers in slaves, still, Pedius says in the Fifteenth Book that the Edict must be held to embrace transactions of every description. 2Merchandise of the peculium we do not understand to mean the same as the peculium itself, for the latter is considered to indicate the remainder after what has been due to the master has been deducted; but merchandise of the peculium renders a master liable to the Tributorian Action, even though there may be nothing whatever in the peculium, only however, where the business is transacted with his knowledge. 3In this instance we understand the word “knowledge” to signify that which includes consent, but (as I think) not merely consent but tolerance, for the master need not wish it, but he must not be unwilling. Hence, if he is aware of the facts, and does not protest and evince opposition, he will be liable under the Tributorian Action. 4The term “control” must be extended to both sexes, and also to all such as are subject to the power of others. 5The Tributorian Action will be applicable not only to slaves, but also to such as are serving us in good faith, whether they are free born, the slaves of others, or those in whom we have an usufruct,

2Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. ut ta­men merx, qua pe­cu­lia­ri­ter neg­otie­tur, ad nos per­ti­neat.

2Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX. Provided that the merchandise which is handled with the money of the peculium belongs to us.

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Sed si ser­vus com­mu­nis sit et am­bo sciant do­mi­ni, in utrum­li­bet ex il­lis da­bi­tur ac­tio: at si al­ter scit, al­ter igno­ra­vit, in eum qui scit da­bi­tur ac­tio, de­du­ce­tur ta­men so­li­dum quod ei qui igno­ra­vit de­be­tur. quod si ip­sum quis igno­ran­tem con­ve­ne­rit, quon­iam de pe­cu­lio con­ve­ni­tur, de­du­ce­tur et­iam id quod scien­ti de­be­tur et qui­dem in so­li­dum: nam et si ip­se de pe­cu­lio con­ven­tus es­set, so­li­dum quod ei de­be­re­tur de­du­ce­re­tur, et ita Iu­lia­nus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit. 1Si ser­vus pu­pil­li vel fu­rio­si scien­te tu­to­re vel cu­ra­to­re in mer­ce pe­cu­lia­ri neg­otie­tur, do­lum qui­dem tu­to­ris vel cu­ra­to­ris no­ce­re pu­pil­lo vel fu­rio­so non de­be­re pu­to, nec ta­men lu­cro­sum es­se de­be­re, et id­eo hac­te­nus eum ex do­lo tu­to­ris tri­bu­to­ria te­ne­ri, si quid ad eum per­ve­ne­rit: idem et in fu­rio­so pu­to. quam­vis Pom­po­nius li­bro oc­ta­vo epis­tu­la­rum, si sol­ven­do tu­tor sit, ex do­lo eius pu­pil­lum te­ne­ri scrip­sit: et sa­ne hac­te­nus te­ne­bi­tur, ut ac­tio­nem, quam con­tra tu­to­rem ha­beat, prae­stet. 2Sed et si ip­sius pu­pil­li do­lo fac­tum sit, si eius ae­ta­tis sit, ut do­li ca­pax sit, ef­fi­ce­re ut te­n­ea­tur, quam­vis scien­tia eius non suf­fi­ciat ad neg­otia­tio­nem. quid er­go est? scien­tia qui­dem tu­to­ris et cu­ra­to­ris de­bet fa­ce­re lo­cum huic ac­tio­ni: do­lus au­tem qua­te­nus no­ceat, os­ten­di.

3Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX. Where, however, a slave is held in common, and both owners are aware of the fact, an action will be granted against either of them, but if one of them knows and the other is ignorant, an action will be granted against the one who knows; and whatever is due to the one who was ignorant will be deducted in full. But if anyone should sue the owner who is ignorant, since proceedings are brought against him on the peculium, what was due to the party who knew will be deducted, and, indeed, in full; for if he himself was sued in the action on the peculium, what is owing to him would be deducted in full. This Julianus stated in the Twelfth Book of the Digest. 1If the slave of a ward or of an insane person, with the knowledge of his guardian or curator, employs the funds of the peculium in business transactions, I am of the opinion that the fraud of the guardian or of the curator should not prejudice the ward, or the insane person, nor should it be a source of gain to him; and hence he ought not to be liable to the Tributorian Action, on account of the fraud of the guardian, only so far as he may have derived any advantage from it. I think that the same rule applies to an insane person, although Pomponius, in the Eighth Book of Epistles, stated that if a guardian is solvent, his ward is liable on account of his fraud, and it is evident that he will be liable to such an extent that he must assign the right of action which he has against his guardian. 2Again, if fraud was committed by the ward himself, and he is of such an age as to be capable of it, it has the effect of rendering him liable; although his knowledge may not be sufficient for the transaction of business. What course must then be pursued? The knowledge of the guardian and curator should furnish ground for this action, and I have shown to what extent fraud may cause injury.

4Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Si pu­pil­lus, cu­ius tu­tor scie­rit, pu­bes fac­tus vel fu­rio­sus sa­nae men­tis do­lum ad­mit­tant, te­nen­tur ex hoc edic­to.

4Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX. If the ward, whose guardian was aware of the facts, is guilty of fraud after reaching puberty, or the insane person when he becomes of sound mind, they will be liable under this Edict.

5Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Pro­cu­ra­to­ris au­tem scien­tiam et do­lum no­ce­re de­be­re do­mi­no ne­que Pom­po­nius du­bi­tat nec nos du­bi­ta­mus. 1Si vi­ca­rius ser­vi mei neg­otie­tur, si qui­dem me scien­te, tri­bu­to­ria te­ne­bor, si me igno­ran­te, or­di­na­rio scien­te, de pe­cu­lio eius ac­tio­nem dan­dam Pom­po­nius li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo scrip­sit, nec de­du­cen­dum ex vi­ca­rii pe­cu­lio, quod or­di­na­rio de­be­tur, cum id quod mi­hi de­be­tur de­du­ca­tur. sed si uter­que scie­ri­mus, et tri­bu­to­riam et de pe­cu­lio ac­tio­nem com­pe­te­re ait, tri­bu­to­riam vi­ca­rii no­mi­ne, de pe­cu­lio ve­ro or­di­na­rii: eli­ge­re ta­men de­be­re agen­tem, qua po­tius ac­tio­ne ex­pe­ria­tur, sic ta­men, ut utrum­que tri­bua­tur et quod mi­hi et quod ser­vo de­be­tur, cum, si ser­vus or­di­na­rius igno­ras­set, de­du­ce­re­tur in­te­grum, quod ei a vi­ca­rio de­be­tur. 2Sed et si an­cil­la neg­otia­bi­tur, ad­mit­ten­dam tri­bu­to­riam di­ci­mus. 3Item par­vi re­fert, cum ip­so ser­vo con­tra­ha­tur an cum in­sti­to­re eius. 4‘Mer­cis no­mi­ne’ me­ri­to ad­ici­tur, ne om­nis neg­otia­tio cum eo fac­ta tri­bu­to­riam in­du­cat. 5Per hanc ac­tio­nem tri­bui iu­be­tur, quod ex ea mer­ce et quod eo no­mi­ne re­cep­tum est. 6In tri­bu­tum au­tem vo­can­tur, qui in po­tes­ta­te ha­bent, cum cre­di­to­ri­bus mer­cis. 7Sed est quae­si­tum, do­mi­nus utrum ita de­mum par­tie­tur ex mer­ce, si quid ei mer­cis no­mi­ne de­bea­tur, an ve­ro et si ex alia cau­sa. et La­beo ait, ex qua­cum­que cau­sa ei de­bea­tur, par­vi­que re­fer­ret, an­te mer­cem an post­ea ei de­be­re quid ser­vus coe­pe­rit: suf­fi­ce­re enim, quod pri­vi­le­gium de­duc­tio­nis per­di­dit. 8Quid ta­men si qui con­tra­he­bant ip­sam mer­cem pig­no­ri ac­ce­pe­rint? pu­to de­be­re di­ci, prae­fe­ren­dos do­mi­no iu­re pig­no­ris. 9Si­ve au­tem do­mi­no si­ve his qui in po­tes­ta­te eius sunt, de­bea­tur, uti­que erit tri­buen­dum. 10Sed si duo plu­res­ve do­mi­ni sint, uti­que om­ni­bus tri­bue­tur pro ra­ta de­bi­ti sui. 11Non au­tem to­tum pe­cu­lium venit in tri­bu­tum, sed id dum­ta­xat, quod ex ea mer­ce est, si­ve mer­ces ma­nent si­ve pre­tium ea­rum re­cep­tum con­ver­sum­ve est in pe­cu­lium. 12Sed et si ad­huc de­bea­tur mer­cis no­mi­ne a qui­bus­dam, qui­bus so­le­bat ser­vus dis­tra­he­re, hoc quo­que tri­bue­tur, pro­ut fue­rit re­cep­tum. 13Si prae­ter mer­cem ser­vus is­te in ta­ber­nam ha­beat in­stru­men­tum, an hoc quo­que tri­bua­tur? et La­beo ait et hoc tri­bui, et est ae­quis­si­mum: ple­rum­que enim hic ap­pa­ra­tus ex mer­ce est, im­mo sem­per. ce­te­ra ta­men, quae ex­tra haec in pe­cu­lium ha­buit, non tri­buen­tur, ut pu­ta ar­gen­tum ha­buit vel au­rum, ni­si si haec ex mer­ce com­pa­ra­vit. 14Item si man­ci­pia in neg­otia­tio­ne ha­buit ex mer­ce pa­ra­ta, et­iam haec tri­buen­tur. 15Si plu­res ha­buit ser­vus cre­di­to­res, sed quos­dam in mer­ci­bus cer­tis, an om­nes in is­dem con­fun­den­di erunt et om­nes in tri­bu­tum vo­can­di? ut pu­ta duas neg­otia­tio­nes ex­er­ce­bat, pu­ta sa­ga­riam et lin­tea­riam, et se­pa­ra­tos ha­buit cre­di­to­res. pu­to se­pa­ra­tim eos in tri­bu­tum vo­ca­ri: unus­quis­que enim eo­rum mer­ci ma­gis quam ip­si cre­di­dit. 16Sed si duas ta­ber­nas eius­dem neg­otia­tio­nis ex­er­cuit et ego fui ta­ber­nae ver­bi gra­tia quam ad Bu­ci­num ha­buit ra­tio­ci­na­tor, alius eius quam trans Ti­be­rim, ae­quis­si­mum pu­to se­pa­ra­tim tri­bu­tio­nem fa­cien­dam, ne ex al­te­rius re mer­ce­ve alii in­dem­nes fiant, alii dam­num sen­tiant. 17Pla­ne si in ea­dem ta­ber­na mer­ces de­fe­re­ban­tur, li­cet hae quae ex­stent11Die Großausgabe liest ex­tent statt ex­stent. ex unius cre­di­to­ris pe­cu­nia sint com­pa­ra­tae, di­cen­dum erit om­nes in tri­bu­tum venire, ni­si fue­rint cre­di­to­ri pig­ne­ra­tae. 18Sed si de­di mer­cem meam ven­den­dam et ex­stat, vi­dea­mus, ne in­iquum sit in tri­bu­tum me vo­ca­ri. et si qui­dem in cre­di­tum ei ab­iit, tri­bu­tio lo­cum ha­be­bit: enim­ve­ro si non ab­iit, quia res ven­di­tae non alias de­si­nunt es­se meae, quam­vis ven­di­de­ro; ni­si ae­re so­lu­to vel fi­de­ius­so­re da­to vel alias sa­tis­fac­to, di­cen­dum erit vin­di­ca­re me pos­se. 19Tri­bu­tio au­tem fit pro ra­ta eius quod cui­que de­bea­tur, et id­eo, si unus cre­di­tor ve­niat de­si­de­rans tri­bui, in­te­gram por­tio­nem con­se­qui­tur, sed quon­iam fie­ri pot­est, ut alius quo­que vel alii ex­sis­te­re pos­sint mer­cis pe­cu­lia­ris cre­di­to­res, ca­ve­re de­bet cre­di­tor is­te pro ra­ta se re­fu­su­rum, si for­te alii emer­se­rint cre­di­to­res.

5Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX. Ad Dig. 14,4,5 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 6 (1872), S. 85: Umfang der Ermächtigung des Inspectors einer Feuerversicherungsgesellschaft zur Feststellung des Schadens.ROHGE, Bd. 6 (1872), S. 403: Recht des durch den Procuristen Betrogenen, die ganze Contractsobligation gegen den Geschäftsführer oder gegen den Principal geltend zu machen.Pomponius does not doubt, however, neither do we, that the knowledge and the malicious intent of an agent prejudice the principal. 1Where the sub-slave of my slave transacts business, and I am aware of the fact, I shall be liable to the Tributorian Action, but if I am not aware of it, and the chief slave is, Pomponius states in the Sixtieth Book, that an action De peculio should be granted, and that nothing should be deducted from the peculium of the sub-slave for what he owes to the chief slave, while what is due to me should be deducted. But if both of us were aware of the facts, he says that both the Tributorian Action and the one on the peculium will lie; the Tributorian Action on account of the sub-slave, and that on the peculium on account of the chief slave; but the plaintiff must decide under which action he would rather proceed, but in such a way that contribution shall be made of both what is due to me and what is due to the chief slave, while if the latter was ignorant of the facts, whatever was due to him from the sub-slave should be deducted in full. 2Moreover, where a female slave transacts business, we hold that the Tributorian Action will lie. 3Again, it makes little difference whether the contract is entered into with the slave himself or with his business manager. 4The terms, “On account of the business,” are added with good reason, in order to prevent every kind of transaction carried on with him from affording ground for the Tributorian Action. 5By means of this action it is established that everything connected with the merchandise, or which has been received on account of it, shall be subject to contribution. 6Those who have slaves under their control are called upon to contribute, together with the creditors of the business. 7The question arose, however, whether the master has a right to share in the division of the merchandise only to the extent of what is due to him on account of the same; or whether he can do so on account of other matters? Labeo says that this is the case where money is due to him for any reason whatsoever; and that it makes very little difference whether the slave became indebted to him before or after the business was transacted, for it is sufficient that he has lost the privilege of deduction. 8What would be the case, however, if those who contracted with the slave received the merchandise itself by way of pledge? I think that it should be said that they will be preferred to the master by the right of pledge. 9Whether the debt is owing to the master or to those who are under his control, contribution must be made in every instance. 10Where there are two or more masters, contribution should be made to each of them in proportion to his debt. 11The entire peculium, however, is not subject to contribution, but only that which is connected with the business, whether it consists of merchandise, or whether the price of the latter has been received and placed in a peculium. 12Again, if money was due for merchandise from parties to whom the slave was accustomed to make sales, this also will be subject to contribution to the extent of the receipts. 13If, in addition to merchandise, this slave has in the shop utensils belonging to the business, are these also subject to contribution? Labeo says that they are, and this is perfectly just, for generally, and in fact always, such tools are derived from the stock. Other articles, however, which he had in the peculium will not be liable to contribution, as for instance, if he had silver or gold, except where he acquired them with money obtained from trade. 14Moreover, if he employed slaves in the business who had been acquired with the proceeds of the same, these also will be subject to contribution. 15If the slave had several creditors, but some of them were engaged in certain branches of commerce, are all of them to be brought in and called upon to share in the contribution; for example, if he was engaged in two kinds of business, such as cloak making and the weaving of linen, and had separate creditors? It is my opinion that they should be called upon separately to share in the contribution, for each of them gave credit rather to the business than to the party himself. 16Moreover, if he had two shops devoted to the same kind of business, and I, for example, purchased goods at the shop in the Bucinum, and someone else made purchases in that across the Tiber; I think it would be perfectly just that the contributions should be made separately, to avoid having one set of creditors indemnified out of the property of the other, and the latter suffer loss. 17It is evident that if merchandise is offered for sale in the same shop, even if what was there had been obtained with the money of one of the creditors, it will all be subject to contribution, unless it was pledged to the creditor. 18Ad Dig. 14,4,5,18Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 370, Note 11.If, however, I have delivered my merchandise to be sold, and it is still in existence, let us consider whether it will not be unjust that I should be called upon for contribution? If, however, I have only a claim against the slave, there will be ground for contribution, but if this is not the case, for the reason that property which is sold does not cease to belong to me, even though I have disposed of it, unless the money has been paid, or a surety furnished, or satisfaction made in some other manner; it must be said that I can bring an action for recovery. 19Contribution, however, is made in proportion to the amount which is due to each one; and therefore if one creditor appears asking for contribution, he will obtain his share in full, but since it may happen that there is one other or several other creditors of the business conducted with a peculium, this creditor must furnish security that he will refund pro rata if other creditors should appear.

6Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. Non enim haec ac­tio sic ut de pe­cu­lio oc­cu­pan­tis me­lio­rem cau­sam fa­cit, sed ae­qua­lem con­di­cio­nem quan­do­que agen­tium.

6Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX. For this action does not, like that on the peculium, make the condition of the prior claimant the better, but it makes that of all of them the same, no matter when they file their claims.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Il­lud quo­que ca­ve­re de­bet, si quid aliud do­mi­ni de­bi­tum emer­se­rit, re­fu­su­rum se ei pro ra­ta. fin­ge enim con­di­cio­na­le de­bi­tum im­mi­ne­re vel in oc­cul­to es­se: hoc quo­que ad­mit­ten­dum est: nam in­iu­riam do­mi­nus pa­ti non de­bet, li­cet in tri­bu­tum vo­ca­tur. 1Quid ta­men si do­mi­nus tri­bue­re no­lit nec hanc mo­les­tiam sus­ci­pe­re, sed pe­cu­lio vel mer­ci­bus ce­de­re pa­ra­tus sit? Pe­dius re­fert au­dien­dum eum, quae sen­ten­tia ha­bet ae­qui­ta­tem: et ple­rum­que ar­bi­trum in hanc rem prae­tor de­be­bit da­re, cu­ius in­ter­ven­tu tri­buan­tur mer­ces pe­cu­lia­res. 2Si cu­ius do­lo ma­lo fac­tum est, quo mi­nus ita tri­bue­re­tur, in eum tri­bu­to­ria da­tur, ut quan­to mi­nus tri­bu­tum sit quam de­bue­rit, prae­stet: quae ac­tio do­lum ma­lum co­er­cet do­mi­ni. mi­nus au­tem tri­bue­re vi­de­tur et­iam si ni­hil tri­bu­tum sit. si ta­men igno­rans in mer­ce ser­vum ha­be­re mi­nus tri­buit, non vi­de­tur do­lo mi­nus tri­buis­se, sed re com­per­ta si non tri­buat, do­lo nunc non ca­ret. pro­in­de si si­bi ex ea mer­ce sol­vi fe­cit, uti­que do­lo vi­de­tur mi­nus tri­buis­se. 3Sed et si mer­cem perire pas­sus est aut eam aver­tit aut vi­lio­ris da­ta ope­ra dis­tra­xit vel si ab emp­to­ri­bus pre­tium non ex­ege­rit, di­cen­dum erit te­ne­ri eum tri­bu­to­ria, si do­lus in­ter­ve­nit. 4Sed et si ne­ga­ve­rit do­mi­nus cui­quam de­be­ri, vi­den­dum erit, an tri­bu­to­riae lo­cus sit: et est ve­rior La­beo­nis sen­ten­tia tri­bu­to­riam lo­cum ha­be­re: alio­quin ex­pe­diet do­mi­no ne­ga­re. 5Haec ac­tio et per­pe­tuo et in he­redem da­tur de eo dum­ta­xat quod ad eum per­ve­nit,

7Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX. He should also furnish security that, if anything else should be found to be due to the master, he will refund it to him pro rata; for suppose that a conditional debt is about to be due, or that there is one which has been concealed; this also must be admitted, for the master should not suffer injury, even though he may be called to share in the contribution. 1What, however, must be done if the master refuses to make contribution, or to take this trouble, but is prepared to surrender the peculium or the goods? Pedius states that he should be heard, and this opinion is equitable; and generally, the Prætor should appoint an arbiter, by whose intervention the goods belonging to the peculium may be distributed. 2Where, through the malicious contrivance of anyone, the result is that the proper contribution was not made, the Tributorian Action is granted against him, in order to compel him to make good the amount by which what was contributed is less than it should have been. This action acts as a restraint upon the malicious intent of the master. It is held that too little is contributed, if nothing is contributed. Where, however, he, being ignorant of what the slave has invested in merchandise, contributes too little, he is not held to have acted with malicious intent; but if, having ascertained the facts, he neglects to make proper contribution, he is now not free from fraud. Hence if he obtains payment to himself out of the merchandise, he is, in fact, held to have fraudulently contributed too little. 3Again, if he permitted the property to be destroyed, or to be converted to an improper purpose, or intentionally sold it at too low a price, or did not require payment from the purchasers; it must be held that he will be liable to the Tributorian Action, if fraudulent intent existed. 4Moreover, if the master denies that anything is due to anybody, it should be considered whether there is ground for the Tributorian Action. The opinion of Labeo that this action will lie is the better one; otherwise it will be expedient for the master to set up a denial. 5This action is both perpetual and granted against the heir, but only for the amount which conies into his hands:

8Iu­lia­nus li­bro un­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. quia non de do­lo est, sed rei per­se­cu­tio­nem con­ti­net: qua­re et­iam mor­tuo ser­vo do­mi­nus, item he­res eius per­pe­tuo te­ne­ri de­be­bit prop­ter fac­tum de­func­ti: quam­vis non ali­ter quam do­lo in­ter­ve­nien­te com­pe­tat.

8Julianus, Digest, Book XI. Because the proceeding is not based upon fraud, but includes the prosecution of a claim, and therefore, even if the slave is dead, the master, as well as his heir, should be held perpetually liable for the act of the deceased; although the action will not lie except where fraud has been committed.

9Ul­pia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Quod in he­rede di­ci­mus, idem erit et in ce­te­ris suc­ces­so­ri­bus. 1Eli­ge­re quis de­bet, qua ac­tio­ne ex­pe­ria­tur, utrum de pe­cu­lio an tri­bu­to­ria, cum scit si­bi re­gres­sum ad aliam non fu­tu­rum. pla­ne si quis ve­lit ex alia cau­sa tri­bu­to­ria age­re, ex alia cau­sa de pe­cu­lio, au­dien­dus erit. 2Si ser­vo tes­ta­men­to ma­nu­mis­so pe­cu­lium le­ga­tum sit, non de­be­re he­redem tri­bu­to­ria te­ne­ri, qua­si ne­que ad eum per­ve­ne­rit ne­que do­lo fe­ce­rit, La­beo ait. sed Pom­po­nius li­bro se­xa­gen­si­mo scrip­sit he­redem ni­si cu­ra­ve­rit ca­ve­ri si­bi a ser­vo vel de­du­xit a pe­cu­lio quod tri­buen­dum erat, te­ne­ri tri­bu­to­ria, quae sen­ten­tia non est si­ne ra­tio­ne: ip­se enim auc­tor do­li est, qui id egit, ne in­tri­bue­ret: to­tiens enim in he­redem da­mus de eo quod ad eum per­ve­nit, quo­tiens ex do­lo de­func­ti con­ve­ni­tur, non quo­tiens ex suo.

9Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX. What we state with respect to the heir will also apply to other successors. 1A party must elect by what kind of an action he will proceed, whether by the one on the peculium, or by the Tributorian Action, since he knows that he can not have recourse to the other. It is clear that if anyone desires to bring the Tributorian Action for one claim, and the one De peculio for another, he should be heard. 2Labeo says that if the peculium is bequeathed to a slave manumitted by will, the heir should not be liable to the Tributorian Action, as neither has obtained anything nor has been guilty of fraud. Pomponius, in the Sixtieth Book, states that the heir is liable to the Tributorian Action, unless he took care to obtain security for himself from the slave, or deducted from the peculium what should have been contributed. This opinion is not unreasonable, since he who acted in such a way as to avoid contribution is himself guilty of malicious contrivance. For the action against the heir with reference to what comes into his hands will be granted by us, as often as he is sued on account of the fraud of the deceased, but not when he is sued on account of his own.

10Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. De pe­cu­lio ac­tio­ne et­iam cum emp­to­re ser­vi agi pot­est, tri­bu­to­ria non pot­est,

10Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX. The action De peculio can also be brought against a purchaser of the slave; but the Tributorian Action can not.

11Gaius li­bro no­no ad edic­tum pro­vin­cia­le. Ali­quan­do et­iam agen­ti­bus ex­pe­dit po­tius de pe­cu­lio age­re quam tri­bu­to­ria: nam in hac ac­tio­ne de qua lo­qui­mur hoc so­lum in di­vi­sio­nem venit, quod in mer­ci­bus est qui­bus neg­otia­tur quod­que eo no­mi­ne re­cep­tum est: at in ac­tio­ne de pe­cu­lio to­tius pe­cu­lii quan­ti­tas spec­ta­tur, in quo et mer­ces con­ti­nen­tur. et fie­ri pot­est, ut di­mi­dia for­te par­te pe­cu­lii aut ter­tia vel et­iam mi­no­re neg­otie­tur: fie­ri prae­ter­ea pot­est, ut pa­tri do­mi­no­ve ni­hil de­beat.

11Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IX. It is sometimes more expedient for parties to bring suit by the action De peculio than by the Tributorian Action, for in the one of which we are treating that alone is subject to division which forms part of the merchandise with which the business is transacted, and whatever has been received on account of the same; but, in the action De peculio the entire amount of the peculium (in which also the merchandise is included) must be taken into consideration, and it may happen that the business is being conducted perhaps with a half, or a third, or even a smaller portion of the peculium; and it also may happen that nothing is owing by the party to his father or owner.

12Iu­lia­nus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Alius dum­ta­xat de pe­cu­lio, alius tri­bu­to­ria ser­vi no­mi­ne cum do­mi­no agit: quae­si­tum est, an de­du­ce­re do­mi­nus de pe­cu­lio de­beat, quod tri­bu­to­ria agen­ti prae­sta­tu­rus sit. re­spon­dit: tri­bu­to­ria ac­tio­ne tunc de­mum agi pot­est, cum do­mi­nus in dis­tri­buen­do pre­tio mer­cis edic­to prae­to­ris non sa­tis­fe­cit, id est cum ma­io­rem par­tem de­bi­ti sui de­du­xit quam cre­di­to­ri­bus tri­buit, vel­uti si, cum in mer­ce tri­gin­ta fuis­sent, in quam ip­se qui­dem quin­de­cim cre­di­de­rat, duo au­tem ex­tra­nei tri­gin­ta, to­ta quin­de­cim de­du­xe­rit, et cre­di­to­ri­bus re­li­qua quin­de­cim de­de­rit, cum de­be­ret so­la de­cem de­du­ce­re, ex­tra­neis de­na tri­bue­re. cum igi­tur hoc fe­cit, nec in­tel­le­gen­dus est ser­vum a se li­be­ras­se eo, quod quin­que ad­huc no­mi­ne eius tri­bu­to­ria ac­tio­ne prae­sta­tu­rus sit: qua­re si agi de pe­cu­lio coe­pe­rit, cum for­te ex­tra mer­cem pe­cu­lium es­set, quin­que tam­quam ad­huc cre­di­tor ser­vi de­du­ce­re de­be­bit.

12Julianus, Digest, Book XII. One man brings a suit against the master on account of the slave, only on the peculium, another institutes proceedings under the Tributorian Action; the question arises whether the master ought to deduct from the peculium what he will have to make good to the plaintiff in the Tributorian Action? The answer is that proceedings can be instituted under the Tributorian Action only where the master, in distributing the value of the merchandise, did not comply with the terms of the Prætor’s Edict; that is, when he has deducted a greater part of his own debt than he has apportioned among the creditors; as, for instance, where the merchandise was worth thirty aurei of which he himself had lent fifteen, and two other creditors had lent thirty, he deducted the entire fifteen, and gave the creditors the remaining fifteen, when he should only have deducted ten, and have given each of the creditors ten. Therefore, when he has acted in this way, it is not to be understood that he has released the slave from liability to him, for the reason that he still must pay five aurei on his account in the Tributorian Action. Wherefore, if he institutes proceedings with reference to the peculium, (if by chance there should be other peculium than that invested in the business) he has a right to deduct five aurei as being still a creditor of the slave.