De legibus senatusque consultis et longa consuetudine
(Concerning statutes, decrees of the Senate, and long established customs.)
1 Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Lex est commune praeceptum, virorum prudentium consultum, delictorum quae sponte vel ignorantia contrahuntur coercitio, communis rei publicae sponsio.
1 Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. A statute is a general precept; a resolution of men learned in the law; a restraint of crimes committed either voluntarily or through ignorance; or a general obligation of the State.
2 Marcianus libro primo institutionum. Nam et Demosthenes orator sic definit: τοῦτό ἐστι νόμος, ᾧ πάντας ἀνθρώπους προσήκει πείθεσθαι διὰ πολλά, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι πᾶς ἐστι νόμος εὕρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον θεοῦ, δόγμα δὲ ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων, ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων, πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, καθ’ ἣν ἅπασι προσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει. sed et philosophus summae stoicae sapientiae Chrysippus sic incipit libro, quem fecit περὶ νόμου: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων, προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.
2 Marcianus, Institutes, Book I. The orator Demosthenes thus defined it. “A law is something which it is proper for all men to obey for many reasons, and principally because every law was devised by, and is a gift of God; the decree of learned men; the restraint of those who either voluntarily or involuntarily are guilty of crime; it is also a common obligation of the State, by whose rules all those who reside therein should regulate their lives.” Chrysius, a Stoic philosopher of the greatest erudition, began a book which he wrote as follows: “Law is the queen of all things, Divine and human. It should also be the Governor, the leader, the ruler, of both the good and the bad, and, in this way, be the standard of whatever is just and unjust, as well as of those things which are civil by Nature, prescribing what should be done, and prohibiting what should not be done.”
3 Pomponius libro vicensimo quinto ad Sabinum. Iura constitui oportet, ut dixit Theophrastus, in his, quae ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον accidunt, non quae ἐκ παραλόγου.
3 Pomponius on Sabinus, Book XXV. Laws, as Theophrastus has stated, ought to be established with respect to matters which often occur, and not with reference to such as occur unexpectedly.
4 Celsus libro quinto digestorum. Ex his, quae forte uno aliquo casu accidere possunt, iura non constituuntur:
4 Celsus, Digest, Book V. Laws are not established concerning matters which can only happen in a single instance.
5 Idem libro XVII digestorum. nam ad ea potius debet aptari ius, quae et frequenter et facile, quam quae perraro eveniunt.
5 The Same, Digest, Book XVII. For laws ought to be adapted to events which frequently and readily occur, rather than to such as rarely happen.
6 Paulus libro XVII ad Plautium. Τὸ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἢ δίς, ut ait Theophrastus, παραβαίνουσιν οἱ νομοθέται.
6 Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVII. In fact, what only happens once or twice, as Theophrastus says, legislators omit.
7 Modestinus libro I regularum. Legis virtus haec est imperare vetare permittere punire.
7 Modestinus, Rules, Book I. The office of the law is to command, to forbid, and to punish.
8 Ulpianus libro III ad Sabinum. Iura non in singulas personas, sed generaliter constituuntur.
8 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III. Laws are not established for individuals, but for general purposes.
9 Idem libro XVI ad edictum. Non ambigitur senatum ius facere posse.
9 The Same, On the Edict, Book XVI. There is no doubt that the Senate can make law.
10 Iulianus libro LVIIII digestorum. Neque leges neque senatus consulta ita scribi possunt, ut omnes casus qui quandoque inciderint comprehendantur, sed sufficit ea quae plerumque accidunt contineri.
10 Julianus, Digest, Book LIX. Neither statutes nor decrees of the Senate can be written in such a way as to include all cases at any time which may arise; but it is sufficient if they include such as frequently occur.
11 Idem libro LXXXX digestorum. Et ideo de his, quae primo constituuntur, aut interpretatione aut constitutione optimi principis certius statuendum est.
11 The Same, Digest, Book XC. And therefore in those laws which are enacted in the first place, a more certain interpretation or construction must be given by the most excellent Emperor.
12 Idem libro XV digestorum. Non possunt omnes articuli singillatim aut legibus aut senatus consultis compraehendi: sed cum in aliqua causa sententia eorum manifesta est, is qui iurisdictioni praeest ad similia procedere atque ita ius dicere debet.
12 The Same, Digest, Book XV. All matters cannot be specifically included in the laws or decrees of the Senate; but where their sense is clear in any instance, he who has jurisdiction of the same can apply it to others that are similar, and in this way administer justice.
13 Ulpianus libro I ad edictum aedilium curulium. Nam, ut ait pedius, quotiens lege aliquid unum vel alterum introductum est, bona occasio est cetera, quae tendunt ad eandem utilitatem, vel interpretatione vel certe iurisdictione suppleri.
13 Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule Ædiles, Book I. For, as Pedius says, whenever anything has been introduced by law there is a good opportunity for extending it by interpretation or certain construction to other matters, where the same principle is involved.
14 Paulus libro LIIII ad edictum. Quod vero contra rationem iuris receptum est, non est producendum ad consequentias.
14 Publius, On the Edict, Book LIV. Where anything contrary to the principles of the Law has been accepted, it must not be applied to its full extent.
15 Iulianus libro XXVII digestorum. In his, quae contra rationem iuris constituta sunt, non possumus sequi regulam iuris.
15 Julianus, Digest, Book XXVII. In those instances where anything has been established contrary to the principles of the law, we cannot follow this rule of law.
16 Paulus libro singulari de iure singulari. Ius singulare est, quod contra tenorem rationis propter aliquam utilitatem auctoritate constituentium introductum est.
16 Paulus, Sole Book on Special Law. Special law is that which has been introduced by the authority of those establishing it against the tenor of a legal principle, on account of some particular advantage.
17 Celsus libro XXVI digestorum. Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem.
17 Celsus, Digest, Book XXVI. To know the laws is not to be familiar with their phraseology, but with their force and effect.
18 Idem libro XXVIIII digestorum. Benignius leges interpretandae sunt, quo voluntas earum conservetur.
18 The Same, Digest, Book XXIX. Laws should be interpreted liberally, in order that their intention may be preserved.
19 Idem libro XXXIII digestorum. In ambigua voce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio, quae vitio caret, praesertim cum etiam voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit.
19 The Same, Digest, Book XXIII. When the terms of the law are ambiguous, that meaning is to be accepted which is without incongruity; especially when the intention of the law can be ascertained therefrom.
20 Iulianus libro quinquagensimo quinto digestorum. Non omnium, quae a maioribus constituta sunt, ratio reddi potest,
20 Julianus, Digest, Book LV. The principle of every law established by our ancestors cannot be stated.
21 Neratius libro VI membranarum. et ideo rationes eorum, quae constituuntur, inquiri non oportet: alioquin multa ex his quae certa sunt subvertuntur.
21 Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. Hence it is not necessary to seek for the reasons of those laws which have been established; otherwise many rules which are based upon the same and which are now accepted, will be overthrown.
22 Ulpianus libro trigensimo quinto ad edictum. Cum lex in praeteritum quid indulget, in futurum vetat.
22 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXV. When the law pardons anything which is past it forbids it for the future.
23 Paulus libro quarto ad Plautium. Minime sunt mutanda, quae interpretationem certam semper habuerunt.
23 Paulus, On Plautius, Book IV. Matters which have always had a certain interpretation should, under no circumstances, be changed.
24 Celsus libro VIIII digestorum. Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua particula eius proposita iudicare vel respondere.
24 Celsus, Digest, Book IX. It is not proper without taking into consideration an entire law either to decide, or give an opinion upon any particular portion of the same.
25 Modestinus libro VIII responsorum. Nulla iuris ratio aut aequitatis benignitas patitur, ut quae salubriter pro utilitate hominum introducuntur, ea nos duriore interpretatione contra ipsorum commodum producamus ad severitatem.
25 Modestinus, Opinions, Book VIII. No principle of law or indulgent construction of equity permits matters which have been introduced for the welfare of mankind to be interpreted so rigorously as to be productive of hardship to them.
26 Paulus libro IIII quaestionum. Non est novum, ut priores leges ad posteriores trahantur.
26 Paulus, Questions, Book IV. There is nothing new in the interpretation of recent laws by former ones.
27 Tertullianus libro I quaestionum. Ideo, quia antiquiores leges ad posteriores trahi usitatum est, semper quasi hoc legibus inesse credi oportet, ut ad eas quoque personas et ad eas res pertinerent, quae quandoque similes erunt.
27 Tertullianus, Questions, Book I. Therefore, for the reason that it is the custom to interpret recent laws by former ones, it ought always to be understood that the principles of the laws are applicable to such persons or things as may at any time be of a similar character.
28 Paulus libro V ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Sed et posteriores leges ad priores pertinent, nisi contrariae sint, idque multis argumentis probatur.
28 Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V. Recent laws are applicable to former ones unless they are opposed to them; and this may be established by many reasons.
29 Idem libro singulari ad legem Cinciam. Contra legem facit, qui id facit quod lex prohibet, in fraudem vero, qui salvis verbis legis sententiam eius circumvenit.
29 The Same, On the Lex Cincia. To do what the law prohibits violates the law, and anyone who evades the meaning of the law without disobeying its words, is guilty of fraud against it.
30 Ulpianus libro IIII ad edictum. Fraus enim legi fit, ubi quod fieri noluit, fieri autem non vetuit, id fit: et quod distat ῥητὸν ἀπὸ διανοίας, hoc distat fraus ab eo, quod contra legem fit.
30 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book IV. Fraud is committed against the law when something is done which the law did not wish to be done, but did not absolutely prohibit; and the difference between fraud against the law and violation of the same is that between speech and opinion.
31 Idem libro XIII ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. Princeps legibus solutus est: Augusta autem licet legibus soluta non est, principes tamen eadem illi privilegia tribuunt, quae ipsi habent.
31 The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia. The Emperor is free from the operation of the law, and though the Empress is undoubtedly subject to it, still, the Emperors generally confer upon her the same privileges which they themselves enjoy.
32 Iulianus libro LXXXIIII digestorum. De quibus causis scriptis legibus non utimur, id custodiri oportet, quod moribus et consuetudine inductum est: et si qua in re hoc deficeret, tunc quod proximum et consequens ei est: si nec id quidem appareat, tunc ius, quo urbs Roma utitur, servari oportet. 1Inveterata consuetudo pro lege non immerito custoditur, et hoc est ius quod dicitur moribus constitutum. nam cum ipsae leges nulla alia ex causa nos teneant, quam quod iudicio populi receptae sunt, merito et ea, quae sine ullo scripto populus probavit, tenebunt omnes: nam quid interest suffragio populus voluntatem suam declaret an rebus ipsis et factis? quare rectissime etiam illud receptum est, ut leges non solum suffragio legis latoris, sed etiam tacito consensu omnium per desuetudinem abrogentur.
32 Julianus, Digest, Book XCIV. In cases where there are no written laws, that should be observed which has been established by usage and custom, and if anything is lacking therein, then whatever is nearest to, and resulting from it should be observed; and if even this does not exist, then the law which is used by the City of Rome must be followed. 1An ancient custom is not improperly observed as a law (and this is what is called law established by usage). For as the laws themselves restrain us for no other reason than because they are accepted by the judgment of the people—for it is but proper that what the people have approved without being written should bind all persons—for what difference does it make whether the people have manifested their will by vote, or by acts and deeds? Wherefore the rule has also been most justly adopted that laws shall be abrogated not only by the vote of the legislator, but also through disuse by the silent consent of all.
33 Ulpianus libro primo de officio proconsulis. Diuturna consuetudo pro iure et lege in his quae non ex scripto descendunt observari solet.
33 Ulpianus, Concerning the Office of Proconsul, Book I. It is usual for long established custom to be observed as law in those matters which have not come down in writing.
34 Idem libro IIII de officio proconsulis. Cum de consuetudine civitatis vel provinciae confidere quis videtur, primum quidem illud explorandum arbitror, an etiam contradicto aliquando iudicio consuetudo firmata sit.
34 The Same, Book IV. When anyone seems to be confident concerning the custom of a city or province, I think it should first be determined whether that custom has been confirmed by a judicial decree after it had been disputed.
35 Hermogenianus libro I iuris epitomarum. Sed et ea, quae longa consuetudine comprobata sunt ac per annos plurimos observata, velut tacita civium conventio non minus quam ea quae scripta sunt iura servantur.
35 Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I. Those rules which have been approved by long established custom and have been observed for many years, by, as it were, a tacit agreement of citizens, are no less to be obeyed than laws which have been committed to writing.
36 Paulus libro VII ad Sabinum. Immo magnae auctoritatis hoc ius habetur, quod in tantum probatum est, ut non fuerit necesse scripto id comprehendere.
36 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VII. And indeed, a law of this kind has greater authority, for the reason that it has been approved to such an extent that it is not necessary to commit it to writing.
37 Idem libro I quaestionum. Si de interpretatione legis quaeratur, in primis inspiciendum est, quo iure civitas retro in eiusmodi casibus usa fuisset: optima enim est legum interpres consuetudo.
37 Callistratus, Questions, Book I. When inquiry is made as to the interpretation of a law, it must in the first place be ascertained what rule the State formerly made use of in cases of the same kind; for custom is the best interpreter of the laws.
38 Callistratus libro I quaestionum. Nam imperator noster Severus rescripsit in ambiguitatibus quae ex legibus proficiscuntur consuetudinem aut rerum perpetuo similiter iudicatarum auctoritatem vim legis optinere debere.
38 The Same, Questions, Book I. For our Emperor Severus stated in a Rescript that in questions of doubt arising from statutory enactments, custom, or the authority of decisions which have always been decided in the same manner, should obtain the force of law.
39 Celsus libro XXIII digestorum. Quod non ratione introductum, sed errore primum, deinde consuetudine optentum est, in aliis similibus non optinet.
39 Celsus, Digest, Book XXIII. That which has in the first place been introduced, not by any rule but through error, and has afterwards been confirmed by custom, shall not prevail in other similar cases.
40 Modestinus libro I regularum. Ergo omne ius aut consensus fecit aut necessitas constituit aut firmavit consuetudo.
40 Modestinus, Rules, Book I. Thus all law has been either made by consent, or established by necessity, or confirmed by custom.
41 Ulpianus libro II institutionum. Totum autem ius constitit aut in adquirendo aut in conservando aut in minuendo: aut enim hoc agitur, quemadmodum quid cuiusque fiat, aut quemadmodum quis rem vel ius suum conservet, aut quomodo alienet aut amittat.
41 Ulpianus, Institutes, Book II. Hence all law consists either in the acquisition, preservation, or diminution of right; for it has reference to the way in which anything becomes the property of a person, or how he can preserve it or his rights, or how he can alienate or lose them.