De iureiurando sive voluntario sive necessario sive iudiciali
(Concerning the taking of an oath, whether voluntary, compulsory, or judicial.)
1 Gaius libro quinto ad edictum provinciale. Maximum remedium expediendarum litium in usum venit iurisiurandi religio, qua vel ex pactione ipsorum litigatorum vel ex auctoritate iudicis deciduntur controversiae.
1 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V. A very important means for promptly disposing of litigation has come into use, that is to say, the religious character of an oath, by means of which controversies are decided either through the agreement of the parties themselves, or by the authority of the judge.
2 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Iusiurandum speciem transactionis continet maioremque habet auctoritatem quam res iudicata.
2 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. The taking of an oath has the appearance of a compromise, and it has greater weight than the judgment of a court.
3 Ulpianus libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. Ait praetor: ‘Si is cum quo agetur condicione delata iuraverit’. eum cum quo agetur accipere debemus ipsum reum. nec frustra adicitur ‘condicione delata’: nam si reus iuraverit nemine ei iusiurandum deferente, praetor id iusiurandum non tuebitur: sibi enim iuravit: alioquin facillimus quisque ad iusiurandum decurrens nemine sibi deferente iusiurandum oneribus actionum se liberabit. 1Quacumque autem actione quis conveniatur, si iuraverit, proficiet ei iusiurandum, sive in personam sive in rem sive in factum sive poenali actione vel quavis alia agatur sive de interdicto. 2Sed et si de condicione personae fuerit iuratum, praetor iusiurandum tuebitur: ut puta detuli iusiurandum et iurasti in potestate mea te non esse: tuendum erit iusiurandum. 3Unde Marcellus scribit etiam de eo iurari posse, an praegnas sit mulier vel non sit, et iuriiurando standum: denique ait, si de possessione erat quaestio, servari oportere, si forte quasi praegnas ire in possessionem volebat et, cum ei contradiceretur, vel ipsa iuravit se praegnatem vel contra eam iuratum est: nam si ipsa, ibit in possessionem sine metu, si contra eam, non ibit, quamvis vere praegnas fuerit: proderitque, inquit Marcellus, mulieri iuranti iusiurandum, ne conveniatur quasi calumniae causa ventris nomine fuerit in possessionem neve vim patiatur in possessione. sed an iusiurandum eo usque prosit, ut post editum partum non quaeratur, ex eo editus sit an non sit cuius esse dicitur, Marcellus tractat: et ait veritatem esse quaerendam, quia iusiurandum alteri neque prodest neque nocet: matris igitur iusiurandum partui non proficiet: nec nocebit, si mater detulerit et iuretur ex eo praegnas non esse. 4Iurari autem oportet, ut delatum est iusiurandum: ceterum si ego detuli ut per deum iurares, tu per caput tuum iurasti
3 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXII. The Prætor says: “Where a party against whom suit is brought, after certain proposals have been offered, makes oath.” We must understand the words “The party against whom suit is brought” to mean the defendant himself. The other words “After certain proposals have been offered,” as not unnecessarily added; for if a defendant should take the oath without its being tendered to him by anyone, the Prætor will not recognize an oath of this description, as the party merely swears to himself; otherwise, it would be extremely easy for anyone who cares little for an oath to take it where no one tendered it to him, and thereby free himself from the burden of a suit. 1Where a party is sued in any kind of an action, if he makes oath it will be a benefit to him, whether the action is one in personam, in rem, or in factum, or where it is a penal action, or any other kind, or where the proceedings relate to an interdict. 2Where the oath is taken with reference to the civil condition of the person, the Prætor will sustain it; as, for instance, where I tendered you an oath and you swore that you were not under my control, the oath must be sustained. 3Wherefore, Marcellus states that an oath can be taken with reference to the question as to whether a certain woman is pregnant or not, and the oath must stand. Finally, he says that where the inquiry relates to possession, the oath must be sustained; for example, where a woman wishes to be placed in possession of property because she is pregnant, and when this is disputed by the other side, then she must either swear that she is pregnant, or the other party must swear that she is not, for if she herself makes oath, she can enter into possession without apprehension; and, on the other hand, if the oath is made against her, she cannot do so, even though she may be actually pregnant; and therefore Marcellus says that a woman who takes the oath will have the benefit of it, and will avoid legal proceedings on the ground of having taken possession in behalf of an unborn child, for the purpose of deception; nor can she be subject to force while she is in possession. But whether an oath will be an advantage so far as to prevent inquiry being made after a child is born as to whether it is the offspring of him who is said to be its father or not, is a question discussed by Marcellus, and he says that the truth ought to be ascertained, because the oath does not benefit or injure another; hence the oath of the mother will not benefit the child, nor will it cause any injury if the mother tenders it, and oath is made that she is not pregnant by a certain man. 4It is necessary for a party to swear in the terms in which the oath is tendered, but if I tender it for you, you may swear by God and you swear by your own head,
4 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. vel filiorum tuorum,
4 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Or the heads of your sons,
5 Ulpianus libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. non erit ratum habendum iusiurandum: quod si exegi, ut per salutem tuam iurares, et iurasti, stabitur. omne enim omnino licitum iusiurandum, per quod voluit quis sibi iurari, idoneum est et si ex eo fuerit iuratum, praetor id tuebitur. 1Divus Pius iureiurando, quod propria superstitione iuratum est, standum rescripsit. 2Dato iureiurando non aliud quaeritur, quam an iuratum sit, remissa quaestione an debeatur, quasi satis probatum sit iureiurando. 3Sed si quis illicitum iusiurandum detulerit, scilicet improbatae publice religionis, videamus an pro eo habeatur atque si iuratum non esset: quod magis existimo dicendum. 4Si neque iuratum est neque remissum iusiurandum, pro eo debet haberi, atque si res in iusiurandum admissa non esset. proinde si postea iurare paratus sit, nihil ei hoc iusiurandum proficiet, quia ex eo quod delatum est iuratum non est.
5 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXII. An oath of this kind will be of no effect. If, however, I required you to swear by your own salvation and you do so, I must abide by it; for every kind of an oath which is at all lawful and by which any one wishes to be sworn in his own behalf is suitable, and if it is taken, the Prætor will sustain it. 1The Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that if an oath was taken in accordance with some peculiar superstition, it must stand. 2When the oath has been taken, nothing else must be asked but whether the party was sworn, and the question as to whether anything is due is not considered, as this is sufficiently established by the oath. 3Where, however, a party tenders an unlawful oath, that is to say, one relative to a religion the profession of which is publicly forbidden; let us see whether it should be considered as if no oath had been taken; and this, I think, is the better opinion. 4Where an oath is taken, and the party is not released from being sworn, it must be held that the matter has never been submitted to determination by oath, and hence if he should afterwards be willing to be sworn, the oath will be of no advantage to him; because it was not taken with reference to the matter for which it was tendered.
6 Paulus libro nono decimo ad edictum. Remittit iusiurandum, qui deferente se cum paratus esset adversarius iurare gratiam ei facit contentus voluntate suscepti iurisiurandi. quod si non suscepit iusiurandum, licet postea parato iurare actor nolit deferre, non videbitur remissum: nam quod susceptum est remitti debet.
6 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIX. A party waives an oath who, when he tenders it, and his adversary evinces a willingness to take it, he excuses him from doing so, being satisfied because the other party consents to be sworn. Where, however, the latter did not take it, but is afterwards ready to do so, and the plaintiff is unwilling to tender it; he is not held to have dispensed with it, for it can only be dispensed with when it is accepted.
7 Ulpianus libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. Ait praetor: ‘Eius rei, de qua iusiurandum delatum fuerit, neque in ipsum neque in eum ad quem ea res pertinet actionem dabo.’ eius rei sic erit accipiendum, sive de tota re sive de parte sit iuratum: nam de eo quod iuratum est pollicetur se actionem non daturum neque in eum qui iuravit neque in eos qui in locum eius cui iusiurandum delatum est succedunt,
7 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXII. The Prætor says: “With reference to a matter for which an oath has been tendered, I will not grant an action either against the party himself, or against him to whom the property belonged.” The term “matter” must be understood to be applicable whether the oath is taken with reference to the entire property in question or only a portion of the same; for the Prætor promises that he will not grant an action with reference to what was sworn to, either against the party who took the oath, or against those who succeed to him to whom the oath was tendered,
8 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. etiamsi in rem successerint.
8 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Even though they succeed to the property.
9 Ulpianus libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. Nam posteaquam iuratum est, denegatur actio: aut, si controversia erit, id est si ambigitur. an iusiurandum datum sit, exceptioni locus est. 1Iureiurando dato vel remisso reus quidem adquirit exceptionem sibi aliisque, actor vero actionem adquirit, in qua hoc solum quaeritur, an iuraverit dari sibi oportere vel, cum iurare paratus esset, iusiurandum ei remissum sit. 2Si damnetur quis post iusiurandum ex famoso iudicio, famosum esse magis est. 3Si is, qui temporaria actione mihi obligatus erat, detulerit iusiurandum, ut iurem eum dare oportere, egoque iuravero, tempore non liberatur, quia post litem contestatam cum eo perpetuatur adversus eum obligatio. 4Si minor viginti quinque annis detulerit et hoc ipso captum se dicat, adversus exceptionem iurisiurandi replicari debebit, ut Pomponius ait. ego autem puto hanc replicationem non semper esse dandam, sed plerumque ipsum praetorem debere cognoscere, an captus sit, et sic in integrum restituere: nec enim utique qui minor est statim et circumscriptum se docuit. praeterea exceptio ista sive cognitio statutum tempus post annum vicensimum quintum non debet egredi. 5Sed et si quis in fraudem creditorum iusiurandum detulerit debitori, adversus exceptionem iurisiurandi replicatio fraudis creditoribus debet dari. praeterea si fraudator detulerit iusiurandum creditori, ut iuret sibi decem dari oportere, mox bonis eius venditis experiri volet, aut denegari debet actio aut exceptio opponitur fraudatorum creditorum. 6Iusiurandum defensoris vel procuratoris ei ab adversario delatum prodesse exceptionemque domino parere Iulianus scribit. idem ergo dicendum erit et si datus ad petendum procurator reo deferente iuraverit dari mihi oportere: nam actionem mihi parit. quae sententia habet rationem. 7Si petitor iuravit possessore deferente rem suam esse, actori dabitur actio, sed hoc dumtaxat adversus eum qui iusiurandum detulit eosque qui in eius locum successerunt: ceterum adversus alium si velit praerogativa iurisiurandi uti, nihil ei proderit,
9 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXI. For, after the oath is taken, the action is refused; and if there should be any controversy, that is to say, if it is disputed whether the oath was taken or not, there is ground for an exception. 1Where the oath has been taken or dispensed with, the defendant will be entitled to an exception both for himself and for others; and the plaintiff will acquire a right of action in which the only matter to be considered is whether he swore that something should be given him, or where he was prepared to swear and the oath was dispensed with. 2If judgment is rendered against a party after the oath has been taken, in a case where infamy is involved; the better opinion is that he becomes infamous. 3Where a party who is liable to me in a temporary action tenders me an oath in such a way that I must swear that he is obliged to pay, and I swear to this; he will not be released by lapse of time, for the reason that his liability is perpetuated after issue has been joined. 4Where anyone under twenty-five years of age tenders an oath, and states that advantage has been taken of him in doing so, he should file a replication in answer to an exception based upon the oath; as Pomponius says. I, however, am of the opinion that this replication should never be granted; but that, in most instances, the Prætor himself should investigate as to whether advantage was taken of the minor, and grant him complete restitution; for the mere fact that he is a minor does not establish the fact that he has been swindled. Moreover, this exception or inquiry ought not to extend beyond the time prescribed by law after the minor has reached his twenty-fifth year. 5Moreover, where a party tenders an oath to a debtor in fraud of his creditors, and a replication on the ground of fraud should be granted the creditors against an exception based upon the oath; and, moreover, if the party guilty of fraud tenders an oath to a creditor in order to have the latter swear that he should pay him ten aurei, and afterwards, when his property has been sold, he wishes to bring an action; either the action must be refused, or it may be opposed by an exception on the ground of defrauding creditors. 6Julianus says that the oath of a party who defends a case voluntarily or is appointed an attorney, if tendered by the adversary, will be a good defence and will provide the principal with an exception. Hence it must be said that the same rule applies where an agent is appointed to bring an action, and the defendant, having tendered an oath, swears that the amount should be paid to me; for this furnishes me with a right of action. This opinion is reasonable. 7Where the plaintiff has sworn, on the oath tendered by the party in possession, that the property is his, he will be entitled to an action; but this only applies to the party who tendered the oath and to these who have succeeded to his place; but if he should wish to make use of the privilege obtained by taking the oath in an action against another, his oath will be of no benefit to him;
10 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. quia non deberet alii nocere, quod inter alios actum esset.
10 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Because a transaction between certain parties should not injure anyone else.
11 Ulpianus libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. Sed si possessori fuerit iusiurandum delatum iuraverit rem petitoris non esse, quamdiu quidem possidet, adversus eum qui detulit iusiurandum, si petat, exceptione iurisiurandi utetur: si vero amiserit possessionem, actionem non habebit, ne quidem si is possideat qui ei iusiurandum detulit: non enim rem suam esse iuravit, sed eius non esse. 1Proinde si, cum possideret, deferente petitore rem suam iuravit, consequenter dicemus amissa quoque possessione, si is qui detulit iusiurandum nanctus sit possessionem, actionem in factum ei dandam. et fructus perceptos ex re, quam meam esse iuravi, restitui mihi placuit: sed et partum editum fetusque pecorum restituendos constat post iusiurandum delatum. 2Item si iuravero usum fructum alicuius rei vel meum esse vel dari mihi oportere, eatenus mihi competit actio, quatenus, si vere usum fructum haberem, duraret: quibus vero casibus amitteretur, non competit mihi actio. sed si rerum, in quibus usus fructus propter abusum constitui non potest, iuraverit usum fructum se habere vel sibi deberi, effectum iurisiurandi sequendum arbitror ideoque tunc quoque videri eum recte iurasse puto et ex eo iureiurando posse petere usum fructum cautione oblata. 3Si, cum de hereditate inter me et te controversia esset, iuravero hereditatem meam esse, id consequi debeo, quod haberem, si secundum me de hereditate pronuntiatum esset. et non solum eas res restituere debes, quas tunc possidebas, sed et si quas postea coepisses possidere, perindeque haberi quod iuratum est atque si probatum esset: idcirco utilis actio mihi competit, quod si ego ex eadem hereditate possiderem tuque coepisses petere eam a me, cum adversus te iurassem, exceptione me uti debere iurisiurandi. plane si alius a me hereditatem petere coeperit, dubium non erit, ut et Iulianus scribit, nihil mihi iusiurandum prodesse.
11 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXII. Where an oath is tendered to a party in possession, and he swears that the property does not belong to the plaintiff, then, so long as he holds possession, he can make use of an exception based upon the oath against the party who tendered it; but if he should lose possession, he will not be entitled to the action, not even if the party who tendered him the oath is in possession; for he did not swear that the property was his, but merely that it did not belong to the other party. 1Hence, if, while he is in possession, the plaintiff having tendered him the oath he swore that the property was his; we hold, in consequence, that even though he should lose possession, and the party who tendered him the oath should acquire it, an action in factum should be granted him. Again, it has been settled that any crops which may have been gathered from property which I have sworn to be mine must be restored to me, and that the offspring of female slaves and the young of cattle must be surrendered, after the oath is tendered. 2In like manner, if I should swear that the usufruct of any property is either mine or should be surrendered to me, an action will lie in my favor as long as I am entitled to the usufruct in the same; but in those cases in which the usufruct would be lost, I will have no right of action. Where, however, the party swears that he has an usufruct, or that he is entitled to one in property in which no usufruct can be created, because it would be consumed by use; my opinion is that the effect of the oath must be sustained, and, therefore, even though it should be held that he was properly sworn, I think that, on account of the oath, he can claim the usufruct if security is given. 3When a controversy exists between yourself and me with reference to an estate, and I swear that it belongs to me, I have a right to obtain whatever I would have been entitled to if judgment had been rendered in my favor in a suit for the estate; and you are required to deliver not only the property of which you had possession at the time, but also whatever you became possessed of afterwards; and the oath must be considered of as much importance as if my case had been proved, and therefore an equitable action will lie in my favor. If, however, I am in possession on account of a right to the estate, and you undertake to recover it from me, and I make oath against you; I shall be entitled to an exception based on said oath. It is clear that, if some other party institutes proceedings against me to recover the estate, there will be no doubt (as Julianus says), that the oath will be of no advantage to me.
12 Iulianus libro nono digestorum. Idem est et si ego a quolibet alio possidente res hereditarias petere velim, quia et si petissem a te hereditatem et probassem meam, nihilo minus ab altero petendo id ipsum probare necesse haberem.
12 Julianus, Digest, Book IX. The same rule prevails where I wish to sue anyone who is in possession of property belonging to an estate; because if I should bring an action to recover the estate from you, and prove that it is mine, nevertheless, if I brought suit against another person it would be necessary for me to prove the same thing.
13 Ulpianus libro vicensimo secundo ad edictum. Si duo patroni essent et libertus altero deferente iurasset se libertum eius non esse, utrum alteri totius debitae patronis portionis an vero dimidiae debitae eis partis bonorum possessio competeret? et ait, si is cui iuratum est patronus fuisset, alteri suae partis bonorum possessionem competere nec ei prodesse, quod adversus alterum libertus iurasset: multum tamen fidei et auctoritatis apud iudicem patronum habiturum, quo magis solum se patronum probaret, quod libertus iurasset alterum patronum non esse. 1Iulianus ait eum, qui iuravit fundum suum esse, post longi temporis praescriptionem etiam utilem actionem habere debere. 2Idem Iulianus scribit eum, qui iuravit furtum se non fecisse, videri de toto iurasse, atque ideo neque furti neque condicticia tenetur, quia condicticia, inquit, solus fur tenetur. numquid ergo qui iuravit se furtum ne fecisse hoc solo nomine, condictione si conveniatur, exceptione utatur? ceterum si contendat qui condicit quasi cum herede se furis agere, non debet repelli et quasi μονομερὴς condictio ei dari debet adversus furis heredem nec pati eum iudex debet, si coeperit temptare probare furem. 3Si quis iuraverit vendidisse me ei rem centum, ex empto agere poterit, ut ei cetera praestentur, id est res tradatur et de evictione caveatur: an tamen ad pretium consequendum ex venditio conveniri possit, videndum. et si quidem et de hoc ipso iuratum est, quod pretium solutum est, nulla pro pretio actio superest: si vero hoc non fuerit iuratum, tunc consequens est de pretio eum teneri. 4Idem dicemus et si quis societatem fecisse iuraverit: nam et is pro socio poterit conveniri. 5Marcellus etiam scribit, si quis iuraverit ob decem pignori dedisse fundum, non alias eum pigneraticia agere posse, quam si decem solverit: sed et illud adici fortassis eum etiam in decem ex iureiurando suo posse conveniri, quod magis probat. cui Quintus Saturninus consentit argumentoque utitur eius, qui iuravit eam, quae uxor sua fuerit, rem sibi in dotem dedisse: nam et hic uxori ait utilem de dote actionem dandam. quae non esse extra aequitatem posita non negaverim. 6Si quis iuraverit in re pecuniaria per genium principis dare se non oportere et peieraverit vel dari sibi oportere, vel intra certum tempus iuraverit se soluturum nec solvit: imperator noster cum patre rescripsit fustibus eum castigandum dimittere et ita ei superdici: προπετῶς μὴ ὄμνυε.
13 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXII. Where there are two patrons, and, one of them having tendered an oath, a freedman swears that he is not his freedman, will the other be entitled to possession of the entire property which patrons have a right to, or only to half of the same? It is said, by way of answer, that if the party to whom the oath was sworn was a patron, the other has a right to the possession of his own share of the property, and it will be of no benefit to him that the freedman made oath against the other; but the patron will have a great deal of consideration and authority if he applies to a judge in an attempt to prove that he is the sole patron, because the freedman swore that the other was not his patron. 1Julianus says that anyone who swears that a certain tract of land is his should, after sufficient time has elapsed to give him a title by prescription, also have a right to a prætorian action. 2Julianus also says that where a party swears that he did not commit theft, he is held to have made oath with reference to everything relating to the matter; and therefore he will not be liable to an action of theft, or to a personal action for recovery, for the reason that only a thief is liable to the latter action. Therefore, can anyone who swears that he did not commit theft, make use of an exception on this account, if a personal action for recovery is brought against him? Where the party who brings the action alleges that he is the heir of the thief, he cannot be refused a hearing, and he should be granted a special action for recovery against the heir of the thief, and the judge must not permit him to proceed if he attempts to prove that the party is a thief. 3Where anyone swears that I sold him something for a hundred aurei, he can bring an action based on the purchase for the performance of whatever is connected with the contract; that is to say, for the delivery of the property and for security against recovery by a genuine owner. Should it not, however, be considered whether he can be sued on the contract of sale for the recovery of the purchase-money? If, indeed, oath was taken with reference to this, that is to say, that the money was paid, no right of action will exist for the recovery of the latter; but if this was not sworn to, the party will, in consequence, be liable for the purchase-money. 4We say that the same rule applies where anyone swears that he entered into a partnership; for he can still be sued in a partnership action. 5Marcellus says that where anyone swears that he gave his land as security for ten aurei, he cannot bring suit on the pledge without paying ten aurei, but he adds that perhaps he can be sued for ten aurei on account of his oath; and this he entirely approves of. Quintus Saturninus concurs in this opinion, and he makes use of the case where a party swore that his former wife gave him certain property as a dowry; for he says that, in this instance, an equitable action for the dowry should be granted her, and I deny that this opinion exceeds the demands of justice. 6Where, in a pecuniary transaction, a party swears by the Genius of the Emperor that he is not obliged to pay, or that his adversary is entitled to payment, and perjures himself; or where he swears that he will pay within a certain time and does not do so; our Emperor and his father stated in a Rescript that he must be sent away to be whipped with rods, and the following notice attached to him, namely: “Do not swear rashly!”
14 Paulus libro tertio ad edictum. Quotiens propter rem iuratur, nec parenti nec patrono remittitur iusiurandum: propter rem autem iusiurandum exigitur veluti de pecunia credita, cum iurat actor sibi dari oportere vel reus se dare non oportere. idem est, cum de pecunia constituta iusiurandum exigitur.
14 Paulus, on the Edict, Book III. Whenever an oath is taken with reference to property, it cannot be dispensed with in favor of a parent or a patron, and an oath is exacted with reference to property; for instance, where money is borrowed and the plaintiff swears that he should be paid, or the defendant swears that he is not obliged to pay. The same rule applies where an oath is required with reference to mere promise to pay at a certain time.
15 Idem libro sexto ad edictum. Ad personas egregias eosque qui valetudine impediuntur domum mitti oportet ad iurandum.
15 The Same, On the Edict, Book VI. Someone must be sent to their homes to administer the oath to distinguished persons, and to those who are prevented by illness from appearing in court.
16 Ulpianus libro decimo ad edictum. Si patronus libertam suam uxorem duxerit, non compelletur iurare de rerum amotarum iudicio. sed et si ipse deferat iusiurandum libertae suae, de calumnia non debet iurare.
16 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book X. When a patron marries his freedwoman, he cannot be compelled to swear in an action for the removal of property; but if he himself tenders the oath to his freedwoman, he will not be compelled to swear that he did so for the purpose of annoyance.
17 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Iusiurandum, quod ex conventione extra iudicium defertur, referri non potest. 1Pupillus tutore auctore iusiurandum deferre debet: quod si sine tutore auctore detulerit, exceptio quidem obstabit, sed replicabitur, quia rerum administrandarum ius ei non competit. 2Si tutor qui tutelam gerit aut curator furiosi prodigive iusiurandum detulerit, ratum id haberi debet: nam et alienare res et solvi eis potest et agendo rem in iudicium deducunt. 3Procurator quoque quod detulit ratum habendum est, scilicet si aut universorum bonorum administrationem sustinet aut si id ipsum nominatim mandatum sit aut si in rem suam procurator sit:
17 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Where an oath is tendered extrajudicially in accordance with an agreement, it cannot be tendered back again. 1A ward shall tender an oath with his guardian’s consent, because, if he tenders it without it, an exception can be placed against him; but he is entitled to a replication, because he has no legal right to attend to his own affairs. 2Where a guardian who is administering a guardianship, or the curator of an insane person or a spendthrift, tenders an oath, it should be considered as ratified; as they dispose of property, and give receipts where money is paid, and can also bring a matter into court by means of a legal action. 3Moreover, where an agent tenders an oath, it must be sustained where he has control of all the property of his principal, or was especially directed to do this, or is an agent acting in his own behalf.
18 Ulpianus libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum. alias autem procuratorem deferentem iusiurandum non esse audiendum Iulianus libro decimo digestorum scribit, ne postea reus, qui semel iuravit, a domino conveniatur: nec multum ei proficere, si fuerit ei de rato cautum: sive enim dominus petat, cogetur docere reus liquido se iurasse posita scilicet exceptione, sive ex stipulatione de rato agat, necesse habebit ipse de periurio suo docere.
18 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. But, otherwise, an agent who attempts to tender an oath should not be heard, as Julianus states in the Tenth Book of the Digest, nor can a defendant who has taken the oath subsequently be sued by the principal; and it is of not much benefit to him if security was furnished that the principal would ratify the act; for if the latter should sue him, the defendant will be compelled to show that he made oath in all sincerity, provided an exception is filed; but if he should bring suit based on the stipulation that the act would be ratified, he will be required to prove that perjury was committed by himself.
19 Idem libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum. Si itaque mandatum fuit procuratori, ut petat, ille iusiurandum detulit, aliud fecit quam quod mandatum est.
19 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXVI. Therefore, if an agent was directed to bring suit, and he tendered an oath, he did something which he was not directed to do.
20 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Servus quod detulit vel iuravit, servetur, si peculii administrationem habuit:
20 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Where a slave tenders an oath or takes one, it will be sustained if he has the administration of his peculium:
21 Gaius libro quinto ad edictum provinciale. huic enim solvi quoque recte potest et novandae obligationis ius habuit.
21 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V. For he can lawfully receipt for money paid, and has the right to renew an obligation.
22 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Quidam et de peculio actionem dandam in dominum, si actori detulerit servus iusiurandum. eadem de filio familias dicenda sunt.
22 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Some authorities hold that an action De peculio should be granted against the owner where a slave tenders an oath to the plaintiff. The same rules apply to a son under paternal control.
23 Ulpianus libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum. Si servus iuraverit dominum dare non oportere, exceptio domino indulgenda est sibique adversarius imputabit, qui servo detulit iusiurandum.
23 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. Where a slave swears that his owner is not obliged to pay, the latter is entitled to an exception, and his adversary, who tendered the oath to the slave, has no one but himself to blame.
24 Paulus libro vicensimo octavo ad edictum. Multo magis proderit patri religio filii, cum quo etiam iudicium consistere potest. ipsi autem referentes condicionem eorum, quibus subiecti sunt, non faciunt deteriorem.
24 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXVIII. It is much more true that the religious feeling of a son is advantageous to his father, where suit can be brought against the latter. But where parties of this kind tender the oath back, they do not render the legal position of those to whose authority they are subject any worse.
25 Ulpianus libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum. Sed et si servus meus delato vel relato ei iureiurando, iuravit rem domini esse vel ei dari oportere, puto dandam mihi actionem vel pacti exceptionem propter religionem et conventionem.
25 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. If my slave, where an oath has been tendered in the first place or tendered back to him, swears that certain property belongs to his master, or should be delivered to him; I think that I am entitled to an action or an exception based on contract, on account of the sacred character of the oath and the terms of the agreement.
26 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Qui iurasse dicitur nihil refert cuius sexus aetatisve sit: omni enim modo custodiri debet iusiurandum adversus eum, qui contentus eo cum deferret fuit: quamvis pupillus non videatur peierare, quia sciens fallere non videatur. 1Si pater filium dare non oportere iuraverit, Cassius respondit et patri et filio dandam exceptionem iurisiurandi: si pater iuraverit in peculio nihil esse, filius conveniri poterit: sed et pater ita convenietur, ut post adquisiti peculii ratio habeatur. 2Iurisiurandi condicio ex numero esse potest videri novandi delegandive, quia proficiscitur ex conventione, quamvis habeat et instar iudicii.
26 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Where any one is said to have sworn, it makes no difference what his or her sex, or age may be, for the oath should, by all means, be sustained against the party who was content with it when he tendered it; although a ward is never considered to have perjured himself, because it is not held that he can knowingly be guilty of deception. 1If a father swears that his son is not obliged to pay; Cassius stated as his opinion that an exception based on the oath should be granted to both father and son. Where a father swears that there is nothing in the peculium, an action can be brought against the son; and it can also be brought against the father in order to obtain an accounting for any peculium which may have been subsequently acquired. 2The taking of an oath may be considered as belonging to the same class as the renewal or assignment of an obligation, as it grows out of an agreement; although it also bears some resemblance to a judgment.
27 Gaius libro quinto ad edictum provinciale. Iusiurandum etiam loco solutionis cedit.
27 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V. An oath also takes the place of payment.
28 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. In duobus reis stipulandi ab altero delatum iusiurandum etiam alteri nocebit. 1Quod reus iuravit, etiam fideiussori proficit. a fideiussore exactum iusiurandum prodesse etiam reo Cassius et Iulianus aiunt: nam quia in locum solutionis succedit, hic quoque eodem loco habendum est: si modo ideo interpositum est iusiurandum, ut de ipso contractu et de re, non de persona iurantis ageretur. 2Si ei, qui debitorem meum in iudicium exhibere promisit, iusiurandum detulerim isque iuraverit se omnino exhibitionem eius non promississe, prodesse debitori meo id non debet: si vero iuraverit se nihil mihi praestare oportere, distinguendum sit et replicatione emendandum, utrum ideo iuraverit an quia post promissionem exhibuerit an vero quia solverit: quod et in fideiussorem debiti distinguendum est. 3Ex duobus reis promittendi eiusdem pecuniae alter iuravit: alteri quoque prodesse debebit. 4Exceptio iurisiurandi non tantum si ea actione quis utatur, cuius nomine exegit iusiurandum, opponi debet, sed etiam si alia, si modo eadem quaestio in hoc iudicium deducatur, forte si ob actionem mandati negotiorum gestorum societatis ceterasque similes iusiurandum exactum sit, deinde ex isdem causis certum condicatur, quia per alteram actionem altera quoque consumitur. 5Si quis iuraverit se non rapuisse, non debet adiuvari hoc iureiurando in actione furti aut condictione, quia aliud est furtum fecisse, quod vel clam fieri potest. 6Colonus, cum quo propter succisas forte arbores agebatur ex locato, si iuraverit se non succidisse, sive e lege duodecim tabularum de arboribus succisis sive e lege Aquilia damni iniuria sive interdicto quod vi aut clam postea convenietur, per exceptionem iurisiurandi defendi poterit. 7Quae iuravit divortii causa rem se non amovisse, non debet defendi per exceptionem, si cum ea in rem agatur, et si contendat suam esse, alio iureiurando opus est: contra si iuraverit suam esse, debet in actione rerum amotarum defendi. et omnino hoc observandum est, licet per aliam actionem eadem quaestio moveatur, ut exceptio iurisiurandi locum habeat. 8Igitur si quis iuravit se non esse condemnatum, etiamsi ex stipulatu iudicatum solvi ob rem iudicatam conveniatur, defendetur per exceptionem. contra si, cum ex stipulatu iudicatum solvi conveniretur, iuravit se dare non oportere, agenti iudicati non utique obstabit exceptio: potest enim fieri, ut non sit commissa stipulatio, licet res iudicata sit: nisi ideo iurasset, quod nec damnatum se esse diceret. 9Item Pomponius ait eum, qui furtum sibi factum alicuius rei iuravit, non statim etiam condictionis causam nancisci. 10Item cum ex hac parte iusiurandum et actionem et exceptionem inducat, si forte reus extra iudicium actore inferente iuraverit se dare non oportere et actor reo deferente dari sibi oportere, vel contra, posterior causa iurisiurandi potior habebitur: nec tamen praeiudicium periurio alterius fiet, quia non quaeretur, an dare eum oportet, sed an actor iuraverit.
28 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Where two creditors jointly interested enter into a stipulation, and the oath is tendered by one of them, it will also prejudice the other. 1Where the principal debtor takes an oath, it also benefits a surety; and where an oath is required of a surety it likewise benefits the principal debtor, as Cassius and Julianus say; for, because it takes the place of payment it must, in this instance also, be considered as doing so; provided that the oath was introduced with reference to the contract itself and the property in question, and not with respect to the person who was sworn. 2Where anyone promises to produce my debtor in court, and I tender him the oath, and he swears that he never promised to produce him, this should be of no advantage to my debtor; but if he swears that he himself is not at all indebted to me, a distinction ought to be made, and the proceedings amended by means of a replication; whether he made oath to the effect that after his promise he had produced the party, or, in fact, had paid what was due. A distinction of the same kind can also be made in the case of a surety for a debt. 3Where one of two joint-debtors of a certain sum of money took the oath; this should also benefit the other. 4An exception based upon an oath can be used not only where a party brings an action on account of the matter for which he executed the oath, but also with reference to another case, provided the same question is concerned in the latter proceeding; for example, where an oath is required in an action on mandate, or in one based on business transacted, partnership, and others of the same kind; and then a specific action for recovery based on the same matters can be brought, for the reason that one action is annulled by the other. 5Where anyone swears that he did not commit robbery, he should not be permitted to derive any advantage from his oath in an action for theft, or in one for the recovery of stolen property; because theft is a different crime, being one that can be perpetrated secretly. 6Where suit is brought against a tenant on his lease, for instance, because trees have been cut down, and he swears that he did not cut them, and he is afterwards sued under the Law of the Twelve Tables for having cut trees, or under the Lex Aquilia for wrongful damage, or an interdict Quod vi aut clam is applied for against him; he can make a defence by means of an exception based upon his oath. 7Where a woman swears that she did not remove property belonging to her husband on account of a divorce, she cannot make a defence by means of an exception, if suit is brought against her for the recovery of the property, and if she contends that it is hers, another oath will be required; on the other hand, if she swore that the property was hers, this oath can be set up as a defence in an action for the removal of property which has been removed. And, indeed, it should be generally observed that where the same question comes up in a different action, an exception based upon the oath will be available. 8Therefore, where a party swears that judgment was not rendered against him, even though he is sued on a judgment based on a stipulation that the decision of the court will be obeyed; he can defend himself by means of an exception. Where, however, on the other hand, he is sued on the stipulation that the decision of the court will be complied with, and he then swears that he is not obliged to pay, an exception cannot be properly pleaded against the party bringing suit on the judgment; for it may happen that the stipulation did not become operative, even though judgment was rendered against him, unless he should swear that this was not the case. 9Moreover, Pomponius says that where a man swears that some of his property was stolen, he does not immediately acquire a good cause of action for the recovery of the property. 10Again, since under this Section the oath affords ground for both an action and an exception, if the defendant takes an oath out of court, which is tendered by the plaintiff, and swears that he is not obliged to pay; and then the plaintiff, on the tender of the oath by the defendant, swears that he has a right to exact payment, or vice-versa; the last claim supported by oath will have more force, but this will not prejudice the point as to whether the other party has committed perjury; for the question is not whether the defendant was obliged to pay, but whether the plaintiff made oath that he was.
29 Tryphoninus libro sexto disputationum. Quod si iuravi te deferente non iurasse te dare tibi oportere, et adversus utilem actionem, qua hoc quaeritur, an iuraveris tibi dari oportere, opponenda est exceptio iurisiurandi perementis quaestionem actione comprehensam.
29 Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book VI. Moreover, if you tender an oath, and I swear that you did not swear that I was obliged to pay you; then, in opposition to an equitable action by which it is intended to ascertain whether you made oath that you had a right to require payment, I can plead an exception based upon my oath for the purpose of disposing of the question included in the action.
30 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad edictum. Eum, qui iuravit ex ea actione quae infitiando crescit aliquid sibi deberi, simpli, non dupli persecutionem sibi adquirere Pedius ait: abunde enim sufficere exonerare petitorem probandi necessitate, cum omissa hac parte edicti dupli actio integra maneat: et potest dici hoc iudicio non principalem causam exerceri, sed iusiurandum actoris conservari. 1Si iuravero te Stichum mihi dare oportere, qui non sit in rerum natura, nec aestimationem mihi praestare reus debet nisi ex causa furtiva vel propter moras: tunc enim etiam post mortem servi aestimatio praestatur. 2Si mulier iuraverit decem dotis sibi deberi, tota ea summa praestanda est: sed si iuravit decem se dedisse in dotem, hoc solum non erit quaerendum, an data sint, sed quasi data sint, quod ex eo reddi oportet praestandum erit. 3In popularibus actionibus iusiurandum exactum ita demum adversus alios proderit, si bona fide exactum fuerit: nam et si quis egerit, ita demum consumit publicam actionem, si non per collusionem actum sit. 4Si libertus deferente patrono iuravit se libertum non esse, ratum habendum est iusiurandum, ut nec operarum petitio nec bonorum possessio contra tabulas dari debeat. 5Si iuravero usum fructum mihi dari oportere, non aliter dari debet, quam si caveam boni viri arbitratu me usurum et finito usu fructu restituturum.
30 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Pedius says that where a man, in an action in which the amount is increased by the denial of the defendant, swears that something is owing to him, he acquires a right to bring suit for simple and not for double damages; for it is abundantly sufficient that the plaintiff should be freed from the necessity of proving his case, since, leaving out this part of the Edict, his right of action for double damages remains unimpaired; and it may be said that in a case of this kind the principal cause of action is not the object of the proceeding, but that the oath of the plaintiff should take effect. 1If I swear that you are obliged to deliver Stichus to me, and such a slave is not in existence, you, as defendant, are not required to pay me his value, except in case of theft or because of your default; for in either of these instances the value of the slave must be stated, even after his death. 2Where a woman swears that ten aurei are due to her on account of dowry, that entire amount must be paid; but if she swears that she paid ten aurei by way of dowry, inquiry will not be made as to the mere fact whether the amount was paid, but it will be considered as paid, and whatever portion should be returned must be given to her. 3In a popular action, an oath which has been exacted can be used against others only if it was demanded in good faith; for, where anyone institutes proceedings, this does not prevent a public action, unless the proceedings were instituted through collusion. 4Where a freedman, after his patron has tendered him the oath, swears that he is not his freedman, the oath must be sustained; so that no claim for services, nor one for the possession of the property of an estate contrary to the provisions of the will, can be considered. 5If I swear that I have a right to have a usufruct transferred to me, this should be done only where I give security that I will make use of it in the way that a good citizen would do, and that, when the usufruct terminates, I will restore it.
31 Gaius libro trigensimo ad edictum provinciale. Admonendi sumus interdum etiam post iusiurandum exactum permitti constitutionibus principum ex integro causam agere, si quis nova instrumenta se invenisse dicat, quibus nunc solis usurus sit. sed hae constitutiones tunc videntur locum habere, cum a iudice aliquis absolutus fuerit (solent enim saepe iudices in dubiis causis exacto iureiurando secundum eum iudicare qui iuraverit): quod si alias inter ipsos iureiurando transactum sit negotium, non conceditur eandem causam retractare.
31 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXX. We must remember that sometimes, even after the oath has been exacted, it is permitted by the Imperial Constitutions to have recourse to ordinary proceedings, where the party interested alleges that new documents have been found which he now only desires to use. These Constitutions are held to be available solely where a party has been discharged by the court; for judges, after requiring an oath, are frequently accustomed to render a decision in favor of the party who was sworn; but where the matter has been settled between the parties by means of an oath, it is not permitted for the same case to be reheard.
32 Modestinus libro ... differentiarum. Iurisiurandi gratiam facere pupillus non potest.
32 Modestinus, Differences, Book III. A ward cannot dispense with the oath.
33 Ulpianus libro vicensimo octavo ad Sabinum. Qui per salutem suam iurat, licet per deum iurare videtur (respectu enim divini numinis ita iurat), attamen, si non ita specialiter iusiurandum ei delatum est, iurasse non videtur: et ideo ex integro sollemniter iurandum est.
33 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVIII. When a party swears by his own salvation, although he is held to swear by God (for when he swears in this way he has reference to the Divinity), still, if the oath had not been tendered him in this particular manner, he is held not to have sworn; and therefore he will be compelled to make oath again in the proper form.
34 Idem libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum. Iusiurandum et ad pecunias et ad omnes res locum habet: etiam de operis iusiurandum deferri potest. nec de iniuria queri adversarius potest, cum possit iusiurandum referre. quid tamen, si ideo dicat reus se liberatum, quoniam Stichum, quem promiserat, putat decessisse? non erit tutus per relationem. et ideo ex hac causa putat Marcellus, et recte, aut remittendum ei iusiurandum aut spatium dandum, ut certioretur et sic iuret. 1Defensor municipum vel cuiusvis corporis iusiurandum deferre potest, si super hoc mandatum habeat. 2Pupillo non defertur iusiurandum. 3Procurator non compellitur iurare nec defensor, et ita Iulianus scribit libro decimo digestorum defensorem iurare non compelli sufficereque ad plenam defensionem, si paratus sit iudicium accipere. 4Qui iusiurandum defert, prior de calumnia debet iurare, si hoc exigatur, deinde sic ei iurabitur. hoc iusiurandum de calumnia aeque patrono parentibusque remittitur. 5Si de qualitate iuramenti fuerit inter partes dubitatum, conceptio eius arbitri iudicantis est. 6Ait praetor: ‘eum, a quo iusiurandum petetur, solvere aut iurare cogam’: alterum itaque eligat reus, aut solvat aut iuret: si non iurat, solvere cogendus erit a praetore. 7Datur autem et alia facultas reo, ut, si malit, referat iusiurandum: et si is qui petet condicione iurisiurandi non utetur, iudicium ei praetor non dabit. aequissime enim hoc facit, cum non deberet displicere condicio iurisiurandi ei qui detulit: sed nec iusiurandum de calumnia referenti defertur, quia non est ferendus actor, si condicionis quam ipse detulit de calumnia velit sibi iurari. 8Non semper autem consonans est per omnia referri iusiurandum quale defertur, forsitan ex diversitate rerum vel personarum quibusdam emergentibus, quae varietatem inducunt: ideoque si quid tale inciderit, officio iudicis conceptio huiuscemodi iurisiurandi terminetur. 9Cum res in iusiurandum demissa sit, iudex iurantem absolvit: referentem audiet et, si actor iuret, condemnet reum: nolentem iurare reum si solvat, absolvit, non solventem condemnat: ex relatione non iurante actore absolvit reum.
34 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXVI. An oath may be employed both with reference to money and to all other matters, for an oath may even be tendered in an action for services, and the adversary cannot complain of any injury done him, since he can tender the oath back. What then should be done if the defendant alleges that he is released because he thinks that Stichus, the slave whom he promised, is dead? In this case he cannot be protected by tendering the oath back; and therefore, for this reason, Marcellus thinks, and very properly, that he should either be excused from taking the oath, or that certain time should be granted him that he may ascertain the facts and then be sworn. 1A party who appears in defence of a municipality or of any corporate body can tender the oath, if he has an order to do so. 2An oath cannot be tendered to a ward. 3Neither an agent nor a defender can be compelled to swear; for it is stated by Julianus in the Ninth Book of the Digest that a defender cannot be compelled to swear and that it will be sufficient for a complete defence if he is prepared to join issue in the case. 4Where a party tenders an oath, he must himself first swear that he does not do so with a desire to cause annoyance, if this is required; and then the oath for him will be taken. This oath with reference to annoyance is dispensed with in the case of a patron or parents. 5If there is any doubt among the parties as to the nature of the oath to be taken, its terms are to be decided by the arbiter who hears the case. 6The Prætor says, “He who is asked to swear I will compel either to pay or to take the oath,” and therefore the defendant must choose whether he will pay or swear, and if he does not swear, he will be compelled by the Prætor to pay. 7Another resource is, however, granted to the defendant, namely, that of tendering back the oath if he prefers to do so, and if he who brings the action refuses to accept the conditions under which he must be sworn, the Prætor will not permit the case to go on, and in doing so he acts most justly; since the conditions under which the oath must be taken should not be displeasing to the party who himself tendered one. The plaintiff, however, cannot tender the oath relating to annoyance to the defendant who tenders back the oath, for, that the plaintiff should expect that an oath de calumnia will be taken with reference to terms which he himself imposed, is something that ought not to be tolerated. 8It is not always proper for an oath to be again tendered in the same terms as at first; for, perhaps, on account of the diversity of things or persons, matters may arise which cause a difference to exist between them, and therefore if anything of this kind should occur, the terms of the oath should be decided by the judge. 9When the matter in dispute is referred to an oath, the judge discharges the party who swears and will hear the one who desires to tender the oath back, and if the plaintiff should swear, he must render a judgment against the defendant; and if the latter refuses to swear, but pays, he must discharge him, and if he does not pay, he must render judgment against him; and where the plaintiff, after the oath is tendered back, refuses to take it, he must discharge the defendant.
35 Paulus libro vicensimo octavo ad edictum. Tutor pupilli omnibus probationibus aliis deficientibus iusiurandum deferens audiendus est: quandoque enim pupillo denegabitur actio. 1Prodigus si deferat iusiurandum, audiendus non est: idemque in ceteris similibus ei dicendum est. nam sive pro pacto convento sive pro solutione sive pro iudicio hoc iusiurandum cedit, non ab aliis delatum probari debet, quam qui ad haec habiles sunt. 2Qui non compelluntur Romae iudicium accipere, nec iurare compellendi sunt, ut legati provinciales.
35 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXVIII. When the guardian of a ward tenders an oath where all other evidence is lacking, he must be heard, for circumstances may exist under which an action will be refused the ward. 1Where a spendthrift tenders an oath, he shall not be heard, and the same rule applies in other similar cases; for, whether the oath takes the place of an agreement, or of a debt, the payment of the execution of a judgment, it should not be allowed, except when tendered by those who are properly qualified for such things. 2Parties who cannot be compelled to join issue at Rome, cannot be compelled to make oath there; as, for example, provincial envoys.
36 Ulpianus libro vicensimo septimo ad edictum. Si actor deferat iusiurandum de sola constituta pecunia et reus iuraverit, exceptione utetur, si de constituta conveniatur: sed si de sorte, id est de priore obligatione conveniatur, exceptio cessabit, nisi de hac quoque iuraverit adversario deferente.
36 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVII. Where the plaintiff tenders an oath with reference to money which had been merely promised, and the defendant swears, he can avail himself of an exception if an action is brought against him on the promise; but if he is sued for the principal—that is on account of the prior obligation—an exception cannot be pleaded, unless he swore with respect to this also, after the plaintiff had tendered him the oath.
37 Ulpianus libro tricensimo tertio ad edictum. Si non fuerit remissum iusiurandum ab eo qui detulerit, sed de calumnia non iuratur, consequens est, ut debeat denegari ei actio: sibi enim imputet, qui processit ad delationem iurisiurandi nec prius de calumnia iuravit, ut sit iste remittenti similis.
37 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. If the oath has not been waived by the party who tendered it, and no oath has been taken denying that proceedings have been instituted for purposes of annoyance, the action will not be granted in consequence; for he has only himself to blame who proceeded to tender the oath before the denial that annoyance was intended was sworn to, so that he is in the same position as if he had dispersed with the oath.
38 Paulus libro trigensimo septimo ad edictum. Manifestae turpitudinis et confessionis est nolle nec iurare nec iusiurandum referre.
38 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. Where a party is unwilling either to swear or to tender back the oath, it is an evidence of manifest depravity, and equivalent to a confession.
39 Iulianus libro decimo digestorum. Si quis cum debitore suo pepigerit, ne ab eo pecunia peteretur, si iurasset se Capitolium non ascendisse vel aliud quodlibet fecisse vel non fecisse, isque iuraverit, et exceptio iurisiurandi dari debebit et solutum repeti poterit: est enim iusta conventio, si quaelibet causa in condicione iurisiurandi deducta fuerit.
39 Julianus, Digest, Book XXX. Where anyone agrees with his debtor that suit shall not be brought for the money if he swears that he did not “ascend the Capitol,” or that he had done or had not done anything else whatsoever; and the latter makes oath accordingly, an exception on the ground of the oath should be granted him, and if he has paid he can recover the money; for an agreement is lawful where, in any case whatsoever, it is made dependent upon the condition of an oath.
40 Idem libro tertio decimo digestorum. Iusiurandum a debitore exactum efficit, ut pignus liberetur: est enim hoc acceptilationi simile: perpetuam certe exceptionem parit. idcirco poenam quoque petentem creditorem exceptione summoveri oportet et solutum repeti potest, utpote cum interposito eo ab omni controversia discedatur.
40 The Same, Digest, Book XIII. Where an oath is required from a debtor it effects a release of a pledge; for this resembles the discharge from liability for a debt, and certainly gives rise to a perpetual exception. Therefore, a creditor who brings suit for a penalty will be barred by an exception, and if the money has been paid it can be recovered; just as where an oath is interposed all controversy is at an end.
41 Pomponius libro singulari regularum. Labeo etiam absenti et ignoranti iurisiurandi gratiam fieri posse respondit: sed et per epistulam gratia iurisiurandi fieri potest.
41 Pomponius, Rules. Labeo stated that the oath may be dispensed with in favor of a party who is absent, or ignorant of the facts; and it can even be waived by letter.
42 Idem libro octavo decimo epistularum. Creditore, qui de mutua pecunia contra pupillum contendebat, iusiurandum deferente pupillus iuravit se dare non oportere: eandem pecuniam a fideiussore eius petit: an excludendus sit exceptione iurisiurandi? quid tibi placet, rescribe mihi. eam rem apertius explicat Iulianus. nam si controversia inter creditorem et pupillum fuerit, an omnino pecuniam mutuam accepisset, et convenit, ut ab omni condicione discederetur, si pupillus iurasset, isque iuraverit se dare non oportere, naturalis obligatio hac pactione tolletur et soluta pecunia repeti poterit. sin vero creditor quidem se mutuam dedisse contendebat, pupillus autem hoc solo defendebatur, quod tutor eius non intervenisset et hoc tale iusiurandum interpositum est, hoc casu fideiussorem praetor non tuebitur. si autem liquido probari non potest, quid actum sit, et in obscuro erit (ut plerumque fit), de facto an de iure inter creditorem et pupillum controversia fuerit deferente creditore pupillum iurasse, intellegere debemus id actum inter eos, ut, si iurasset se dare non oportere, ab omni condicione discederetur: atque ita et solutam pecuniam repeti posse et fideiussoribus exceptionem dari debere existimavimus. 1Si fideiussor iuraverit se dare non oportere, exceptione iurisiurandi reus promittendi tutus est: atquin si, quasi omnino idem non fideiussisset, iuravit, non debet hoc iusiurandum reo promittendi prodesse. 2Sed et si actore deferente defensor absentis vel praesentis iuravit eum quem defendit dare non oportere, exceptio iurisiurandi ei cuius nomine iurandum fuerit dari debebit. eadem ratio est et si fideiussoris defensor iuraverit: reo enim detur exceptio: 3Item si reus iuravit, fideiussor tutus sit, quia res iudicata secundum alterutrum eorum utrique proficeret.
42 The Same, Epistles, Book XVIII. Where an oath was tendered by a creditor who had instituted proceedings against a ward for money which had been loaned, the latter swore that he was not obliged to pay, and then the creditor brought suit against his surety for the money; should he be barred by an exception based on the oath? Write to me what your opinion is. Julianus discusses the point more fully; for he says if the controversy that arose between the creditor and the ward was whether the ward had ever received the money, and it was agreed that the whole question should be settled if the ward would take an oath, and he swore that he was not obliged to pay; the natural obligation is disposed of by this agreement, and if any money has been paid it can be recovered. If, however, the creditor maintained that he had made the loan, and the ward only defended himself upon the ground that his guardian had not intervened, and an oath of this kind is taken; the Prætor, in this instance, will not afford the surety any relief. But where it cannot be clearly proved what the agreement was, and it is doubtful (as very frequently happens) whether the controversy between the creditor and the ward was a question of fact or one of law; and the creditor, having tendered the oath, the ward took it; we must hold that the understanding between them was that if the ward should swear that he was not obliged to pay, the controversy should be considered at an end, and the money paid can be recovered; and we think that an exception should be granted the sureties. 1Where a surety swears that he is not obliged to pay, the defendant is protected by an exception founded on the oath; but if a surety should swear that he had never been surety at all for the sum demanded, this oath ought not to benefit the person who promised. 2Moreover, where the plaintiff tenders the oath, and a party who appears for either the absent or present defendant swears that the latter is not obliged to pay; an exception based upon the oath shall be granted to him in whose behalf the oath was taken. The same rule is applicable where some one who appears in defence of a surety makes oath for an exception to be granted the principal. 3In like manner if the principal makes oath, his surety will be protected; because a decision in favor of either of them will benefit the other.