1Paulus, On Sabinus, Book X. Everything which is given is parted with either with some purpose in view or for a consideration; and where it is given for some purpose it may be either immoral or honorable, and where it is immoral, the immorality may either attach to the giver and not to the receiver, or it may attach to the receiver and not the giver, or it may attach to both. 1Hence where anything is given for an honorable purpose, an action can be brought for its recovery only where the purpose for which it was granted was not accomplished. 2Where, however, the receiver is the one guilty of immorality, even though the purpose be accomplished, an action can be brought for the recovery of the gift.

2Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. For example, suppose I gave you something to induce you not to commit sacrilege or theft, or not to kill a man. In this instance, Julianus says that if I give it to you to prevent you from killing a man, an action for its recovery can be brought. 1Moreover, the rule is the same, if I gave you something on the condition that you would return to me property which I deposited with you, or would restore to me certain documents. 2Where, however, I gave you something on the condition that the judge would decide in my favor in a good cause, it has indeed, been stated that there will be ground for an action for recovery, but he who does this commits a crime, as he is held to corrupt the judge; and recently our Emperor decreed that he should lose his case.

3Paulus, On Sabinus, Book X. Where both the giver and the receiver are guilty of immoral conduct, we hold that suit cannot be brought for the recovery of the donation; as, for instance, where money is paid in order that an unjust judgment may be rendered.

4Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. The same rule applies where money is paid in consideration of prostitution, or where a party who has been caught in adultery purchases immunity, as no action for recovery will lie; and this is the opinion of Sabinus and Pegasus. 1Moreover, where a thief pays to avoid being surrendered, since, in this instance, as both parties are guilty of immorality, no action for recovery will lie. 2Where, however, only the receiver is guilty of immoral conduct, Celsus says an action for recovery can be brought; for example, where I pay you to prevent you from injuring me. 3Money paid to a harlot, however, cannot be recovered, as Labeo and Marcellus state; but the principle is not the same, as the question is not whether there is immorality on both sides, but that it exists only on the part of the giver; as the woman acts in an immoral manner because she is a harlot, but she is not immoral when she accepts the money since she is a harlot. 4If I give you something in return for information, for example, in order that you may reveal the whereabouts of my fugitive slave, or tell me where a thief who has stolen my property may be found; suit cannot be brought for what I have, because you, in receiving it, were not guilty of immorality. But if you accept money from my fugitive slave to prevent you from giving information respecting him, I can bring an action against you to recover said money, just as if you were a thief; and if the thief himself, or the companion of a thief, or of a fugitive slave, received money from me in return for information; I am of the opinion that there will be ground for an action for the recovery of the same.

5Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. Where anyone receives money from my slave to prevent him from giving information concerning a theft which he committed, whether he gives the information or not, Proculus says that an action will lie for the recovery of the money.

6Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XVIII. Sabinus always approved of the opinion of the ancient authorities, namely, that where anything is in the hands of a party illegally, it can be recovered by a personal action; and Celsus also concurs in this opinion.

7Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXII. Where money has been obtained through a stipulation which was extorted by force, it is established that an action will lie for its recovery.

8Paulus, Questions, Book III. If you should promise Titius anything for an immoral consideration, you can bar him by an exception on the ground of malicious contrivance, or in factum; nevertheless, if you give it, you cannot bring an action for its recovery; since the more recent event, that is to say the stipulation, is disposed of, having been made of no effect by reason of the exception, and the former event, that is to say the immorality, remains. And, moreover, if the position of both the giver and the receiver is immoral, that of the possessor is preferable; and hence an action for recovery will not lie, although the money was paid on account of the stipulation.

9Ad Dig. 12,5,9ROHGE, Bd. 8 (1873), S. 171: Widerrechtliche Einwirkung des einen Paciscenten auf die Willensbestimmung des Andern durch Bedrohungen.The Same, On Plautius, Book V. If I lend you clothes to be used by you, and afterwards I pay money for their return, it has been held that I can properly proceed by means of a personal action for recovery; because, although the money was paid for a certain purpose, and the purpose was accomplished, nevertheless, it was improperly paid. 1If you receive money from me as an incentive for you to return property which was rented to you, or sold to you, or placed in your custody, I will be entitled to an action against you based on lease, sale, or mandate; but if I paid you the money to induce you to deliver to me something which you owed by reason of a will or a stipulation, there will be merely a right to bring suit for recovery of the money paid you for this purpose; as was stated by Pomponius.