Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XIII1,
De condictione furtiva
Liber tertius decimus
I.

De condictione furtiva

(Concerning the Action for the Recovery of Stolen Property.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. In fur­ti­va re so­li do­mi­no con­dic­tio com­pe­tit.

1Ad Dig. 13,1,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 453, Note 8.Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XVIII. Where property is stolen, suit for its recovery can be brought by the owner alone.

2Pom­po­nius li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo ad Sa­binum. Con­dic­tio­ne ex cau­sa fur­ti­va et fu­rio­si et in­fan­tes ob­li­gan­tur, cum he­redes ne­ces­sa­rii ex­sti­te­runt, quam­vis cum eis agi non pos­sit.

2Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XVI. Both insane persons and infants are liable to an action based on theft where they have become necessary heirs, although suit cannot be brought against them personally.

3Pau­lus li­bro no­no ad Sa­binum. Si con­di­ca­tur ser­vus ex cau­sa fur­ti­va, id venire in con­dic­tio­nem cer­tum est quod in­ter­sit agen­tis, vel­uti si he­res sit in­sti­tu­tus et pe­ri­cu­lum sub­eat do­mi­nus he­redi­ta­tis per­den­dae. quod et Iu­lia­nus scri­bit. item si mor­tuum ho­mi­nem con­di­cat, con­se­cu­tu­rum ait pre­tium he­redi­ta­tis.

3Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IX. Where a slave is sued in an action based on theft, it is certain that damages can be claimed to the amount of the interest of the plaintiff; as, for instance, where he was appointed heir, and his master may be in danger of losing the estate; and Julianus is of this opinion. Moreover, if the action is brought for a slave who is dead, the plaintiff will obtain the value of the estate.

4Ul­pia­nus li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo pri­mo ad Sa­binum. Si ser­vus vel fi­lius fa­mi­lias fur­tum com­mi­se­rit, con­di­cen­dum est do­mi­no id quod ad eum per­ve­nit: in re­si­duum no­xae ser­vum do­mi­nus de­de­re pot­est.

4Ad Dig. 13,1,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 359, Note 14.Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLI. Where a slave or a son under paternal control commits a theft, an action can be brought against the owner of the slave for whatever came into his hands; and with respect to the remainder, the owner can surrender the slave by way of reparation.

5Pau­lus li­bro no­no ad Sa­binum. Ex fur­ti­va cau­sa fi­lio fa­mi­lias con­di­ci pot­est: num­quam enim ea con­dic­tio­ne alius quam qui fe­cit te­ne­tur aut he­res eius.

5Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IX. An action arising from theft can be brought against a son under paternal control, for no one is ever liable to an action of this kind but the party who committed the theft or his heir.

6Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Pro­in­de et­si ope con­si­lio ali­cu­ius fur­tum fac­tum sit, con­dic­tio­ne non te­ne­bi­tur, et­si fur­ti te­ne­tur.

6Ad Dig. 13,1,6Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 453, Note 5.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXVIII. Hence, even where a theft is committed with the assistance and advice of another party, the latter will not be liable to this action, although he will be to an action for theft.

7Idem li­bro qua­dra­gen­si­mo se­cun­do ad Sa­binum. Si pro fu­re dam­num de­ci­sum sit, con­dic­tio­nem non im­pe­di­ri ve­ris­si­mum est: de­ci­sio­ne enim fur­ti qui­dem ac­tio, non au­tem con­dic­tio tol­li­tur. 1Fur­ti ac­tio poe­nam pe­tit le­gi­ti­mam, con­dic­tio rem ip­sam. ea res fa­cit, ut ne­que fur­ti ac­tio per con­dic­tio­nem ne­que con­dic­tio per fur­ti ac­tio­nem con­su­ma­tur. is ita­que, cui fur­tum fac­tum est, ha­bet ac­tio­nem fur­ti et con­dic­tio­nem et vin­di­ca­tio­nem, ha­bet et ad ex­hi­ben­dum ac­tio­nem. 2Con­dic­tio rei fur­ti­vae, quia rei ha­bet per­se­cu­tio­nem, he­redem quo­que fu­ris ob­li­gat, nec tan­tum si vi­vat ser­vus fur­ti­vus, sed et­iam si de­ces­se­rit: sed et si apud fu­ris he­redem diem suum ob­iit ser­vus fur­ti­vus vel non apud ip­sum, post mor­tem ta­men fu­ris, di­cen­dum est con­dic­tio­nem ad­ver­sus he­redem du­ra­re. quae in he­rede di­xi­mus, ea­dem erunt et in ce­te­ris suc­ces­so­ri­bus.

7The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLII. Where a party has made good the loss as a thief, it is perfectly certain that this is no bar to an action for recovery of the property; for by payment of the loss the right of action for theft is extinguished, but not the right of action for recovery of the stolen property. 1The action for theft is brought for the lawful penalty, but the action for recovery for the property itself; and the result is that neither the right of action for theft is lost by the one for recovery nor the action for recovery by that of theft. Therefore, a party who is the victim of a theft has a right of action for theft, a right of action for damages, and a right of action for recovery, and he is also entitled to an action for production. 2The action for the recovery of stolen property, because it involves proceedings to obtain the property itself, renders the heir of the thief also liable, and not only while the slave who was stolen is living, but also after his death. Where, however, the slave who was stolen lost his life while in possession of the heir of the thief—or even when he was not in his possession—after the death of the thief; it must be said that the action will continue to lie against the heir. What we have stated with reference to the heir is equally applicable to all other successors.

8Idem li­bro vi­cen­si­mo sep­ti­mo ad edic­tum. In re fur­ti­va con­dic­tio ip­so­rum cor­po­rum com­pe­tit: sed utrum tam­diu, quam­diu ex­stent, an ve­ro et si de­sie­rint es­se in re­bus hu­ma­nis? et si qui­dem op­tu­lit fur, si­ne du­bio nul­la erit con­dic­tio: si non op­tu­lit, du­rat con­dic­tio aes­ti­ma­tio­nis eius: cor­pus enim ip­sum prae­sta­ri non pot­est. 1Si ex cau­sa fur­ti­va res con­di­ca­tur, cu­ius tem­po­ris aes­ti­ma­tio fiat, quae­ri­tur. pla­cet ta­men id tem­pus spec­tan­dum, quo res um­quam plu­ri­mi fuit, ma­xi­me cum de­te­rio­rem rem fac­tam fur dan­do non li­be­ra­tur: sem­per enim mo­ram fur fa­ce­re vi­de­tur. 2No­vis­si­me di­cen­dum est et­iam fruc­tus in hac ac­tio­ne venire.

8The Same, On the Edict, Book XXVII. In the case of stolen property suit for recovery can be brought for the articles themselves; but can this be done only so long as they still exist, or where they have ceased to be in existence? If, indeed, the thief has surrendered them, then there is no doubt that suit for their recovery cannot be brought; but if he did not surrender them, a right of action for the recovery of their value still remains, for the articles themselves cannot be delivered. 1Ad Dig. 13,1,8,1ROHGE, Bd. 3 (1872), S. 96: Die allein für den Fall des furtum gegebene Vorschrift läßt keine analoge Ausdehnung auf nicht erfüllte Lieferungsverträge zu.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 280, Note 15.Where an action is brought for the recovery of stolen property, the question arises at what time the appraisement of its value should be made? It is, however, established that the time must be considered when the property was of the greatest value it ever possessed, and especially since a thief will not be released by giving up property which is deteriorated; for a thief is considered to be always in default. 2Finally, it must be said that the profits are also included in this action.

9Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo ad edic­tum. In con­dic­tio­ne ex cau­sa fur­ti­va non pro par­te quae per­ve­nit, sed in so­li­dum te­ne­mur, dum so­li he­redes su­mus, pro par­te au­tem he­res pro ea par­te, pro qua he­res est, te­ne­tur.

9The Same, On the Edict, Book XXX. In a suit for the recovery of stolen property, the party is liable not only for the amount which came into his hands, but also for all of it, if he is the sole heir; but where he is heir to a share, he is liable to the same proportion of such a share in the stolen property as he is entitled to in the estate.

10Idem li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Si­ve ma­ni­fes­tus fur si­ve nec ma­ni­fes­tus sit, pot­erit ei con­di­ci. ita de­mum au­tem ma­ni­fes­tus fur con­dic­tio­ne te­ne­bi­tur, si de­prae­hen­sa non fue­rit a do­mi­no pos­ses­sio eius: ce­te­rum ne­mo fu­rum con­dic­tio­ne te­ne­tur, post­ea­quam do­mi­nus pos­ses­sio­nem ad­prae­hen­dit. et id­eo Iu­lia­nus, ut pro­ce­dat in fu­re ma­ni­fes­to trac­ta­re de con­dic­tio­ne, ita pro­po­nit fu­rem de­pre­hen­sum aut oc­ci­dis­se aut fre­gis­se aut ef­fu­dis­se id quod in­ter­ce­pe­rat. 1Ei quo­que, qui vi bo­no­rum rap­to­rum te­ne­tur, con­di­ci pos­se Iu­lia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum sig­ni­fi­cat. 2Tam­diu au­tem con­dic­tio­ni lo­cus erit, do­nec do­mi­ni fac­to do­mi­nium eius rei ab eo re­ce­dat: et id­eo si eam rem alie­na­ve­rit, con­di­ce­re non pot­erit. 3Un­de Cel­sus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scri­bit, si rem fur­ti­vam do­mi­nus pu­re le­ga­ve­rit fu­ri, he­redem ei con­di­ce­re non pos­se: sed et si non ip­si fu­ri, sed alii, idem di­cen­dum est ces­sa­re con­dic­tio­nem, quia do­mi­nium fac­to tes­ta­to­ris, id est do­mi­ni, dis­ces­sit.

10The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXVIII. A thief can be sued for the recovery of stolen property whether he is a manifest thief or a non-manifest one. A manifest thief, however, will only be liable to an action for recovery where the possession of the property stolen has not been obtained by the owner; for no one is liable to a suit for recovery after the owner has taken possession of the property. Therefore, Julianus, in order that he may proceed with the discussion of the action for recovery in the case of a manifest thief, supposes that the thief, after being caught, has either killed, broken to pieces, or spilled what he had wrongfully appropriated. 1A person also who is liable for robbery with violence, (so Julianus states in the Twenty-second Book of the Digest), can be sued in an action for the recovery of the property. 2Ad Dig. 13,1,10,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 171, Note 2.There is ground for an action for recovery only so long as the ownership of the property has not been lost to the proprietor by his own act; and therefore, if he transfers it to another, he cannot bring suit for its recovery. 3Wherefore Celsus states in the Twelfth Book of the Digest, that if the owner bequeaths the stolen property to the thief absolutely, the heir cannot bring an action against him to recover it; and where the bequest was not made to the thief himself but to another, the same rule is applicable, and an action for recovery will not lie, as the ownership is lost by the act of the testator; that is to say of the owner.

11Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Sed nec le­ga­ta­rius con­di­ce­re pot­est: ei enim com­pe­tit con­dic­tio, cui res sub­rep­ta est, vel he­redi eius: sed vin­di­ca­re rem le­ga­tam ab eo pot­est.

11Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Nor can the legatee himself bring a personal action, for this is only available by the person whose property has been stolen or by his heir; but the legatee has a right to recover property which was bequeathed to him by means of another action.

12Ul­pia­nus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad edic­tum. Et id­eo ele­gan­ter Mar­cel­lus de­fi­nit li­bro sep­ti­mo: ait enim: si res mi­hi sub­rep­ta tua re­ma­neat, con­di­ces. sed et si do­mi­nium non tuo fac­to amis­e­ris, ae­que con­di­ces. 1In com­mu­ni igi­tur re ele­gan­ter ait in­ter­es­se, utrum tu pro­vo­cas­ti com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do iu­di­cio an pro­vo­ca­tus es, ut, si pro­vo­cas­ti com­mu­ni di­vi­dun­do iu­di­cio, amis­e­ris con­dic­tio­nem, si pro­vo­ca­tus es, re­ti­neas. 2Ne­ra­tius li­bris mem­bra­na­rum Aris­to­nem ex­is­ti­mas­se, re­fert eum, cui pig­no­ri res da­ta sit, in­cer­ti con­dic­tio­ne ac­tu­rum, si ea sub­rep­ta sit.

12Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXVIII. Consequently Marcellus very properly states in the Seventh Book, that if the property stolen still remains yours you can bring a personal action to recover it; but if you lose the ownership in some other way than by your own act, you can likewise bring suit to recover it. 1Therefore he very aptly says that where the property is held in common, it makes a difference whether you instituted proceedings against your co-owner by an action for partition, or he brought suit against you, and if you instituted proceedings for this purpose you will lose the right to bring a personal action for recovery, but if he did so, he will still retain that right. 2Neratius, in the Books of Parchments, states that it is held by Aristo that he to whom property had been pledged can, if it should be stolen, bring an action for an uncertain amount of damages.

13Pau­lus li­bro tri­gen­si­mo no­no ad edic­tum. Ex ar­gen­to sub­rep­to po­cu­la fac­ta con­di­ci pos­se Ful­ci­nius ait: er­go in con­dic­tio­ne po­cu­lo­rum et­iam cae­la­tu­rae aes­ti­ma­tio fiet, quae im­pen­sa fu­ris fac­ta est, quem­ad­mo­dum si in­fans sub­rep­tus ad­ole­ve­rit, aes­ti­ma­tio fit ad­ules­cen­tis, quam­vis cu­ra et sump­ti­bus fu­ris cre­ve­rit.

13Ad Dig. 13,1,13Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 187, Note 3.Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Where cups have been made out of stolen silver, Fulcinius says that a personal action can be brought, and therefore in the proceedings for their recovery an estimate should be made of the value of any engraving which was done at the expense of the thief; just as where a slave-child is stolen and grows up, an estimate is made of his value when grown, even though he was reared under the care and at the expense of the thief.

14Iu­lia­nus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo se­cun­do di­ges­to­rum. Si ser­vus fur­ti­vus sub con­di­cio­ne le­ga­tus fue­rit, pen­den­te ea he­res con­dic­tio­nem ha­be­bit et, si li­te con­tes­ta­ta con­di­cio ex­sti­te­rit, ab­so­lu­tio se­qui de­be­bit, per­in­de ac si idem ser­vus sub con­di­cio­ne li­ber es­se ius­sus fuis­set et li­te con­tes­ta­ta con­di­cio ex­sti­tis­set: nam nec pe­ti­to­ris iam in­ter­est ho­mi­nem re­ci­pe­re et res si­ne do­lo ma­lo fu­ris eius es­se de­siit. quod si pen­den­te con­di­cio­ne iu­di­ca­re­tur, iu­dex aes­ti­ma­re de­be­bit, quan­ti emp­to­rem in­ve­ne­rit. 1Ca­ve­re au­tem ex hac ac­tio­ne pe­ti­tor ei cum quo agi­tur non de­be­bit. 2Bo­ve sub­rep­to et oc­ci­so con­dic­tio et bo­vis et co­rii et car­nis do­mi­no com­pe­tit, sci­li­cet si et co­rium et ca­ro con­trec­ta­ta fue­runt11Die Großausgabe liest fue­rint statt fue­runt.: cor­nua quo­que con­di­cen­tur. sed si do­mi­nus con­dic­tio­ne bo­vis pre­tium con­se­cu­tus fue­rit et post­ea ali­quid eo­rum, de qui­bus su­pra dic­tum est, con­di­cet, om­ni­mo­do ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­tur. con­tra si co­rium con­di­xe­rit et pre­tium eius con­se­cu­tus bo­vem con­di­cet, of­fe­ren­te fu­re pre­tium bo­vis de­trac­to pre­tio co­rii do­li ma­li ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­bi­tur. 3Idem iu­ris est uvis sub­rep­tis: nam et mus­tum et vi­na­cia iu­re con­di­ci pos­sunt.

14Julianus, Digest, Book XXII. Ad Dig. 13,1,14 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 361, Note 3.Where a stolen slave has been bequeathed under some condition, then, as long as the condition is pending, the heir will have a right of action for his recovery, but if the condition should be fulfilled after issue has been joined, the case must be dismissed; just as if the same slave had been directed by the testator to be free under a certain condition, and the condition was complied with after issue had been joined; for the plaintiff is no longer interested in securing the slave, and the property has ceased to be his without any fraudulent act on the part of the thief. Where judgment is rendered while the condition was pending, the judge must make an estimate of the sum the slave would have been worth if a purchaser had been found. 1In this action, however, the plaintiff is not obliged to furnish security to the party who is sued. 2Where an ox is stolen and killed, a personal action for recovery can be brought by the owner for the ox, the hide, and the flesh; that is, where the hide and the flesh have been handled in stealing, and suit to recover the horns may also be brought. Where, however, the owner obtains the value of the ox by a personal action for recovery, and afterwards brings a similar suit for any of the things above mentioned, he can undoubtedly be barred by an exception. On the other hand, if he should bring suit for the hide and recover its value, and then sue to recover the ox, and the thief tenders the value of the ox after deducting the value of the hide, the plaintiff will be barred by an exception on the ground of fraudulent intent. 3Ad Dig. 13,1,14,3Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 187, Note 3.The same rule applies where grapes are stolen, for the must and the grape-stones can be recovered by a personal action.

15Cel­sus li­bro duo­de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum. Quod ab alio ser­vus sub­ri­puit, eius no­mi­ne li­ber fur­ti te­ne­tur: con­di­ci au­tem ei non pot­est, ni­si li­ber con­trec­ta­vit.

15Celsus, Digest, Book XII. Where a slave steals from another party, he will be liable for theft in his own name if he becomes free; but a personal action for recovery cannot be brought against him unless he handled the property after he was free.

16Pom­po­nius li­bro tri­gen­si­mo oc­ta­vo ad Quin­tum Mu­cium. Qui fur­tum ad­mit­tit vel re com­mo­da­ta vel de­po­si­ta uten­do, con­dic­tio­ne quo­que ex fur­ti­va cau­sa ob­strin­gi­tur: quae dif­fert ab ac­tio­ne com­mo­da­ti hoc, quod, et­iam­si si­ne do­lo ma­lo et cul­pa eius in­ter­ie­rit res, con­dic­tio­ne ta­men te­ne­tur, cum in com­mo­da­ti ac­tio­ne non fa­ci­le ul­tra cul­pam et in de­po­si­ti non ul­tra do­lum ma­lum te­n­ea­tur is, cum quo de­po­si­ti age­tur.

16Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXXVIII. Where anyone commits a theft by using something which was lent to him or deposited with him, he can be compelled to account for doing so by a personal action for recovery on the ground of theft also, and this differs from the action to recover property loaned, because, even if the property had been destroyed without his malice or negligence, he will, nevertheless, be liable to a personal action for recovery; while in the action to recover property loaned he will not readily be held liable, except where he was guilty of negligence, and in an action on deposit he would not be liable at all unless malicious intent was established.

17Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro de­ci­mo quaes­tio­num. Par­vi re­fert ad tol­len­dam con­dic­tio­nem, of­fe­ra­tur ser­vus fur­ti­vus an in aliud no­men alium­que sta­tum ob­li­ga­tio­nis trans­fe­ra­tur: nec me mo­vet, prae­sens ho­mo fue­rit nec ne, cum mo­ra, quae eve­nie­bat ex fur­to, vel­uti qua­dam dele­ga­tio­ne fi­nia­tur.

17Papinianus, Questions, Book X. It makes little difference, so far as the loss of the right of action to recover is concerned, whether, after a slave had been stolen, an offer is made to return him, or whether the case is placed under a different class or a different species of obligation; for it does not matter to me whether the slave is present or not, as the default which arose from the theft is disposed of by a kind of assignment of the claim.

18Scae­vo­la li­bro quar­to quaes­tio­num. Quon­iam fur­tum fit, cum quis in­de­bi­tos num­mos sciens ac­ce­pe­rit, vi­den­dum, si pro­cu­ra­tor suos num­mos sol­vat, an ip­si fur­tum fiat. et Pom­po­nius epis­tu­la­rum li­bro oc­ta­vo ip­sum con­di­ce­re ait ex cau­sa fur­ti­va: sed et me con­di­ce­re, si ra­tum ha­beam quod in­de­bi­tum da­tum sit. sed al­te­ra con­dic­tio­ne al­te­ra tol­li­tur.

18Scævola, Questions, Book IV. Where a party knowingly receives money which is not due, since this is the same as a theft, it should be considered whether, when an agent makes payment with his own money, he does not commit a theft upon himself? Pomponius says in the Eighth Book of the Epistles, that the agent has a right of action for recovery based on theft; and that I, also, have such a right, if I ratify the payment of money which is not due; but where one action is brought, the right to bring the other is extinguished.

19Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio ad Ne­ra­tium. Iu­lia­nus ex per­so­na fi­liae, quae res amo­vit, dan­dam in pa­trem con­dic­tio­nem in pe­cu­lium re­spon­dit.

19Paulus, On Neratius, Book III. Julianus says, with reference to a daughter who removed property belonging to her husband, that a personal action for recovery should be granted against her father to the extent of her peculium.

20Try­pho­ni­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Li­cet fur pa­ra­tus fue­rit ex­ci­pe­re con­dic­tio­nem et per me ste­te­rit, dum in re­bus hu­ma­nis res fue­rat, con­di­ce­re eam, post­ea au­tem per­emp­ta est, ta­men du­ra­re con­dic­tio­nem ve­te­res vo­lue­runt, quia vi­de­tur, qui pri­mo in­vi­to do­mi­no rem con­trec­ta­ve­rit, sem­per in re­sti­tuen­da ea, quam nec de­buit au­fer­re, mo­ram fa­ce­re.

20Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book XV. Suppose a thief is prepared to defend a personal action brought against him for the recovery of stolen property; as long as the property exists I have a right to bring the action, but where it is afterwards destroyed, the ancient authorities held that the right still remained, because it was their opinion that where a man had, in the beginning, handled the property without the consent of the owner, he is always in default with reference to returning it, because he ought not to have removed it.