1Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. A statute is a general precept; a resolution of men learned in the law; a restraint of crimes committed either voluntarily or through ignorance; or a general obligation of the State.

2Marcianus, Institutes, Book I. The orator Demosthenes thus defined it. “A law is something which it is proper for all men to obey for many reasons, and principally because every law was devised by, and is a gift of God; the decree of learned men; the restraint of those who either voluntarily or involuntarily are guilty of crime; it is also a common obligation of the State, by whose rules all those who reside therein should regulate their lives.” Chrysius, a Stoic philosopher of the greatest erudition, began a book which he wrote as follows: “Law is the queen of all things, Divine and human. It should also be the Governor, the leader, the ruler, of both the good and the bad, and, in this way, be the standard of whatever is just and unjust, as well as of those things which are civil by Nature, prescribing what should be done, and prohibiting what should not be done.”

3Pomponius on Sabinus, Book XXV. Laws, as Theophrastus has stated, ought to be established with respect to matters which often occur, and not with reference to such as occur unexpectedly.

4Celsus, Digest, Book V. Laws are not established concerning matters which can only happen in a single instance.

5The Same, Digest, Book XVII. For laws ought to be adapted to events which frequently and readily occur, rather than to such as rarely happen.

6Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVII. In fact, what only happens once or twice, as Theophrastus says, legislators omit.

7Modestinus, Rules, Book I. The office of the law is to command, to forbid, and to punish.

8Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III. Laws are not established for individuals, but for general purposes.

9The Same, On the Edict, Book XVI. There is no doubt that the Senate can make law.

10Julianus, Digest, Book LIX. Neither statutes nor decrees of the Senate can be written in such a way as to include all cases at any time which may arise; but it is sufficient if they include such as frequently occur.

11The Same, Digest, Book XC. And therefore in those laws which are enacted in the first place, a more certain interpretation or construction must be given by the most excellent Emperor.

12The Same, Digest, Book XV. All matters cannot be specifically included in the laws or decrees of the Senate; but where their sense is clear in any instance, he who has jurisdiction of the same can apply it to others that are similar, and in this way administer justice.

13Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. For, as Pedius says, whenever anything has been introduced by law there is a good opportunity for extending it by interpretation or certain construction to other matters, where the same principle is involved.

14Publius, On the Edict, Book LIV. Where anything contrary to the principles of the Law has been accepted, it must not be applied to its full extent.

15Julianus, Digest, Book XXVII. In those instances where anything has been established contrary to the principles of the law, we cannot follow this rule of law.

16Paulus, Sole Book on Special Law. Special law is that which has been introduced by the authority of those establishing it against the tenor of a legal principle, on account of some particular advantage.

17Celsus, Digest, Book XXVI. To know the laws is not to be familiar with their phraseology, but with their force and effect.

18The Same, Digest, Book XXIX. Laws should be interpreted liberally, in order that their intention may be preserved.

19The Same, Digest, Book XXIII. When the terms of the law are ambiguous, that meaning is to be accepted which is without incongruity; especially when the intention of the law can be ascertained therefrom.

20Julianus, Digest, Book LV. The principle of every law established by our ancestors cannot be stated.

21Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. Hence it is not necessary to seek for the reasons of those laws which have been established; otherwise many rules which are based upon the same and which are now accepted, will be overthrown.

22Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXV. When the law pardons anything which is past it forbids it for the future.

23Paulus, On Plautius, Book IV. Matters which have always had a certain interpretation should, under no circumstances, be changed.

24Celsus, Digest, Book IX. It is not proper without taking into consideration an entire law either to decide, or give an opinion upon any particular portion of the same.

25Modestinus, Opinions, Book VIII. No principle of law or indulgent construction of equity permits matters which have been introduced for the welfare of mankind to be interpreted so rigorously as to be productive of hardship to them.

26Paulus, Questions, Book IV. There is nothing new in the interpretation of recent laws by former ones.

27Tertullianus, Questions, Book I. Therefore, for the reason that it is the custom to interpret recent laws by former ones, it ought always to be understood that the principles of the laws are applicable to such persons or things as may at any time be of a similar character.

28Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Recent laws are applicable to former ones unless they are opposed to them; and this may be established by many reasons.

29The Same, On the Lex Cincia. To do what the law prohibits violates the law, and anyone who evades the meaning of the law without disobeying its words, is guilty of fraud against it.

30Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book IV. Fraud is committed against the law when something is done which the law did not wish to be done, but did not absolutely prohibit; and the difference between fraud against the law and violation of the same is that between speech and opinion.

31The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia. The Emperor is free from the operation of the law, and though the Empress is undoubtedly subject to it, still, the Emperors generally confer upon her the same privileges which they themselves enjoy.

32Julianus, Digest, Book XCIV. In cases where there are no written laws, that should be observed which has been established by usage and custom, and if anything is lacking therein, then whatever is nearest to, and resulting from it should be observed; and if even this does not exist, then the law which is used by the City of Rome must be followed. 1An ancient custom is not improperly observed as a law (and this is what is called law established by usage). For as the laws themselves restrain us for no other reason than because they are accepted by the judgment of the people—for it is but proper that what the people have approved without being written should bind all persons—for what difference does it make whether the people have manifested their will by vote, or by acts and deeds? Wherefore the rule has also been most justly adopted that laws shall be abrogated not only by the vote of the legislator, but also through disuse by the silent consent of all.

33Ulpianus, Concerning the Office of Proconsul, Book I. It is usual for long established custom to be observed as law in those matters which have not come down in writing.

34Ad Dig. 1,3,34Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 17, Note 1.The Same, Book IV. When anyone seems to be confident concerning the custom of a city or province, I think it should first be determined whether that custom has been confirmed by a judicial decree after it had been disputed.

35Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. Those rules which have been approved by long established custom and have been observed for many years, by, as it were, a tacit agreement of citizens, are no less to be obeyed than laws which have been committed to writing.

36Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VII. And indeed, a law of this kind has greater authority, for the reason that it has been approved to such an extent that it is not necessary to commit it to writing.

37Callistratus, Questions, Book I. When inquiry is made as to the interpretation of a law, it must in the first place be ascertained what rule the State formerly made use of in cases of the same kind; for custom is the best interpreter of the laws.

38The Same, Questions, Book I. For our Emperor Severus stated in a Rescript that in questions of doubt arising from statutory enactments, custom, or the authority of decisions which have always been decided in the same manner, should obtain the force of law.

39Ad Dig. 1,3,39Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 16, Note 3.Celsus, Digest, Book XXIII. That which has in the first place been introduced, not by any rule but through error, and has afterwards been confirmed by custom, shall not prevail in other similar cases.

40Modestinus, Rules, Book I. Thus all law has been either made by consent, or established by necessity, or confirmed by custom.

41Ulpianus, Institutes, Book II. Hence all law consists either in the acquisition, preservation, or diminution of right; for it has reference to the way in which anything becomes the property of a person, or how he can preserve it or his rights, or how he can alienate or lose them.