Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts
Dig. I21,
De officio eius, cui mandata est iurisdictio
Liber primus
XXI.

De officio eius, cui mandata est iurisdictio

(Concerning the Office of him to whom jurisdiction is delegated.)

1 Papinianus libro primo quaestionum. Quaecumque specialiter lege vel senatus consulto vel constitutione principum tribuuntur, mandata iurisdictione non transferuntur: quae vero iure magistratus competunt, mandari possunt. et ideo videntur errare magistratus, qui cum publici iudicii habeant exercitionem lege vel senatus consulto delegatam, veluti legis Iuliae de adulteriis et si quae sunt aliae similes, iurisdictionem suam mandant. huius rei fortissimum argumentum, quod lege Iulia de vi nominatim cavetur, ut is, cui optigerit exercitio, possit eam si proficiscatur mandare: non aliter itaque mandare poterit, quam si abesse coeperit, cum alias iurisdictio etiam a praesente mandetur. et si a familia dominus occisus esse dicetur, cognitionem praetor, quam ex senatus consulto habet, mandare non poterit. 1Qui mandatam iurisdictionem suscepit, proprium nihil habet, sed eius, qui mandavit, iurisdictione utitur. verius est enim more maiorum iurisdictionem quidem transferri, sed merum imperium quod lege datur non posse transire: quare nemo dicit animadversionem legatum proconsulis habere mandata iurisdictione. Paulus notat: et imperium, quod iurisdictioni cohaeret, mandata iurisdictione transire verius est.

1 Papinianus, Questions, Book I. Whatever authority is specially conferred either by a law, a decree of the Senate, or an Imperial Constitution, is not transferred when delegated, but any powers acquired by the right of magistracy can be delegated. Therefore, those magistrates are in error who, having authority conferred upon them by law or by a decree of the Senate, (such for instance as the Lex Julia de Adulteriis, and others of the same kind) to preside in a criminal trial, delegate their jurisdiction. A very strong argument in favor of this is, that in the Lex Julia de Vi it is expressly provided: “That he to whom the jurisdiction belongs can delegate it if he departs.” He can not delegate it unless he is absent, although any other jurisdiction can be delegated by one who is present. Where a master is said to have been killed by his slaves, the Prætor cannot delegate the right to try them, which was conferred upon him by a decree of the Senate. 1He to whom jurisdiction has been delegated possesses none peculiar to himself, but must only exercise that of the magistrate who conferred it upon him; for while it is true that by the custom of our ancestors jurisdiction can be transferred, the authority conferred by law cannot be transferred. For this reason no one says that the Deputy of a Proconsul has the right of imposing penalties when jurisdiction has been delegated to him. Paulus states that the authority attaching to jurisdiction is also delegated with it.

2 Ulpianus libro tertio de omnibus tribunalibus. Mandata iurisdictione a praeside consilium non potest exercere is, cui mandatur. 1Si tutores vel curatores velint praedia vendere, causa cognita id praetor vel praeses permittat: quod si mandaverit iurisdictionem, nequaquam poterit mandata iurisdictione eam quaestionem transferre.

2 Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book III. Where jurisdiction has been delegated by a Governor, he to whom it is delegated cannot assemble a Council. 1Where guardians or curators desire to sell land, the Prætor or Governor can permit this to be done after hearing the case; but if he delegates his jurisdiction he can, under no circumstances, transfer with it the right to conduct the inquiry instituted for this purpose.

3 Iulianus libro quinto digestorum. Et si praetor sit is, qui alienam iurisdictionem exsequitur, non tamen pro suo imperio agit, sed pro eo cuius mandatu ius dicit, quotiens partibus eius fungitur.

3 Julianus, Digest, Book V. He who exercises the jurisdiction of another, even if he is a Prætor, still does not do so by his own authority, but every time he acts he administers justice in the place of him by whom he was appointed.

4 Macer libro primo de officio praesidis. Cognitio de suspectis tutoribus mandari potest. immo etiam ex mandata generali iurisdictione propter utilitatem pupillorum eam contingere constitutum est in haec verba: ‘Imperatores Severus et Antoninus Braduae proconsuli Africae. cum propriam iurisdictionem legatis tuis dederis, consequens est, ut etiam de suspectis tutoribus possint cognoscere.’ 1Ut possessio bonorum detur, vel si cui damni infecti non caveatur ut is possidere iubeatur, aut ventris nomine in possessionem mulier, vel is cui legatum est legatorum servandorum causa in possessionem mittatur, mandari potest.

4 Macer, On the Office of Governor, Book I. Cognizance of the acts of suspected guardians can be delegated, and it is settled that this may occur in the general delegation of jurisdiction, on account of the interest of wards, as follows: “The Emperors Severus and Antoninus to Braduas, Proconsul of Africa. Since you have delegated your jurisdiction to your Deputies, it follows that they can take cognizance of the acts of suspected guardians.” 1Thus power can be delegated to give possession of property, as for instance, when an order is issued to take possession where a bond is not furnished to provide against threatened injury; or for possession in the case of a woman in behalf of her unborn child; or to grant possession to a legatee for the preservation of his legacy.

5 Paulus libro octavo decimo ad Plautium. Mandatam sibi iurisdictionem mandare alteri non posse manifestum est. 1Mandata iurisdictione privato etiam imperium quod non est merum videtur mandari, quia iurisdictio sine modica coercitione nulla est.

5 Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVIII. It is evident that anyone to whom jurisdiction has been delegated cannot delegate the same to another. 1When jurisdiction is delegated to a private individual, it is held that all magisterial power except that of condemning to death is delegated with it; because there is no jurisdiction which does not include the right to inflict moderate punishment.